He was cleared to commence line training, which began on 26 April 2007.
During the first 38 sectors of line training, he flew with eight different training captains and their reports generally reflected good preparation, good performance and a keen, willing, attitude. However, his landing technique was a recurring theme of concern and relevant notes were made a number of times in his reports. Some of these indicated that a satisfactory landing had been performed, others identified unsatisfactory performance, with many of the comments generated during his earlier training being repeated. On several occasions, the aircraft commander either intervened or took over control. However, towards the end of this period of line training, there were favourable reports of his landings.
In late May 2007, the operator’s FDM scheme indicated that one co-pilot had been involved in three double sidestick events9 during the landing phase of flight, on 7, 12 and 27 May. The analysts operating this system did not identify any particular individual involved or whether the flights were training flights. On 5 June 2007, a ‘firm’ landing incident led to an alert from the FDM system which identified that the same individual was involved. In accordance with the operator’s agreement with the relevant pilot’s trade union, the incident pilot was identified, and found to be the co-pilot involved in the landing at Kos.
On 11 June 2007, the company flight safety officer wrote to the training manager detailing these double sidestick events. The co-pilot was removed from flying duties and interviewed by the training manager. He also discussed the landing events with a member of the safety department. The co-pilot then flew two line training sectors with the company’s chief Airbus training captain and performed to a satisfactory standard, although the report on these flights contained the comment ‘note about aiming short’. The co-pilot was returned to line training. At a meeting of training captains on 27 June, the co-pilot’s landings were discussed. It was felt that his landings had improved and that he was performing to a satisfactory standard.
Analysis by the company’s flight safety department, after the accident at Kos, showed that during line training the co-pilot had carried out 28 landings and, on nine occasions, the commander had intervened.
‘TRAINING DEFICIENCIES
All cases where the pilot under instruction or undergoing a recurrent programme or check experiences difficulties that are likely to lead to more serious consequences, such as withdrawal from training, are to be brought to the attention of the Head of Training as soon as possible. Training failures especially in the later stages are very costly and wasteful of our resources.’
‘Another issue raised was the training of low hours cadets. Whilst the trainers are not objecting, it was felt that this training does expose the company to an increased risk. Cadet training had already been discussed at the top ten safety issues meetings, but the company felt the risk was mitigated by the training syllabus.’
‘There was also evidence that the Second Officer had difficulty in judging the amount of flare required to achieve acceptable landings in different circumstances. Predominantly this manifested itself as “firm” landings, although he also “over flared” on occasion. Whilst most trainers who witnessed this believed that he was flaring late, flight data suggested he may in fact have had a tendency to an early but weak flare. In the absence of sidestick feedback, from the Training Captain’s perspective, an early weak flare and late flare were likely to have the same effect, a firm landing.’
Co-pilot’s training
The co-pilot’s training record to PPL issue was not available. The fact that he achieved licence issue in 45 hours of flying could be taken as a sign that he did not experience significant problems at that stage. However, it took him two attempts to pass the CPL skills test, and three to pass the IR test. From 2003 until he began the cadetship programme, he flew fewer than ten hours each year and not being particularly current, possibly, did not enable him to progress as straightforwardly as others through the conversion course onto the Airbus. Having failed to achieve the required standard at the simulator stage of the selection process, his second attempt was assessed not by an employee of the operator, but by an employee of the flying training organisation. The purpose of the ‘jet bridge’ course is to provide pilots whose only experience is of piston-engine powered aircraft, with a general awareness of the operation of the more complex jet powered airliner and, as such, is a valuable way of beginning their conversion to such aircraft.
In the case of the co-pilot on G-DHJZ, the course provided him with the opportunity to carry out a number of landings in the A320 simulator, but without any type specific formal training to do so. It is possible that this, at least, led to his rehearsing actions of his own choosing in circumstances where formal learning of the correct technique was desirable.
Once the formal simulator training towards the issue of the Airbus type rating began, his difficulties in landing were soon identified. By the fourth training detail, the instructor commented that:
‘there is a need to greatly improve the landing technique which is still almost out of control.’
However, it was not until the tenth simulator detail that an instructor wrote any detailed analysis of the co‑pilot’s landing technique. Constraints of time meant that early action to concentrate upon correcting his landing technique was not taken and it is surprising that such a comment made at this stage of his training, did not result in an immediate attempt to remedy his difficulties.
His training report noted that he was a keen and well-prepared trainee and that he was a very pleasant individual. Instructors knew that he had invested considerable time and money into his chosen career and that the operator’s training manual mentioned ‘Training failures especially in the later stages are very costly and wasteful of our resources’.
The operator has subsequently stated that this comment in the manual is not guidance for instructors to just focus on cost control. They also point out that, on a number of occasions, decisions to terminate training have been taken in a robust manner.
Instructor intervention
The circumstances of the landing at Kos showed that it was not a stabilized approach; by 160 ft aal (11 seconds before touchdown), the aircraft was still above the glidepath as defined by the PAPIs and descending at around 1,000 ft/min. The instructor did not intervene until the co-pilot retarded the thrust levers and initiated the flare at about 35 ft aal, progressively moving the sidestick aft about two thirds of its travel.
Once the aircraft reaches flare height, if the trainee does not flare effectively, the aircraft may touch down more firmly than intended, with the possibility that such touchdowns could be heavy. By the time the commander realised that the aircraft was not going to land ‘normally’, it was too late to recover the situation.
Therefore, the aircraft demands a relatively high level of ‘assured’ skill from the trainee; their ability to land the aircraft correctly, consistently, should not be in doubt before base training commences, and certainly not in doubt during line training where passengers are carried.
The commander, on this occasion, was not able to prevent the heavy landing, despite his application of nearly full aft sidestick. The aircraft touched down heavily, with a recorded normal acceleration of 3.15g, before bouncing and touching down again at 2.75g, during which period a tailstrike was narrowly avoided. His decision to implement the company’s TOGA 10 recovery manoeuvre after the first touchdown was reversed when the takeoff configuration warning sounded and the engines appeared to be slow to spool-up. Given the relative difficulty in which the training captain finds himself when mentoring trainees whose landings may not be of a consistently high standard, it seems logical that any landing recovery manoeuvre should be flown with some expertise, and certainly without further hazarding the aircraft.
