Why the H is ALPA Advocating MPL Licensing?!

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Rez,
Arguing with you is like masturbating with a cheese grater. While it may be mildly amusing, it is mostly painful.

I am not remotely familiar with that kind of behavior.... what is the heal time? Also, is that a pre existing condition for medical claims?

I could talk till I'm blue in the face but you will keep marching in your own direction. That is fine. I don't think you are getting my point: I don't buy the argument from the world's largest professional pilot union that we are powerless to stop legislation that negatively impacts our careers and safety.

And yet what is reality and what you can't comprehend are two different concepts. So where is the disconnect? Reality or your ability to understand it?

The issue here is MPL not age 65.

I never brought up 65. Either you or another did.... we can talk about whatever you want....

I gave you examples of what could have been done with age 65 if we had effective leadership that rallied the troops.

That is fine. I agree the leadership needs to rally the troops. But for some reason as a mature professional adult you refuse to act until the leadership rallies you? Why?

Who are the leaders? They are any guy like you or I that decided not to be you or I and decided to be a leader.

You could be that guy. Why not? Why can't you be a leader? In any capacity?

It was just an example to show that we don't have to roll over like beaten dogs every time. If Prater comes out again saying "Well, there is nothing we can do about MPL so let's just roll with it" I think I will puke.

You simply do not get politics. If there are more organizations and money that want MPL it will happen. Don't think for a minute that it won't. Case in point Age 65. In addition, don't you assume to blame a union for not stopping a market force. CEO's can't do it and neither can unions. You can't stop consumer demand. You blaming ALPA for not doing what you think ALPA should do, not because they should or won't but because you do not understand, it a major reason why we a pilots are not as effective.

You'd rather get on this board and flaunt your misunderstandings that seek to understand and move this profession forward. You and those with similar attitudes have not shown that membership apathy has proven effective.

Last, get off your high horse and quit being such an ALPA snob. You have no idea what I did or did not do so leave your apathy and indifference remarks at the door. Thanks.

It is your career. You can be pissed at ALPA all day and night, but in the end it is your career......

 

[Mamma]

I am not remotely familiar with that kind of behavior.... what is the heal time? Also, is that a pre existing condition for medical claims?

As usual, you missed the point, however crude it was.

And yet what is reality and what you can't comprehend are two different concepts. So where is the disconnect? Reality or your ability to understand it?
Where did you pick up I could not comprehend a concept? I fully understand the concepts and I also see your ignorance on effective leadership. I see exactly what you are saying also and actually agree with you on much of it. It seems you cannot seem to grasp what I am saying and keep spinning it to mean I am apathetic. Go ahead and label/call names whatever, my point still stands.

I never brought up 65. Either you or another did.... we can talk about whatever you want....

No, you just failed to grasp the point on leadership and using the tools we have to effect change. Age 65 was used to make a point.

That is fine. I agree the leadership needs to rally the troops. But for some reason as a mature professional adult you refuse to act until the leadership rallies you? Why?

OK. Why don't we get rid of CEOs, generals and just about any boss in the professional marketplace? Professional people do not need leaders as you say. You advocate unionism but from what you are saying, you want various splinter groups going in different directions. ALPA National should set the agenda and rally the members around them. How difficult is that for you to grasp? You just don't get it.

Who are the leaders? They are any guy like you or I that decided not to be you or I and decided to be a leader.

Come on now. You are reaching now. My stance is these guys stepped up to do a job and many are getting paid very well to do so. Nobody put a gun to their head. They now have a responsibility to educate and motivate the membership. From what I see, the membership does not seem to motivated. Maybe this apathy or lack of motivation spawns from so many past failings or failures to explain what happened to the membership. Just take a look at the downward spiral of this career field.

You could be that guy. Why not? Why can't you be a leader? In any capacity?

What guy would this be? I am not at a place in my life to be that guy right now. Sure I could step up and volunteer for a job but it would be impossible for me to give it the attention it deserves. That is what a leader does....follows when the time calls for it. A few more years when the kids are a little older and I am out of the Reserves I will take more on and step into a leadership role. Until then, I will serve on my union committee, go to my union meetings, vote, consult with leadership, write my congressmen and senators and do what I have to do. What are you doing? Should all members be upper leadership in ALPA to do their part? Is that what you are saying?


You simply do not get politics. That is just plain stupid to say. If there are more organizations and money that want MPL it will happen. Don't think for a minute that it won't. I'll think for a lot of minutes that it won't if the proper front is put up. Case in point Age 65. ALPA HELPED WRITE THAT LAW!!!! Prater endorsed it 100% What are you talking about!?!! In addition, don't you assume to blame a union for not stopping a market force. CEO's can't do it and neither can unions. Not always, but sometimes. I told you how you could do this in earlier posts. We have a lot more power with the flying public than you seem to grasp. You can't stop consumer demand. Never tried to do it. You blaming ALPA for not doing what you think ALPA should do, not because they should or won't but because you do not understand, it a major reason why we a pilots are not as effective. Thank you. Aside of you thinking I don't get it, you just made my point. ALPA leadership has failed to educate and motivate the ranks. This is a union and you need strong leadership with a clear direction. I don't see that happening. You can disagree with me all you want, think I am ignorant and put me down to make your point. Go ahead, but take a look around at your fellow ALPA pilots and see the attitude and the lack of direction and you will see how right I am. If you understood leadership or had much experience with it, you would see we have a fundamental leadership problem in ALPA. You make excuses for it but take a look around and see where we are. Oh, it is all our fault. I forgot.


You'd rather get on this board and flaunt your misunderstandings that seek to understand and move this profession forward. You and those with similar attitudes have not shown that membership apathy has proven effective.

What have you done lately except come on an anonymous message board and berate your fellow pilots, the military and conservatives? As far as your perceptions of my misunderstandings, all I did was give examples on how to fight a war instead of rolling over like you would do.







It is your career. You can be pissed at ALPA all day and night, but in the end it is your career......

I am not pissed at ALPA. I just made the point that the argument "it's going to happen anyway so we just have to roll with it" is a bunch of baloney. It's my career and there happens to be tens of thousands of professionals out there who also have a career doing this. The public will listen to what we have to say if it involves their safety. That is a huge amount of leverage to steer events in your direction. Ask yourself this....do politicians ask AARP or the Jewish Lobby before they act or do they try to ram things down their throats?

 

[Sedona16]

MPL/Ab Initio Nonsense vs Flight Time/Experience. Even after conclusive real world examples that these rush through programs dont work (something ALPA should be citing) it appears ALPA is onboard because as they say "its going to happen anyway". What a defeatest and worthless attitude for a Pilots Union!

http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/Airbus A320, G-DHJZ 12-08.pdf

The aircraft landed heavily on Runway 32 at Kos Airport, causing substantial damage to the aircraft’s main landing gear. It touched down with a high rate of descent, following a late initiation of the flare by the co‑pilot, who was undergoing line training. Three safety recommendations are made.

It was apparent that the commander was ‘coaching’ the co-pilot somewhat during the final approach but he stopped mid-sentence at the automatic FIFTY callout from the RA. The subsequent FORTY, THIRTY and TWENTY callouts came in very rapid succession, with the touchdown occurring almost immediately after the TWENTY callout. At about 35 ft aal, approximately three seconds before main gear touchdown, the co‑pilot retarded the thrust levers and started the flare, progressively moving the sidestick aft about two thirds of full travel; the airspeed was 133 kt. Almost co-incidentally, the commander applied nearly full aft sidestick, (A) Figure 1. The aircraft’s pitch attitude increased to about 6° before touching down with a descent rate of 900 ft/min.

as the aircraft touched down almost simultaneously on both main landing gears, following which it bounced. The commander took control of the aircraft and decided to carry out a TOGA 10 manoeuvre4 and placed his hand on the thrust levers. He did not state that he was taking control, but the co-pilot later said that he had been in no doubt that the commander was taking over at that instant. The commander advanced the thrust levers to the TOGA position, (C) Figure 1, and attempted to stabilise the pitch attitude at 10° nose up. The co‑pilot’s sidestick returned to the neutral position. The takeoff configuration warning then sounded, and the commander retarded the thrust levers, (D) Figure 1. The aircraft momentarily became airborne before touching down a second time with a normal acceleration value of 2.75g being recorded (E) Figure 1. During the bounce, the aircraft’s pitch attitude reached 11.6º. (The pitch attitude at which a tail strike occurs, with the main gear compressed, is 11.7º.)

The aircraft bounced twice more before settling on the runway, following which heavy braking was applied. The spoilers had deployed automatically, the thrust reversers unlocked at 70 kt but no reverse thrust was selected. No standard callouts were made by the crew during the landing roll. The aircraft gross weight at touchdown was 63,900 kg.

The initial touchdown was approximately 225 m beyond the runway threshold and, by the time the wheel brakes were applied, the aircraft was 1,400 m from the end of the runway. Its groundspeed had reduced to 40 kt by the time 850m of runway remained.



The co-pilot

The co-pilot began his flying training in late October 2005, on an intensive course with a flying school in Florida, USA, for a UK JAA PPL on single engine piston (SEP) powered aircraft. He passed the skills test for licence issue approximately one month later, after 45 hours of flying. He then gained hours, flying privately, with the aim of obtaining a Commercial Pilot’s Licence (CPL). In 2002, he passed the CPL skills test at the second attempt and the Instrument Rating (IR) skills test at the third attempt.

He flew privately for nine hours in 2003, and eight hours in 2004. In 2005, he flew a further eight hours and trained for a Multi-crew Co-operation Certificate (MCC), for which he undertook 20 hours of simulator training. In 2006, he flew for five hours. All his flying between 2003 and 2006 was in SEP aircraft types.

Late in 2006, he attended selection tests for a ‘Cadetship’ programme offered by a commercial flying training organisation (FTO), in conjunction with the operator (of G-DHJZ)6; the tests were run by the training organisation. Under the scheme, a cadet would pay for a ‘Jet Bridge’7 course, type rating and 150 hours of line flying with the airline. Thereafter, there would be a possibility of employment should the airline concerned have any vacancies. The commercial training organisation paid the airline for its involvement in the training, enabling the airline to generate revenue through their training department, and to have a ‘pool’ of trained pilots available to meet seasonal operational needs.

For consideration for the cadetship programme, the co‑pilot underwent psychometric, literacy and numeracy tests, and an interview, before his flying skills were assessed in a Boeing 737 simulator. Although he performed well in the non-flying aspects of the assessment, "]his performance in the simulator did not meet the required standard. However, he was offered a further assessment in an A320 simulator with a senior training captain employed by the training organisation. He passed this second assessment and was offered a place on the scheme.

"]In January 2007, having by then logged 180 hours SEP and 60 hours Multi-Piston Engine (MEP) flying, the co-pilot began the ‘Jet Bridge’ course. This included a number of training details, including landings in an A320 simulator but this did not cover the specific landing technique relevant to the A320 type.8 The course consisted of 14 hours in an A320 fixed base training device, and 16 hours in an A320 full flight simulator. After this course, he undertook simulator training towards the grant of an A320 type rating, which consisted of a further 28 hours in a fixed base device and 50 hours in a full flight simulator.

His first training detail in the full flight simulator was on 10 March 2007 and, during this part of his training, "]he was taught by six different instructors. During this period his landing technique was a recurring theme of concern and relevant notes were made a number of times in his reports.

Although instructors identified that more time needed to be spent training the co-pilot to land, this time was not found, and the training was repeatedly deferred. Moreover, it was not until the tenth detail that specific comment was made as to the cause of the co-pilot’s inconsistency, with the instructor noting that the co-pilot appeared to be following the flight director commands below 200 ft.


The co-pilot’s ninth training detail was scheduled as the Licence Skills Test (LST) for issue of the A320/321 type rating, but the co-pilot did not perform satisfactorily. The report stated that one landing was:
‘firm - little or no flare’
and, in detailing the examiner’s three main areas of concern, stated:
‘landings are still an area of concern with very late flare leading to very firm touchdown.’

A further note stated:
‘following discussion with the chief pilot it has been decided that [the co-pilot’s] next sim will concentrate on further training to include single engine handling and landings. It has also been decided that a full LST shall be completed after this [next] training detail. Note - no items have been recorded as tested so far on Form SRG/1158.’

]however, these were: ‘not always consistent’ and the copilot still had a: ‘tendency to flare late sometimes.’
The report noted that he was asked to: ‘remember to look outside in the last stages of the landing.’

‘initial landing OK but [the co-pilot]could not subsequently stabilise the aircraft on approach after going visual…..below 200 feet he allowed the nose to rise leading to a steep descent just prior to a hard landing. Three attempts with no improvement.’ The instructor recommended further simulator training to improve the co-pilot’s final approach technique.

An additional simulator training detail was carried out on 17 April 2007. It was noted in the first half of the detail that:

the variable flare and landing was cause for concern’ and that ‘the second detail initially did not see much improvement but then something clicked and the final 5 approaches and landings were to a [satisfactory] standard. On that basis [the co-pilot] is cleared to re-attempt base training but he must be under no illusion that he needs to reproduce the standard of the final 5 approaches consistently to pass.

 

[Sedona16]

He was cleared to commence line training, which began on 26 April 2007.
During the first 38 sectors of line training, he flew with eight different training captains and their reports generally reflected good preparation, good performance and a keen, willing, attitude. However, his landing technique was a recurring theme of concern and relevant notes were made a number of times in his reports. Some of these indicated that a satisfactory landing had been performed, others identified unsatisfactory performance, with many of the comments generated during his earlier training being repeated. On several occasions, the aircraft commander either intervened or took over control. However, towards the end of this period of line training, there were favourable reports of his landings.

In late May 2007, the operator’s FDM scheme indicated that one co-pilot had been involved in three double sidestick events9 during the landing phase of flight, on 7, 12 and 27 May. The analysts operating this system did not identify any particular individual involved or whether the flights were training flights. On 5 June 2007, a ‘firm’ landing incident led to an alert from the FDM system which identified that the same individual was involved. In accordance with the operator’s agreement with the relevant pilot’s trade union, the incident pilot was identified, and found to be the co-pilot involved in the landing at Kos.

On 11 June 2007, the company flight safety officer wrote to the training manager detailing these double sidestick events. The co-pilot was removed from flying duties and interviewed by the training manager. He also discussed the landing events with a member of the safety department. The co-pilot then flew two line training sectors with the company’s chief Airbus training captain and performed to a satisfactory standard, although the report on these flights contained the comment ‘note about aiming short’. The co-pilot was returned to line training. At a meeting of training captains on 27 June, the co-pilot’s landings were discussed. It was felt that his landings had improved and that he was performing to a satisfactory standard.

Analysis by the company’s flight safety department, after the accident at Kos, showed that during line training the co-pilot had carried out 28 landings and, on nine occasions, the commander had intervened.

‘TRAINING DEFICIENCIES
All cases where the pilot under instruction or undergoing a recurrent programme or check experiences difficulties that are likely to lead to more serious consequences, such as withdrawal from training, are to be brought to the attention of the Head of Training as soon as possible. Training failures especially in the later stages are very costly and wasteful of our resources.’

‘Another issue raised was the training of low hours cadets. Whilst the trainers are not objecting, it was felt that this training does expose the company to an increased risk. Cadet training had already been discussed at the top ten safety issues meetings, but the company felt the risk was mitigated by the training syllabus.’

‘There was also evidence that the Second Officer had difficulty in judging the amount of flare required to achieve acceptable landings in different circumstances. Predominantly this manifested itself as “firm” landings, although he also “over flared” on occasion. Whilst most trainers who witnessed this believed that he was flaring late, flight data suggested he may in fact have had a tendency to an early but weak flare. In the absence of sidestick feedback, from the Training Captain’s perspective, an early weak flare and late flare were likely to have the same effect, a firm landing.’

Co-pilot’s training

The co-pilot’s training record to PPL issue was not available. The fact that he achieved licence issue in 45 hours of flying could be taken as a sign that he did not experience significant problems at that stage. However, it took him two attempts to pass the CPL skills test, and three to pass the IR test. From 2003 until he began the cadetship programme, he flew fewer than ten hours each year and not being particularly current, possibly, did not enable him to progress as straightforwardly as others through the conversion course onto the Airbus. Having failed to achieve the required standard at the simulator stage of the selection process, his second attempt was assessed not by an employee of the operator, but by an employee of the flying training organisation. The purpose of the ‘jet bridge’ course is to provide pilots whose only experience is of piston-engine powered aircraft, with a general awareness of the operation of the more complex jet powered airliner and, as such, is a valuable way of beginning their conversion to such aircraft.

In the case of the co-pilot on G-DHJZ, the course provided him with the opportunity to carry out a number of landings in the A320 simulator, but without any type specific formal training to do so. It is possible that this, at least, led to his rehearsing actions of his own choosing in circumstances where formal learning of the correct technique was desirable.

Once the formal simulator training towards the issue of the Airbus type rating began, his difficulties in landing were soon identified. By the fourth training detail, the instructor commented that:
‘there is a need to greatly improve the landing technique which is still almost out of control.’

However, it was not until the tenth simulator detail that an instructor wrote any detailed analysis of the co‑pilot’s landing technique. Constraints of time meant that early action to concentrate upon correcting his landing technique was not taken and it is surprising that such a comment made at this stage of his training, did not result in an immediate attempt to remedy his difficulties.
His training report noted that he was a keen and well-prepared trainee and that he was a very pleasant individual. Instructors knew that he had invested considerable time and money into his chosen career and that the operator’s training manual mentioned ‘Training failures especially in the later stages are very costly and wasteful of our resources’.

The operator has subsequently stated that this comment in the manual is not guidance for instructors to just focus on cost control. They also point out that, on a number of occasions, decisions to terminate training have been taken in a robust manner.
Instructor intervention

The circumstances of the landing at Kos showed that it was not a stabilized approach; by 160 ft aal (11 seconds before touchdown), the aircraft was still above the glidepath as defined by the PAPIs and descending at around 1,000 ft/min. The instructor did not intervene until the co-pilot retarded the thrust levers and initiated the flare at about 35 ft aal, progressively moving the sidestick aft about two thirds of its travel.

Once the aircraft reaches flare height, if the trainee does not flare effectively, the aircraft may touch down more firmly than intended, with the possibility that such touchdowns could be heavy. By the time the commander realised that the aircraft was not going to land ‘normally’, it was too late to recover the situation.

Therefore, the aircraft demands a relatively high level of ‘assured’ skill from the trainee; their ability to land the aircraft correctly, consistently, should not be in doubt before base training commences, and certainly not in doubt during line training where passengers are carried.

The commander, on this occasion, was not able to prevent the heavy landing, despite his application of nearly full aft sidestick. The aircraft touched down heavily, with a recorded normal acceleration of 3.15g, before bouncing and touching down again at 2.75g, during which period a tailstrike was narrowly avoided. His decision to implement the company’s TOGA 10 recovery manoeuvre after the first touchdown was reversed when the takeoff configuration warning sounded and the engines appeared to be slow to spool-up. Given the relative difficulty in which the training captain finds himself when mentoring trainees whose landings may not be of a consistently high standard, it seems logical that any landing recovery manoeuvre should be flown with some expertise, and certainly without further hazarding the aircraft.

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

As usual, you missed the point, however crude it was.

I think you missed that I got it.

And yet what is reality and what you can't comprehend are two different concepts. So where is the disconnect? Reality or your ability to understand it?

Where did you pick up I could not comprehend a concept? I fully understand the concepts and I also see your ignorance on effective leadership. I see exactly what you are saying also and actually agree with you on much of it. It seems you cannot seem to grasp what I am saying and keep spinning it to mean I am apathetic. Go ahead and label/call names whatever, my point still stands.

All right... perhaps we are actually agreeing. I do think I understand your position and disagree with it in part... So for the sake of clarity... what is your position?

I never brought up 65. Either you or another did.... we can talk about whatever you want....

No, you just failed to grasp the point on leadership and using the tools we have to effect change. Age 65 was used to make a point.

A majority of the membership failed to participate in the survey. What is the leadership to do... go door to door and make pilots take the survey? It seems it wasn't that important... why then did they not participate. This is what you need to reconcile... Leadership/followership is a mutual dynamic. You cannot place the onus of effectiveness soley on the leadership. Especially when the followership are educated professionals.

That is fine. I agree the leadership needs to rally the troops. But for some reason as a mature professional adult you refuse to act until the leadership rallies you? Why?

OK. Why don't we get rid of CEOs, generals and just about any boss in the professional marketplace? Professional people do not need leaders as you say. You advocate unionism but from what you are saying, you want various splinter groups going in different directions. ALPA National should set the agenda and rally the members around them. How difficult is that for you to grasp? You just don't get it.

First off, grassroots movements are far more powerful than than union leader led agendas.

Explain why professionals need not be leaders?

The point is.. professionals are not say E1, E2 or E3s in the MIL. Professional pilots are already leaders in the cockpit. They should be able anticipate the needs of union leaders and operate in concert.

Who are the leaders? They are any guy like you or I that decided not to be you or I and decided to be a leader.

Come on now. You are reaching now. My stance is these guys stepped up to do a job and many are getting paid very well to do so. Nobody put a gun to their head. They now have a responsibility to educate and motivate the membership. From what I see, the membership does not seem to motivated. Maybe this apathy or lack of motivation spawns from so many past failings or failures to explain what happened to the membership. Just take a look at the downward spiral of this career field.

You are missing a huge point. The fact is.. they volunteered to be a leader in unions. They had no obligation. If they had no obligation suddenly you place (all of) the responsbility on them... who can at anytime... simply quit and resolve themselves of the responsbility.

And they are not paid that well.... they get what they get at thier airlines plus expenses. and those expenses are taxed on thier AGI.

You could be that guy. Why not? Why can't you be a leader? In any capacity?

What guy would this be? I am not at a place in my life to be that guy right now. Sure I could step up and volunteer for a job but it would be impossible for me to give it the attention it deserves. That is what a leader does....follows when the time calls for it.

Then do not expect anyone else. IF you won't do it, do not expect anyone else to step forward. Maybe the guy that is a union leader is a worse place than you in his life... but someone had to do it... so he is doing a crappy job because he is in a bad place in his life and can't volunteer as well as he should..but he feels compelled to help out.... but here you are chiding him...

A few more years when the kids are a little older and I am out of the Reserves I will take more on and step into a leadership role. Until then, I will serve on my union committee, go to my union meetings, vote, consult with leadership, write my congressmen and senators and do what I have to do. What are you doing? Should all members be upper leadership in ALPA to do their part? Is that what you are saying?

Sounds like we are in more agreement than not... it just seems to me that you lack an understanding and hold your union officers to something that isn't realistic...

You simply do not get politics. That is just plain stupid to say. If there are more organizations and money that want MPL it will happen. Don't think for a minute that it won't. I'll think for a lot of minutes that it won't if the proper front is put up.

Describe the proper front....

Case in point Age 65. ALPA HELPED WRITE THAT LAW!!!! Prater endorsed it 100% What are you talking about!?!!

Exactly... wold you rather ALPA not help write the law? Would you rather management and industry write it with no input?

In addition, don't you assume to blame a union for not stopping a market force. CEO's can't do it and neither can unions. Not always, but sometimes. I told you how you could do this in earlier posts. We have a lot more power with the flying public than you seem to grasp.

I disagree. Talk to your Communications guy including at Herndon... PR campaigns have low ROI.

You can't stop consumer demand. Never tried to do it.

No, that is what you are advocating by thinking ALPA can stop MPL.

You blaming ALPA for not doing what you think ALPA should do, not because they should or won't but because you do not understand, it a major reason why we a pilots are not as effective. Thank you. Aside of you thinking I don't get it, you just made my point. ALPA leadership has failed to educate and motivate the ranks. This is a union and you need strong leadership with a clear direction. I don't see that happening.

Do you know the politics to the last national officer election? What the UAL guys did?

I agree ALPA needs to motivate and educate the ranks. Why not do something?

You can disagree with me all you want, think I am ignorant and put me down to make your point. Go ahead, but take a look around at your fellow ALPA pilots and see the attitude and the lack of direction and you will see how right I am. If you understood leadership or had much experience with it, you would see we have a fundamental leadership problem in ALPA. You make excuses for it but take a look around and see where we are. Oh, it is all our fault. I forgot.

So what do you do? If the leadership isn't satisfactory... what does the membership who votes in the LEC guys who votes in the MEC and EC guys.. what do you do? Indifference?

Look... this is time consuming stuff. Democracy is not easy....

What have you done lately except come on an anonymous message board and berate your fellow pilots, the military and conservatives? As far as your perceptions of my misunderstandings, all I did was give examples on how to fight a war instead of rolling over like you would do.

Again... what do you do?

You've stated education and motivation are ALPA failures. Do you wait? For what?

I've asked... if the leaders aren't leading... what do you do. I am sorry but inaction is not acceptable. Yet so many pilots choose this path.

It is your career. You can be pissed at ALPA all day and night, but in the end it is your career......


I am not pissed at ALPA. I just made the point that the argument "it's going to happen anyway so we just have to roll with it" is a bunch of baloney. It's my career and there happens to be tens of thousands of professionals out there who also have a career doing this. The public will listen to what we have to say if it involves their safety. That is a huge amount of leverage to steer events in your direction. Ask yourself this....do politicians ask AARP or the Jewish Lobby before they act or do they try to ram things down their throats?

Ok... so the public will listen to us if it involves thier safety.....

So you want ALPA to be a public safety advocate....

What I am getting at... is you also want better economic conditions for us professionals. (so do I). But public safety and better pilot economics can be two vastly different concepts to management and industry groups....

How do you craft a message and ALPA action that gets us both?