For those interested in how an ALPA/ALPA merger works and how you can't trust the MEC you have.
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=2nd&navby=case&no=977666
From the above case law:
While in reorganization, Pan Am continued to search for potential buyers of its remaining assets. In early July 1991, the MEC informed Pan Am pilots that Delta Airlines ("Delta") had agreed to buy Pan Am's North Atlantic routes and "shuttle" operation. Under the proposed Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA"), Pan Am would sell its entire fleet of Airbus 310 ("A-310") aircraft and up to 19 of its Boeing 727 ("B-727") aircraft to Delta. In return, Delta would sponsor and fund Pan Am's reorganization as a going airline, purchase a 45% equity stake in Pan Am, and establish a marketing alliance with Pan Am.
DAL created this bogus equity stake a methold of not having to take all of the enmployees. Fully aware that Pan Am had no chance. Where where they planning on flying all of those 747's with No Pacific or European routes?
Pan Am also agreed to supply Delta with nearly 800 pilots who were "current and qualified" on those two planes. A "current and qualified" pilot is one who is trained to fly a particular airplane and has made three takeoffs and landings on that plane within the last ninety days. Delta needed approximately 494 qualified pilots for the A-310 aircraft and 280 for the B- 727. Since Pan Am did not have enough "current and qualified" pilots to satisfy Delta's needs, it needed to train some of its pilots for transfer to Delta. Pan Am and Delta agreed that the transfer of pilots and assets would occur no later than November 1, 1991.
On July 20, 1991, Pan Am's crew chief, Vito Cutrune, presented a proposal to Pan Am, Delta, and the MEC that would allow Pan Am to offer pilot training on a strict seniority basis. He concluded that Pan Am had enough money and flight simulator capacity to complete 120 "long course" training programs for the A-310 and 22 long course programs for the B-727. Long course programs were designed for pilots who had never before flown the A-310 or B-727. Accordingly, since every Pan Am pilot would be eligible for training
under Cutrune's proposal, the training would be offered on a strict seniority basis.
The long course training proposal was consistent with the seniority-based methodology by which most Pan Am pilot assignments were determined. The Pilot Working Agreement ("PWA"), the collective bargaining agreement between Pan Am and its pilots, provided that whenever Pan Am projected a major change or "shift" in its flight operations, it announced the change to the pilots and issued a "proffer."
See PWA §§ 3, 5. The new flight positions were posted in the proffer and pilots had an opportunity to "bid" for these positions. Pan Am then issued "awards" to the pilots, based on their seniority.
See id.
On July 24, 1991, as Pan Am and Delta were finalizing the APA,
Pan Am rejected the strict seniority plan. Pan Am explained that it could not accept the long course proposal because: (1) there was insufficient time to train the requisite number of pilots before Delta's deadline; and (2) even if the training could be accomplished in time, training by seniority would decimate the ranks of senior Pan Am captains needed to continue Pan Am's operations after the sale.
The MEC sought to accommodate Pan Am by presenting an alternate plan, entitled the "System Seniority Transfer Plan." Under this plan, pilots could gain eligibility for transfer by training after the November 1, 1991 deadline set by Pan Am and Delta. Upon completion of their training, these pilots would transfer to Delta, thereby bumping to the bottom of Delta's seniority list junior pilots who had transferred on November 1, 1991.
On July 31, 1991, Delta rejected the System Seniority Transfer Plan, explaining that training after November 1, 1991 conflicted with its plan for a "turn-key" operation and would result in too many senior pilots being hired, adversely affecting the normal Delta cross-section and profile of airmen.
On August 2, 1991, the MEC met to discuss how pilots would be trained for transfer to Delta. After debating various training and transfer plans, it presented a new plan calling for "short course" training on the A-310. Short course training is a refresher course for pilots who had once flown, but are no longer qualified to fly, a particular airplane. Under the short course plan, only pilots who had previously flown the A-310 were eligible for training. While few Pan Am pilots had experience flying the A-310, four members of the MEC had flown this plane.
The short course plan was supported by Cutrune, Pan Am's crew chief, who told Pan Am executives that his original training proposal, long course training, was simply not feasible. He said that under his "revised analysis," the necessary simulator time for long course training on the A-310 could not be arranged before the date of sale. Cutrune explained, however, that the short course plan could be accomplished. On August 8, 1991, Pan Am and Delta decided to adopt the short course plan for the A-310.
Rather than informing the pilots that a training plan had now been adopted, the MEC told the pilots that Delta was still open to alternative plans. They assured the pilots that Delta would listen to any plan designed to preserve the integrity of the seniority system. The MEC also told the pilots that, rather than deciding which of the competing plans it would endorse, ALPA and the MEC would let an arbitrator decide which plan best served the union's interests. However, since Pan Am and ALPA had agreed in principle on a plan governing retraining on the A-310, the only issue presented to the arbitrator was the B-727 training. The arbitrator recommended a training plan for the B- 727 based on strict seniority.
Following the arbitrator's decision, ALPA, Pan Am, and Delta entered into a formal agreement defining the training for Pan Am pilots. ALPA agreed that the short course training would be used for the A-310, but a strict seniority system would be used to select pilots for B-727 training. The Bankruptcy Court approved this agreement. When Pan Am sold the planes and routes in
November 1991, six of the seven MEC members were on the list of pilots to be transferred to Delta. Shortly thereafter, Pan Am went out of business.
30 in total requaled on the 727 in a short requal course that was not put out for bid and not accomplished in seniority order. The folks were refered to as the "Dirty Thirty" and wee taken by DAL as 727 pilots.
Accusing the MEC pilot members of feathering their own nests, two groups of pilots sued ALPA and the individual members of the MEC. The first group, the "Spellacy" pilots, commenced an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Dorsey,
J. ), alleging that ALPA and the MEC breached their duties of fair representation by adopting the short course training plan. The Spellacy pilots asserted that ALPA and the MEC violated their duties because: (1) the PWA required that training opportunities be awarded on a strict seniority basis and ALPA failed to protect the pilots' contractual rights; and (2) ALPA and the MEC advocated the short course plan so that they could secure pilot positions for themselves.
The second group, the "Duke" pilots, filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein,
J. ). These pilots each held a "proffer,"--
i.e. , an offer from Pan Am to be transferred to Delta. These proffers had been given before Pan Am realized that it lacked a sufficient number of qualified pilots to send to Delta. The Duke pilots alleged that ALPA should first have ensured that Pan Am honored the existing proffers before implementing a training program.
Needless to say what the DAL pilots did to the Pan Am pilts was MUCH worse then what the APA ever tried doing to the TWA pilots.
