To the Skywest Crew with "Severe Icing" in DEN today...

[Green]

Almost happened to these LAN Chile guys...

that's great that they blamed it on the russians....lol...course it couldn't have been our space junk!

 

[capt. megadeth]

A "hazard not controlled" sounds like an emergency - more than just a pirep. That's my point. Either you're in a tight spot or you're not. Don't cry wolf.

I'd rather cry wolf when it comes to ice than be dead.

 

[capt. megadeth]

I swear, this drives me nuts. You know, if a meteor hit an airplane, the NTSB would cite the crew for failure to see and avoid the meteor....

Oh, you know it.

 

[Kaman]

I have a pretty good amount of experience flying in ice over the Appalachians, and I have found that icing can be highly localized and can differ drastically in just a few miles or as little as a 1000' foot altitude change. The Appalachians are much smaller than the Rockies, and I can only imagine how ugly and rapid air mass modification takes place as a front or low moves across them. I think that this particular person that made the original post is not only being unfair to a fellow airline pilot, but also showing a lack of respect for the forces of nature that we literally "cheat" everytime we fly. The captain he is questioning made a judgement based on his experience, training and the conditions that he was presented with. I'd rather have someone err on the side of caution than try to be a cowboy shooting from the hip with an empty cap gun.

Regards,

ex-Navy Rotorhead

 

[~~~^~~~]

SKYWEST AIRLINES INC (D.B.A. Skywest Airlines)

The captain stated that almost immediately upon entering the top of the fog layer they received an ICE caution message. He stated they turned on the wing and engine inlet anti-ice, but the ice accumulation on the windshield wipers was rapid and ice was accumulating on the winglet. The captain stated the approach lights came into sight when they were just above minimums and that he had the runway in sight at approximately 140 feet above the ground. The first officer then disconnected the autopilot and the nose came up slightly. He stated he informed the first officer to keep the nose down and add thrust.

He stated the airspeed was just inside the "bottom of the bucket" and the trend vector was indicating a decrease in airspeed. The captain stated he "again said something about more thrust and keeping the nose down." He stated the airplane continued to move to the right of the centerline and he took control of the airplane. He stated the airplane responded "poorly" feeling "heavy and sluggish." The captain stated the airplane was close to the right side of the runway and he added thrust at which time the ailerons became more responsive. He stated the left wing dropped, scraping the runway, at about the same time the left main gear touched down. The captain stated the airplane bounced into the air then landed hard on the runway.

The first officer, who was flying the approach, had about 15 hours of total flight time in the CL-600. The captain, who was also a check airman, had a total of 1,196 hours of flight time in the CL-600. At the time of the accident the local weather was reported as being visibility 1/4 mile in freezing fog, vertical visibility 100 feet.

Inspection of the airport and airplane on the afternoon following the incident revealed ice was still visible on the antennas, windshield wipers, radome, winglets, and horizontal and vertical stabilizers. The main body of ice on these structures measured between one-half to five-eights of an inch thick and that the main body of ice plus the "ice spines" totaled three-quarters of an inch thick. A Kinematic parameter extraction showed loss of lift consistent with airframe icing but there was no early stall due to icing prior to touchdown and no indication that airframe icing had caused any loss of control. Marks on the ground and on the runway revealed the airplane initially touched down 1,976 feet from the approach end of the runway with the right main landing gear in the grass off the side of the runway. The left wing tip then left a 63-foot long scrape mark on the runway, which was followed about 1,100 feet later by another set of tire marks. Data from the flight data recorder showed the airplane rolled slightly to the left followed by a roll to the right when the autopilot was disengaged. It then showed the airplane touched down with a vertical acceleration of at least 1.8g's. The airplane then became airborne in a 16-degree left bank, with a 5-degree nose up pitch at which time the ground and flight spoilers deployed contributing to the firmness of the 3.25 g touchdown one second later.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
The copilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during the landing and the captain's delay in initiating remedial action. Factors contributing to the accident were the low ceiling and low visibility due to fog, and the aircraft's deviation from expected performance due to airframe icing.

Anyone heard of going missed? It is this procedure where you set go around thrust, ensure spoilers are in, set flaps 8 and climb like your life depended on it. It works real well if either pilot is close to the ground and has to exceed normal bank angles to get the landing gear over a paved surface.

This isn't an icing incident. This is an inexperience incident. There are many people who are now coming into this job who have never seen any ice, let alone severe icing and who really have no idea how to deal with it. First, an extra 5 or 10 knots (providing you are landing at a long runway) is a good idea. Hand flying the approach so you have a better feel for what the aircraft is doing is a good idea. Having the more experienced (on this case, less inexperienced pilot) fly an approach to minimums in icing conditions is a good idea. Considering another destination is also a good idea.

In almost 6,000 hours I've only seen icing on the severe side of moderate twice. Going slow always makes it worse, particularly in the RJ. My experience is that severe icing is hard to find in the real world and easy to get away from. Like thunderstorms, you learn to recognize the characteristics and take action to avoid the hazardous condition. Waiting 15 minutes can make all the difference.

Now days that longevity and experience are considered a bad thing at SkyWest (at least the ASA division of SkyWest) there are few who have seen any hazardous icing conditions and few Instructor Pilots who know enough about the stuff to teach their students how to deal with it. Only a few of the experienced IP's at my airline fully understand how important it is to stay on profile, most have never considered how ice is kept off the fan.

The sad fact is that airlines will continue hiring with 200 / 50 and upgrading IP's with only 1,000 hours in the aircraft, while trying to chase away the IP's with almost 20,000 hours total time & and a little uncommon sense. In my opinion this report really highlights the dangers of inexperienced crews out flying together.

In Comair 5191 the experienced guys get on the airplane focused on finding another job. In other incidents we read about inexperience like this nearly leading to a crash. Wouldn't it be nice if this was a profession where pilots flying airline passengers were paid reasonably and their experience appreciated by management?

I'm not criticizing these pilots, they apparently did not know any better. I am asking if this would have happened with a more experienced crew and I think we all know the answer.

 

[homerjdispatch]

So, someone is gonna bitch about SKYW calling Severe icing? So should they NOT call braking action NIL?
http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=94082&highlight=braking+action

 

[Rez O. Lewshun]

Fins-

You are talking about an entire mind set in this country. Treating Pilots like professionals instead of blue collar labor. A labor cost that needs to be controlled....

Where do we even begin?

There is no silver bullet or magical cure. However, there are many many pieces to puzzle....

I am in.....

 

[Leroy Smith]

The sad fact is that airlines will continue hiring with 200 / 50 and upgrading IP's with only 1,000 hours in the aircraft, while trying to chase away the IP's with almost 20,000 hours total time & and a little uncommon sense. In my opinion this report really highlights the dangers of inexperienced crews out flying together.

I was thinking the same thing, but maybe he had been a check airman on the E120 for a while and then transitioned over. I dont know. Without some kind of explaination, I find it rather troubling. I would be interested to know what kind of total time that guy had, or how long he had been with the company.

...at which time the ground and flight spoilers deployed contributing to the firmness of the 3.25 g touchdown one second later.

If an instantaneous 3.25g is "firm", I wonder how high the g meter has to go to get a "hard" landing?

 

[No.W.]

Hey fins, this guy was in my recurrent class last year(the captain, C.A.). He said when they "pulled" to flare, there was nothing there. Not an icing accident? There were plenty of indications that it was. The NTSB, I think, might have been influenced by the findings of the FAA inspector who had a personal vendetta against this guy. He has also been with the company for a long time...not flying the RJ...but a long time. You can't judge this thing based on what you read in an NTSB report. If you ever get a chance to hear the story from the horse's mouth...it makes a lot more sense.

 

[BoilerUP]

So, someone is gonna bitch about SKYW calling Severe icing? So should they NOT call braking action NIL?
http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=94082&highlight=braking+action

Agreed. I'd rather somebody "over-report" than "under-report". Yeah it might be a PITA but its much more conservative that way. Its our jobs to get our folks to their destination on schedule...but more important than that is delivering them to their destination safely, and I get paid by the minute to do that. My job, my ticket, and my life are worth far more than ensuring nonstop operations in less than ideal conditions.

IMO

 

[~~~^~~~]

Hey fins, this guy was in my recurrent class last year(the captain, C.A.). He said when they "pulled" to flare, there was nothing there. Not an icing accident? There were plenty of indications that it was. The NTSB, I think, might have been influenced by the findings of the FAA inspector who had a personal vendetta against this guy. He has also been with the company for a long time...not flying the RJ...but a long time. You can't judge this thing based on what you read in an NTSB report. If you ever get a chance to hear the story from the horse's mouth...it makes a lot more sense.

Very true, the safety folks get it wrong on plenty of occassions, but usually the NTSB is a reliable source and "not under the influence" particularly of the FAA who they internally kind of regard as hacks. But the other decisions on this flight (letting a 15 hour FO perform the approach with VV100, keeping it coupled up in ice, flying right at VREF with a decreasing trend vector, not going missed) seem to indicate inexperience. Maybe the Capt. missed his cup of coffee, who knows, but taken only on the information presented in the report it looks like NOOB flying.. and every airline has managers that fly, sort of, usually who hold IP credentials, reference the worst aviation disaster of all time - Tenerife.

Arguably there are no weather related accidents. The airplane got into the weather under the command of someone. Once the airplane is in adverse weather the crew should have the ability to get out, or adjust, so that the safety of the flight is not in question. If the airplane (particularly a jet with a little wing) starts to resemble a popcicle on the unheated portion of the side window, starts to grow cool ice formations on the wipers, or anything else really interesting on an approach to minimums I'm probably taking the airplane (depending on the demonstrated skill of my FO - some are better and more experienced than I am) and seriously fingering the TOGA's.

But I would always defer to the Captain and crew. They were there and of course know a lot more than I do about their flight. My point is only that this business is getting to the point where the blind are leading the blind. At my airline we need to be keeping the 20,000 hour IP's, not chasing them off because "OH MY gOD, they make as much as a Vice President of ground services!!!!"

 

[meatwallet]

Cardinal:

There is a well known and respected training CA at SKW who lost all control of a CRJ on an ILS in South Dakota due to severe airframe icing which occured with no warning...

The thing rolled off the LOC and dove for the dirt...the CA realizing he had almost no controll decided that it wouldn't hurt any more to hit the ground faster, so he fire-walled it. Fortunately he picked up enough airspeed at the last second to get some aerodynamic control and plant the thing on the runway. This guy basically KNEW he was dead and had to make the decision that more speed couldn't hurt and might help. How would you like to be in THAT situation?

Everybody at SKW knows this story, so they operate as though the monster in the closet is real, cuz we know it is...

Rickair, thank you for the enlightening comments.

As for the severe icing incident, I happened to be flying into DEN at the exact same time. Icing can be very localized, and I did not personally experience anything severe (nor have I ever in my career).

One's determinination of icing/turbulence etc is somewhat subjective. A UAL plane will report moderate turb what a GLA plane reports light (or doesn't report), but the UA CA also has flight attendants walking around and pax pissing in the lav.

In my opinion, though the SKW flight may have encountered some severe icing, the report was unnecessary and created excessive delays. No one cares about the cost of fuel here, but I do not enjoy holding and using up my extra fuel when I don't have to.

Tops were at 11 or 12000 msl, bases were at 2000 agl. Not a very dangerous situation IMO.

What is severe icing on a hot wing anyway (I only have flown with boots)? I would guess anything that adheres to it since the "anti-ice equipment cannot eliminate the icing risk."

 

[~~~^~~~]

Meatwallet - you are right. They define supercooled large water droplet icing and severe icing in the Flight Operations Manual. The description of ice adhering in areas not normally observed to collect ice is a good description (if you know how your airplane collects ice normally)

Generally, you will know severe icing when you are surprised by how quick the ice and the airplane's performance is degraded. The time to take action is sooner, rather than later. Usually the most moisture is near the top of the weather.

In ice, speed is your best friend. Most of the anti icing on any jet is the tremendous rise in Total Air Temperature as the airplane compresses the air around it. Fly an RJ on profile (or a little faster in ice) and ice is nearly never a problem. Let it get slow and you can ice up the fan, trash the aerodynamics of the aircraft and crash the thing. The only protection your fan (and most of your thrust) has is TAT rise. I have no idea what the temps are inside the cowling, but getting a 43C(+) degree TAT rise on the airframe is common. If you consider the spread from temperatures where it is too cold for ice to form (-40C) and the TAT (more than 40) rise you can see how simply going fast makes ice much less of a problem in a jet.

On approach the same is true. Keep the airplane clean an fast as long as is practical. If approach asks you to slow to final approach speed 30 miles from the airport query them about what other options might be available. Then accept the approach when you determine conditions, including traffic management, make it acceptable. Fly the profile, but don't slow early and you should not ever see the types of scenarios being discussed on this thread.

Controllers are usually very good about working with you if they understand what your needs are. In the ATR any mention of "ice" had controllers parting traffic like Moses did the Red Sea. However, in reality the ATR has one of the better de-icing systems around for a T-Prop.

 

[HelloNewman]

Fins-

You are talking about an entire mind set in this country. Treating Pilots like professionals instead of blue collar labor. A labor cost that needs to be controlled....

Where do we even begin?

There is no silver bullet or magical cure. However, there are many many pieces to puzzle....

I am in.....

We are not blue collar labor though, last time I checked our shirt collars are white. Pilots basically are management people. Both pilots are responsible for MANAGING the computer system in flight and just doing the take off and landing. The captain is the leader and is responsible for the entire crew. The captain is a management pilot big time. He has the finaly say/authority. I have no idea where this blue collar thing comes from. BTW if you really think about it we are salaried employees.

You see we get what is called a monthly guarantee. If we work over the guarantee then we get paid above our salary. All people on reserve, etc get paid a monthly guarantee. BTW at most airlines if you have your flights cancelled you usually get paid at least what your line award is, again a guaranteed salary. Trust me we want people to think we are professionals not blue collar schmoes. Discuss amongst yourselves, I simply do not buy the argument we are blue collar labor.

 

[rickair7777]

I swear, this drives me nuts. You know, if a meteor hit an airplane, the NTSB would cite the crew for failure to see and avoid the meteor....

Yes, I know the CA personally and he said that the NTSB report vastly understated the hazard to the aircraft and the control issues. Read the part where it talks about the airplane still being covered with ice when the NTSB arrived the NEXT day.