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Skywest in Aspen

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If anybody wants to make some extra $$$money$$$ on the side during the winter, then come join me. I got the luxury party busses, I just need some fearless bus drivers. I heard they(SkyWest) do a lot of bussing between KASE, KDEN and KGJT. We can make thousands.
 
I worked with the Captain of this ill-fated flight at a previous airline. He was a great guy, and great pilot. All it takes is one tiny slip-up in ASE. I say better to be in GJT than just short of ASE.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avjet_Aspen_Crash

Just for a little more reading, the following quote is from the approach controller that worked that flight into Aspen that night

Well - Basically I would have to say my version of the story is not the whole story - i.e., I was not privy to the entire investigation - therefore the facts that I only know are what I saw and what I read about or discussed with the NTSB. - If anyone has heard the tapes of the incident - they will notice - I'm not joking- that I used perfect phraseology on the entire tape - I swear that I remember as I was sitting down to take over the position that I said to myself "Ok lets try to be real professional on this session and use perfect phraseology" - This made the investigation of the incident a little easier to do - and it also eliminated most liabilities from the FAA ---

Anyways - that night it was snowing on and off the final - It would be VFR for 15 minutes or so - then it would start snowing again and become IFR - so it was really hit or miss if you were going to make it into the airport. (The min's for the approach at the time were 2400-2) - If your not familiar with the approach - It is a VOR circling approach - 16 degrees offset from the runway - The approach starts at 14,0000 (IAF DBL VOR) - and the missed approach point was 10,200) - The field elevation is 7,815 -
Yes I could hold seminars about Aspen (airport, approaches, mountains, procedures, etc.)

Also, sunset was approaching radpidy - And as everyone knows there is a curfew at Aspen for noise abatement - So it is usually very busy just before sunset with departures and arrivals.

As I was working the radar position - I had probably about 9 planes at the time on the approach side - I would advise all of the pilots what the last airplane did on approach - made it in -straight in, circling, missed, etc. -

So when I was working the Gulfstream It was a busy session - As the Gulfstream was on a right downwind - about FL190 - he said something very wierd to me - I never heard anything like it - He said something like "I have the valley insight and if I knew which one it was - I would call for the visual" - which blew my mind - A. we didnt have the weather for the Roaring Fork Visual B. Which valley - there are a few of them C. Was he trying to ask for a contact approach - if so I couldnt give it to him there were departures also coming off of the airport -So I said "roger" - Remeber I was trying to use the best phraseology - I take pride in my work -


Also, this crew did something that was different - They abbreviated there callsign to the last 2 digits in there callsign instead of three - I really dont know why - To this day it gives me the chills if a plane does that as I am controlling it.

So, the "have the valley in sight comment" - made me think that he wasn't to familiar with the airport - So I was thinking to turn him onto a nice intercept point for the approach - in order to help him setup for a good final -

Everything else was pretty normal - i turned him on final - cleared him - and switched him to the tower -

Business as usual - I continued to work my other planes - and then I remember my local controller (tower) screaming - "Whats this Gulfstream doing" - I look to my left down the final and see the Gulfstream at a wierd angle with fire and flames all behind it - the sky lit up into a orange color behind hit - HOLY ******************** -
(It crashed 1,500 feet from the runway)

The cab coordinator (controller in charge) reached for the crash phone - I pushed our communications panel to talk to Denver Center - I told Center to Stop everything and to tell the other sectors - we just had a crash

I then went to all of my other planes - I announced "There was a crash at Aspen - the airport is closed - say intentions" - And then I worked their divert request - I basically had to ignore the chaos that was happening behind me to separate the planes on approach

One of the controllers that was on break comes up and gets the tower crew out - I stay on to continue to work - there is nobody to relieve me -

The airport management calls up and says - were not closed - the crash happened outside of airport property - Bring them in! (The crash occured just outside of the perimeter fence right by the highway)

So we actually did - We brought them in - we actually landed planes over burning wreakage of the Gulfstream. It was all very strange - And I try but I cant forget about the conversations between the tower controller on the radio about morgue setup, "no survivors", etc, etc - That still rings in my ears.

Anyways, I remember the long drive home that night -
And turning on the TV and seeing a plane I just worked on CNN, MSNBC, etc. - That was a bad feeling.

And then I get to work the next day - and the NTSB wants to know why we issued the approach when there was a NOTAM out on it - We didnt know about any NOTAM - Apparently - the FAA flight checked the approach a couple of weeks ago and didnt like the tolerences of the approach for night operations - so they issued a NOTAM "circling minimums NA at night" - At least thats how I think it was worded. - What does this mean - The approach is a circling approach only - It basically means that Aspen has no approach after night - We were dumbfounded - we never heard of anything - nobody told us -

2 things - A. Did this NOTAM have anything to do with the crash - No Way - B. Upon review of the tapes I issued an approach clearance to the Gulfstream before night (30 mins after sunset) - It was only a few minutes before night.

So did we have to ensure that no aircraft was on the approach as Night occured? Or can you issue a clearance before night - and while the aircraft is on approach it becomes night? - Nobody could answer this for us - It is a very grey area - I think we determined that as long as you issue the clearance before night - then it is legal - You dont have to ensure that the aircraft will be off of the approach before night.

So, the crash happend on my Monday of my work week - I refused to go visit the site - I worked past this incident - I didn't know anybody on the plane - and I didn't cause the crash to happen - I moved on.

A contoller was devistated by the crash (I will not say who) - She was a great person to work with and I miss working with her - And I think a few of the airport rescue people were affected by it as well.

Upon review of all of the information that was presented to me - I would have to say that crash was caused by pilot error - They did not have the airport in sight until the very last moment - They cheated on the approach to get into the airport. I believe the person that chartered them was pushing them to get in. They were trying to follow the highway to the airport. And I believe they did not brief the approach to themselves - I swear these guys were trying to come into one of the hardest airports in North America without even breifing the approach to themselves - I do not recall anywhere on the last 30 or 20 minutes of the recorder any discussion about the approach - Did they do it on the ground at Burbank, maybe? But the conversation about not doing a weight and balance for the plane - therefore if anyone comes up to them at Aspen for a ramp check - "they just won't open the door" - makes me believe not.

I'm sorry, I have a sense of anger for this crew - This crash should not of happened - It was easily preventable - It's true - All crashes happen with a chain - take one link out - and you break the chain -

There are so many points along this flight that the chain could of been broken -
 
While I understand that Aspen apparently sucks to fly into, technically speaking how do you knowingly exceed a clear limitation and be in the right?

I seriously doubt a fed, or NTSB investigator would see it your 'logical' way.

First off, if I am alive answering to why I did what I did, then in my eyes, I'm in the right. Take my license and my job, at least I still have what's most important...my life. If I die executing an emergency extraction procedure and my reasoning was "because I don't have performance numbers to legally land with more than 10kts tailwind" what have I gained. I'm dead.
I'd rather hit an airport fence at 10-20kts rather than a mountain at V2. There is a better chance of survival doing that.

Secondly, if you honestly heard the wind report and acknowledged it once you were too far committed, to make it all legal, declare an emergency and land. Either way, you are in an emergency situation. Emergency extraction OR emergency landing. Between the two options of landing or emergency extraction, you have to weigh all factors involved and make a decision. As mentioned before, if I'm well below max landing weight, dry runway, warmer temps etc, I'm going to chose to land on a runway that I already have the performance to land within 60% of it with calm winds. If 16 kts causes me to run off the end with Thrust Reversers assisting my already max braking (Thrust Reversers not used in performance data), THEN I have a problem, FAA investigates and I answer to them then.

If it was a 30kt reported tailwind, it's a whole new ballgame. I'd probably take my chances with the mountain HOPING my other engine doesn't fail.

There are so many factors involved in making a split second decision. As others have written before, everything cannot be written out. Common sense and experience have to make the final decision.

Fly safe everyone.
 
I worked with the Captain of this ill-fated flight at a previous airline. He was a great guy, and great pilot. All it takes is one tiny slip-up in ASE. I say better to be in GJT than just short of ASE.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avjet_Aspen_Crash

Now, back to the s'mores.








I used to take B.F. along on charter flights whenever possible...even though he had just started flight instructing at the time, and had very little multi or turbine time he did a fantastic job! He was one of the best natural "sticks" I've ever flown with, along with being a true friend, may he rest in peace.
 
I've watched a plane run off the runway in ASE, a G3 pop out of the clouds in a 45 degree bank diving to runway, a challenger shoot a visual to 33 while disappearing in the clouds for for a minute....oh and a lear jet land in ASE with gear problems causing me to divert (WTFO). SkyWest operates in safest possible manner and the FAA seems to thinks so too or they would not have approved to flying. Nobody knowingly breaks airplane limits. From what i've seen so far the only people having problems are general aviation and corporate planes(exluding NJA).
 
What is this "Emergency Extraction" that I keep reading about? Sounds like a missed approach that could lead to disasterous consequences.

With the way it is worded you all can have Aspen.
 
What is this "Emergency Extraction" that I keep reading about? Sounds like a missed approach that could lead to disasterous consequences.

With the way it is worded you all can have Aspen.

I'm guessing it might be the procedure to visually fly up the valley to GJT? Or not...

Still waiting for a few Mesaba Avro or AWAC 146 drivers to chime in on this...
 
Extraction.

Track the loc till .8 on the far side then a 28 degree banked left turn heading 275 degrees to intercept the 300 degree course of another Loc that's express purpose is to define the missed approach and emergency extraction. Climb at V2.
 
I don't know about the CV-580 but the BAe146 did a bang up job in ASE and we didn't have an "emergency extraction" procedure. If we needed to go around, terrain clearance was never a problem...even on the 1 engine out balked landing procedure. The procedures where highly defined and specific DMEs had to be adhered to. Otherwise the engine out go-around (including losing an engine during a 4 engine go-around) was simply an LNAV procedure. What Skywest got approved for is simply rolling the dice every time they go in there. Their Jepps plainly state that "terrain clearance is not assured". No thanks, I'll take the bus.
 
I don't know about the CV-580 but the BAe146 did a bang up job in ASE and we didn't have an "emergency extraction" procedure. If we needed to go around, terrain clearance was never a problem...even on the 1 engine out balked landing procedure. The procedures where highly defined and specific DMEs had to be adhered to. Otherwise the engine out go-around (including losing an engine during a 4 engine go-around) was simply an LNAV procedure. What Skywest got approved for is simply rolling the dice every time they go in there. Their Jepps plainly state that "terrain clearance is not assured". No thanks, I'll take the bus.

This thread went much further than I ever imagined.

And for the record...the ATIS was calling the winds at 330/10G17. So the steady wind was at the limit. We were following this plane and heard him being "cleared to land runway 15, winds 330 at 12 kts". They continued. While they were still on the approach, we were cleared to land with the same winds. We continued. As they were about to touch down we asked for the winds ( we were at the point to make a decision). "320 at 17kts". They were down low and continued, while we were about 3 miles in trail and executed a missed (or go-around), and went to the alternate (KEGE).

While watching them continue, I couldnt help but thinking if I was on there, knowing that they landed with a 15+kt tailwind. Reminds me of the Airtran jumpseater sitting in the back of the Comair flight in KLEX.

Just be careful out there....it aint worth it.
 
How often do you guys fly there with high winds and no alternate? i.e. does dispatch always add an alternate?
I may not always list an alternate, but I personally dispatch ASE with a load of extra fuel to get to DEN if the winds/cigs take a dump on us. LAX-ASE and ORD-ASE almost always get an alternate regardless...WX is just too predictible.

Very few times have I sent without the extra gas...only with 10sm, CLR, calm winds and forecast to stay that way. Divert burn to from DBL to KGJT is at least pretty close to our minimum contingency fuel anyway.
 
Same here, when I was at AWI, I always carried at least GJT as an alternate for ASE, unless the weather was severe clear, with no chance of any clouds at all into ASE. Our rules required an alternate at 4000-4 or worse.

I did a jumpseat ride into there one day; VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
 
while we were about 3 miles in trail and executed a missed

Hmmm. Min in trail spacing on final at ASE is five miles as ATC has to protect for a missed approach by the preceeding ac minus an ability to vector.

I did a jumpseat ride into there one day; VERY HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.

Agree. All dispatchers that work ASE should be required to do some minimum number of observations to the ASE airport. I've been here approaching 10 years and have never had a dispatcher JS in the actual. Very few other pilots have seen them either.
 
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