The NTSB will never cite "lack of experience" as a probable cause or even a casual factor. If the crew meets the minimums set by the FAA and the airline, it would be treated as any 20,000-hour crew having a wreck. Yes, folks, the regionals are in the armpit of aviation.
This has already happened. Low time CA in type. Low time FO. At night at ROA. No, the NTSB did not out n out say low time caused this accident but it seems steeped in the body of the report.
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20011030X02159&key=1
NTSB Identification:
NYC02LA013.
The docket is stored in the Docket Management System (DMS). Please contact
Records Management Division
Scheduled 14 CFR Part 121: Air Carrier operation of Mesa Airlines (D.B.A. US Airways Express)
Accident occurred Tuesday, October 16, 2001 in Roanoke, VA
Probable Cause Approval Date: 6/25/2003
Aircraft: Embraer 145LR, registration: N825MJ
Injuries: 33 Uninjured.
The captain briefed a "no go-around" for a night visual approach to a "Special Airport." The approach was not stabilized, and the airspeed decreased to the point of a stall. The airplane struck the runway in a nose high pitch attitude, on the aft fuselage, and settled on the landing gear. The first officer made initial callouts of slow airspeed and then stopped when the captain failed to respond to her callouts. After landing, the airplane was taxied to the gate where a post flight inspection limited to the main landing gear did not find the damage. When interviewed, the captain reported that she briefed "no go-around" because no takeoffs were authorized on the runway at night or in IMC conditions; however, the first officer knew this was incorrect, but did not challenge the captain. Both pilots had received CRM training, which included crewmember assertiveness, methods of fostering crew input, and situational awareness, and training on special use airports; however it was not followed by either pilot. The captain's handling of the airplane was outside the parameters specified in the company manuals. Both pilots were described to having good flying skills. The captain said the first officer was passive and quiet. The first officer reported the captain was defensive and did not take criticism very well. A definition of stabilized approach criteria was not found in the company manuals. An FAA Advisory Circular dated August 10, 2000 defined stabilized approach criteria, and actions to be taken if the approach was not stabilized.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
the captain's failure to maintain airspeed which resulted in an inadvertent stall/mush, and hard landing. Factors were the failure of both pilots to follow company CRM and flight manual procedures, and the captains improper approach briefing.