Rez O. Lewshun
Save the Profession
- Joined
- Jan 19, 2004
- Posts
- 13,422
FoxHunter,
I don't think your going to get confirmation or absolution (at least here)that being a non-member has been the right choice.....
I Learned About Flying From That!
Capt. Eugene P. Frake
On the evening of July 4, 2000, F/O John Tinsley and I, due to severe weather impacting the Philippine Island area, were assigned a revised pairing requiring us to jumpseat on an MD-11 from Subic Bay to Taipei. Of the six MD-11 crewmembers assigned to travel to Taipei, I was by far the most senior and, unquestionably, the most experienced crewmember, having more than 13 years of international experience as a captain, including seven years in the MD-11. For some reason, in their wisdom, crew scheduling assigned the least senior captain to actually fly the leg to TPE—a captain with less than one year’s experience as a PIC on a widebody aircraft. At that time, not one but two typhoons were simultaneously lashing the Philippines from the northeast and southwest; these storms ultimately killed scores of local residents. FedEx’s Subic flight operations were closed due to the storm, and remained closed for several days as typhoons Kirogi and Kai Tak battered their way through the Luzon Strait. The plane that I was to leave on was the last—and only—aircraft scheduled to leave Subic Bay.
In my 23 years of operating transport category aircraft, experience and common sense have taught me that it is wise to avoid intentionally flying into hazardous weather phenomena such as squall line thunderstorms, tornadoes and other cyclonic events (hurricanes or typhoons), and severe wind shear (aloft or on the surface). SFS is an inherently dangerous airport, and when you combine it with severe weather you have tremendous potential for disaster. Dismiss me as over-conservative if you wish, but my suggestion was to delay the flight until we could see what the typhoons were doing in terms of intensity and movement. The operating captain felt that it was safe to depart, which was his prerogative. Another player in the “go/no go” debate was the Assistant Chief Pilot Subic Bay, who, along with the Memphis Duty Officer, felt that the weather we were experiencing was “seasonal monsoonal flow and perfectly safe to operate in.” To make a long story short, Tinsley (making his own, independent decision) and I decided it was foolhardy to take off at that time. Nevertheless, we were directed to depart on the aircraft. We refused—out of fear for our personal safety. We immediately contacted our Subic FPA representative and briefed him extensively on the situation. He and the FPA Grievance Committee representatives in Memphis told us what to expect from flight management. As they predicted, we were both relieved from flight status the next day, and we were ordered to return to Memphis for a preliminary hearing with the ACP MD-11.
At no time during the days leading up to the hearing did Tinsley or I expect disciplinary action to result from this incident. We were convinced that we had made the proper decision not to depart based on safety concerns. Additionally, we told the duty officer that we would strenuously attempt to get our pairing back on schedule once the typhoons moved out. What we expected was a safety debrief, and little else. Surely, we felt, common sense would prevail once the facts were made known. However, the meeting that was held was disciplinary in nature. And although the facts were presented succinctly, to our dismay, we were both sent letters of termination on August 4, 2000.
We appealed this decision, of course. With guidance, support, and representation from FPA, Tinsley and I attended a Level 2 Appeal Hearing before the vice president of flight operations on August 22, 2000. Again, we felt the facts of the case would exonerate us once a fair-minded and reasonable management pilot examined the evidence and testimony.
However, on September 8, 2000, claiming that my “asserted reasons for refusing to depart were not reasonable under the circumstances…” and wishing me luck in my future endeavors, the VP of Flight Op’s unceremoniously upheld my termination.
After 23 straight years of discipline-free and loyal service, I was fired with extreme prejudice for refusing management’s order to depart into intensely hazardous weather that I strongly felt was unsafe. If anyone is looking for a term that describes this event, it is called “pilot pushing”—something that was quite common many years ago in commercial aviation. If any of you, my fellow crewmembers, think that the flight management team at FedEx is not embracing this “motivational tool,” you’re in serious denial. The sad part of this is that some inexperienced or intimidated captain is going to one day succumb to a management “push,” and a catastrophe will result.
We, as a pilot group, must understand that this management team is zealous in their pursuit of system efficiency. In my opinion, words such as “paranoid,” “political,” and “predatory” are not out of line. It is also my opinion that some members of this management team would resort to prevarication in order to fulfill their intended agenda.
I don't think your going to get confirmation or absolution (at least here)that being a non-member has been the right choice.....
I Learned About Flying From That!
Capt. Eugene P. Frake
On the evening of July 4, 2000, F/O John Tinsley and I, due to severe weather impacting the Philippine Island area, were assigned a revised pairing requiring us to jumpseat on an MD-11 from Subic Bay to Taipei. Of the six MD-11 crewmembers assigned to travel to Taipei, I was by far the most senior and, unquestionably, the most experienced crewmember, having more than 13 years of international experience as a captain, including seven years in the MD-11. For some reason, in their wisdom, crew scheduling assigned the least senior captain to actually fly the leg to TPE—a captain with less than one year’s experience as a PIC on a widebody aircraft. At that time, not one but two typhoons were simultaneously lashing the Philippines from the northeast and southwest; these storms ultimately killed scores of local residents. FedEx’s Subic flight operations were closed due to the storm, and remained closed for several days as typhoons Kirogi and Kai Tak battered their way through the Luzon Strait. The plane that I was to leave on was the last—and only—aircraft scheduled to leave Subic Bay.
In my 23 years of operating transport category aircraft, experience and common sense have taught me that it is wise to avoid intentionally flying into hazardous weather phenomena such as squall line thunderstorms, tornadoes and other cyclonic events (hurricanes or typhoons), and severe wind shear (aloft or on the surface). SFS is an inherently dangerous airport, and when you combine it with severe weather you have tremendous potential for disaster. Dismiss me as over-conservative if you wish, but my suggestion was to delay the flight until we could see what the typhoons were doing in terms of intensity and movement. The operating captain felt that it was safe to depart, which was his prerogative. Another player in the “go/no go” debate was the Assistant Chief Pilot Subic Bay, who, along with the Memphis Duty Officer, felt that the weather we were experiencing was “seasonal monsoonal flow and perfectly safe to operate in.” To make a long story short, Tinsley (making his own, independent decision) and I decided it was foolhardy to take off at that time. Nevertheless, we were directed to depart on the aircraft. We refused—out of fear for our personal safety. We immediately contacted our Subic FPA representative and briefed him extensively on the situation. He and the FPA Grievance Committee representatives in Memphis told us what to expect from flight management. As they predicted, we were both relieved from flight status the next day, and we were ordered to return to Memphis for a preliminary hearing with the ACP MD-11.
At no time during the days leading up to the hearing did Tinsley or I expect disciplinary action to result from this incident. We were convinced that we had made the proper decision not to depart based on safety concerns. Additionally, we told the duty officer that we would strenuously attempt to get our pairing back on schedule once the typhoons moved out. What we expected was a safety debrief, and little else. Surely, we felt, common sense would prevail once the facts were made known. However, the meeting that was held was disciplinary in nature. And although the facts were presented succinctly, to our dismay, we were both sent letters of termination on August 4, 2000.
We appealed this decision, of course. With guidance, support, and representation from FPA, Tinsley and I attended a Level 2 Appeal Hearing before the vice president of flight operations on August 22, 2000. Again, we felt the facts of the case would exonerate us once a fair-minded and reasonable management pilot examined the evidence and testimony.
However, on September 8, 2000, claiming that my “asserted reasons for refusing to depart were not reasonable under the circumstances…” and wishing me luck in my future endeavors, the VP of Flight Op’s unceremoniously upheld my termination.
After 23 straight years of discipline-free and loyal service, I was fired with extreme prejudice for refusing management’s order to depart into intensely hazardous weather that I strongly felt was unsafe. If anyone is looking for a term that describes this event, it is called “pilot pushing”—something that was quite common many years ago in commercial aviation. If any of you, my fellow crewmembers, think that the flight management team at FedEx is not embracing this “motivational tool,” you’re in serious denial. The sad part of this is that some inexperienced or intimidated captain is going to one day succumb to a management “push,” and a catastrophe will result.
We, as a pilot group, must understand that this management team is zealous in their pursuit of system efficiency. In my opinion, words such as “paranoid,” “political,” and “predatory” are not out of line. It is also my opinion that some members of this management team would resort to prevarication in order to fulfill their intended agenda.
