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I don't think the flaps going from 10 to zero (at 22:16:35 on the video) helped. Shortly after, it rolled. I was surprised to not see mention of this on the NTSB slides. To anyone who listened to the whole briefing, was this issue brought up? It makes me wonder if the captain could have recovered it if the flaps had stayed out. Nothing on the CVR indicates either pilot mentioning flaps. They just come up. I wonder if one of the pilots reacted as if it were a go-around, bringing some flaps up as power went in, resulting in the fatal loss of lift.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxywEE1kK6I
 
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I don't think the flaps going from 10 to zero (at 22:16:35 on the video) helped. Shortly after, it rolled. I was surprised to not see mention of this on the NTSB slides. To anyone who listened to the whole briefing, was this issue brought up? It makes me wonder if the captain could have recovered it if the flaps had stayed out. Nothing on the CVR indicates either pilot mentioning flaps. They just come up. I wonder if one of the pilots reacted as if it were a go-around, bringing some flaps up as power went in, resulting in the fatal loss of lift.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxywEE1kK6I


F/O said she put the flaps up
 
I don't think the flaps going from 10 to zero (at 22:16:35 on the video) helped. Shortly after, it rolled. I was surprised to not see mention of this on the NTSB slides. To anyone who listened to the whole briefing, was this issue brought up? It makes me wonder if the captain could have recovered it if the flaps had stayed out. Nothing on the CVR indicates either pilot mentioning flaps. They just come up. I wonder if one of the pilots reacted as if it were a go-around, bringing some flaps up as power went in, resulting in the fatal loss of lift.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lxywEE1kK6I


If for some reason they thought they were in a Tail Stall... going flaps zero may have been the right choice >> although they screwed up their analysis of what actually happened >> a normal wing stall
 
Not sure if anyone else has been through a PC check recently, but i just got back from mine and the stall recovery has changed at my airline. We do training in a deep stall situation now, never did before. The requirements for recover is now "Minimum Altitude Loss" as opposed to the number of 50 feet loss max which used to be the requirement. I think the Feds are realizing that teaching zero loss for years and years to a pilot the muscle memory is going to be for zero loss on stall recovery, not a good technique, never liked training it, or performing it. Minimal loss is a good practice.

Pretty simple

There's the checkride way to recover from a stall and then there is the real way to recover from a stall >> which involves lowering the nose to reduce aoa.

Minimum altitude loss >> great way to get yourself into a secondary stall
 
I agree with most of what's been said on here regarding the stall recovery, but talking details of stall recovery is "getting in the weeds" and missing the big picture, i.e. "how the h&ll did they end up at the point where they needed to perform a stall recovery?" That's where the big lessons learned ought to be from this one.
 
I agree with most of what's been said on here regarding the stall recovery, but talking details of stall recovery is "getting in the weeds" and missing the big picture, i.e. "how the h&ll did they end up at the point where they needed to perform a stall recovery?" That's where the big lessons learned ought to be from this one.


TRUE for sure
 
I agree with most of what's been said on here regarding the stall recovery, but talking details of stall recovery is "getting in the weeds" and missing the big picture, i.e. "how the h&ll did they end up at the point where they needed to perform a stall recovery?" That's where the big lessons learned ought to be from this one.

Take a low skilled pilot, add fatigue, a 15kt stick shaker speed increase by having the icing speed switch on (without telling the FO) and slowing for a vref that does not have that icing speed computed and you get someone who reacted improperly to a stall that wasn't even happening.

...and that is one of the travesties of the final ruling. Fatigue was not a contributing factor.
Vice-chair Sumwalt (a former USair pilot) said something to the effect that 'while they were fatigued, that did not affect their performance.'

What, what, what!? That's like saying, while the driver was drunk, it did not effect his running a red light.

The chairwoman wanted that included, but was out voted by the two pilots on the board who seemed to be on a witchunt after the captain.
 
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I have to agree that the real factor is why did they even get into the stall? Why did they get so slow?

Basically a lack of Situational Awereness...I do not even think they knew that they were stalling...no one was monitoring the approach...the whole thing could have been avoided if someone was actually flying the airplane...like having their hand on the power levers when they started the descent and approach. And maybe looking at the PFD.

One thing I have never heard brought up was the fact that the captain transitioned from the SAAB. He only had a little more than 100 hours in the D-8 (I know that has been mentioned) but one thing that I have never heard was the fact that this was the first airplane he ever flew with tape instead of an airspeed indicator.....just something to think about. He was not used to seeing what slow speeds looked like on the tape...

Just an observation...

Situational Awareness and flying the airplane...lesson one in any private pilot lesson plan!

Again too much beer and pizza!
 
Take a low skilled pilot, add fatigue, a 15kt stick shaker speed increase by having the icing speed switch on (without telling the FO) and slowing for a vref that does not have that icing speed computed and you get someone who reacted improperly to a stall that wasn't even happening.

...and that is one of the travesties of the final ruling. Fatigue was not a contributing factor.
Vice-chair Sumwalt (a former USair pilot) said something to the effect that 'while they were fatigued, that did not affect their performance.'

What, what, what!? That's like saying, while the driver was drunk, it did not effect his running a red light.

The chairwoman wanted that included, but was out voted by the two pilots on the board who seemed to be on a witchunt after the captain.

The NTSB has said the same thing about the switch...however, I don't seem to understand how an early stall warning could have caused this accident. Regardless if the stall warning fired on-time or early...the recovery was jacked up, After watching the animation it seems to me that if the stall warning did go off early, it gave the Captain a "head-start" on the failed recovery.
 
There's the checkride way to recover from a stall and then there is the real way to recover from a stall >> which involves lowering the nose to reduce aoa.
Which is not right...we all know there is a line way and a sim way of doing stuff. Now we should all do the sim way when we are on line...however, recovering from stall should not look pretty on the sim plot, it should be abrupt and aggressive to save lives. If we responded to RA's with the goal of making it feel nice for our passengers we would hit other airplanes...if some people are not taught how to recover from a stall in a sim the correct way, they will do it the sim way and try to make it look pretty. We have all flown with people who can't think out of the box and get zoned in too much and fail to see the big picture (CA's and FO's). I guess my point is, they need to train recovery different...they need to teach people how to recover from a low altitude stall, quickly and without making it feel nice for the passengers.
 
As a SIM instructor and from my experience w/the POI's the "minimal altitude lost " statement is correct. But the continuation of the statement and the gray area for companies(121/135) as wells as the FEDS is "safety of flight not in question!"

Having instructed on multiple jets all in the same family none of them share the same characteristics in the stall...of course lots of free time may have gone a little outside the ENVELOPE.
I hope to not ever see it in the actual aircraft...but there are some a/c I would rather stall in than others if you know what I mean!

Regardless no a/c stalls the same and no monday morning quarterback ever agrees, as neither do any instructor(TRE/TRI/IP/CA/TCE/DPE...etc), or POI!

Thoughts and prayers for the families and crew.
 
The NTSB has said the same thing about the switch...however, I don't seem to understand how an early stall warning could have caused this accident. Regardless if the stall warning fired on-time or early...the recovery was jacked up, After watching the animation it seems to me that if the stall warning did go off early, it gave the Captain a "head-start" on the failed recovery.

There's several different ways to look at it.

You can say that this accident was caused by hiring a weak pilot and allowing him to continue flying when his deficiencies were noted.
OR
If you acknowledge that weak pilots exist,
the fact that he was slowing to a target speed that was below the stick shaker speed is certainly a causal factor. (along with fatigue, poor stall recovery training, misleading tailplane stall info for the Q400, poor training on the icing speed switch....etc)

I wasn't able to watch all of the hearing, but what I did see led me to understand that they didn't "let their speed get slow" they were intentionally slowing to a ref speed that they (through fatigue or incompetence or both) did not know would set off the shaker.
The aircraft was not actually stalling or approaching a stall when the shaker went off. (unless you know for certain that the capt would not have added power when target speed was reached and the fo wouldn't have said anything if he didn't)
The shaker went off at an unanticipated speed and he freaked out, pulled 1.4 g's and pulled the plane in to an accelerated stall. The FO then freaked out and retracted the flaps (perhaps a pre-briefed item by the captain who had recently seen the tailplane icing video?) and the rest is sad history.

The solution? Don't hire or continue to employ weak pilots. Don't pass the "gouge" around. Skilled pilots don't really need it and it just allows the weak ones to perform mediocre enough to train to proficiency and continue flying.
The over-supply of pilots is one of the main reasons the entire airline piloting profession is in the state its in right now. Even more so at the regional airlines.
 
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If for some reason they thought they were in a Tail Stall... going flaps zero may have been the right choice >> although they screwed up their analysis of what actually happened >> a normal wing stall

OK, thanks. Still wonder why.

When I was an EMB120 FO many moons ago, I had a few captains who were concerned with tail stalls brief me that if we had a tail stall or unknown upset occour just after moving the flaps to a new position; put them back to the previous position immediately.

Something similar could be an explanation as to why the FO did what she did?
 
When I was an EMB120 FO many moons ago, I had a few captains who were concerned with tail stalls brief me that if we had a tail stall or unknown upset occour just after moving the flaps to a new position; put them back to the previous position immediately.

Something similar could be an explanation as to why the FO did what she did?


Could be true!!
 
...FEDS is "safety of flight not in question!"

Exactly. If you happen to have a stall during an actual flight and you recover, good for you...if you crash, that was not safe and they will go after you.

If you drop loose 250 feet in the sim with an FAA guy observing or even a sim check airman, you are still going to bust.
 
When I was an EMB120 FO many moons ago, I had a few captains who were concerned with tail stalls brief me that if we had a tail stall or unknown upset occour just after moving the flaps to a new position; put them back to the previous position immediately.

Something similar could be an explanation as to why the FO did what she did?
Interesting point. They were under control at flaps 5. The stickshaker/stall occurred just after captain called for flaps 10. Shortly after, the flaps went from 10 all the way to up.
 
( Sound of Buzzer ) Referee:

" Ten Points! Unfair question. Incorrect conclusion. Improper Use of Quote. Incomplete Quote. "

-------------------------------------------------------------------------


Even if the Quote were submitted in proper context, and not altered as in the above, if a minor point of humor ( such as it were ) takes explaining....It is not worth the explanation.

Next.


YKMKR
 
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( Sound of Buzzer ) Referee:

" Ten Points! Unfair question. Incorrect conclusion. Improper Use of Quote. Incomplete Quote. "

-------------------------------------------------------------------------


Even if the Quote were submitted in proper context, and not altered as in the above, if a minor point of humor ( such as it were ) takes explaining....It is not worth the explanation.

Next.


YKMKR

I will figure it out for myself, just give a hint or make it multiply choice :)
 
Because of his constant flirting with the fo the entire flight.

Where does this urban legend keep coming from? The expanded CVR transcript is available from the NTSB and doesn't even remotely suggest this.
 
Where does this urban legend keep coming from? The expanded CVR transcript is available from the NTSB and doesn't even remotely suggest this.
Are you really this dense? No, really???
 
they were intentionally slowing to a ref speed that they (through fatigue or incompetence or both) did not know would set off the shaker.
The aircraft was not actually stalling or approaching a stall when the shaker went off.

That's what I missed...thanks.
 
Originally Posted by SuperFLUF

they were intentionally slowing to a ref speed that they (through fatigue or incompetence or both) did not know would set off the shaker.
The aircraft was not actually stalling or approaching a stall when the shaker went off.

OK, I missed that post, and have to disagree with it.

Yes, they were intentionally slowing to a ref speed that they did not know would set off the shaker IN THEIR CURRENT CONFIGURATION.

However, the aircraft WAS, INDEED approaching the stall when the shaker went off. That's WHY the shaker went off. As in, "hey dummy, you're about to stall the airplane". It didn't go off for some mysterious, unknown reason.

That's why they pinned it completely on pilot error, although I believe strongly that the REASONS they MADE so many errors are more of a systemic problem underlying the actual error chain of the accident.

I think we're saying the same thing, just want to be clear that the shaker didn't malfunction, it did exactly what it was supposed to do, indicated the approaching stall if the speed continued to deteriorate...

The rest of your post I agree with 100%
 
[/I]
OK, I missed that post, and have to disagree with it.

Yes, they were intentionally slowing to a ref speed that they did not know would set off the shaker IN THEIR CURRENT CONFIGURATION.

However, the aircraft WAS, INDEED approaching the stall when the shaker went off. That's WHY the shaker went off. As in, "hey dummy, you're about to stall the airplane". It didn't go off for some mysterious, unknown reason.

That's why they pinned it completely on pilot error, although I believe strongly that the REASONS they MADE so many errors are more of a systemic problem underlying the actual error chain of the accident.

I think we're saying the same thing, just want to be clear that the shaker didn't malfunction, it did exactly what it was supposed to do, indicated the approaching stall if the speed continued to deteriorate...

The rest of your post I agree with 100%

Yes it was completely pilot error. But why did they make that error?
A weak pilot who is fatigued is an even weaker pilot. He turned on that icing switch without verbalizing it to the FO. She didn't set the ref speeds for icing.
Poor communication between the two of them = pilot error.
Less than poor reaction to the stick shaker = pilot error.

The testimony that I recall from the hearing was that they were not stalling when the shaker went off.
The "icing switch" was on with little or no ice on the lifting surfaces. This caused the shaker speed to increase. They were slowing to a non-ice ref speed. Somewhere in the report I recall that the ref speed they were using was 13kts slower than the shaker onset.

The shaker goes off at a predetermined AOA not by measuring the exact lift of the wing at that time.
They were not stalling when they got the shaker, however; the bone headed moves by the captain induced an accelerated stall and the FO compounded it by retracting the flaps.

It is entirely possible that had not the "icing switch" been turned on or if they had flown the proper (increased) "icing" target speed that the approach & landing would have been uneventful.
 
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It is entirely possible that had not the "icing switch" been turned on or if they had flown the proper (increased) "icing" target speed that the approach & landing would have been uneventful.

Regardless of the speeds they were using, when they brought the props up, without the throttles, they may have just as well put out a drag chute. There was absolutely NO attempt to add power until it was too late.
 
Apparently, my original post was removed (?).


YKW
Yes, by me. You should have received a PM about it.

Got several complaints from people about the subject matter. Want to say it happened because she was a girl? Fine. Not saying I agree with you, just saying to leave the sexual organ references out of it so it's not a violation of the TOS.

Thanks,
 

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