Plane down in BUF

[Bigoober]

"Had we known what we know now, no, he would not have been in that seat."

Wow! Now this is one brilliant man. No wonder he is an airline executive.

 

[CaptJax]

NTSB Pins NY Crash Cause On Pilot Errors

Safety board pins NY crash cause on pilot errors

By JOAN LOWY, Associated Press Writer

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

(02-02) 19:27 PST WASHINGTON (AP) --

Pilot error was the probable cause of an airline crash into a house near Buffalo, N.Y., last year, but the accident's root problems extend far beyond a single event, a federal safety panel said Tuesday.

The head of the National Transportation Safety Board, Deborah Hersman, said the accident casts doubt on whether regional airlines are held to the same level of safety as are major airlines, and she promised the board will pursue the issue. She also criticized the Federal Aviation Administration for taking too long to address safety problems raised by the crash, saying the same issues have turned up before.

"Today is Groundhog Day, and I feel like we are in that movie," Hersman said, referring to the 1993 Bill Murray movie about a Pittsburgh weatherman who repeatedly lives through the same day. "We have made recommendations time after time after time. They haven't been heeded by the FAA."

The FAA said in a statement that it has driven significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training and background checks in the past year. The agency said it will soon propose new rules to prevent pilot fatigue, further improve training and increase the qualifications required to be an airline pilot.

The three-member board agreed unanimously that an "inappropriate response" by the captain of Continental Connection Flight 3407 to a key piece of safety equipment caused the crash. The board also said the flight crew's inattention to airspeeds, their violation of regulations prohibiting unnecessary conversation during takeoffs and landings, and the air carrier's inadequate procedures for entering airspeeds for freezing weather were contributing factors.

The board issued more than 20 safety recommendations to the FAA as a result of the accident. They included recommendations related to pilot fatigue, remedial training for pilots who have failed skills tests, making pilot's test records available to prospective employers, training on how to recover from a stall and airspeed selection procedures.

Hersman praised FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt for initiating regulation changes in response to the crash on Feb. 12, 2009, when the plane dove into a house, killing all 49 people aboard and one man in the house. But Hersman said Babbitt has been unable so far to push reforms "across the finish line" and that congressional action may be needed.

Flight 3407, operated for Continental Airlines by Colgan Air Inc., was approaching Buffalo-Niagara International Airport when the twin-engine turboprop experienced an aerodynamic stall and went into a dive. The board said Capt. Marvin Renslow should have been able to recover from the stall but that he did the opposite of what he should have done.

In the final seconds of the flight, two pieces of safety equipment activated — a stick shaker to alert the crew their plane was nearing a stall and a stick pusher that points a plane's nose down so it can recover speed, investigators said. The correct response to both situations would have been to push forward on the control column to increase speed, they said.

But Renslow pulled back on the stick shaker, investigators said. When the plane stalled and the pusher activated, Renslow again pulled back three times.

"It wasn't a split-second thing," NTSB safety investigator Roger Cox said. "I think there was time to evaluate the situation and initiate a recovery, but I can't give you a number of seconds."

Seventy-five percent of pilots who had experienced the stick-pusher activation in training also responded by pulling back instead of pushing forward, even though they knew ahead of time to expect a stall, investigators said.

The first officer, Rebecca Shaw, 24, should have stepped in to push the plane's nose down herself when Renslow, 47, responded improperly, but she may not have because she was a relatively inexperienced pilot, investigators said.

Shaw commuted across the country overnight to Newark, N.J., to make Flight 3407. It's not clear how much sleep either pilot received the night before the flight, but investigators said both pilots likely were suffering from fatigue. Hersman wanted to list fatigue as a contributing factors to the crash. The board's other two members declined, saying it couldn't conclusively be determined if fatigue had impaired the pilots' performance.

Shaw erred at the beginning of the flight by programming an ordinary airspeed into the plane's computer, rather than the higher airspeed needed for freezing weather, investigators said. The plane didn't accumulate enough ice on the wings to stall, but the mix-up on speeds caused the stick shaker to warn of a stall even though one wasn't actually imminent.

Colgan's pilot training program was also criticized for not giving Renslow remedial attention despite his failures on several tests of piloting skill and for not emphasizing procedures for recovering from a full stall, including how to respond to the stick pusher.

Colgan said in a statement that the pilots were properly trained in how to recover from a stall.

"We have taken a number of important and specific steps to further enhance all of our training and hiring programs," the statement said.

 

[SuperFLUF]

Seventy-five percent of pilots who had experienced the stick-pusher activation in training also responded by pulling back instead of pushing forward, even though they knew ahead of time to expect a stall, investigators said.

Wow. That's kinda scary.

 

[CaptSeth]

Pay peanuts = Get monkeys.

 

[Mike man]

Seventy-five percent of pilots who had experienced the stick-pusher activation in training also responded by pulling back instead of pushing forward, even though they knew ahead of time to expect a stall, investigators said.

Thinking back to EMB-145 sim training and PC's, a type ride and more PC's I seem to remember if you lower the nose to recover from a stall you will fail the stall portion of the checkride due to excessive altitude loss.

I was taught, for a clean stall: Maintain altitude, add full power...for a approach to landing stall, maintain altitude, add full power, retract flaps and gear on schedule.

Maybe they need to reevaluate how they are evaluating stall recovery for 121 PC's.

Anyone else have some input?

 

[PA31Driver]

Thinking back to EMB-145 sim training and PC's, a type ride and more PC's I seem to remember if you lower the nose to recover from a stall you will fail the stall portion of the checkride due to excessive altitude loss.

I was taught, for a clean stall: Maintain altitude, add full power...for a approach to landing stall, maintain altitude, add full power, retract flaps and gear on schedule.

Maybe they need to reevaluate how they are evaluating stall recovery for 121 PC's.

Anyone else have some input?

Exactly!

 

[jayme]

In the E120, when you test the stick shaker the test will fail if you don't resist hard against it and the yoke reaches the stop. That builds muscle memory to pull back when you get a shaker.

 

[ImbracableCrunk]

Thinking back to EMB-145 sim training and PC's, a type ride and more PC's I seem to remember if you lower the nose to recover from a stall you will fail the stall portion of the checkride due to excessive altitude loss.

I was taught, for a clean stall: Maintain altitude, add full power...for a approach to landing stall, maintain altitude, add full power, retract flaps and gear on schedule.

Maybe they need to reevaluate how they are evaluating stall recovery for 121 PC's.

Anyone else have some input?

When I started at Mesaba, the stalls in the sim were based on the syllabus for the actual airplane: climb to 10k, do some checklists, brief the stall, and then do the stall recovery.

Some of the instructors decided the "stall series" was useless and came up with some common scenarios where stall would occur and put you in them.

It was much more "real-world" and was a much better use of the scant amount of regional sim time.

 

[Simon Says]

Thinking back to EMB-145 sim training and PC's, a type ride and more PC's I seem to remember if you lower the nose to recover from a stall you will fail the stall portion of the checkride due to excessive altitude loss.

I was taught, for a clean stall: Maintain altitude, add full power...for a approach to landing stall, maintain altitude, add full power, retract flaps and gear on schedule.

Maybe they need to reevaluate how they are evaluating stall recovery for 121 PC's.

Anyone else have some input?

Not to bust on what you said, but I think what they really said is that you don't need to lower the nose below the horizon, but to lower it from the current pitch attitude.

I used to hear the instructor say don't lower the nose while recovering, but what they were really saying is "you don't need to lower it so much, just a 5 degrees or so.

 

[igneousy2]

Not to bust on what you said, but I think what they really said is that you don't need to lower the nose below the horizon, but to lower it from the current pitch attitude.

I used to hear the instructor say don't lower the nose while recovering, but what they were really saying is "you don't need to lower it so much, just a 5 degrees or so.

Maybe that's what yours were saying but I went through 7 121 training programs at 3 different airlines across 12 years and I was always taught to not let the nose drop at all...Altitude loss was always emphasized as the priority...in fact I remember being told that "you don't need to lower the nose because this isn't a 172...this airplane can power itself out of an imminant stall...no problem" during one of my first programs in the SF340 at American Eagle I recall having to get "retrained" in the stall series because I was letting the nose drop at the shaker.

 

[igneousy2]

Bulleted findings available at http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2010/AAR1001.htm

Pretty interesting...

"The captain had not established a good foundation of attitude instrument flying skills early in his career, and his continued weaknesses in basic aircraft control and instrument flying were not identified and adequately addressed."

"The captain’s response to stick shaker activation should have been automatic, but his improper flight control inputs were inconsistent with his training and were instead consistent with startle and confusion."

"It is unlikely that the captain was deliberately attempting to perform a tailplane stall recovery. "

"The inclusion of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration icing video in Colgan Air’s winter operations training may lead pilots to assume that a tailplane stall might be possible in the Q400, resulting in negative training."

 

[waveflyer]

They 100% need to be said- but f^ck- to be responsible for all those lives and the reason they died- I couldn't imagine being family of this guy and have these things written- this is why we ought to keep studying and training hard-

And it's why what we do is important and NOT everyone should be doing it. And why we shouldn't get paid peanuts - but I can't tell you how many Pilots I've met that didn't agree with that statement....it's not about ego and chest thumping- what we do is very responsible. I pray for these pilots and their families--- along with the victims

By the way- good points on the letting the nose drop- there ought to be differences training in imminent stall and deep stall recovery

 

[igneousy2]

By the way- good points on the letting the nose drop- there ought to be differences training in imminent stall and deep stall recovery

I think their should be no difference because this is what got us into trouble in the first place. If you are surprised by the shaker then I would guess your SA is not where it needs to be to make a decision as to if you are in a full stall, deep stall, or imminent stall. The recovery needs to take place in muscle memory...you got the shaker because your SA was down - I don't think you'd be in a position to make a determination what kind of stall you are in.

 

[Mike man]

Not to bust on what you said, but I think what they really said is that you don't need to lower the nose below the horizon, but to lower it from the current pitch attitude.

No bubble busted...they told me DO NOT LOWER THE NOSE (I'm looking at my sim tips sheet and my notes on the page).

But maybe you missed the point, I was not trying to start a discussion on how to recover from various stalls in regional aircraft--but rather a discussion on how pilots do as they are trained...so maybe in Colgan Q400 school (taught by Flight Saftey -- in STL among others -- the same place I received my EMB145 training) they teach the same thing maintain attitude, add power.

 

[rajflyboy]

No bubble busted...they told me DO NOT LOWER THE NOSE (I'm looking at my sim tips sheet and my notes on the page).

But maybe you missed the point, I was not trying to start a discussion on how to recover from various stalls in regional aircraft--but rather a discussion on how pilots do as they are trained...so maybe in Colgan Q400 school (taught by Flight Saftey -- in STL among others -- the same place I received my EMB145 training) they teach the same thing maintain attitude, add power.

I agree 100%.

This crap about holding altitude isn't a good thing during stall recovery training. I blame the Feds and I also blame the training faciliities.

I have always used these techniques for Sim training or Checkride purpose's but nothing else. To recover from a stall you have to REDUCE angle of attack. The quickest way to do that is to lower the nose.

 

[s3jetman]

Not sure if anyone else has been through a PC check recently, but i just got back from mine and the stall recovery has changed at my airline. We do training in a deep stall situation now, never did before. The requirements for recover is now "Minimum Altitude Loss" as opposed to the number of 50 feet loss max which used to be the requirement. I think the Feds are realizing that teaching zero loss for years and years to a pilot the muscle memory is going to be for zero loss on stall recovery, not a good technique, never liked training it, or performing it. Minimal loss is a good practice.

 

[ultrarunner]

I'll be interested in my sim next month. We're flying a high performance jet. Been taught the same...at first indication of stall, TOGA, do NOT lower pitch, and recover with NO altitude loss...All this while the friggin stall warning is going on, the stick shaker banging away, and the aircraft WANTING to nose over because that is the aerodynamic tendency with full power application.

A SLIGHT reduction in AOA makes this maneuver go MUCH more smoothly, and I'd prly lost 100 feet or so, but NOOOOO....we want you to fight with the bitttch, and have ZERO LOSS.

So stupid....

 

[Simon Says]

No bubble busted...they told me DO NOT LOWER THE NOSE (I'm looking at my sim tips sheet and my notes on the page).

But maybe you missed the point, I was not trying to start a discussion on how to recover from various stalls in regional aircraft--but rather a discussion on how pilots do as they are trained...so maybe in Colgan Q400 school (taught by Flight Saftey -- in STL among others -- the same place I received my EMB145 training) they teach the same thing maintain attitude, add power.

Agreed, but I think a discussion on stall recovery is interesting on how other carriers do it.

 

[Mike man]

The requirements for recover is now "Minimum Altitude Loss" as opposed to the number of 50 feet loss max which used to be the requirement.

The ATP PTS says minimal altitude loss, and has since 2001.

 

[bubbers44]

I guess if max power in level flight works immediately, fine. Lowering the nose always helps stall recovery reducing AOA.