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Flt 3407 Rocked Like A Roller Coaster Before Fall

Flight 3407 Rocked Like A Roller Coaster Before Fall

Feb 16,5:02 PM EST

by Ramit Plushnick-Masti
Associated Press Writer

BUFFALO, N.Y. (AP) -- Seats are upright. Belts are buckled. Trays are up. Flight 3407 is beginning its descent to Buffalo Niagara International Airport. And then something suddenly goes terribly wrong.
The 44 passengers are lifted from their seats - like on a roller coaster - very abruptly and repeatedly. Simultaneously, they are forcefully jostled from side to side.
But the severe pitches and rolls that jerked the plane's nose down, up and then down again from 31 degrees to 45 degrees while rolling violently from side to side, once as much as 105 degrees and almost onto the plane's back - would have ended within 20 seconds when the plane hit the ground.
Pilots and experts say a sense of panic was likely setting in among passengers on the turboprop Continental commuter plane, but they probably did not have time to realize they were crashing.
"Just panic. They were feeling things they've never felt before, but it wouldn't have been: `We're going down. We're going down,'" said Skip Moshner, a pilot and instructor for the type of plane that crashed Thursday night in Clarence, N.Y., barely three minutes from touchdown.
"Nobody suffered in this crash," Moshner said.
Passengers may have first noticed something was awry minutes before the pitching and rolling.
At about 16,000 feet, the pilot reported haze to the control tower and asked to descend.
As the aircraft passed through clouds, it encountered ice and likely shook from turbulence in the mist and snow, Moshner said. The plane's deicers would have broken up the ice, the wind flinging it off the wings and propellers, knocking chunks of it against the side of the aircraft, loud enough for passengers to hear.
"That would be alarming in significant ice if you hadn't heard it before, but it's routine," Moshner said.
The plane continued its descent. The landing gear was brought down and flaps were opened to 5 degrees at about 2,000 feet. As the pilot tried to open the flaps further - somewhere between 10 and 15 degrees - the control yoke shook in his hand, indicating the plane was losing lift.
Then, it indicated he was going to stall - an aerodynamic phenomenon that means something such as ice has corrupted the wings or tail, or possibly both, making the plane unbalanced and unable to fly.
"The plane's out of control so it's banking over. It may feel like it's upside-down," said Moshner, who as a flight simulator instructor often mimics similar circumstances for his students so they know what a crash or loss of control would feel like.
"It's going to feel like you're rolling over or you're upside-down. You may be vertical or 90 degrees on your side, but it's going to feel like you're upside-down," he said. "The drinks are probably going flying. Anything loose is going to be airborne."
Still, looking out the window would not have helped a passenger determine exactly what was happening to the aircraft because it was dark and the weather was bad, said John Hansman, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor who specializes in flight safety.
Then, the plane dropped 800 feet in just five seconds.
Passengers would have felt like the bottom was dropping out. The plane rolled right and pitched down once more, facing away from the airport.
"Adrenaline and fear factor take over and then it's over," Moshner said.
It lasted only 15 to 30 seconds, but the episode is likely to be studied for decades.
"It takes longer to describe it than the whole incident occurred. Pitch up, pitch down, roll, roll, pitch up, roll and it's done, that quick," Moshner said.
 
FAA To Inspect Pilot Training At Regionals


FAA to inspect pilot training at regional airlines


By JOAN LOWY, Associated Press Writer

Tuesday, June 9, 2009


(06-09) 13:50 PDT WASHINGTON (AP) --

Federal officials said Tuesday they will beef up inspection of pilot training programs at regional airlines in response to safety concerns raised by the crash of a regional airliner in New York in February

Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood and Federal Aviation Administrator Randy Babbitt said in a statement they will also hold a meeting with the airline industry — both regional and major carriers — next week to seek better pilot training, cockpit discipline and other safety improvements.

Babbitt said it was clear from the crash of a regional airliner near Buffalo, N.Y., on Feb. 12 that safety needs to be improved.

"My goal is to make sure that the entire industry, from large commercial carriers to smaller regional operators, is meeting our safety standard," Babbitt said in a statement.

James May, president of the Air Transport Association, which represents large airlines, called the meeting "an important step." He compared it to a government-industry collaboration two years ago to reduce dangerous runway incidents.

Roger Cohen, president of the Regional Airline Association, also endorsed the meeting.

"Safety always has been and always will be our number one priority," Cohen said in a statement

Testimony at a National Transportation Safety Board hearing last month revealed that a series of critical errors by the captain and co-pilot preceded the crash of Continental Express Flight 3407 as it neared Buffalo Niagara International Airport on Feb. 12. The plane experienced an aerodynamic stall before plunging to the ground, killing all 49 aboard and one man in a house on the ground.

The flight was operated for Continental by Colgan Air Inc. of Manassas, Va. Testimony at the hearing indicated the flight's captain may not have had hands-on training on a critical cockpit safety system. The cockpit voice recorder showed the co-pilot describing her lack of experience flying in icy weather not long before the crash.

The NTSB investigation has also raised concern that pilot fatigue may have been a factor in the crash. The co-pilot, Rebecca Shaw, lived near Seattle with her parents and had commuted all-night to get to Newark Liberty International Airport in New Jersey, where Flight 3407 originated. The captain, Marvin Renslow, commuted to work from his home in Tampa, Fla. It's not clear where either of them slept the night before the crash or how much sleep they received.

Testimony at the hearing indicated they may have tried to snatch sleep in a crew lounge at the airport in violation of company policy. The pair were chitchatting just before the crash, which may have prevented them from realizing the airspeed of the twin-engine turboprop had dropped dangerously low.

Jeff Skiles, the co-captain of the US Airways flight that made a safe emergency landing in the Hudson River in January, said most regional airline pilots are well qualified but "there are cracks in the system."

Interviewed Tuesday on CBS'"The Early Show," Skiles said the current rest rules "are less restrictive than truck drivers work under. Once you've been on duty for 13 hours, you are about 500 percent more likely to make an error, and once you've been on duty for 16 hours, you have the response rate of somebody who is legally drunk."

Colgan officials testified at the hearing that Shaw, who had worked for the airline a little over a year, earned about $16,000 her first year. A company spokesman, Joe Williams, later said she earned $23,900. Colgan officials also testified that pilots with Renslow's experience typically earned about $55,000 a year; Williams said the correct figure was about $67,000.

A Senate panel is scheduled to hold a hearing Wednesday on FAA oversight of regional airlines; the House holds a hearing Thursday.
 
Exec Says Pilot Should Not Have Flown

Exec Says Pilot Should Not Have Flown
Captain in Crash That Killed 50 Had Failed Five Pilot Tests
CNN



(Aug. 7) -- An airline executive whose plane crashed earlier this year said although the pilot was "a fine man by all accounts," had the airline "known what we know now ... he would not have been in that seat."
Colgan Air Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, N.Y., on Feb. 12, killing all 49 on the plane and one person on the ground.

After the deadly accident, it was revealed by Colgan Air that the pilot, Capt. Marvin Renslow, had failed five pilot tests, known as 'check-rides,' three of which occurred before he joined the airline. Renslow had revealed only one of those failures to the airline, according to Colgan.
Philip Trenary, president and CEO of Pinnacle Airlines, which is the parent company of Colgan Air, told the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee on Thursday that while "a failure on a check-ride is not necessarily a reason for someone not to fly, it depends on what kind of failure it is."
"The failures that we were unable to see were the basic fundamental failures that you would not want to have," Trenary told the hearing, which was examining relationships between regional airline networks and safety issues.

"Let me stress one thing, Capt. Renslow was a fine man by all accounts," Trenary said. But he added, "Had we known what we know now, no, he would not have been in that seat."
In response to speculation that Renslow was impaired by fatigue, Trenary told the committee the fatigue policy of both Pinnacle and Colgan airlines is clear. "If a pilot is fatigued for any reason, all they have to do is say so and they are excused from duty. The night of (Flight) 3407, we did have 11 reserve pilots available."

Colgan has insisted that pilot fatigue was not a factor in the crash, noting that Renslow had "nearly 22 consecutive hours of time off before he reported for duty on the day of the accident."
There were also reports that Renslow's co-pilot, Rebecca Shaw, was feeling ill and had considered backing out of the flight, according to a cockpit voice recorder transcript released by the National Transportation Safety Board.
The flight, which was part of the Continental Connection schedule, plunged into a house in Clarence Center, N.Y.

According to investigators, the crash resulted from Renslow's incorrect response to a precarious drop in air speed. Renslow reportedly overrode an emergency system known as a stick pusher, which sends the plane into a dive so it can avoid a stall and regain speed.
 
In response to speculation that Renslow was impaired by fatigue, Trenary told the committee the fatigue policy of both Pinnacle and Colgan airlines is clear. "If a pilot is fatigued for any reason, all they have to do is say so and they are excused from duty. The night of (Flight) 3407, we did have 11 reserve pilots available."

I worked for Pinnacle. I called in fatigued once due to a >16 hour duty day that scheduling forced on me the previous night followed by min rest. I had to fill out a form, talk to the chief pilot, and was threatened numerous times. You cannot call in fatigued without consequences at that company.

Burn that *ker to the ground.
 
Colgan had the oportunity to verify Renslow's background. Colgan and Pinnacle are such poor places to work that they looked the other way to get some warm body to fill the seat.

I just emailed the members of the aviation sub committee a long letter detailing all the BS they heard yesterday.
 
Of course PT is going to latch on to the check ride busts - it's the only thing he can claim he has no control over.
 
" I worked for Pinnacle. I called in fatigued once due to a >16 hour duty day that scheduling forced on me the previous night followed by min rest. I had to fill out a form, talk to the chief pilot, and was threatened numerous times. You cannot call in fatigued without consequences at that company."



Maybe you would care to share the above information with a group of folks who might actually make a difference?

NTSB, FAA, Media, Congress just to name a few....


YKMKR
 
"Let me stress one thing, Capt. Renslow was a fine man by all accounts," Trenary said. But he added, "Had we known what we know now, no, he would not have been in that seat."
In response to speculation that Renslow was impaired by fatigue, Trenary told the committee the fatigue policy of both Pinnacle and Colgan airlines is clear. "If a pilot is fatigued for any reason, all they have to do is say so and they are excused from duty. The night of (Flight) 3407, we did have 11 reserve pilots available."

http://commerce.senate.gov/public/i...aring_id=9287f7f2-f8d6-476f-87ab-bdaf2f7f6e35

He also said they had 12 pilots in the ready room. Anyone know what that means? Do they actually have 12 people assigned to ready reserve at the same time?
 
I know how to read you don't know how to listen. Watch the testimony. He said there were 11 people on reserve on 12 ready to go in the ready room. Go to 20 : 00 in the link above.
 
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NTSB Pins NY Crash Cause On Pilot Errors

Safety board pins NY crash cause on pilot errors

By JOAN LOWY, Associated Press Writer

Tuesday, February 2, 2010

(02-02) 19:27 PST WASHINGTON (AP) --

Pilot error was the probable cause of an airline crash into a house near Buffalo, N.Y., last year, but the accident's root problems extend far beyond a single event, a federal safety panel said Tuesday.

The head of the National Transportation Safety Board, Deborah Hersman, said the accident casts doubt on whether regional airlines are held to the same level of safety as are major airlines, and she promised the board will pursue the issue. She also criticized the Federal Aviation Administration for taking too long to address safety problems raised by the crash, saying the same issues have turned up before.

"Today is Groundhog Day, and I feel like we are in that movie," Hersman said, referring to the 1993 Bill Murray movie about a Pittsburgh weatherman who repeatedly lives through the same day. "We have made recommendations time after time after time. They haven't been heeded by the FAA."

The FAA said in a statement that it has driven significant improvements in pilot professionalism, training and background checks in the past year. The agency said it will soon propose new rules to prevent pilot fatigue, further improve training and increase the qualifications required to be an airline pilot.

The three-member board agreed unanimously that an "inappropriate response" by the captain of Continental Connection Flight 3407 to a key piece of safety equipment caused the crash. The board also said the flight crew's inattention to airspeeds, their violation of regulations prohibiting unnecessary conversation during takeoffs and landings, and the air carrier's inadequate procedures for entering airspeeds for freezing weather were contributing factors.

The board issued more than 20 safety recommendations to the FAA as a result of the accident. They included recommendations related to pilot fatigue, remedial training for pilots who have failed skills tests, making pilot's test records available to prospective employers, training on how to recover from a stall and airspeed selection procedures.

Hersman praised FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt for initiating regulation changes in response to the crash on Feb. 12, 2009, when the plane dove into a house, killing all 49 people aboard and one man in the house. But Hersman said Babbitt has been unable so far to push reforms "across the finish line" and that congressional action may be needed.

Flight 3407, operated for Continental Airlines by Colgan Air Inc., was approaching Buffalo-Niagara International Airport when the twin-engine turboprop experienced an aerodynamic stall and went into a dive. The board said Capt. Marvin Renslow should have been able to recover from the stall but that he did the opposite of what he should have done.

In the final seconds of the flight, two pieces of safety equipment activated — a stick shaker to alert the crew their plane was nearing a stall and a stick pusher that points a plane's nose down so it can recover speed, investigators said. The correct response to both situations would have been to push forward on the control column to increase speed, they said.

But Renslow pulled back on the stick shaker, investigators said. When the plane stalled and the pusher activated, Renslow again pulled back three times.

"It wasn't a split-second thing," NTSB safety investigator Roger Cox said. "I think there was time to evaluate the situation and initiate a recovery, but I can't give you a number of seconds."

Seventy-five percent of pilots who had experienced the stick-pusher activation in training also responded by pulling back instead of pushing forward, even though they knew ahead of time to expect a stall, investigators said.

The first officer, Rebecca Shaw, 24, should have stepped in to push the plane's nose down herself when Renslow, 47, responded improperly, but she may not have because she was a relatively inexperienced pilot, investigators said.

Shaw commuted across the country overnight to Newark, N.J., to make Flight 3407. It's not clear how much sleep either pilot received the night before the flight, but investigators said both pilots likely were suffering from fatigue. Hersman wanted to list fatigue as a contributing factors to the crash. The board's other two members declined, saying it couldn't conclusively be determined if fatigue had impaired the pilots' performance.

Shaw erred at the beginning of the flight by programming an ordinary airspeed into the plane's computer, rather than the higher airspeed needed for freezing weather, investigators said. The plane didn't accumulate enough ice on the wings to stall, but the mix-up on speeds caused the stick shaker to warn of a stall even though one wasn't actually imminent.

Colgan's pilot training program was also criticized for not giving Renslow remedial attention despite his failures on several tests of piloting skill and for not emphasizing procedures for recovering from a full stall, including how to respond to the stick pusher.

Colgan said in a statement that the pilots were properly trained in how to recover from a stall.

"We have taken a number of important and specific steps to further enhance all of our training and hiring programs," the statement said.
 
Seventy-five percent of pilots who had experienced the stick-pusher activation in training also responded by pulling back instead of pushing forward, even though they knew ahead of time to expect a stall, investigators said.

Wow. That's kinda scary.
 
Seventy-five percent of pilots who had experienced the stick-pusher activation in training also responded by pulling back instead of pushing forward, even though they knew ahead of time to expect a stall, investigators said.

Thinking back to EMB-145 sim training and PC's, a type ride and more PC's I seem to remember if you lower the nose to recover from a stall you will fail the stall portion of the checkride due to excessive altitude loss.

I was taught, for a clean stall: Maintain altitude, add full power...for a approach to landing stall, maintain altitude, add full power, retract flaps and gear on schedule.

Maybe they need to reevaluate how they are evaluating stall recovery for 121 PC's.

Anyone else have some input?
 

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