OK... a couple things for those who haven't had the time today to listen to the NTSB live or read the CVR transcripts:
1. The Capt and F/O were obviously goofing off. The pitch, roll, and yaw was all over the place during the climb and high g-loads both positive and negative were induced.
2. At 15,000 the autopilot came on for 80 seconds and the pilots SWITCHED SEATS. At the time of the beginning of the event, the F/O was at the controls monitoring the autopilot and the speed from the left seat, the CA was back in the galley getting Pepsis.
3. The aircraft weight was 37,600 pounds, or close enough to 38,000 for chart work. The temp was ISA + 10 for chart work (9.4). The maximum climb ceiling at that weight and temp combo is FL 40,400 (out of FCOM2) for 300 fpm climb. Max altitude for LRC (lightest possible weight) is also 40,400. The aircraft should never have been taken that high.
4. The aircraft never reached Mach .70 in the climb. The above charts referenced REQUIRE a minimum climb speed. The crew got behind L/D max so far they were NEVER coming out.
5. The crew realized they weren't going to be able to maintain altitude, and were starting to request lower when the first shaker event occurred. Several shaker / pusher actuations ensued from there. The CA was back in the right seat just as the event began.
6. We don't yet know if the aircraft flipped over, but from testimony provided by Bombardier today, they know d*mn well that if the aircraft is pitched even SLIGHTLY above the stall AOA, airflow is interrupted into the engines and both will flame out. They testified they had 3 unplanned dual egine flameouts during flight testing in this scenario.
7. The transcripts show that
THE CREW DID THE DUAL ENGINE FLAMEOUT CHECKLIST IMMEDIATELY. THE CREW DID THE RELIGHT ATTEMPTS PROPERLY! That's right folks, they did just about everything by the numbers once they got in that position. To Cesarz' credit, he seemed to have his head on straight and it might be argued that he was the most useful member of the crew once the event began. The windmill restart checklist was started, but halfway through it the crew realized they had no N2 rotation so that start was abandoned. THAT is why the aircraft never accelerated to the 300 kts required.
8. The engines were NEVER going to restart. They were "core locked". Read ALPA's latest release on it - the engine manufacturer had to own up to it during testimony and it's not good for them that it took an accident for us to realize. Basically, the engine "vapor locked" like a carbureted auto.
http://www.alpa.org/DesktopModules/ALPA_Documents/ALPA_DocumentsView.aspx?itemid=1616&ModuleId=1316&Tabid=256
9. The crew properly attempted 4 APU Starter-assisted relights, none of which were successful because the engine's N2 spool was "core locked" and wouldn't rotate.
10. The crew passed 3 usable airports during the event but by the time they started thinking about usable airports, they were too low to get anywhere. As an aside, the company is STILL not training the basic "find a usable airport first" mentality for the dual engine flameout scenario in the sim. Our training department at its finest - jerkoffs.
11. The crew switched BACK into their original seats at 10,000 feet. Why the h*ll they did this... who knows, it's not on the CVR transcripts.
Fact: the pilots caused the accident by failing to operate the aircraft in a safe manner.
Fact: the company bears some responsibility for not EVER covering ALL the FCOM charts properly with new-hires and the CA was close enough to being a new-hire to fall into this category.
Fact: both crewmembers should have taken it upon themselves to know the FCOM thoroughly and know how to use the charts.
Fact: The aircraft manufacturer bears some responsibility for not adequately ensuring pilots are trained in just how critical the aircraft pitch is in relation to engine airflow (although most pilots who have been through a REAL training program in jet aircraft get this hammered in early).
Fact: the engine manufacturer bears some blame in designing engines that have the very REAL possibility of locking up in a flameout condition.
One of my coworkers said it best: hopefully this will cause enough of a shakeup to get the company to implement a REAL training program, hire QUALIFIED individuals by paying enough to attract them, and hopefully this loss of life will educate enough people to one day prevent another such tragedy with even greater loss of life.
