Pinnacle Pilots: "Just wanted to have fun"

[BoilerUP]

Doesn't sound to me like they tried correctly to start and engine, if the procedure calls for 300 knots than GET 300 KNOTS, don't lollygag around at 190 and wonder why the engine won't turn.

They may have tried in vain to restart the engine, but you gotta follow the published profile to get the thing to restart.

May they RIP, and may we all learn from their mistakes...

 

[Gateau]

I thought i posted the most disgusting crap on this website. I sit here dethroned, and mesmorized by shock and awe. Bravo sir.

Why, thank you! *********

 

[Wasted]

Just wondering, how many of you people here were ever flight instructors? And when you were a flight instructor, didn't you ever tell your students that the numbers in section 5 of that little C152 POH were derived from perfect planes flown on perfect days by perfect pilots using perfect techniques? And that they probably were not going to see a takeoff run that short, or a cruise speed that fast, or a fuel consumption that low, or a ceiling that high, because well, nobody's that perfect.... Or now that we all got hired somewhere, did we forget all that?

First the pilots being sent to jail, then this hearing, what does it take for pilots to get a break these days? Are we not our own worst enemies?

 

[humveedriver]

What an unfortunate accident. I have not had the opportunity yet to read the NTSB report, but have every intention to. I do not fly the RJ, but have an aircraft specific question for those who do. Is there a minimum power setting for operations at high altitude/cold temps to keep the fuel in the tanks above freezing? I have heard the aerodynamic explanation, but was wondering if it was possible that the crew set a lower power setting to keep the plane below Vmo, and inadvertently chilled their gas?

 

[Godvek]

Latinachick, how much TT do you have and how much on the panel? Was your boyfriend PFT? Are you? You stink of it!

 

[PCL_128]

What an unfortunate accident. I have not had the opportunity yet to read the NTSB report, but have every intention to. I do not fly the RJ, but have an aircraft specific question for those who do. Is there a minimum power setting for operations at high altitude/cold temps to keep the fuel in the tanks above freezing? I have heard the aerodynamic explanation, but was wondering if it was possible that the crew set a lower power setting to keep the plane below Vmo, and inadvertently chilled their gas?

Nope, no limitation on that. We have a limit for the min temp on the fuel, but a thrust setting is not required. The thrust is up almost to the stops anyway at that altitude. Trust me, keeping the CRJ below Vmo or Mmo up at altitude isn't a problem.

 

[exchexflyer]

*********

Understandably upset with Gateau...

 

[Crossky]

What an unfortunate accident. I have not had the opportunity yet to read the NTSB report, but have every intention to. I do not fly the RJ, but have an aircraft specific question for those who do. Is there a minimum power setting for operations at high altitude/cold temps to keep the fuel in the tanks above freezing? I have heard the aerodynamic explanation, but was wondering if it was possible that the crew set a lower power setting to keep the plane below Vmo, and inadvertently chilled their gas?

No limitation, and NO chance of fuel freezing. The CRJ has an oil to fuel heat exchanger which prevents that. We have a min fuel temp for takeoff though.

Were those guys really showing 180 kts TAS? wow. RIP.

 

[Lear70]

OK... a couple things for those who haven't had the time today to listen to the NTSB live or read the CVR transcripts:

1. The Capt and F/O were obviously goofing off. The pitch, roll, and yaw was all over the place during the climb and high g-loads both positive and negative were induced.

2. At 15,000 the autopilot came on for 80 seconds and the pilots SWITCHED SEATS. At the time of the beginning of the event, the F/O was at the controls monitoring the autopilot and the speed from the left seat, the CA was back in the galley getting Pepsis.

3. The aircraft weight was 37,600 pounds, or close enough to 38,000 for chart work. The temp was ISA + 10 for chart work (9.4). The maximum climb ceiling at that weight and temp combo is FL 40,400 (out of FCOM2) for 300 fpm climb. Max altitude for LRC (lightest possible weight) is also 40,400. The aircraft should never have been taken that high.

4. The aircraft never reached Mach .70 in the climb. The above charts referenced REQUIRE a minimum climb speed. The crew got behind L/D max so far they were NEVER coming out.

5. The crew realized they weren't going to be able to maintain altitude, and were starting to request lower when the first shaker event occurred. Several shaker / pusher actuations ensued from there. The CA was back in the right seat just as the event began.

6. We don't yet know if the aircraft flipped over, but from testimony provided by Bombardier today, they know d*mn well that if the aircraft is pitched even SLIGHTLY above the stall AOA, airflow is interrupted into the engines and both will flame out. They testified they had 3 unplanned dual egine flameouts during flight testing in this scenario.

7. The transcripts show that THE CREW DID THE DUAL ENGINE FLAMEOUT CHECKLIST IMMEDIATELY. THE CREW DID THE RELIGHT ATTEMPTS PROPERLY! That's right folks, they did just about everything by the numbers once they got in that position. To Cesarz' credit, he seemed to have his head on straight and it might be argued that he was the most useful member of the crew once the event began. The windmill restart checklist was started, but halfway through it the crew realized they had no N2 rotation so that start was abandoned. THAT is why the aircraft never accelerated to the 300 kts required.

8. The engines were NEVER going to restart. They were "core locked". Read ALPA's latest release on it - the engine manufacturer had to own up to it during testimony and it's not good for them that it took an accident for us to realize. Basically, the engine "vapor locked" like a carbureted auto. http://www.alpa.org/DesktopModules/ALPA_Documents/ALPA_DocumentsView.aspx?itemid=1616&ModuleId=1316&Tabid=256

9. The crew properly attempted 4 APU Starter-assisted relights, none of which were successful because the engine's N2 spool was "core locked" and wouldn't rotate.

10. The crew passed 3 usable airports during the event but by the time they started thinking about usable airports, they were too low to get anywhere. As an aside, the company is STILL not training the basic "find a usable airport first" mentality for the dual engine flameout scenario in the sim. Our training department at its finest - jerkoffs.

11. The crew switched BACK into their original seats at 10,000 feet. Why the h*ll they did this... who knows, it's not on the CVR transcripts.

Fact: the pilots caused the accident by failing to operate the aircraft in a safe manner.
Fact: the company bears some responsibility for not EVER covering ALL the FCOM charts properly with new-hires and the CA was close enough to being a new-hire to fall into this category.
Fact: both crewmembers should have taken it upon themselves to know the FCOM thoroughly and know how to use the charts.
Fact: The aircraft manufacturer bears some responsibility for not adequately ensuring pilots are trained in just how critical the aircraft pitch is in relation to engine airflow (although most pilots who have been through a REAL training program in jet aircraft get this hammered in early).
Fact: the engine manufacturer bears some blame in designing engines that have the very REAL possibility of locking up in a flameout condition.

One of my coworkers said it best: hopefully this will cause enough of a shakeup to get the company to implement a REAL training program, hire QUALIFIED individuals by paying enough to attract them, and hopefully this loss of life will educate enough people to one day prevent another such tragedy with even greater loss of life.

 

[Towelie]

OK... a couple things for those who haven't had the time today to listen to the NTSB live or read the CVR transcripts:

Well said.

 

[Diesel]

Just because you are at max cert alt in a plane doesn't mean you can get up there every time.

A couple examples. The Citation 750 is certified to FL510. Will it get up there? Sure but you better be **CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED** light and fly it fast and climb slow. You can get there. I've been to 490 and you better make sure the plane will want to get there.

The king air 90 series were certified to 310. How they got them up there I will never know. Probably with jato bottles or something like that because they will never make it.

Just because a plane is certified doesn't mean it will get there. It is flown with test pilots, a green airplane and new engines. Not some RJ that is all bent to shiat and is not flown as the profile to the altitude.

So yes you can sevice ceiling but there isn't much room for error.

 

[DirkkDiggler]

Lear70, Thanks for the informative post. Nicely objective and that is certainly refreshing.

 

[flap operator]

Lear - nicely put.



FO

 

[exchexflyer]

Lear70, I agree with everything you said. Thanks for saying what I couldn't have put into words!

 

[CRJ puppy]

Lear70's post is almost right on with the exception of the fact that the double engine failure memory items were not completed correctly. While the thrust levers were moved to the idle position, there is no indication that they were moved to the SHUTOFF position to stop the fuel flow. Therefore they still had fuel flow to the engines with the continuous ignition on, resulting in the melting of the various turbine vanes in both the HPT and the LPT (in the #2 engine). (Varying from 30% to 70% of the metal melted away...reference the Chairman's Powerplant report.) The #2 engine was doomed never to relight at this point, long before they ever began to initiate a windmill restart. This is why they never got N2 rotation on the #2 engine (unfortunately).

 

[psycho]

Hey Gateau,
********

Another unhappy reader of Gateau. Unfortunately, he went a bit too far...

 

[BLing]

One of my coworkers said it best: hopefully this will cause enough of a shakeup to get the company to implement a REAL training program, hire QUALIFIED individuals by paying enough to attract them, and hopefully this loss of life will educate enough people to one day prevent another such tragedy with even greater loss of life.

Cannot agree with you more. Pinnacle needs to solve this problem by setting higher standards for who they hire at all levels. They can do this by paying people better and actually offering benefits. The training programs are in need of a major overhaul as well. Not to say that Pinnacle doesnt have good people working for them, because they have a lot, but they have been forced to hire some people that may not have been able to get jobs elsewhere. I am not in anyway bashing this crew, I did not personally know them, nor have I read any reports, but there are lessons to be learned from this tragedy.

 

[Flechas]

Of course he went too far, Gateau is Rhoid, he can't help but get banned. (i'm drunk right now, not too far from getting banned myself...)

 

[JD2003]

Core Lock? Thats pretty spooky. I thought the EMB had its share of spookiness until I heard this bit about core lock.

Did the previous poster meen to suggest that there was ignition and fuel flow with the thrust levers at idle during the restart sequence? Seems to me that fuel flow is introduced after a certain N1 has been achieved but that's just the EMB...don't know about the CRJ.

spooky indeed...but heck, I still love airplanes.

pilot error?...foolishness...yes!!!

engineering shortfall...this I like!


Oh god...I could have been a doctor or a lawyer...what was I thinking?

 

[Lear70]

Lear70's post is almost right on with the exception of the fact that the double engine failure memory items were not completed correctly. While the thrust levers were moved to the idle position, there is no indication that they were moved to the SHUTOFF position to stop the fuel flow.

Strange... I must have missed that part. In the CVR transcript PC does the memory items and says they're shut off, then later when doing the engine relight, he talks again about them being shutoff.

Did he get his verbiage wrong because he was rattled and only move them to idle but said "shutoff"? During the initial briefing (very beginning of the hearing) the synopsis says they did the restart attempts but makes no mention that they were done incorrectly - something I believe would be important in the hearing.

I'll have to review the transcripts a little better and see what I missed. Thanks for the clarification.

Regarding core lock... we'll hear more about that today from the G.E. engineers' testimonies. Some of our more experienced pilots (guys with 15 to 20k hours) seem to have heard about it before; it's a new one for me so I'm all ears...