Okay, here's my two cents (as both a former CRJ FO & CA, and having duplicated this in a CRJ Sim).
First, here are some things to consider:
1. The crew exceeded published limitations for the aircraft. They climbed at a weight/temperature that exceed the certifications of the aircraft. In addition, FDR data shows that the departure from the originating airport included pitch angles as high as 22 degrees nose up, and also induced stick shaker warnings.
2. The crew violated set company policies and common sense by SWITCHING SEATS after departure.
3. The crew violated FARs when one crewmember (the CA) left the cockpit at FL410 and the FO didn't put on O2.
4. The crew failed to recognize the continual negative trend of airspeed after the plan leveled off. Once they did recognize it, they failed to take immediate corrective action. They even laughed about how the airplane couldn't stay up at altitude
5. Because of the failure to remain within certificated operating envelopes, when the aircraft did stall, it did so in a manner that caused irrecoverable engine damage in the right (#2) engine. (ITT spiked at the top of the FDR recording limits at 1200 degrees C. For those of you unfamiliar with the CRJ, 928 ITT is the maximum ITT in the published limitations, 874 is max continuous operation)
6. The crew was so overwhelmed after the failure, it took them almost a full minute before they even silenced the master warning messages.
7. The crew failed to notify ATC in a timely manner that they had experienced a dual engine failure.
8. At 2200:38, the CA (while reading the QRH) instructs the FO (FP) to pitch for 300 knots to attempt a windmilling restart. At this point, the aircraft was descending through 27,000 feet. The top of the windmilling airstart envelope is 21,000'.
The windmilling restart requires a MINIMUM of 300 KIAS at or below FL210. The crew never pitched significantly enough to reach this speed (they made it only to approximately 250 KIAS).
As a result of not reaching the required airspeed, N2 rotation was never achieved, and the engine start/relight sequence was aborted.
9. At 2203:15 on the CVR, the captain misrepresented to ATC that they had only lost one engine at altitude, and were going to "descend down now to start our other engine."
10. There is the issue of engine core lock for the restart of the number 1 engine at 13000'. However, it is not unreasonable to expect engine damage following such violent maneuvers outside of normal operating limits. GE/Bombardier have shown in flight test that an engine that experiences either a flameout or intentional shutdown within the operating envelope will restart with APU bleed air rotation.
It's a sh*tty deal. Every accident is. However this was a 100% preventable accident. Even if the engines had never been relit. If the crew had considered the ramifications of a dual engine failure earlier on (and with significant altitude), there is no question in my mind that they could have found an airport to set down on that was within range. It might not have been pretty and might have resulted in an overrun, but it would have most likely been survivable.
This lawsuit is nothing more than a frivolous attempt by the families to gain some sort of monetary settlement, and in their mind clear the records of their deceased family members.
Instead it only serves to dig up the incident once again, put the spot light on two pilots that acted very unprofessionally and recklessly, and contribute to the growing legal burden that this country faces due to unjustifiable torts.
~Josh
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For those of you who are interested, here are some links for you to conduct your own research on this accident:
NTSB public docket of the last NTSB hearing held on the accident:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/default.htm
Some of the recommended reading from these documents would be the following:
CVR Transcript:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/CVR_Factual.pdf
FDR Factual Report:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/316970.pdf
GE Report on Engine Core Lock:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/324090.pdf
Human Performance Report/Crew Histories:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/322805.pdf