Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Friendliest aviation Ccmmunity on the web
  • Modern site for PC's, Phones, Tablets - no 3rd party apps required
  • Ask questions, help others, promote aviation
  • Share the passion for aviation
  • Invite everyone to Flightinfo.com and let's have fun

Pinnacle family members sue NWA!

Welcome to Flightinfo.com

  • Register now and join the discussion
  • Modern secure site, no 3rd party apps required
  • Invite your friends
  • Share the passion of aviation
  • Friendliest aviation community on the web
First of all, hindsight is always 20/20...
Having said that, I don't see how the parents have any chance of winning a lawsuit here. They declared an emergency at 2155, then 8 minutes (!) later, they finally tell ATC that they have ONE engine out, when they in fact had two from the get go. To top it off, when they finally acknowledge dual engine failure and request vectors to the nearest airport, another 6 minutes have passed. That is 14 minutes between losing both engines and requesting vectors for the nearest airport. Sad part is, they crashed only 2.5 miles short of the airport, meaning they would have made it in plenty of time if they would have headed that way sooner. Seems pilot error is pretty easy to prove here. Although, like I said, hindsight is always 20/20, and who am I to judge these pilots? Just trying to look at things from a logical point of view.
 
redflyer65 said:
Neither engine restarted when they pressed the button with the APU running. I suppose your families wouldn't care about that fact. The aircraft is certified to due certain things, and it didn't. The main reason these lawsuits are filed isn't just for the money. These issues will be completely swept under the carpet by the airframe and engine manufactures unless they are held somewhat accountable. These guys paid the ultimate price for the position they got themselves into, but the engines should have restarted. How would you explain that in another accident with a different set of circumstances and there were people in the back? Pick whatever reason you want for an engine flameout, but it shouldn't have core locked. GE knew about this from their flight test. Alot of this info will come out in the lawsuits. Otherwise you would never see it. Let these guys rest in peace and let the process play out.

Hey Redflyer65,

Question for you...what is the max ambient temp for flight at FL410? My airplane is ISA + 35. I rememer that night when 3701 went down. It was SUPER warm at altitude in the Arkansas area. Yes, the CRJ is certified for FL410, but only within a certain temp range. I bet the airplane was operating outside the LIMITATION.

Yes, "the aircraft is suppose to do certain things," and it stalled at FL410 just like the manual suggested it should do. It was too warm.
 
mrnolmts said:
They declared an emergency at 2155, then 8 minutes (!) later, they finally tell ATC that they have ONE engine out, when they in fact had two from the get go. To top it off, when they finally acknowledge dual engine failure and request vectors to the nearest airport, another 6 minutes have passed. That is 14 minutes between losing both engines and requesting vectors for the nearest airport.

Would you conceal a CRJ dual engine failure from ATC unless you knew that you had caused the failure by clowning around, and were trying to hide it?

Obviously these clowns thought they could get away with it if they kept it quiet as long as possible. A dumb choice (not their first) that killed them. I hope the jury laughs in the face of these gold digging family members who have clearly decided to trade in (deserved) sympathy for greed, no doubt with the help of a greedy lawyer.
 
Okay, here's my two cents (as both a former CRJ FO & CA, and having duplicated this in a CRJ Sim).

First, here are some things to consider:

1. The crew exceeded published limitations for the aircraft. They climbed at a weight/temperature that exceed the certifications of the aircraft. In addition, FDR data shows that the departure from the originating airport included pitch angles as high as 22 degrees nose up, and also induced stick shaker warnings.

2. The crew violated set company policies and common sense by SWITCHING SEATS after departure.

3. The crew violated FARs when one crewmember (the CA) left the cockpit at FL410 and the FO didn't put on O2.

4. The crew failed to recognize the continual negative trend of airspeed after the plan leveled off. Once they did recognize it, they failed to take immediate corrective action. They even laughed about how the airplane couldn't stay up at altitude

5. Because of the failure to remain within certificated operating envelopes, when the aircraft did stall, it did so in a manner that caused irrecoverable engine damage in the right (#2) engine. (ITT spiked at the top of the FDR recording limits at 1200 degrees C. For those of you unfamiliar with the CRJ, 928 ITT is the maximum ITT in the published limitations, 874 is max continuous operation)

6. The crew was so overwhelmed after the failure, it took them almost a full minute before they even silenced the master warning messages.

7. The crew failed to notify ATC in a timely manner that they had experienced a dual engine failure.

8. At 2200:38, the CA (while reading the QRH) instructs the FO (FP) to pitch for 300 knots to attempt a windmilling restart. At this point, the aircraft was descending through 27,000 feet. The top of the windmilling airstart envelope is 21,000'.

The windmilling restart requires a MINIMUM of 300 KIAS at or below FL210. The crew never pitched significantly enough to reach this speed (they made it only to approximately 250 KIAS).

As a result of not reaching the required airspeed, N2 rotation was never achieved, and the engine start/relight sequence was aborted.

9. At 2203:15 on the CVR, the captain misrepresented to ATC that they had only lost one engine at altitude, and were going to "descend down now to start our other engine."

10. There is the issue of engine core lock for the restart of the number 1 engine at 13000'. However, it is not unreasonable to expect engine damage following such violent maneuvers outside of normal operating limits. GE/Bombardier have shown in flight test that an engine that experiences either a flameout or intentional shutdown within the operating envelope will restart with APU bleed air rotation.

It's a sh*tty deal. Every accident is. However this was a 100% preventable accident. Even if the engines had never been relit. If the crew had considered the ramifications of a dual engine failure earlier on (and with significant altitude), there is no question in my mind that they could have found an airport to set down on that was within range. It might not have been pretty and might have resulted in an overrun, but it would have most likely been survivable.

This lawsuit is nothing more than a frivolous attempt by the families to gain some sort of monetary settlement, and in their mind clear the records of their deceased family members.

Instead it only serves to dig up the incident once again, put the spot light on two pilots that acted very unprofessionally and recklessly, and contribute to the growing legal burden that this country faces due to unjustifiable torts.

~Josh

------------------------------------
For those of you who are interested, here are some links for you to conduct your own research on this accident:

NTSB public docket of the last NTSB hearing held on the accident:

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/default.htm

Some of the recommended reading from these documents would be the following:

CVR Transcript:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/CVR_Factual.pdf

FDR Factual Report:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/316970.pdf

GE Report on Engine Core Lock:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/324090.pdf

Human Performance Report/Crew Histories:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/322805.pdf
 
Guys, I don't disagree with you. They should have never gotten themselves in that position. PERIOD. Do any of you know the stall characteristics of the CRJ above FL300? Have you gone over it and taught the recovery procedure at that altitude? The stall recovery procedure that your taught at 10,000 doesn't work. Let me review...... At 10,000ft, go full power and hold altitude to not lose more than 100ft. What happens when you use that at F370? There is no more power and if you try to hold altitude you will enter a secondary stall, which might be completely unrecoverable. They had never been given the training and had NEVER heard of the 'core lock', which was known about at Bombarbier and GE.

And no the APU wasn't running until they started it around 15,000ft, so don't act like I don't know what I'm talking about because I have sifted through the FDR data more than once. The valves were all in the correct position with the APU running and neither engine started. I have read through this stuff to learn more about the airplane for my own knowledge. I hope there will be more to come with these lawsuits. Info that is not readily available to any CRJ pilot.
 
Well, it sounds as if you are referring to issues in the PCL training program. If so, why wasn't PCL named in the lawsuit? I think you know the reason.

Furthermore, if the alleged negligence concerns "core lock" and a faulty oil pump, then why are the avionics manufacturers named in the suit? Again, I think you know the reason.

If not, perhaps you can get in contact with John Edwards and ask him. :-)

Btw, it doesn't take a lawsuit to bring about an investigation of an event. The investigation is the NTSB/FAA's job regardless of any litigation.
 
Last edited:
redflyer65 said:
Guys, I don't disagree with you. They should have never gotten themselves in that position. PERIOD. Do any of you know the stall characteristics of the CRJ above FL300? Have you gone over it and taught the recovery procedure at that altitude? The stall recovery procedure that your taught at 10,000 doesn't work. Let me review...... At 10,000ft, go full power and hold altitude to not lose more than 100ft. What happens when you use that at F370? There is no more power and if you try to hold altitude you will enter a secondary stall, which might be completely unrecoverable. They had never been given the training and had NEVER heard of the 'core lock', which was known about at Bombarbier and GE.

And no the APU wasn't running until they started it around 15,000ft, so don't act like I don't know what I'm talking about because I have sifted through the FDR data more than once. The valves were all in the correct position with the APU running and neither engine started. I have read through this stuff to learn more about the airplane for my own knowledge. I hope there will be more to come with these lawsuits. Info that is not readily available to any CRJ pilot.

Red,

I agree. The crew wasn't taught how to recover from a stall at FL410. However we are all taught how to stay out of such a condition that would cause such a stall. They don't teach us how to fly the plane inverted either. Hopefully we have enough common sense not to fly upside down (even though the plane could probably do it for a period of time).

Just an FYI, the APU was running prior to 15000'. (It shows ready and connected from the time that the FDR regains "consciousness" at ~0259:15). This time point coinsides with approximately the time descended they through FL300.

The bleeds look like they were configured okay, however remember the engines weren't designed to be flamed out due to air starvation at FL410. There's a reason that the manufacturer creates LIMITATIONS and OPERATING ENVELOPES.

When the crew ceased to abide by those limits, they became test pilots. In doing so, they took the engines outside of anything that they had ever been tested for, including core lock. Notice that during the flight testing, GE didn't starve any of the engines. They intentionally shut them down, which is not likely to cause damage... unlike a starvation which can severely spike the ITT.

Just because the engines didn't restart doesn't mean that it's the engine manufacturers fault. Consider this. If you purchase an new car with a warranty, can you do anything you want with it and expect the dealer to fix it? No. You have to remain within pre-set use limits, otherwise the warranty is void. Essentally the crew, in failing to follow set procedures and abide by limitations established by the engine and aircraft manufacturers, void any claims of airworthiness made by either party.

Will the CRJ fly at F410? Sure. I've been there myself. Will it do it under every circumstance. Hell no. That's why the plane (and many others) have climb performace limits that are based on things such as weight, ISA deviation, SAT, AOA, etc.

This is nothing more than a lawsuit by scary mary and the families in an attempt to either clear the pilots names (ain't gonna happen), or grab what they feel is their share of the cash from huge corporations.
 
redflyer65 said:
Guys, I don't disagree with you.........

Sorry, but that's all you've done.

redflyer65 said:
Do any of you know the stall characteristics of the CRJ above FL300? Have you gone over it and taught the recovery procedure at that altitude?...........

Has nothing to do with it. What has everything to do with it is the ability to recognize aircraft limitations that are published for a reason. It's the ability to recognize and react appropriately to COFFIN CORNER. It's the ability to react to such. The aircraft didn't stall at 10,000 or "FL300". The aircraft limitations were exceeded, the aircraft engines stalled due to lack of airflow, and they tried to override every warning possible.

redflyer65 said:
They had never been given the training and had NEVER heard of the 'core lock'.....

You can't tell me that neither had EVER received ANY training in high altitude operations or swept wing characteristics. As far as "core lock", is concerned, understood. However, limitations and operating envelopes are published for a reason. Rhodes NEVER ensured as PIC that the limitations were nevered exceeded or that the checklist was utilized 100%. He also, among numerous other screw ups, failed to notify the appropriate ground facility of an immediate failure of an aircraft component as required by 14CFR Part 91.
Unless you're employed by a manufacturer as a test pilot, it's never your place to question why limitations and checklists are as such, especially when you're putting someone else's life at stake. If you want to question them, be on the ground without someone else's life at stake.

redflyer65 said:
And no the APU wasn't running until they started it around 15,000ft, so don't act like I don't know what I'm talking about because I have sifted through the FDR data more than once. The valves were all in the correct position with the APU running and neither engine started.

As a Captain (hopefully not on the CRJ), you again fail to recognize the necessity for limitations and checklists. From reading your comments, I highly recommend that you go back to the right seat of whatever aircraft you can hold and allow someone else with brains and common sense to assume the responsibility of the left seat. Here it is again.....had they done their jobs and not been "Cowboy children", they would still be alive. There are reasons why limitations and checklists exist. Our company has a minimum climb speed limitation of 250/.70. Did PCL not have such a limitation prior to this accident?

redflyer65 said:
I hope there will be more to come with these lawsuits. Info that is not readily available to any CRJ pilot.

Hopefully the info will be simple......Rhodes was dangerous. There were numerous students and instructors from Riddle who had "running bets" on how long it would take him to kill himself or someone else due to his "hotdogging" and lack of professionalism. I've spoken personally to a few, so I don't see it as a rumor. Should Rhodes' family be ashamed of themselves for these lawsuits? Big time. Should Cesarz' family toy with the idea of a wrongful death suit against Rhodes' family. I'm not a lawyer, but I know the answer.

People seem to forget that when you're in a "high profile" profession such as we are, what you do away from home can be publisized and scrutenized easily. Do your job, and no one gets hurt.



Sorry your friends died, which is obviously why you're being so defensive. They screwed up bad. Thank God there were no passengers on board. Thank God no one on the ground was killed.


Obviously he couldn't have been, but it's a shame that Rhodes wasn't by himself.
 
Last edited:
Like all of us I wanted the uniform, to fly a cool jet as quick as possible, to feel equal to my friends, have hot chicks look at you during boarding while you flip switches and look cool, and all that other stuff
 
commuterpuke said:
Like all of us I wanted the uniform, to fly a cool jet as quick as possible, to feel equal to my friends, have hot chicks look at you during boarding while you flip switches and look cool, and all that other stuff

???????? You're a tool. Do you always wear your uniform to airshows?
 
No Delay said:
I doubt the APU was running at FL410. There are procedures for Double Engine failure. The pilots had the engines fried before the ever got into the parameters for an air restart.

It was a bad deal and a great loss. But I disagree with the lawsuit. Also, I believe the FAA, Bombardier, and many airlines have changed / updated procedures and limitations as a result of this crash.
ok the plane was brought outside the envelope of operation INTENTIONALLY...and they expected to bring it back inside the envelope and have everything work perfectly? lack of airflow to cool components while going so slow up that high WILL damage something. and then they think these parts should work fine after doing this?...heh heh....yeah right.
 
commuterpuke said:
Why am I a tool? At least I don't wear my nomex flight suit to fly a 172! Who's the tool now!

That would be you.
 
redflyer65 said:
They had never been given the training and had NEVER heard of the 'core lock', which was known about at Bombarbier and GE.


Core lock is not some great mystery of RJ engines. Every jet engine on the planet will do the very same thing if abused such as these engines were.

Why do you think a hot start is treated with such respect? Because even a little over temp limits can damage an engine, what these guys caused to happen in their engines was way way beyond what you might expect in the worst hot start.

As somebody else stated, you cannot abuse the equipment and then expect it to perform as advertised 5 minutes later. Machinery does not work that way. If you think it does then maybe you should question your competency to be sitting in the left seat.

Remember, metal fatigue is cumulative. If you abuse a piece of equipment, it may not quit on you, but you have weakened it so that it may fail on some poor slob later, who isn't abusing it. The same is true of internal engine parts. It just so happens that these guys abused it bad enough that it failed on them and saved the next unsuspecting slob from having to deal with their mess.
 
KeroseneSnorter said:
It just so happens that these guys abused it bad enough that it failed on them and saved the next unsuspecting slob from having to deal with their mess.

That's a good point. It seems like they didn't care to show any TLC to that jet. And had they successfully reignited, in an effort to cover up the mishap, I wonder if they would have reported it to maintenance. The next flight would probably been a revenue one where the engines could have quit without any possibilty to restart due to the earlier damage.
 
Long Time Gone said:
You can't tell me that neither had EVER received ANY training in high altitude operations or swept wing characteristics.
Pinnacle's training in high-alt and swept-wing aerodynamics is practically nonexistent, and that's even after this accident. Unless you came from flying jets previously, then you'd have to learn everything on your own. Pinnacle doesn't seem to care about teaching anything at all about these sorts of operations, which is a real problem when you are hiring 1000 TT CFIs and BE-1900 drivers.

Our company has a minimum climb speed limitation of 250/.70. Did PCL not have such a limitation prior to this accident?
No, in fact, we did not. That limitation was adopted only after it became apparent that this accident was partly caused by flying at altitude with too low a speed. Thankfully, the FOQA program will now pick up deviations from this limitation also so that the ALPA "gatekeeper" can educate pilots that aren't adhering this limitation for whatever reason.
 
A truly professional airman seeks out as much information about his operational environment as possible, instead of simply assuming that groundschool taught them all they ever needed to know.

A little judgement and self-study might have prevented this.

Although that actually leads to a sort of chicken-and-egg situation:
Those who are responsible and cautious enough to seek out such information probably are not likelyy to engage in foolish behavior either.

Therfore it still boils down to personality, temperment, etc. We need some way to test for that.

Children+Machinery=Fatalities.
 
P-Dawg_QX said:
Do aircraft limitations mean nothing?!? Can I go load my airplane up to two times max takeoff weight, then go pull 5Gs, then have my family sue every company that manufactured a component in that airplane because the wings snapped off?

Why, yes -- I believe you can. ;)
 
Long Time, I would have never gotten myself into the position they did, its just not in my nature. Have I made some mistakes flying along the way, absolutely. But none that was as periless as these guys. I have learned from my mistakes and I'm trying my best to learn from theirs. I understand that the engines overtemped. But the manufacture came upon the core lock during test flying and NEVER attempted a windmilling relight. They ALWAYS left the APU running for the restart. How many times do we have the luxury of leaving the APU running? How about never. They say the engines should restart after a core lock event, it takes a matter of minutes for the engines to be "un-locked". So what happened exactly? I would like to know. Unless you put the manufacturer on the stand, you will probably never know.

PCL128 is dead on when it comes to high altitude training. If it cost too much, it probably won't be done. Period. Did it come back bite them, I think so. Another example would be the unions attempt at instituting FOQA. The comany resisted at every turn, time and time again. If the pilots had known FOQA would track their activity, maybe, just maybe they wouldn't have down the stupid things they did. Now miraculously we have FOQA.

To give another training example......When does the shaker come on during stall manuevers at 10,000ft? For those of you that don't know, its the top of the snake. When does it come on at say FL370? You wouldn't know any different if you went through training at PCL. It comes on just below the green line (supposed 1.27VS). During the hearings, it came out that the shaker comes on quicker at higher altitudes more so for engine protection and NOT for wing protection. I had never heard this before. Do we have the manufacturers training manuals? No. Is there more to learn? Definitely.
 
How slow did they get in the climb? I remember some insane slow speed like 190 KIAS or .53 Mach. Something like that. Stupid!
 
DetoXJ said:
How slow did they get in the climb? I remember some insane slow speed like 190 KIAS or .53 Mach. Something like that. Stupid!

From the NTSB report:

The altitude levels off at about 36,400 feet and the airspeed increases to slightly above 200 knots. Then the altitude continues to increase to approximately 41,000 feet, the airspeed bleeds off to about 165 knots, and the pitch and AOA continue to increase to about 6 and 5 degress, respectively. After the altitude levels off at 41,000 feet the airspeed continues to bleed off to about 150 knots as the pitch and AOA continue increasing to about 7.5 degrees at about the same time as the stick shaker activates and the auto-pilot
disengages.
 
Pathetic. I hope their families spend 10s of thousands of dollars in lawyer fees and then have it thrown out of court. The pilots screwed the pooch, plain and simple.
 
mesaba2425 said:
Pathetic. I hope their families spend 10s of thousands of dollars in lawyer fees and then have it thrown out of court. The pilots screwed the pooch, plain and simple.

Having been through my share of regional ground schools, I can say one thing is for sure: the most knowledgeble pilots don't teach ground schools. Ground school is a sanctuary for expecting mothers, recovering drunks, and most other forms of medical issues. I cringe at the idea of going back to several more weeks of ground school, and I nearly faint at the idea of having to teach one. One place I worked had INTERNS who didn't have enough flight time to fly the line teaching ground schools. The blind leading the nearly blind.

Face it. These guys were screwing around at 410 because they didn't even know enough that they didnt know. Whos fault is that? Pinnacles, and every other cost cutting regional airline out there.

Sue their asses off.

p.s. they lost thier sons, now you wish them to be broke as well. geeezzz.
 
oops....double clicked.

See below.
 
Last edited:
redflyer65 said:
PCL128 is dead on when it comes to high altitude training.

To both of you....

Fair 'nough. Thanks for the answers. It's a shame that the training was/is non existent. Would've saved lives, maybe. Then again, from what I've heard about Rhodes, maybe not.......unfortunately.

I've done the Dual Failure in the sim in the -700. Trust me, it's an eye opener. Huge difference, I understand, but still the same. Even by following the checklist to a "T", the aircraft entered the rapid-relight envelope prior to restart, and we didn't regain power until about 10000 ft. For those of you who have never done it in the sim, request and insist on it during your next LOFT/recurrent flight training/etc.
 
loverobot said:
Face it. These guys were screwing around at 410 because they didn't even know enough that they didnt know. Whos fault is that? Pinnacles, and every other cost cutting regional airline out there.

Sue their asses off.

p.s. they lost thier sons, now you wish them to be broke as well. geeezzz.

Why is it that you're only the 2nd person here that sees it that way?

Things that make you go HHHMMMMMMMMMMM.........
 
loverobot said:
Face it. These guys were screwing around at 410 because they didn't even know enough that they didnt know. Whos fault is that?

Theirs. Simple as that. A professional pilot is expected to know these things, and should want to know them and seek the knowledge even if it's not spoon fed to them in ground school. That's what professionals do, perhaps not by definition, but certainly in attitude.

What is it with this attitude that someone only needs to know what is spoon fed to them in school, and no more? I suspect it begins with the "train to pass the test" approach taken in many high schools and flight schools. Teach and learn the bare minimum just to pass a test, then move on to the next layer of shallow knowledge built on the resulting weak foundation. It's somewhat less prevalent in colleges, and that's one more good reason (along with learning some critical thinking skills and perhaps more maturity) to make a college degree a mandatory requirement for airline pilot hiring.

loverobot said:
Pinnacles, and every other cost cutting regional airline out there.

Maybe they cut costs, but that doesn't excuse these two idiots their immature, incompetent and dangerous behavior. Blaming their attitude on the quality of training at the Pinnacle training department is absurd, as is blaming Pinnacle for not teaching about core lock - it would be really nice if Pinnacle had unlimited time and budget to teach this stuff but this has nothing to do with whether these two idiots should have been deliberately overriding safety systems in an empty CRJ until both engines compressor stalled and overtemped the hot sections - should Pinnacle have a special class for that, or should they assume a higher level of maturity in their line pilot candidates?
 

Latest resources

Back
Top Bottom