PCL 3701 Multiple Exam Failures

[turbinej]

We can all say that he failed this and that. There are a lot of people that have failed checkrides and orals. If you have not then your time will eventually come. We don't know the exact reasons why they failed their checkrides or orals. I never though it would never happen to me, until it did. I failed my Comm Multi oral on C-310 pressurization systems. The 310 does not have pressurization, but the examiner felt that since one day I was going to be an airline pilot that I should know more on it. My instructor sat in on the oral and I have never seen two individual screaming at the top of their lungs yelling at each other. Then I did two type rides sucessfully then came the third during a pax evac on the CL-65 at the last part of the checkride, I said the memory items correct 3x and everytime I touched the left thrust reverser switch instead of GLD man Disarm. So it could happen to all of us, even the best. Many regional have high failure rates like trans states and great lakes about 10 years ago, don't know how it is now. Also instructor ratings were failed 80 percent of the time on the first try. That was the rumor back them. Nerves play a lot when you take a check ride and can cause you to make simple little error like I did. Just because these individual failed a few check ride does not make tham a bad person or pilot. We all have bad days weather doing a check ride or flying the line. We all make mistakes, but we learn from these mistakes and hope they make each one of us a better pilot next time we do a checkride or go out on the line to fly.

 

[FN FAL]

No $hit??

Just another example of how far behind in my reading I really am, when I'm not even up to speed on the FAA Checkride Award Program.

We'll try to type a little slower for you, as we know that you can't read all that fast.

 

[Sim Sweat]

We can all say that he failed this and that. There are a lot of people that have failed checkrides and orals. If you have not then your time will eventually come.

Yes, it could happen to anyone, and thinking back on all the checkrides I've taken, I could really have busted any number of times if the check airman/DE was in the mood.
But I think what is disturbing about this unfortunate gentleman's history is the trend of multiple failures and problems, along with some of the concerns voiced by the company check airmen after the fact. Passengers placing their lives in your hands really deserve better than that, IMHO.

And it's just one opinion, said with respect for the departed. I've certainly made my share of mistakes over time.

 

[MarineGrunt]

All I can say is that there are some pretty tasteless posts on this thread. Some of you should be ashamed and should pray that karma won't catch up to you.

All that aside, does anyone know why they weren't able to get a re-start, or what caused the flameouts? Before, I thought they lost both engines simultaneously, but after reading the transcript, they happened separate. Were the procedures applied appropriately? The only thing that comes to mind is fuel contamination... ???

 

[ultrarunner]

All that aside, does anyone know why they weren't able to get a re-start, or what caused the flameouts? Before, I thought they lost both engines simultaneously, but after reading the transcript, they happened separate.

If you re-read the transcript, you will see that, upon leveling off at FL410, the aircraft failed to accelerate as they were behind the power curve.

As a result, the aircraft kept pitching up to maintain altitude, since they were in ALT HOLD.

Well, since neither of these idots really recognized what was going on, the aircraft reached excessive pitch attitude. That was the reason for the stall warning indications.

Well, the crew NEVER adequately addressed this "minor problem" and at one point the ANU reached 30 degrees and something like 75 kias..can't quite remember the specifics, but you'll see it there.

It was at this point that the engines overtemped and flamed out....likely not both at the same time, but both engines were so severely overtemped that the flame outs occcured in short order of each other.

Since the aircraft reached such an excessive ANU and a drastically low IAS at the same time, the cores of the engines overheated and resulted in irreversable damage.

It was this reason their feeble attempts at a restart failed.

Heck, had they even followed the correct relight procedure, it would prly have failed.

They sealed their fate at 410.

 

[MarineGrunt]

Heck, had they even followed the correct relight procedure, it would prly have failed.

(knowing nothing about the CRJ), Where did they deviate from procedure?

 

[ultrarunner]

(knowing nothing about the CRJ), Where did they deviate from procedure?

It's been sometime since I read the report, but as I recall, they never returned the aircraft to the inflight re-light envelope.

I believe they attempted an APU start when in fact they should have attempted a windmill start...

They attempted a restart at a MUCH higher altitued than authorized for a start.

Someone with chime in, but they needed to be below 240 or so and at 300kias or so and attempted a windmill start.

These guys were attempting something different.

 

[LowlyPropCapt]

Well this has been fun reading... Not.

No matter how deeply you dive into the NTSB report of this accident, you are getting just a small slice of the total picture.

I knew Jesse Rhodes, which is to say I knew him and worked with him during his ERAU days. I can personally attest to the fact that he took his instructing duties very seriously and was an excellent pilot and teacher. This does not change the fact that he made some very serious, indeed fatal, mistakes in both operating his aircraft and in his leadership on the flightdeck that fateful night. Nothing will change that, but we sure can learn something from it.

As for his checkride failures, we have no idea for the reasons behind those failures. He busted a checkride at TSA... Big freakin' deal. So did I. So did a lot of people. Should they yank my ATP becuase I had to recheck my initial ATR new hire ride? Really, oh ye know-it-all flightinfo gods, be truthful.

Is it a possibility that he could have been one of those guys who just had terminal checkride-itis? I have known very good pilots who were like that. I suffer a touch of it myself, from time to time.

Jesse blew it big time. Nothing will change that. But it amazes me how a knowledgeable group like this can be so much like the unknowledgeable press... Focusing on one aspect of an accident as if that were the only cause. It is all involved here, just like in the Kirksville crash... Training, company policy, decision making, the aircraft itself... Accidents are a chain of causes, not just one.

 

[RideTheWind]

(knowing nothing about the CRJ), Where did they deviate from procedure?

You might want to start by reading this thread
http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=56127

http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2005/Pinnacle/exhibits/CVR_Factual.pdf

 

[405]

Do you a-holes ever let up kicking around a dead crew? I think it has been clearly established by the CVR that they f*cked up royally and paid the ultimate price. We know that already. The question is are you bunch of holier-than-thou over analytical assf*cks ever going to let them rest in peace? They're DEAD. They killed THEMSELVES. Let them rest in peace. Learn from their mistakes and move on already. Why do we have to keep reliving this crash? We all know what caused it for God's sake.

Teach their mistakes to new crews so it will never happen again.

 

[ultrarunner]

Well allrighty then 405.

 

[DoinTime]

It's been sometime since I read the report.

UR....you may want to revisit the NTSB report of the documentable facts before you disparage the memory of my former coworkers. The only part of your recollection that is anywhere near accurate is the part just before the flameout.

 

[ultrarunner]

No disparaging...it is was it is. Game over. I'm off this thread.