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NTSB info on SWA at LGA crash

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Well, from what I have gleaned here...

1) The Captain really knew how to bid. I've been told many times on this forum you make staggering sums over there, yet only had to fly 2600 hrs in six years to do it. Pretty awesome
2) The Captain was a she, or possible a he-she, but not a he
3) He/she was high avoidance, 2nd highest in the base? wow He/she must have been really fugly, or smelly, or not a good pilot/overbearing/disliked unicorns
4) The approach was stable, on speed/profile till 400 ft when he/she took over, and things went to hell.

As far as LGA approaches go, it does not get any easier than a straight-in to RNWY 4. I imagine he/she's gonna have some splainin to do.

Maybe she actually likes kittens, therefor not a perfect fit at SWA.....
 
Rumor is that the FO wanted to go around and the Captain did not. Last time I checked your supposed to be stabilized by 1000'agl not 400'. Also heard the final flap setting was 58 seconds prior to impact. If true, that alone would would fit the definition of unstabilized.


Take caution with rumors you spread. If true, it would be considered Gross Negligence on both pilots. Considering if there was a loss of life, it would be considered Criminal Negligence.
 
Take caution with rumors you spread. If true, it would be considered Gross Negligence on both pilots. Considering if there was a loss of life, it would be considered Criminal Negligence.

Oh boy . . . Gotta love the Crew Room Lawyers. :rolleyes:

I don't know about SWA's requirements, but at AAI, up until a few years ago, we were only required to be stabilized by 500' AGL.

58 seconds, at a ref of 130KIAS and a 10 knot headwind would be around 600' ft AGL. Hardly gross negligence or a mandatory go-around.

Criminal Negligence? Get over yourself. :laugh:
 
Oh boy . . . Gotta love the Crew Room Lawyers. :rolleyes:

I don't know about SWA's requirements, but at AAI, up until a few years ago, we were only required to be stabilized by 500' AGL.

58 seconds, at a ref of 130KIAS and a 10 knot headwind would be around 600' ft AGL. Hardly gross negligence or a mandatory go-around.

Criminal Negligence? Get over yourself. :laugh:

Well...this accident was not a AAI flight, but in fact a SWA flight! That being said, I only suggested that one should not spread rumors until its proven to be factual.

As for Criminal Negligence...Many countries have brought criminal charges against pilots for negligent conduct. Although rare in the US, don't pretend that it can't or won't happen...

A perfect example...

http://www.northwesternda.org/news/...hter-charge-new-year’s-day-plane-crash-orange
 
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My guess is when the final report comes out, there might be at least some mention of he/she's personnel record. Can't wait to read this one: i.e., long list of FOs who refused to fly with he/she.
 
My guess is when the final report comes out, there might be at least some mention of he/she's personnel record. Can't wait to read this one: i.e., long list of FOs who refused to fly with he/she.

Yeah. If that's true, I don't see how it's going to help. While an avoidance bid makes perfect sense to us, the travelling public may not be so understanding, when everyone has a certain someone on their list. Sorta begs either remedial training, a transfer to a desk job or an invitation to work somewhere else.
 
See, there is the problem RIGHT THERE. Where was the "Wind Check" call? Crews should ask every 300 feet to be safe! We all know that...:)


Bye Bye---General Lee
 
I was hired about 8 yrs ago and it was 1000' then...

It was 1000' IMC, 500' on a visual when I checked out on the 737 in late 2004. I thought it changed around 2007. Perhaps it was earlier.

Regardless of when it changed, 600' may be sloppy, but it's hardly a criminal act. Hell, for a while, ATC in ATL was telling us to maintain 200KIAS to the marker on Rwy 28, which is 1674' AGL. Even Chuck Norris would have a hard time being stabilized and spooled up" by 1000'. :D

Sporty, yes. Criminal, no.
 
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Rumor is that the FO wanted to go around and the Captain did not. Last time I checked your supposed to be stabilized by 1000'agl not 400'. Also heard the final flap setting was 58 seconds prior to impact. If true, that alone would would fit the definition of unstabilized.

True.. as far the stabilized approach aspect...however, if you can't adapt to a (in all reality) a minor config. change 1 min. prior to touchdown..you might be operating on a very thin margin of error to begin with. Assuming,everything else remains unchanged from the marker inbound all the way down to the runway. Who knows. Stuff happens at the most inopportune times.
 
See, there is the problem RIGHT THERE. Where was the "Wind Check" call? Crews should ask every 300 feet to be safe! We all know that...:)


Bye Bye---General Lee

Classic!
 
So if something happened much worse and the word got out nobody wanted to work with that person, I would bet an ambulance chaser would pursue that avenue. Maybe I am wrong.
 
It was 1000' since before 2000. In 2008, there was talk of changing to 500' on visual approaches, but flt op's squashed it.

Well, this got me curious . . . so I went through my notes from training. Sheesh! Looks like you guys are right.

Now, if you'll excuse me . . . . I've got about two years of ASCAP reports to file. :mad: Let me know how this LGA thing turns out, willya?
 
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Are there airlines that still do configuration changes below 1000'? (Not on speed and spooled, but flaps & gear?)
 
Isn't an avoidance list a liability waiting to happen?

I think it could be in the hands of a good lawyer. Just imagine the press if this actually were to go to trial - "Mr Airline representative, how would you feel if it were to become public that there was an entire group of pilots that the rest of your pilots do not want to fly with? Does the company track who and why these pilots are being avoided? Does the public have anyway of knowing if one of the pilots on their flights is on an avoidance bid? Shall we subpoena the pilots who had this captain on their avoidance bid and have them testify as to why they wanted to avoid this pilot? Do you want all of that information to become part of the public record?"
 
Those are great questions counselor. Let me explain how we handle the avoidance pilots:

We hire a team of specialists that almost exclusively fly with high avoidance pilots. We call these pilots "reserves". Reserves can put up with more ******************** than 10 normal humans and 100 pilots. We have a rigorous program to break a reserve. First we tell them they will be off Reserve in a short time "6 months or a year", then we keep them on reserve for 5-10 years. If we have a trip that reports at 10 AM we will call the reserve at 3 AM to ensure they are never well rested. The trip is always a real pile of crap we put together by taking several pieces of our "high avoidance" pilots trip and splitting it up. Once broken these reserves are truly the best.
1. Clear right
2. You're right
3. I'll take the fat one
You want to hire a clown then you have to hire some reserves! The system isn't perfect. Even the best reserve can crack. When they do, accidents happen. They are the thin red line between bad hiring, and accidents.

Just out of curiosity was the FO a reserve?
 
Well, this got me curious . . . so I went through my notes from training. Sheesh! Looks like you guys are right.

Now, if you'll excuse me . . . . I've got about two years of ASCAP reports to file. :mad: Let me know how this LGA thing turns out, willya?

I'm dumbfounded that some people on here are admitting they do not know or have a clear understanding of their own SOPs in regards to company stabilization procedures.. Now I understand why there's a recurring problem with accidents involving landing at SWA? You guys are really true cowboys from the Wild West!!!
 
I'm dumbfounded that some people on here are admitting they do not know or have a clear understanding of their own SOPs in regards to company stabilization procedures.. Now I understand why there's a recurring problem with accidents involving landing at SWA? You guys are really true cowboys from the Wild West!!!

Me too!!!!! Where are those SOP's listed again???? Any chance you missed the humor there fella?
 
United has it. Doesn't have to have anything to do with safety it can simply be a personality clash.

Airways has it.

In DC, on reserve, I was given 4 shuttle 1 days (DCA-LGA-DCA-LGA-DCA) 4 days in a row with the same guy. I quickly figured out why.
 
Well, this got me curious . . . so I went through my notes from training. Sheesh! Looks like you guys are right.

Now, if you'll excuse me . . . . I've got about two years of ASCAP reports to file. :mad: Let me know how this LGA thing turns out, willya?

I'm reminded of a certain senior Flight Ops. Management pilot answering questions in recurrent training. Somebody asked him why we have 1000 feet as a stabilized approach height. His response:

"When we tell you to be stabilized by 1000', you're stabilized around 800'. Just before the FOQA snapshot. If I give you 500', you'll be stabilized by 300'. Any more questions ?"
 

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