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Not so good news about flight 3407

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I don't think anyone at nasa thought there was a significant risk before the re-entry. There was no consideration for a rescue, or any other risk reduction measures.

I wasn't there but I highly suspect there were people (engineers) who voiced grave concerns only have them dismissed by managers who "knew better." Wouldn't have been the first time.
 
I wasn't there but I highly suspect there were people (engineers) who voiced grave concerns only have them dismissed by managers who "knew better." Wouldn't have been the first time.

That's pretty much what happened with Challenger.
 
For another Q400 to come in right afterwards is just all you need to well, jump real quick to conclusions.

Exactly.

The media would have you believe that, if icing were the cause, then every plane within 50 miles of Buffalo would have crashed simultaneously.
 
I wasn't there but I highly suspect there were people (engineers) who voiced grave concerns only have them dismissed by managers who "knew better." Wouldn't have been the first time.

My understanding was that the low-level folks who analyzed the images of the debris impact were not too concerned about it, based on the fact that it had happened many times before. They just didn't know how lucky they had been in the past. They did request imaging additional inspections, which management refused.

The Challenger was a different story...an engineer told them EXACTLY what would happen in no uncertain terms, and he was forceful about. They still ignored him...
 
I had increased thrust, but not enough to compensate for the drag from the flight spoilers. It took the jumpseater behind us to say 'spoilers' (yes this was humbling for me) before I clued in. But in that momemt before I got SA back I had increased thrust some, and done nothing to the pitch attitude.
Didn't you get the spoiler caution msg, when the thrust levers were pushed up close to max?(I forget the TLA angle)
PBR
 
Didn't you get the spoiler caution msg, when the thrust levers were pushed up close to max?(I forget the TLA angle)
PBR
I would suppose not because he said the J/S rider advised him. A good technique to use flight spoilers is to keep your hand on the handle until you stow them. That way you couldn't increase thrust until your hand is available for it.
 
The glideslope will shoot down from above just enough to trigger at GS capture and then it heads right back up just as quickly. If you're not on top of it, the airplane will pitch up quickly with resulting airspeed decay. Even disconnecting in a timely manner you can lose 15 knots in a matter of a couple seconds.

Fortunately the CRJ flight director reacts so slowly on an approach that this is rare. Half the time I can't figure out how the thing ever got certified at all.
 
Not true, Columbia was not equipped to dock at the station. It was the only shuttle not set up with a docking port. Nasa also declined the airforce's offer to view the shuttles belly form orbit with a high powered telescope which would have revealed the damage to the leading edge of the left wing. Columbia was not in the right orbit and did not have enough fuel to reach the station.

You are correct but I'd take an "educated guess" that the idea of burning fuel in an "asset" to photograph the shuttle was eventually discounted as being a moot point as there were NO other option but deorbit. There were no other fixes or band-aides they could have used. There are a few guys here who have known me since way back when I worked as a part time flight instructor during the day, and full time at night in a "class A" facility as a civilian contractor that steered X-band radar around the sky 24/7. What we might have known never did, or could have ever known, mattered in this situation.
 
Don't Let Walter Find Out You Are Discussing Things Off Topic!​
 
Didn't you get the spoiler caution msg, when the thrust levers were pushed up close to max?(I forget the TLA angle)
PBR

No, the thrust levers were never advanced enough to activate reach the microswitch which would give the spoilers CAS message. I maybe increased thrust a little, as I was still still to figure out what just happened, post shaker and pusher. The airplane was still flying, and we were basically in stable, flight, with a slight descent. Within 2-3 seconds the jumpseater said 'spoilers', the CA retracted them, and I had SA back, grumbling at myself inside.

It was visual conditions as I said, and we had ORD in sight. If I was IMC I would've reacted more urgently I suspect. We were about 6-8 mi out on GS so about 1800-2400 AGL.

CA wrote an irregularity report and we never heard a word from management.

Don't rat me out! ;)
 
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