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Neptune Aviation P2 down near Tooele, UT

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Once again, we do NOT know what happened here. We do NOT know why the crew elected to go where they did, or if they elected to go where they did.

Typical flights to the fire and back are not made in the flight levels.

A few years ago during a repositioning flight in an airplane equipped with EGPWS and TAWS, I had a discussion with another captain about the ability to predicate terrain avoidance on the terrain database, display, and warnings. I'm firmly in the camp that says it's an idiotic concept to make such an effort, and he believed he could pick his way out of terrain using the onboard equipment.

We entered a low-level environment in an area surrounded by rising terrain, and I asked him to pick an exit canyon predicated on the equipment. He did, and then I demonstrated to him that it would have been a fatal choice.

Certainly TAWS is a dandy development for the airliner flying an approach. It's not necessarily a great feature for an air tanker.

I've no doubt that increased use of TAWS and EGPWS will continue to be had in the industry, however, just as TCAS became prevailant. I've flown tankers that had onboard database-predicated terrain avoidance displays, warnings, and equipment, and found it so distracting that I disabled it.

Should you find yourself flying a tanker, your mileage may vary.
 
Once again, we do NOT know what happened here. We do NOT know why the crew elected to go where they did, or if they elected to go where they did.

Typical flights to the fire and back are not made in the flight levels.

A few years ago during a repositioning flight in an airplane equipped with EGPWS and TAWS, I had a discussion with another captain about the ability to predicate terrain avoidance on the terrain database, display, and warnings. I'm firmly in the camp that says it's an idiotic concept to make such an effort, and he believed he could pick his way out of terrain using the onboard equipment.

We entered a low-level environment in an area surrounded by rising terrain, and I asked him to pick an exit canyon predicated on the equipment. He did, and then I demonstrated to him that it would have been a fatal choice.

Certainly TAWS is a dandy development for the airliner flying an approach. It's not necessarily a great feature for an air tanker.

I've no doubt that increased use of TAWS and EGPWS will continue to be had in the industry, however, just as TCAS became prevailant. I've flown tankers that had onboard database-predicated terrain avoidance displays, warnings, and equipment, and found it so distracting that I disabled it.

Should you find yourself flying a tanker, your mileage may vary.

Cheers Avbug.

I have found TAWS and EGPWS helpfull during 135 flights out west at night.

I certainly miss having it now that I am flying a king air without terrain or TCAS.

I too thought that EGPWS could help avoid terrain. I never attempted anything like you mentioned but I found it very comforting flying out of Rifle, CO.

I did read however that EGPWS was the single greatest factor in reducing CFIT to practically zero.
 
TAWS is a nice helper on night VFR in the mountains, and I am an old fart who firnly believes in charts and studying them. Why not take advantage of what's out there? Turn the crap off when you're on the fire.

And I have lost one helluva lot of friends in this business, and I know better than to think it will stop.
 
And I have lost one helluva lot of friends in this business, and I know better than to think it will stop.

One guy I know who has been around since the Sis-Q days, told me he has lost more friends in crashes in this business, than he friends he currently has
 
It's a sad truth, what your friend says.

One day we were talking, and decided to add it up. For some terrible reason, it's averaged at least one fatality per year since I started in fire. 10 years was around 10 dead friends, 20 was around 20, and now 32 years makes for 35 people gone. Two of those are fine smokejumpers killed in '94; the other 33 are pilots, both fixed-wing and helicopter. I don't count the people I didn't know.

People who do this for a living never forget their buds who have taken off, and not come back to the field by sunset.

But -- here we are. And, fire season could start tomorrow, for me.
 
UN-FRIGGIN-BELIEVABLE I would say Fylingwildfires....

First, the FO's conduct on the morning of the flight is essentially CRIMINAL in nature.....

1. The night before the crash, he tried to file a VFR flight plan, but couldn't for the reasons stated. So, you can deduct that the crew had planned all along to fly VFR.

2. Morning of the crash, TELLS the briefer "we're filed IFR". That was a lie. And gets into DUAT for a low altitude plain-language briefing. FO didn't have the friggin balls to tell they briefer we're 'going VFR', since you know darn well what the briefer would have said to that.

3. They depart VFR. And during the entire flight, attempt to skirt rain showers, thunderstorms, lowering ceilings, restricted airspace, class-B, etc...


Right up to the point where they killed themselves!

Classy!
 
The sad part is, the FO and Cpt murdered someone that had no say in the matter. A TAWS and/or an E-GipWiz would have saved them all that day, as this was clearly a CFIT accident. But the FO and CPT would have simply lived another day to make the same poor decisions they did that morning, again.
 
The sad thing is that you really have no clue whence you speak.

Everybody has a say in the matter, and I know from personal experience with those lost that Tom was no different. He listened and he tended to be very objective.

One riding on board most definitely does have a say in the matter. One picks up one end of the stick one picks up the other. Who put a gun to his head and made him get onboard?

Nobody was "murdered." To be sure, a loss of life occurred. An unfortunate mishap. But no murder took place here. You speak stupidly to assert as much.

The night before the crash, he tried to file a VFR flight plan, but couldn't for the reasons stated. So, you can deduct that the crew had planned all along to fly VFR.

Clearly you're past your depth. And apparently clairvoyant.

Generally on a fire dispatch, a flight plan is not filed. An agency flight plan is maintained, and no longer requires regular check-ins because of the onboard automated flight following tracking equipment. That the crew considered filing a flight plan at all is a noteworthy act on their part.

Operations are generally conducted at low altitude, and close to terrain.

You were not privy to the conversations between the crewmembers, leading up to the flight. Neither was I. Therefore, your wild speculation on intention is misplaced. Perhaps the crew intended to file one way then another, and finally decided to perform an acceptable and perfectly legal departure using AFF for agency tracking.

Morning of the crash, TELLS the briefer "we're filed IFR". That was a lie. And gets into DUAT for a low altitude plain-language briefing. FO didn't have the friggin balls to tell they briefer we're 'going VFR', since you know darn well what the briefer would have said to that.

More stupidity, on your part.

The copilot didn't need "freaking balls" to file VFR, or to file IFR. Neither would he have cared what the controller thought. Perhaps he thought he had filed and that the flight plan had been accepted. Perhaps he thought his captain had filed; you don't know. Perhaps he intended to file. Perhaps he was thinking out loud.

An extended weather briefing and flight planning is a rarity during a tanker dispatch. I can tell you I operated for many years in multiple types of tankers, often with no more than five minutes to be airborne if loaded, and just the time to get on nomex, load, and get airborne if I wasn't already loaded. Getting a weather briefing, filing a flight plan? Often, not. You really have no clue about this kind of an operation, do you?

Flying a tanker isn't a white shirt and tie, after-shave and cuff-link kind of operation. Simply because it's something you don't understand, something with which you have no experience, and something that falls outside the narrow guidelines of your own limited experinece, don't make the mistake of spouting off as though you've something to say here; clearly you don't.

They depart VFR. And during the entire flight, attempt to skirt rain showers, thunderstorms, lowering ceilings, restricted airspace, class-B, etc...

Your point is? This is what one does when one is VFR. Do you not know this?

A TAWS and/or an E-GipWiz would have saved them all that day, as this was clearly a CFIT accident.

You don't know that, at all.
 
Well Avbug, you've read the factual data. What is your opinion?

You don't think that this crew continued VFR flight into IFR conditions that ultimately led then to fly into rising terrain?

Heck at one point they were using some garmin unit for weather avoidance, etc..and you can clearly hear the CPT telling the FO, "don't go in the yellow" or something to that effect...and then again, we should be out of this area in '10 miles'.

Heck, IMHO they were down low IN IFR conditions, using some piece of equipment for purposes is may not have actually been intended.

Do you maintain Avbug that this was NOT a CFIT that killed them all?

And before you get all 'high and mighty' about this crew was on some heroic mission....

They were on a friggin cross country flight of nearly 1100 miles! That requires a certain level of flight planning responsibility on part of the crew when they had planned to do this VFR. And with the weather system in effect at the time.

The FO never had the expectation that his IFR flight plan had been accepted the night before, because the factual data clearly indicates he attempted to file VFR flight plan and with a VFR altitude. So give me a break Avbug!

So avbug, call me stupid. Go right ahead.

Why don't you chime in with your expert opinion!
 

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