Inappropriate comments about RJ crash?

[ASApilotboy]

stereotyping / and the tragedy

As a non-professional pilot, one whose background is Ops, I have a lifelong love for aviation, and an admiration for the folks who dare to soar into that long delirious burning blue. Way north of not only 40, but 50, I have a few thoughts on the 3701 tragedy...
It has been my privilege to jumpseat and observe type A guys flying with type Z guys, and in my limited but valuable experience I've always been impressed with the professionalism exhibited in the cockpit as rigorous training procedures are followed by both older and younger pilots.
I've observed younger men - whose vocabulary in the pilot lounge is peppered with popular items from the contemporary lexicon - revert immediately to standard cockpit English and comport themselves in totally professional manner when in the plane.
In days gone by, I always felt more comfortable when I saw some gray hair in the cockpit. Now, after my experiences jumpseating, while having an experienced pilot still goes a long, long way in emergency situations, I've come to appreciate that rigorous training and professional dedication helps make our younger generation of aviators every bit as capable.
Three things stand out, to me, in the 3701 tragedy: the pilots absolutely did not conduct themselves in a manner remotely resembling professional airline pilots - even given the status of the repositioning flight; the pilots' behavior after clearly realising the seriousness of the situation did not present the level of alarm, or urgency, one would expect to see; and that raises clearly the spectre of at least the possibility of impairment - either physiological or induced by some other agent.
In the end, along with all of you who care about aviation and aviators, it's indeed a tragedy to lose folks - even if they're at fault. Most of us - if not all - have memories of things we did that could have cost us our lives. Most of us - if not all - don't do those things anymore.
All of you have made valid contributions to the thought processes we share concerning 3701's end. My hope is that we don't try so hard to build walls between our different vantage points that we can't see the lesson.
Fly safe. I appreciate what all of you do up there.

 

[SkyBoy1981]

Well said ASA.

 

[de727ups]

"In the midst of it all they forgot to extend the slats and, as we all could guess, a 727 isn't going to get off the ground without them."

Actually, with 14 years on the airplane, I gotta disagree. You'd have to leave it on the ground until around 180 knots and then rotate very slowly. If you had enough runway, it would fly. If you rotated at your computed VR for flaps 15, though, ummm....I don't want to think about it.

"the pilots' behavior after clearly realising the seriousness of the situation did not present the level of alarm, or urgency, one would expect to see; and that raises clearly the spectre of at least the possibility of impairment - either physiological or induced by some other agent."

Well....they didn't find drugs or alcohol in the bodies. I think they were just being stupid.

 

[surplus1]

Borrowed Thoughts

"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect." ​

— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. Circa early 1930's

Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose. — author unknown ​

This accident is indeed a tragedy for it it clearly did not "happen" but was caused by a crew possessed with alll three of the traits that Lamplugh warns about, carelessness, incapacity and neglect.

I seldom agree with TonyC, buat this time he is right, and so is TIS. The attitude of these pilots is a major factor in the probable cause. The pilot in command (I won't call him Captain for there was none on board that flight) was himself devoid of any semblance of discipline and failed completely the "boy" that shared his cockpit and was his charge.

Whatever the reason, the "culture" of the young men's airline let them down completely and is a major contributing factor in their demise. I have no personal knowledge of the training they obviously did not receive or were permitted to totally ignore. But, the recording makes it quite clear that they were both in an evironement, both before and after the "upset", that was completely beyond their individual or collective scope. Both paid a price too high for this neglect.

God rest their souls

​

T






​

 

[h25b]

Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose. — author unknown ​

This accident is indeed a tragedy for it it clearly did not "happen" but was caused by a crew possessed with alll three of the traits that Lamplugh warns about, carelessness, incapacity and neglect.

I seldom agree with TonyC, buat this time he is right, and so is TIS. The attitude of these pilots is a major factor in the probable cause. The pilot in command (I won't call him Captain for there was none on board that flight) was himself devoid of any semblance of discipline and failed completely the "boy" that shared his cockpit and was his charge.

Whatever the reason, the "culture" of the young men's airline let them down completely and is a major contributing factor in their demise. I have no personal knowledge of the training they obviously did not receive or were permitted to totally ignore. But, the recording makes it quite clear that they were both in an evironement, both before and after the "upset", that was completely beyond their individual or collective scope. Both paid a price too high for this neglect.

God rest their souls

Yeah... That's what I meant to say...

 

[belchfire]

As an ignorant autopilotless turboprop pilot
I can figure out that not accelerating could
very well be because of the ball being out
of wack.

WHY was the ball so far out? WTF was
that about? Was that the first indication
of one of the engines getting sick? Was
the yaw damper screwed up? How
much athority does the ap have on the
rudder? Did the first engine flame out
because of the unstable airflow of being
out of yaw trim? Did one of them have
a boot on a rudder?

I also have no experience with FADEC but
if I am not mistaken the crj has it. Why
was it not protecting the one engine that
overtemped?

If it was because of an engine getting
weak, flaming out or whatever (were some of
the "bangs" or "thumps" compressor stalls?)
why weren't there trim beeps from
the ap as thrust decreased and why wasn't the
ap doing something?

I read the "sound simular to ap disconect"
so it was on at some point...

Is it possible that an excessive reliance on
automation to keep them out of trouble led
to the widely expressed absence of so called
"professionalism" in this case?

The jetpigs emergency proceedures allow for
airstarts outside the demonstrated parameters
in the event of a double engine failure. Is this
the case for the crj also?
As far as the word dude goes I think we have
a first usage as the final word on the cvr. Usually
it is something that has an "s" and a "t" in it
if the crew knows they are about to hit.
I have been told of a guy that always says
"What was that?" after setting the power...just in
case...

God help me but there is a phrase that I want
to use if I know that someone is going to
be pulling the tape...it ain't dude and it lacks
the usuall "s" and "t" but I could
probably work them in just to make people
scratch their heads even more...probably be too
busy to think about it though...

There are the final words from one transcript
that are burned into my memory...
"I just remembered. The highest point around here
is forty-four hun..." (sound of impact)

Dust off your memory items and fly safe!

 

[enigma]

I have been told of a guy that always says
"What was that?" after setting the power...just in
case...

How about, "Oh my, my look at the tentacles on that thing"?

 

[skyslug]

Belchfire, no FADEC's on the CRJ (the "stretch" has them however). The autopilot also disconnects and if memory serves me correct won't engage when the ADG / EMER POWER is alive and kicking.

 

[Lear70]

WHY was the ball so far out? WTF was
that about? Was that the first indication
of one of the engines getting sick? Was
the yaw damper screwed up? How
much athority does the ap have on the
rudder?

We don't have any information that the aircraft was that far out of trim. We don't have a "ball", we have a "brick", and we don't know if that's what he was referring to or not. There is no indication the Y.D. was malfunctioning. The autopilot doesn't have ANY authority over the rudder - it's not an autopilot-controlled flight surface.

Did the first engine flame out
because of the unstable airflow of being
out of yaw trim? Did one of them have
a boot on a rudder?

Data indicates both engines failed nearly simultaneously.

If it was because of an engine getting
weak, flaming out or whatever (were some of
the "bangs" or "thumps" compressor stalls?)
why weren't there trim beeps from
the ap as thrust decreased and why wasn't the
ap doing something?

Because unless the autopilot trims up CONTINUOUSLY for several seconds, there is NO aural indication that the autopilot is trimming the stab. The autopilot WAS doing something - it was holding altitude as it had been commanded until the first shaker, at which point it automatically disconnects.

Is it possible that an excessive reliance on
automation to keep them out of trouble led
to the widely expressed absence of so called
"professionalism" in this case?

No. Absence of professionalism started at the first decision to "goof around" with an aircraft they didn't own (or understand), continued with the decision to swap seats, and culminated with the decision to take the aircraft an altitude it shouldn't have been at for its weight and temperature at a speed that was unable to sustain that flight.

The unfortunate thing is that this should have ended up with a trip to the Chief Pilot's office, followed shortly by a trip to the unemployment line, not a trip for the families to a burial site. Why the engines didn't relight is the primary concern of the moment. Secondary to that is the training of all our pilots not already well-versed in high altitude swept wing jet aerodynamics that some evidently don't understand.

 

[belchfire]

How about, "Oh my, my look at the tentacles on that thing"?

That's close and pretty much my style...you could
even say "Holy (explative) dude did you see the
tentacles on that thing?" Just for TIS and TonyC...

As for the laughter after the departure from planned
operations I think that subject is covered in the
studies for the FOI written under possible reactions
to stress, fear or nervousness.

"Belchfire, no FADEC's on the CRJ (the "stretch" has them however). The autopilot also disconnects and if memory serves me correct won't engage when the ADG / EMER POWER is alive and kicking."

It is my understanding that swept wing jets are
kind of unpleasant to hand fly at 410. I know the
J-32 gets a little unhappy at 250
(if it can get there at all).

I haven't been able to download the FDR stuff for
review, but that kind of gives me the failure
timeline. It does leave unanswered the question
of why the ball got so out of whack
(Before the autopilot disconnect tone)
the pitch and yaw attitudes are the second things
that the crew notices. I don't know what kind of
warnings the machine will give you if one engine
starts spooling down but the first audio warning
of engine trouble was the "engine oil".

I don't know when the g loadings occured (except
for someone said something about a 2 g rotation,
I am guessing that was at takeoff. Betcha there
aren't many of the critics here that could start
smoothly flying a pissed off machine at 410 when
the autopilot gives up...I doubt Yeager and
Hoover waste any time here! If some of them were
after the disconnect I'm not a bit surprised.
In fact I wonder if anyone here without a glider
rating has ever trained for an unpowered stall
recovery...

Why did the yaw trim get so out of whack???
Am I the only one seeing that? Wouldn't you
hear the engine spooling down first if asemetric
thrust was the causing it? Or did the first one
flame out because of it?

The stall warning/pusher event came after
level off. Why didn't the plane accelerate?

Wonder if an engine overtemped earlier in the
climb and waited till they leveled off to give
it up...

I'm going to have to plow through all that FDR stuff...

dude, that's really lame!