FLOPS Phenom overrun

[BlueNose]

NTSB Prelim

NTSB Identification: CEN13LA462
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Monday, August 05, 2013 in Eden Prairie, MN
Aircraft: EMBRAER EMB-505, registration: N327FL
Injuries: 2 Uninjured.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators may not have traveled in support of this investigation and used data provided by various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On August 5, 2013, at 0848 central daylight time, N327FL, an Embraer S.A. EMB-505, multi-engine turbofan airplane, was substantially damaged during landing at Flying Cloud Airport (FCM), Eden Prairie, Minnesota. The two pilots were not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Flight Options, LLC; Cleveland, Ohio. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident and an instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 positioning flight. The airplane had departed Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, about 0730 eastern daylight time and was destined for FCM.

The pilots reported that the airplane was on a steep visual approach when they landed long and fast. The pilot flying also reported that after touchdown he could feel the pulsing of the anti-skid brakes but was unable to stop on the runway surface. The airplane departed the end of the runway and impacted the airport boundary fence coming to rest on a four-lane highway about 1,000 feet from the runway.

At 0838 the data from FCM revealed that the wind was from 150 degrees at 4 knots, 6 miles visibility in mist, few clouds at 200 feet above ground level (agl), an overcast ceiling at 7,000 feet agl, temperature 18 degrees C, dew point temperature 17 degrees C, with an altimeter setting of 29.89 inches of mercury. Remarks indicated that rain ended at 0819 with a one hour precipitation of 0.01 inches.
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Again, sad to see, and glad no one was hurt.

 

[chief9404]

There is flaws with that plane. One contributing factor is not being able to use full flaps on landing.

 

[el raton]

There is flaws with that plane. One contributing factor is not being able to use full flaps on landing.

You're joking right?

 

[rettofly]

There is flaws with that plane. One contributing factor is not being able to use full flaps on landing.

Not for nothin', but the flaw in this airplane might have been the steep and fast approach. (See previous post)

Can you say "stabilized"?

Can you say "go around"?

 

[el raton]

Not for nothin', but the flaw in this airplane might have been the steep and fast approach. (See previous post)

Can you say "stabilized"?

Can you say "go around"?

Can you say "oops"?

 

[BlueNose]

Not for nothin', but the flaw in this airplane might have been the steep and fast approach. (See previous post)

Can you say "stabilized"?

Can you say "go around"?

We don't know the cause yet, but like you said, it's starting to look like another in the long list of unstabilized approach => runway overrun accidents. These make up about half of all jet accidents (not to mention all the ones that don't get counted because of less than substantial damage). We've all done it, and most of us have gotten away with it every single time - knowing we're outside of the stabilized approach window, but making the decision that we can salvage this one and pressing on anyway. Some of us have scared ourselves with a close enough call that we'd rather endure a go around that take that chance again. I don't know when we as a professional industry will really accept that go around doesn't equal failure, but we're not there yet. It took FOQA snitch boxes to get this across to the airline industry (and they're certainly not 100% there either). Most unstabilized approaches don't lead to overruns, but almost every single overrun starts with an unstabilized approach. Flight Options learned this lesson back in the day with 2 accidents in 2 years at BWI and CGF, hope this will help them remember, and maybe this will make the mgmt think twice before they shorten the field length for the Phenom again (though this runway should have been plenty long enough, cutting margins increases risk).

 

[gutshotdraw]

If they were fatigued, then why not call in fatigued? It happens often at nj. No questions asked.

You know as well as I do that few pilots are very adept at recognizing the symptoms of their own fatigue.

Fewer still are adept at acting on it.

And fewer still (thankfully) abuse the system thereby making legitimate fatigue calls more suspect in the eyes of colleagues and management.

All sad. And all true.

 

[livin'thesim]

Why would they hang themselves by admitting the long and fast? It's a little early for full confessions, is it not?

 

[brokeflyer]

there was something on flight recorder, they knew they're busted so why not just admit it instead of lying.

They were probably discussing the unstabilized approach all the way in.

 

[hammer2]

there was something on flight recorder, they knew they're busted so why not just admit it instead of lying.

They were probably discussing the unstabilized approach all the way in.

Sometimes saying nothing at all goes a long ways...