Combining the seniority lists

[MartinFierro]

Getting back to the original question: the issue of combining lists and convincing management it is a good idea. First, while I agree that management's willingness to combine lists is essential in making it happen, I think that even before one can worry about that, one has to convince mainline pilots that it is worth it, as Flydeltasjets originally pointed out. Let's face it, they have a lot to lose.

So, the principle question becomes what can be done to make mainline pilots want to? Regional pilots will want to for obvious reasons.

Well, what worries mainline pilots today? Outsourcing flying to RJs, fear that RJ growth will inhibit mainline growth, job security, among others. And, if lists were to be combined, then seniority issues and pay as well. Any proposal to integrate lists must address these concerns.

For seniority, perhaps there could be some type of "barrier" for those already on the mainline seniority list. Something like no mainline pilot (already on the list) can be displaced to "regional" equipment. If in the integration process, a regional pilot is placed above a mainline pilot, then that lower mainline pilot should be guaranteed the salary he/she would otherwise be making, if it weren't for that regional pilot. This way, regional pilots with many years of seniority would not be stuck on the bottom, but mainline pilots would not be making any monetary concessions. Perhaps throw something else in there similar dealing with days off, etc., to further preserve mainline seniority.

Then, once the lists have been merged, all new-hires get placed on the bottom, and work their way up normally. Another question which must be addressed is pay. Regional aircraft cannot support mainline wages and remain profitable, so those flying these aircraft will be making less (although it should be more than todays pay scales). How then would upgrades and F/O pay be handled? Perhaps just leave it to seniority, what you can hold. A captain on a turboprop or RJ would make more than some F/Os at mainline, but not all, but more than any F/O on a regional aircraft. So there would be seat jumping, but it would protect the integrity of the seniority list and make it a personal decision as to what to do.

Now, with one list and its pilots doing all the mainline and regional flying, mainline pilots may not worry as much with losing their jobs to RJs, as all of the flying is done by them. Better job security for everyone. Mainline pilots already flying wouldn't be giving up salaries. Regional captains with lots of seniority wouldn't be stuck at the bottom. New hires would have better and more assured retirements and good career advancement.

Anyway, just me blabbering. Just some thoughts, maybe not even good ones.
Once mainline pilots are onboard with integration, then management may not want to do it, but they would surely have to give it due consideration. Without pilot unity, it is dead in the water, and all management has to do is laugh.

 

[Timebuilder]

A few weeks ago, I opined that the only way one list would happen would be for DALPA and the clone's mecs to begin to act together, the idea being that an 89 day strike is a hit that Delta could survive, but a shutdown of all flying under the Delta ownership would be too great a burden, and a move to one list could be forced.

Since that isn't likely, I continued to think on this, and I remembered that the government sometimes chooses to put its nose where it doesn't belong. For example, the government believed that AT&T should be broken apart, and phone service has suffered ever since. Microsoft has sold the most successful computer platform, and its competitors are unable to come up with a system which is so much better that people would switch to a new OS, so the government punishes Gates and company.

Could a supreme court ruling, following a drawn out legal battle, make the observation that Delta's ownership of several other airline properties amounts to a failure to bargain in good faith? If Delta were to choose (or be forced) to spin off its "regional" properties, would the new owners be free to expand and fly all of Delta's routes, leading to more mainline shrinkage?

Sure, that may seem like so much nonsense, and perhaps it is. I have to wonder where this issue will end up, and looking back on where it has been offers no help. I see what is essentially one union that has failed to represent two of its pilot groups in a satisfactory manner. There is a lot of hosility, jealousy, and resentment. How can this be resolved? Is this aviation's version of the Mideast?

 

[Draginass]

Your thoughts on integration, seniority wise, involve costs to the company. Without providing economic incentive to the company, any discussion on seniority integration is irrelevant. Besides, heavy money goes on the bet that says mainline would insist on a pure staple for bidding.

 

[rjcap]

Draginass,

Without providing economic incentive to the company, any discussion on seniority integration is irrelevant

I'll take a stab at that one. How about unrestrained equipment growth, and economies of scale by reducing triplicate management ( Delta - ASA - Comair).

Besides, heavy money goes on the bet that says mainline would insist on a pure staple for bidding.

I don't see how it could be anything else. The notion of DOH for equipment and benefits has been spread like an "Urban Legend." Take a hard look at the seniority level of both Comair and ASA. Its about 75% 5 years and less. Do you really think a staple is an insurmountable task to accomplish with that level of seniority ??

rjcap

 

[Draginass]

"Unrestrained growth, etc etc. . . . "

If the managements thought that those items were economic incentive enough, they'd already be in talks with the unions. As an example, AMR refused to even acknowledge APA's recent proposal as a starting point for discussions.

As far as a staple goes, I think most regional guys would be glad to get it. But then again, there's the few that would bring lawsuits ad naseum.

 

[publisher]

AMR

Please add Eagle to my list of companies that will be spun off. They too are an example that all the mainlines are agreed not tro let this even be an item for discussuion.

The reason that no incentive would exists economically is the airlines worth is much more on the spin off if is independant.

Of all the discussiions on these boards, I have never seen one that is failing to recognize what is going on and where the perception is so far from reality.

What you want them to do is basically shut down all the regionals. Not going to happen/

 

[Timebuilder]

So then, a question.

Suppose Delta spins off all its regional properties. Is there anything that would stop the new owners from flying all of Delta's routes, drawing off their passengers with lower fares? If this happens to all the wholly owned commuters, what flying would be left for "mainline" carriers other than overseas?

 

[NEDude]

There are a few reasons why a large regional would be ill-advised to branch out on its own to compete against its former code-share partner.

First, these regionals make a lot of money off of the code share. They also gain a lot of security in being affiliated with a large mainline. The minute a spun-off Comair (or ASA, Coex, Eagle, etc) dropped its Delta Connection title and went at it on its own against Delta it would, in the eyes of the traveling public, be considered a start-up.

Additionally at all of the airports where they currently use Delta resources (agents, gates, slots, etc) they would now have to set up their own operations. Given the size of Comairs' route structure, you are talking about a HUGE initial investment.

Also Comair would lose all of the Delta bookings and now be responsible for landing its own bookings.

And don't forget the enourmous failure rate of new airlines. Being in essence a new start-up (again in the traveling publics eyes) exposes the company to at least a portion of that risk.

In short you would be taking a profitable company in a good relationship with a mainline and suddenly exposing it to a large financial investment, sudden drop in passenger revenue, a sharply increasing the risk of the failure of the company, and tremendous competition from your former code-share partner who will no doubt be replacing your company with another connection or express partner to run against you.

No regional airline CEO in his or her right mind would want to try such a step.

 

[Timebuilder]

Well, if I had to write the ad copy for the TV spot, it would go something like "same planes, same pilots, same great service, same lower fares. Now you can Connect with us...."

When I was in Orlando last year to visit a flight school, something came up and I had to return to Philly. I had arrived on Delta with a round trip ticket, and getting out of there was a 16 hour chore, which was only fixed by a clever gate agent who found a way to bypass ATL by sending me to PHL via a stop in CVG. I was never sent to the Comair counter, which was some distance away, in another concourse. So, they weren't sending ME to Comair, that much is certain. If Delta doesn't complete a flight for a passenger through Comair, then they would have to use someone else's airline/wholly owned/or bonafide startup. That would REALLY be noticed.

There may have been an advantage to Comair early on to be a codeshare partner, but once they are on their own, I think Delta will realize that they just got off the tiger, and that they were safer when they were sitting on it. I think investors will see the advantage too. I've flown both now, and I don't see what Delta has to offer competitively, except for roomier planes. Comair already is its own company, with 98% of the ingredients it needs.

I don't think it will be seen by the public as a startup, since they already fly on their planes. Whoever replaces the Comair role in completion of a passenger itinerary will likely be seen as unknown and unproved.

 

[surplus1]

Part I of II

Originally posted by FlyDeltaJets Even if the PID was granted, even if the rjdc wins, even if every Delta pilot was for onelist, I don't believe it will ever occur. If you disagree, please give me a realistic strategy to convince mgt to combine the lists, keeping in mind the following points:

FDJ, You asked for my two cents so here it comes.

1. There is nothing in either of our contracts which compels mgt to combine the lists. We have no legal authority.

Agreed. Our contracts have nothing to do with ALPA merger policy. ALPA merger policy does not require the union to force the merger of the corporate entities. The inability to force a merger, whether real or presumed does not relieve the Association from the implementation and application of its established merger policies. The question is not "can we make a merger happen". The question is: should a merger happen under these conditions and this policy? Does the intent of the merge policy apply? IMO, and that of many others, the answer is yes. What the Company may think is immaterial.

2. There is a huge cost advantage in keeping the lists seperate. Management has publicly stated that they will never merge the lists. There are way too many cost issues involved, including f/a's, rampers, csa's, retirement funding, etc.

Agreed. Nothing in the ALPA merger policy specifies that it may be ignored because there may be a cost advantage to the carrier that refuses to merge. The policy speaks to protection of the rights of the affected pilots, not to protection of the airline. There is also a huge cost advantage to the establishment and operation of Alter Ego airlines. Does that mean that the ALPA should sanction their creation whenever management deems it appropriate? Even though the "meat" of the Association's Alter Ego policy was substantially neutered in 1998, the policy still exists. In these cases the Executive Council has simply chosen to ignore the policy.

3. Mgt. has already accepted an 89-day strike to maintain the current cost structure.

Yes it did. Does that mean that the ALPA should disregard its own policies because management does not approve? I would hope not. If as a union we must acquiesce to the whims of management, what is the purpose of the union? It appears to me the union would be redundant and should be eliminated if that were the case.

4. The current trend is to spin off regionals rather than combining the lists. We have no way to prevent management from doing this, even if we put massive pressure on them to combine the lists.

Just how did you determine that this was the "current trend"? I hope you're not hanging your hat on the assumptions of the Boyd group or a few other analysts. There are two IPO's in the offing. Both are presented by airlines strapped for cash post 9-11. One of the IPO's predates 9-11. Raising cash by selling stock in a company that you own is not a revolutionary idea. While we cannot prevent management from doing this, why would we need to? The relevance escapes me. Selling stock while maintaining the same pre-sale relationship does not, in and of itself, negate the viability of a single seniority list in companies that own more than one air carrier. It is possible to operate two or more companies with one seniority list for the same craft. It is being done as we write.

5. We (DALPA) could not possibly get released to strike for at least 4 or 5 years.

That is a reasonable assumption. I do not see this as a factor. I would not expect you to strike over this issue. I would not expect us to strike over an SSL either.

6. Our contracts are staggered, so we would not be released at the same time.

You are correct again. Even if they were not staggered, I have little doubt that ALPA would find a way to delay our release until you had achieved your objectives. They've done that already. Based on my reply to #5, I don't see why this matters.

7. The idea is impossible without the support of the Delta pilots.

Actually it is not. That assumes that the Company will resist any and all forms of seniority integration. If the Company (not that they would) chose to pursue a merger or a seniority integration, the support of the Delta pilots or lack thereof would be irrelevant. I realize the Company is not going to do that anytime soon. Nevertheless, your technical premise is not correct. From a practical point of view you are correct. Lack of support from Delta is precisely why the ALPA rejected the PID. Operational integration clearly exists. The Executive Council chose to ignore it because the Delta MEC wanted them to. Money talks, b*** s*** walks.

8. The rjdc has virtually eliminated any chance of that support being gained.

That may be true but it is ONLY because there was NO support before the existence of the RJDC. The idea of the RJDC being "the obstacle" is nothing more than a politically expedient ruse to cover up a position of total opposition that your group held BEFORE THE RJDC came into being. Remember, when your MEC hired a lawyer to oppose the PID, there was NO RJDC. There are some of you that don't object to the idea as long as you can dictate the terms, but the overwhelming majority of you have made it quite clear that you want no part of us on your list. That's exactly the same as what's happening at Continental. There was great rhetoric about "support" for a SSL over there when they felt it was necessary to get the vote of COEX pilots to join ALPA. Once that objective was realized, the swell of "support" from CAL pilots and the allegations of "support" from ALPA, vanished overnight. Don't blame the RJDC for causing a lack of support.

9. The majority of concessions would have to come from the mainline contract.

That is also an assumption. If the solution were properly structured, in a way that management could accept, there would be no real need for concessions at all. Difficult to do; you bet. Impossible; not at all. No one has tried so we don't know. You're just guessing.

10. See number 8.

Ditto.

11. The support that the rjdc hasn't been able to kill is further strained by the Delta pilot's fear of losing seniority.

It never ceases to amaze me how a group as rich and powerful as the Delta pilots could possibly be afraid of losing their seniority to a small group like Comair or ASA. I think you're crying wolf. Much ado about nothing.

12. No staple has been asked for, lending credence to the Delta pilot's fear of losing seniority.

Why do we need to ASK for anything? We don't want you to do us a "favor", we are simply demanding what is our right in accordance with OUR unions written policies. How could our failure to "ask for a staple" cause you to lose your seniority? That's stuff and nonsense. It is true we did not ask for a staple. We also did not "ask" for anything else, other than implementation of an official, written policy.

You have repeatedly reminded us, over and over again that our case, our complaints, etc., are completely without merit. Why then are you afraid? Given the differences between our airlines and the merger policy's prohibition against windfalls at the expense of another, what are you afraid of? Unless you believe that we are in fact entitled to much more than we believe is justified, you have nothing to fear but fear itself. I think the paranoia has clouded the vision of your group. Either that or someone is raising a lot of unjustified fears in an effort to obscure their basic feeling of "we want no part of you unqualified come latelys' on our list. The very idea that you have the gall to think you could be Delta pilots is just too much."

Don't take it personal, FDJ. I don't think you feel that way yourself, but based on what a great many of your pilots have written in as many different places and the statements of your leaders, both public and private, what I put in quotes is representative of your feelings as a group. I can assure you that your leaders have not left their disdain to our imagination and that happened LONG BEFORE THERE WAS AN RJDC.

Remember please: The RJDC is not suing Delta pilots. It is not suing to force Delta pilots to do anything. The lawsuit does not demand any specific integration. In fact, it does not even demand integration at all. What it DOES demand (from the ALPA) is adherence to written policy, adherence to the Duty of Fair Representation, adherence to fiduciary responsibility, adherence to the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association. For the failure to do any or all of those things, it further demands compensation for the damages suffered and punitive damages to ensure future adherence to the law. There's nothing illegitimate about that. "Me thinks thou doth protest too much" (or whatever he said).

Please continue to Part II