Colgan-Buffalo crash...

[JA PILOT]

Then they should hire and upgrade only those individuals with spotless records in aviation ONLY! This would have prevented all accidents that will occur on any given day.
Pilot records are the only records to be inspected or observed carefully or critically.
This policy should be blanked across aviation from the CEO down.
Many regionals are run by individuals that have led companies to ruin. But they continue to be put in charge of managing companies and throwing hard working employees to the bottom of an unforgiving industry.
They are thousands of pilot in this industry with exact failures as Capt. Renslow that continue to operate aircraft. However on the day questioned its my opinion to believe that Fatigue is the issue that caused this accident. He safely operated all flights prior to the events that took place.
But then again he was nor ever claimed to be an " Airplane Wizard ". If he were one he probably would have pulled out of any catastrophic event possible.
No matter what airport crew room couch, floor or other recess dark hole any pilot crawls out of in order to perform day to day flight operations.
But that would never be printed on any NTSB or FAA investigation report.
Blame it on a Deadman.

 

[airplane wizard]

No matter what airport crew room couch, floor or other recess dark hole any pilot crawls out of in order to perform day to day flight operations.
.

No one is forced to be a pilot. If you don't like the pay/schedule then find a different job. Not saying the schedules/pay are right, but it's a free country. If enough pilots quit/refused to fly then things would change.

 

[Flyprdu]

No one is forced to be a pilot. If you don't like the pay/schedule then find a different job. Not saying the schedules/pay are right, but it's a free country. If enough pilots quit/refused to fly then things would change.

Free market nonsense. People have to earn a living regardless of environment. And if the environment only offers one forced bad choice, then it's up to regulation to make it right.

 

[kf4amu]

This policy should be blanked across aviation from the CEO down.
Many regionals are run by individuals that have led companies to ruin. But they continue to be put in charge of managing companies and throwing hard working employees to the bottom of an unforgiving industry.
They are thousands of pilot in this industry with exact failures as Capt. Renslow that continue to operate aircraft.

Really? He was pretty awful. If you think that failure record he has is indicative of thousands of pilots, then you either know a lot of bush league pilots or your record is similar. We have a handful of failures at my airline that get drug through training kicking and screaming but they are a small minority of the overall pilot group.

 

[JA PILOT]

Flyrdu , Bingo another pilot see's the light!!! He summed it up, with one stroke.
Hope the others small plot minority will being to realize the situation they are in by kicking and screaming into the light.
PS . I have realized how much pilots love to idolize their own greatness, but tend to hide their faults behind the polyester suit . Nothing is funnier /pitiful as overhearing a group of pilots put down one of their own.

I have never had a simulator partner, nor observed anyone whom never had a problem with one of the items listed on Renslow record.
Simulators are training tools. In the end he passed his training with the same standards as the rest of the pilot group.
In my opinion " fatigue" was his last failure, for him and the first officer.

 

[Salukipilot4590]

1.5.1.2 Federal Aviation Administration Certificate Disapprovals and Colgan Air Training Events

The captain’s record of FAA certificate disapprovals showed the following:

• On October 1, 1991, the captain was disapproved for his instrument airplane rating during his initial flight check. He flew a PA-28 during the flight test, and the tasks disapproved were ATC clearance and compliance with ATC clearance, instrument cockpit check, partial panel32very high frequency omnidirectional radio range (VOR) approach, nondirectional beacon (NDB) approach, and holding. He passed the flight test for the rating on October 25, 1991.

On his 2005 application for employment with Colgan,33 the captain stated that he had failed his FAA check ride for an instrument rating and provided the following explanation: “I missed the NDB approach, received additional instruction, then repeated the approach and passed.”

That's it?


• On May 14, 2002, the captain was disapproved for his commercial single-engine land airplane flight certificate during his initial flight check. He flew a Cessna C-177 during the flight test, and the tasks disapproved were takeoffs, landings, go-arounds, and performance maneuvers. (He did not report this disapproval on his application for employment with Colgan.) He passed the flight check for the certificate on June 25, 2002.

WTF?


• On April 9, 2004, the captain was disapproved for his commercial multiengine land airplane flight certificate during his initial flight check. He flew a PA-44 during the flight test and was notified that the entire flight portion of the practical exam would need to be repeated. (He did not report this disapproval on his application for employment with Colgan.) He passed the flight check for the certificate on April 29, 2004.

WTMF?

• On October 15, 2007, while a first officer for Colgan, the captain was disapproved for his airline transport pilot certificate during his initial flight check. He flew a Saab 340 during the flight test, and the disapproved task was approach and landing with a power plant failure in a multiengine airplane. He passed the flight check for the certificate on October 18, 2007.

Colgan’s training records indicated that the captain, while a first officer, needed
additional training in the following areas:

• On October 28, 2005, the captain was graded “train to proficiency” on his initial proficiency check in the Saab 340. This grade indicated that his overall performance was satisfactory but that a checkride item (in this case, normal and abnormal procedures) needed to be repeated during the check ride.

• On October 17, 2006, the captain received an unsatisfactory grade on his recurrent proficiency check in the Saab 340. The unsatisfactory tasks were rejected takeoffs, general judgment, landings from a circling approach, oral exam, and non precision approach. The captain attended recurrent training and completed his requalification proficiency training on November 1, 2006.

Wat?

• On October 3, 2007, the captain received an unsatisfactory grade on his upgrade proficiency check in the Saab 340. The disapproved task was approach and landing with a powerplant failure in a multiengine airplane (as stated previously in the FAA information about this failed flight check). He accomplished upgrade line-oriented flight training on October 14 and simulator training on October 14 and 15. He completed a satisfactory upgrade proficiency checkride on October 15, 2007. (These dates conflict with those in the FAA’s record, which indicated that the captain’s unsatisfactory checkride occurred on October 15 and his satisfactory check ride occurred on October

Erm, not passing judgement but how in the green hell was he hired?

I know I'm STILL a bit of a green-horn but don't companies even look at PRIA when they hire you?

 

[wmuflyguy]

Your first instinct during a stall pusher event would be to raise the flaps, just because you had just put them down? Or did I misunderstand, because I would think a first reaction would be to go to max power.

MY first reaction would be to lower the damn nose.

IF the nose had been lowered they would have recovered fine without power and with the flaps retracting.

 

[Abernathy]

I can't really blame her actions. If you do something and don't like the result, undo it immediately. That's what I would have done. It was just an unfortunate coincidence that the a/c stalled just after she selected those flaps so she just undid what she perceived as putting the a/c in peril. Their fate was sealed long before she retracted the flaps.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

You would have raised the flaps, too? Did I read that right?

 

[rickair7777]

Is it possible that she believed that they had a tail plane stall? If so, then raising the flaps would have been correct. Obviously, the stall was conventional, but if she believed otherwise, it could explain her actions.

No, it's not possible. I'm tired of hearing people trying to apologize for her actions by inferring that she instantly reached a Phd-level conclusion in aerodynamics and, without consulting the CA, took it upon herself to take corrective action. She's that smart but didn't notice the power setting was totally opposite what you'd expect for a TP stall? Really?

Dollars to donuts she did not even know what a tail-plane stall was. I'd need to hear it on the CVR to believe otherwise.

 

[Abernathy]

No, it's not possible. I'm tired of hearing people trying to apologize for her actions by inferring that she instantly reached a Phd-level conclusion in aerodynamics and, without consulting the CA, took it upon herself to take corrective action. She's that smart but didn't notice the power setting was totally opposite what you'd expect for a TP stall? Really?

Dollars to donuts she did not even know what a tail-plane stall was. I'd need to hear it on the CVR to believe otherwise.

Flew the ATR for a couple of years and tail-plane stalls were never part of our curriculum. So I'd agree that unless she studied advanced aerodynamics during her time commuting between the west and east coast at 2AM, she had no idea.


But again, when an airline hires pilots to fly complex aircraft in harsh weather conditions for $15-19K a year, this isn't just something that can happen, it's something that WILL happen. Furthermore, places like this will hire candidates with less-than-steller, or even (as in this case) downright shocking training/checkride records because they just can't be that picky with what they offer as compensation.

 

[Flyer1015]

I feel bad for the girl. And to think, she could have held DTW -200 Captain if she was around!

The regional industry pressured her to be there that night. Even though she was married, she had moved out of her place at ORF to go back to her parents in SEA because she couldn't afford it anymore. The CVR is just horrifying to hear, but it's all the truth in the regional industry. She talks about Colgan constantly walking over her. She talks about how she'll try and fly just one more flight and get some rest in BUF, because if she calls in sick now, she has to pay for her own hotel and she can't afford it. These are things that shouldn't happen, but they do, it is the regional airline. ESPECIALLY the prop regionals, like Colgan and Great Lakes. You have the lowest paid regional pilots right there. And when people can't remove themselves from a flight because they can't afford to, it creates an untenable situation.

 

[bri5150]

And to think, she could have held DTW -200 Captain if she was around!

Might I suggest you delete that comment? That is pretty rude. You are suggesting that because of her apparent lack of skills (again what you are suggesting) that she wouldn't have deserved a 200 captain position. That is what the comment sounds like, and you really need to get over this or move on. Have you put in apps at other regional carriers in which you think you will get a quicker upgrade yet?

 

[Inconceivable]

The "fault" in this doesn't lie with the FO retracting the flaps, it lies on 1. both pilots for not minding the store and letting the plane get too slow and 2. the captain inexplicably pulling on a shaking yoke.

Think about it from the FO: you change the flap setting, the yoke starts shaking, and the captain hauls the yoke back into his chest. Somewhere in the back of your head you remember a short video in basic indoc about tail plane stalls and how recovery is opposite a normal stall...IE you pull instead of push. You also remember something about tail stalls occurring immediately following a configuration change. You happen to forget the part where a tail stall doesn't follow a shaker/pusher, and results in a sharp nose-down attitude with the yoke snapping forward.

You're tired, its late, and suddenly all hell is breaking loose around you...right after you changed flap settings.

What would YOU do?

Bottom line is it wouldn't have gotten to the point where flaps were a saving or damning thing if the captain had firewalled the power levers and pushed the nose forward, OR if either pilot had been paying attention to their rapidly decaying airspeed.

If you're honestly too tired to safely accomplish a flight, CALL FATIGUED - end of story. Same if you are too sick to fly. Doing so is your professional responsibility...regardless of hotel situation or pilot pushing chief pilots or loss of pay or whatever.

Best post ever on the subject

 

[Inconceivable]

Flew the ATR for a couple of years and tail-plane stalls were never part of our curriculum. So I'd agree that unless she studied advanced aerodynamics during her time commuting between the west and east coast at 2AM, she had no idea.

I did fly the ATR - and I nearly tail-stalled one into STL in 1995. Our lives were saved by putting the flaps back up...after losing 500' at the marker in a matter of seconds. Since 1998 many regional airlines, including Colgan and Pinnacle have covered the topic, albeit briefly, in indoc.

It is a much sadder statement of aviation professionalism in this country that pilots consider this to be in the category of "advanced aerodynamics."

 

[Inconceivable]

Erm, not passing judgement but how in the green hell was he hired?

I know I'm STILL a bit of a green-horn but don't companies even look at PRIA when they hire you?

Until this accident a PRIA report showed certificates held, date of issue of the most recent certificate, medical certificate, and accidents and violations within the past seven years. That's all. That's why airlines like SWA asked you to put a post it flag in your logbook for each checkride - sep that they can see if you have had to get retraining following a failure.

In Renslow's defense, while he probably lacked the right stuff, it is also a strong statement on how we train for ratings in this country: minimum hours for the minimum standard of competence. No one learns how to fly an airplane anymore - just how to perform a sequence of practical tasks.

 

[Flyprdu]

You are suggesting that because of her apparent lack of skills (again what you are suggesting) that she wouldn't have deserved a 200 captain position.

Her qualifications and skills are not the reason why she doesn't deserve a -200 spot. The fact that all of Colgan gets to bypass Pinnacle FOs who have more longevity is why she doesn't deserve it.

Don't be so sensitive. Need a hug?

 

[IBNAV8R]

Stop blaming pilots when they make mistakes because, one day it will be your turn.

Did you REALLY mean to say that? That's kind of like saying, "He put the gun to his head and pulled the trigger. But it wasn't really his fault. He was really a good guy, don't blame him. He missed his nap and besides, one day, one of us might accidentally put a loaded gun to our head."

No doubt fatigue was a factor and should be addressed. But, make no mistake, our hero royally screwed the pooch. To lay blame elsewhere is to resign to the thought that we have no control over our own proficiency, condition, ability and actions. And, if you think that, you REALLY need to stay FAR away from the controls of an aircraft.

This isn't a job where the worst thing that could happen is getting yourself fired or even getting yourself killed. Now you are ultimately responsible for other lives in an imperfect world. Man up or get the **** out!!!

Look at the NTSB animation. Look very closely. The airplane had flying energy and was recoverable right up until the last wing drop - Yes, even with the flaps up. All he had to do was let go of the yoke for a moment and recover - something any 20-hour student should be able to do.

Even AFTER the last wing drop, he had flying speed almost 1,000' above the impact point. It could be argued that recovery was STILL possible (albeit unlikely). From the animation, it appears as though our hero quit trying to recover at this point except to hold full aft yoke all the way to impact.

 

[Singlecoil]

So let me get this straight.
The stall warning goes off, the stick shaker activates, captain applies full power and pulls 2 g's establishing a positive rate of climb. Don't the flaps typically come up at some point during a stall recovery? Say, after a positive rate of climb has been established? Wouldn't that improve your climb performance and help you clear any obstacles?
You're saying she should have known the captain was going to freeze with the yoke in his chest and left the flaps down?
Whatever. She should have caught the airspeed decaying and called that out for sure, but to blame her for retracting the flaps at that point in the maneuver doesn't make sense to me.

 

[CFI2766]

CFI FOI stuff: The Law of Primacy.

What she learned first is what she retained. Somewhere along the way, whether in a 172, or perhaps a PA44, she learned that you raise flaps during a stall recovery. While under stress, and while concluding that the Captain was incapable of directing her to perform the actions her brain told her were necessary to recover from the stall, she raised the flaps.

Clearly an indefensible response, but probable.

She definitely didn't wake up that morning and decide to contribute to the deaths of 49 people and the destruction of a multi-million dollar asset. This accident boils down to a study of human factors and multiple, complementary causes.

 

[Flying Illini]

You would have raised the flaps, too? Did I read that right?

Probably a very good chance that I would have reacted exactly as she did, can't say for sure though as I wasn't there. Read BU's post, #12 if you are wondering why. He did a much better job of painting the picture than I ever could.