Colgan-Buffalo crash...

[Flying Illini]

Your first instinct during a stall pusher event would be to raise the flaps, just because you had just put them down? Or did I misunderstand, because I would think a first reaction would be to go to max power.

The CA was the PF, I would have hoped that he had initiated the proper response. However, I say that from my armchair and I'm fully rested. Had I been there that night with the fog of fatigue clouding my judgement...who knows?

 

[BoilerUP]

The "fault" in this doesn't lie with the FO retracting the flaps, it lies on 1. both pilots for not minding the store and letting the plane get too slow and 2. the captain inexplicably pulling on a shaking yoke.

Think about it from the FO: you change the flap setting, the yoke starts shaking, and the captain hauls the yoke back into his chest. Somewhere in the back of your head you remember a short video in basic indoc about tail plane stalls and how recovery is opposite a normal stall...IE you pull instead of push. You also remember something about tail stalls occurring immediately following a configuration change. You happen to forget the part where a tail stall doesn't follow a shaker/pusher, and results in a sharp nose-down attitude with the yoke snapping forward.

You're tired, its late, and suddenly all hell is breaking loose around you...right after you changed flap settings.

What would YOU do?

Bottom line is it wouldn't have gotten to the point where flaps were a saving or damning thing if the captain had firewalled the power levers and pushed the nose forward, OR if either pilot had been paying attention to their rapidly decaying airspeed.

If you're honestly too tired to safely accomplish a flight, CALL FATIGUED - end of story. Same if you are too sick to fly. Doing so is your professional responsibility...regardless of hotel situation or pilot pushing chief pilots or loss of pay or whatever.

 

[RJLoser]

I can't really blame her actions. If you do something and don't like the result, undo it immediately. That's what I would have done. It was just an unfortunate coincidence that the a/c stalled just after she selected those flaps so she just undid what she perceived as putting the a/c in peril. Their fate was sealed long before she retracted the flaps.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

I agree. It's extremely natural to reverse something you've done because you perceive it's causing the problem. Not correct but understandable.

 

[dustrpilot]

The CA was the PF, I would have hoped that he had initiated the proper response. However, I say that from my armchair and I'm fully rested. Had I been there that night with the fog of fatigue clouding my judgement...who knows?

I'm well aware of who was doing what and when. Having several years experience teaching with Colgan's partner airline I still can not believe the crew did what they did. I never agreed with the PTS standard of stall recovery and min altitude loss and I felt like some altitude loss should be expected in a stall recovery, but all an instructor can do is teach it like the company says teach it, but one thing I believe is taught industry wide, and I know is taught from primary training is at the the first recognition of a stall, set max power/thrust first.
Rest rules and fatigue need to be addressed. Schedules need to be built with realistic human factor considerations and not just with budget and bottom lines in mind, but as pilots, if the stall warning and stick pusher won't wake you up from a dead sleep and automatically kick in primary survival skills, please find another profession.

 

[COOPERVANE]

If you're honestly too tired to safely accomplish a flight, CALL FATIGUED - end of story. Same if you are too sick to fly. Doing so is your professional responsibility...regardless of hotel situation or pilot pushing chief pilots or loss of pay or whatever.

I fully agree

However. At ASA, the CP would call you a "wussy" and question your professionalism for calling fatigued. Then tell you that you will be docked min day (almost 4 hours) for that 1.3 credit trip your calling out for. Hey it's legal!!!!!! That means it's safe right?

But remember Kate M says safety is NUMBER ONE!!!

 

[Nevets]

If you're honestly too tired to safely accomplish a flight, CALL FATIGUED - end of story. Same if you are too sick to fly. Doing so is your professional responsibility...regardless of hotel situation or pilot pushing chief pilots or loss of pay or whatever.

The problem is that we are supposed to exercise good judgement about fatigue when our judgement is being impaired by fatigue. Fatigue is insidious which is why regulations should help prevent us from getting to that point to begin with.

 

[dustrpilot]

I hope that didn't come off as cranking on any individual posting on this thread. It wasn't meant to.
I think the Colgan crash was just the obvious result of regional airlines putting anybody at the controls of an airliner as cheaply as possible.

 

[RJLoser]

Regional pilots are used to flying fatigued. That's the problem.

 

[JA PILOT]

RJLoser
You hit this whole topic right on the HEAD!!!! We are too use to completing a job when the situation should tell us to call out Fatigue!!!
Their is more FEAR in calling scheduling about fatigue and less FEAR of being faced with a stalled, iced over, low vis. situation about flying in the regionals.
Then remarks from those that claim that is the nature of the beast so accept it or get another job. I have to SMH on those that refuse to see my point.
Too many of us risk our lives for a low paying job with a bleak future is we do not all bond together and change things through the media.
Call up your local stations and make things happen.
Stop blaming pilots when they make mistakes because, one day it will be your turn.
The company can make mistakes all day but we cannot!!! We have seen them do it time and again. But only pilots hang their own out by a limb.
This is a house that is bound to collapse...thank God I got out of this upside down industry.

 

[airplane wizard]

1.5.1.2 Federal Aviation Administration Certificate Disapprovals and Colgan
Air Training Events
The captain’s record of FAA certificate disapprovals showed the following:
• On October 1, 1991, the captain was disapproved for his instrument airplane rating
during his initial flight check. He flew a PA-28 during the flight test, and the tasks
disapproved were ATC clearance and compliance with ATC clearance, instrument
cockpit check, partial panel32very high frequency omnidirectional radio range
(VOR) approach, nondirectional beacon (NDB) approach, and holding. He passed the
flight test for the rating on October 25, 1991. On his 2005 application for
employment with Colgan,33 the captain stated that he had failed his FAA checkride
for an instrument rating and provided the following explanation: “I missed the NDB
approach, received additional instruction, then repeated the approach and passed.”
• On May 14, 2002, the captain was disapproved for his commercial single-engine land
airplane flight certificate during his initial flight check. He flew a Cessna C-177
during the flight test, and the tasks disapproved were takeoffs, landings, go-arounds,
and performance maneuvers. (He did not report this disapproval on his application for
employment with Colgan.) He passed the flight check for the certificate on June 25,
2002.
• On April 9, 2004, the captain was disapproved for his commercial multiengine land
airplane flight certificate during his initial flight check. He flew a PA-44 during the
flight test and was notified that the entire flight portion of the practical exam would
need to be repeated. (He did not report this disapproval on his application for
employment with Colgan.) He passed the flight check for the certificate on April 29,
2004.
• On October 15, 2007, while a first officer for Colgan, the captain was disapproved for
his airline transport pilot certificate during his initial flight check. He flew a Saab 340
during the flight test, and the disapproved task was approach and landing with a
powerplant failure in a multiengine airplane. He passed the flight check for the
certificate on October 18, 2007.

Colgan’s training records indicated that the captain, while a first officer, needed
additional training in the following areas:
• On October 28, 2005, the captain was graded “train to proficiency” on his initial
proficiency check in the Saab 340. This grade indicated that his overall performance
was satisfactory but that a checkride item (in this case, normal and abnormal
procedures) needed to be repeated during the checkride.
• On October 17, 2006, the captain received an unsatisfactory grade on his recurrent
proficiency check in the Saab 340. The unsatisfactory tasks were rejected takeoffs,
general judgment, landings from a circling approach, oral exam, and nonprecision
approach. The captain attended recurrent training and completed his requalification
proficiency training on November 1, 2006.
• On October 3, 2007, the captain received an unsatisfactory grade on his upgrade
proficiency check in the Saab 340. The disapproved task was approach and landing
with a powerplant failure in a multiengine airplane (as stated previously in the FAA
information about this failed flight check). He accomplished upgrade line-oriented
flight training on October 14 and simulator training on October 14 and 15. He
completed a satisfactory upgrade proficiency checkride on October 15, 2007. (These
dates conflict with those in the FAA’s record, which indicated that the captain’s
unsatisfactory checkride occurred on October 15 and his satisfactory checkride
occurred on October


Seems like he failed the flying part of every checkride he ever took.