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Colgan-Buffalo crash...

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Her qualifications and skills are not the reason why she doesn't deserve a -200 spot. The fact that all of Colgan gets to bypass Pinnacle FOs who have more longevity is why she doesn't deserve it.

Don't be so sensitive. Need a hug?

No, I don't. I just don't respect his comment and think it is offensive. She is dead. No need to use her in his quest to find new ways to complain about the Pinnacle Holdings SLI.
 
Probably a very good chance that I would have reacted exactly as she did, can't say for sure though as I wasn't there. Read BU's post, #12 if you are wondering why. He did a much better job of painting the picture than I ever could.


-You're flying in icing conditions
-You call for flaps and the captain fails to advance the power levers because he's obviously not flying/paying attention
-Speed doesn't just bleed off, it hemorrhages off
-Stick shaker goes off

And YOU'RE instinct---how you would have "reacted exactly"--- if I'm understanding you correctly, would be to raise the flaps?
 
-You're flying in icing conditions
-You call for flaps and the captain fails to advance the power levers because he's obviously not flying/paying attention
-Speed doesn't just bleed off, it hemorrhages off
-Stick shaker goes off

And YOU'RE instinct---how you would have "reacted exactly"--- if I'm understanding you correctly, would be to raise the flaps?

22:16:23.5
HOT-1 flaps fifteen before landing checklist.
22:16:26.0
CAM [sound similar to flap handle movement]
22:16:26.6
HOT-2 uhhh.
22:16:27.4
CAM [sound similar to stick shaker lasting 6.7 seconds]

The shaker fired after the FO selected Flaps 15. Obviously neither pilot was paying attention to WTF the airplane was doing, because if they were, one or the other would have noticed the rapidly decaying airspeed.

It would be human nature to undo an action that seemingly causes a negative consequence, would it not?

To muddy the waters more, the CA inexplicably had the shaking yoke buried in his chest - a textbook procedure for tailplane stall recovery, along with putting the airplane in its previous configuration.

Obviously in hindsight we can say they weren't experiencing a tailplane stall and retracting the flaps was a move that took matters from bad to worse...but their fate was sealed well before that point due to crew inattention and an ass-backward attempt at stall recovery by Capt. Renslow.
 
Inattention based on Fatigue and Get-Home-itis!!!
Make sure this will not happen again. Call out and have a stronger petition to have the rest requirements changed.
Everyone should contact their local media to have attention drawn to Fatigue and not the solid blame on Renslow prior training record.
I have driven home once from a long day at work and I should have pulled over to sleep. However I was only 13 miles from home to get into my bed.
Could have pulled over but the temperature that night was 15 degrees.
Would have ended up crashed under a tracker trailer, and remembered just looking at its break lights. It would have been the end for me.
Unfortunately, both pilots did not realize how fatigue will effect an ass-backwards attempt at flying an airplane or driving a car.
 
-You're flying in icing conditions
-You call for flaps and the captain fails to advance the power levers because he's obviously not flying/paying attention
-Speed doesn't just bleed off, it hemorrhages off
-Stick shaker goes off

And YOU'RE instinct---how you would have "reacted exactly"--- if I'm understanding you correctly, would be to raise the flaps?

Why is this so hard to understand? This is basic human nature stuff, not "pilot stuff." See BU's post quoted below. Keep in mind that the FO wasn't paying any attention to the airspeed either so in her mind, before selecting Flaps 15 everything was great. After selecting Flaps 15 things were very, VERY bad. My first and immediate thought process would be to undo what I had just done that appeared to cause the problem. Maybe that was her very FIRST thought too but maybe (and we'll never know) before acting she then looked over to see her CA initiating a tailplane stall recovery and then her first instinct to undo the last action is now confirmed so she proceeded.

22:16:23.5
HOT-1 flaps fifteen before landing checklist.
22:16:26.0
CAM [sound similar to flap handle movement]
22:16:26.6
HOT-2 uhhh.
22:16:27.4
CAM [sound similar to stick shaker lasting 6.7 seconds]

The shaker fired after the FO selected Flaps 15. Obviously neither pilot was paying attention to WTF the airplane was doing, because if they were, one or the other would have noticed the rapidly decaying airspeed.

It would be human nature to undo an action that seemingly causes a negative consequence, would it not?

To muddy the waters more, the CA inexplicably had the shaking yoke buried in his chest - a textbook procedure for tailplane stall recovery, along with putting the airplane in its previous configuration.

Obviously in hindsight we can say they weren't experiencing a tailplane stall and retracting the flaps was a move that took matters from bad to worse...but their fate was sealed well before that point due to crew inattention and an ass-backward attempt at stall recovery by Capt. Renslow.
Paul, I'm glad you're here as you articulate my thoughts better than I do!
 
The emails were interesting and not good for Colgan. They showed the highlights on nightly news.

No one seems to ever bring up how there was still hope until the FO took it upon herself to raise the flaps.

The accident is a classic breakdown of communication, lack of situational awareness, poor airmanship, etc...bottom line is that BOTH pilots failed to monitor and challenge. At the point where the F/O began to retract the flaps, the airplane was already too low and in such extremis that it wasnt cited as being causal or a contributing factor by the NTSB. However, it did point to the loss of situational awareness on the part of both crewmembers. And, even more frustrating is that we will never know why with any certainty they we're distracted during a critical, yet also routine phase of flight..
 
Last edited:
Just as an addendum to tailplane stalls...The power on-aft stick recovery method depicted in the NASA tail icing video shown during 9L training explains in PLAIN ENGLISH that ONLY airplanes with NON-POWERED flight controls should use this technique. The Q400 has an hydraulic all powered elevator with artificial feel. There is no tactial feedback thru the flight controls to signal an impending tail stall. Additionally, the Q400 vertical stab has a "balbous nose" to create a bowwave effect that virtually eliminates any tailplane icing problems, or so the Bombardier engineers tell us.
Furthermore, the DTW-200 comment is very low-rent from the mind of an ignorant little piss-ant that has probably never pulled out his dress uniform to attend the memorial service for a fellow squadronmate that lost his life serving their country. You, cur should be ashamed of yourself.
 
Bottom line....

A lot of very good people are gone because of two pilots flagrant incompetence. They bruised our profession and changed the lives of an infinite amount of people, forever. There are dozens of hard lessons learned from this accident, this thread bears witness to this fact. Be sharp, pay attention, and protect the big picture; we all have a lot to lose when we turn our back on the fundamentals of the operation.
 
CFI FOI stuff: The Law of Primacy.

What she learned first is what she retained. Somewhere along the way, whether in a 172, or perhaps a PA44, she learned that you raise flaps during a stall recovery. While under stress, and while concluding that the Captain was incapable of directing her to perform the actions her brain told her were necessary to recover from the stall, she raised the flaps.

Clearly an indefensible response, but probable.

She definitely didn't wake up that morning and decide to contribute to the deaths of 49 people and the destruction of a multi-million dollar asset. This accident boils down to a study of human factors and multiple, complementary causes.
This is probably the best explanation for why the FO raised the flaps. It highlights the deficiencies of pilot training programs, namely focusing on teaching pilots to perform a series of tasks by rote memorization. Fortunately this has been changing recently, and more emphasis is being placed on teaching and checking judgement, not just PTS procedures. I think it would be beneficial to require all airline-pilots-in-training to spend some time as a CFI, though, as that is where many really learn to correlate everything and understand the big picture.
 

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