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Colgan-Buffalo crash...

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The emails were interesting and not good for Colgan. They showed the highlights on nightly news.

No one seems to ever bring up how there was still hope until the FO took it upon herself to raise the flaps.

The accident is a classic breakdown of communication, lack of situational awareness, poor airmanship, etc...bottom line is that BOTH pilots failed to monitor and challenge. At the point where the F/O began to retract the flaps, the airplane was already too low and in such extremis that it wasnt cited as being causal or a contributing factor by the NTSB. However, it did point to the loss of situational awareness on the part of both crewmembers. And, even more frustrating is that we will never know why with any certainty they we're distracted during a critical, yet also routine phase of flight..
 
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Just as an addendum to tailplane stalls...The power on-aft stick recovery method depicted in the NASA tail icing video shown during 9L training explains in PLAIN ENGLISH that ONLY airplanes with NON-POWERED flight controls should use this technique. The Q400 has an hydraulic all powered elevator with artificial feel. There is no tactial feedback thru the flight controls to signal an impending tail stall. Additionally, the Q400 vertical stab has a "balbous nose" to create a bowwave effect that virtually eliminates any tailplane icing problems, or so the Bombardier engineers tell us.
Furthermore, the DTW-200 comment is very low-rent from the mind of an ignorant little piss-ant that has probably never pulled out his dress uniform to attend the memorial service for a fellow squadronmate that lost his life serving their country. You, cur should be ashamed of yourself.
 
Bottom line....

A lot of very good people are gone because of two pilots flagrant incompetence. They bruised our profession and changed the lives of an infinite amount of people, forever. There are dozens of hard lessons learned from this accident, this thread bears witness to this fact. Be sharp, pay attention, and protect the big picture; we all have a lot to lose when we turn our back on the fundamentals of the operation.
 
CFI FOI stuff: The Law of Primacy.

What she learned first is what she retained. Somewhere along the way, whether in a 172, or perhaps a PA44, she learned that you raise flaps during a stall recovery. While under stress, and while concluding that the Captain was incapable of directing her to perform the actions her brain told her were necessary to recover from the stall, she raised the flaps.

Clearly an indefensible response, but probable.

She definitely didn't wake up that morning and decide to contribute to the deaths of 49 people and the destruction of a multi-million dollar asset. This accident boils down to a study of human factors and multiple, complementary causes.
This is probably the best explanation for why the FO raised the flaps. It highlights the deficiencies of pilot training programs, namely focusing on teaching pilots to perform a series of tasks by rote memorization. Fortunately this has been changing recently, and more emphasis is being placed on teaching and checking judgement, not just PTS procedures. I think it would be beneficial to require all airline-pilots-in-training to spend some time as a CFI, though, as that is where many really learn to correlate everything and understand the big picture.
 
This is probably the best explanation for why the FO raised the flaps. It highlights the deficiencies of pilot training programs, namely focusing on teaching pilots to perform a series of tasks by rote memorization. Fortunately this has been changing recently, and more emphasis is being placed on teaching and checking judgement, not just PTS procedures. I think it would be beneficial to require all airline-pilots-in-training to spend some time as a CFI, though, as that is where many really learn to correlate everything and understand the big picture.

I agree that the focus is changing but unfortunately the result won't change until they slow down the training process and really take time to teach and allow students to learn. The firehose schooling method only produces rote memorization with understanding coming years later. unfortunately you don't get to choose when you'll need that understanding.
 
Do the flaps in the -400 move as slow between 0-15 as they do on the other series?
 
The old Dashes take SEVERAL seconds to move between 0-15. Beyond 15-35 they move faster. I had thought for a while that the flap retraction in the Colgan crash had little to nothing to do with them stalling, or getting deeper into the stall.

Pick apart the crew actions all you want. Don't forget the guy being blasted here was a dad with 2 kids at home (I think anyway). I don't know about ya'll, but that bothers me.
 
Just as an addendum to tailplane stalls...The power on-aft stick recovery method depicted in the NASA tail icing video shown during 9L training explains in PLAIN ENGLISH that ONLY airplanes with NON-POWERED flight controls should use this technique. f.

Why does that work for planes with non powered controls only? What is the recovery method for planes with powered flight controls? I know powered controls provide no real control feel, so you wouldn't feel the vibration through the yoke, but wouldn't the nose still pitch down if the tail stalled on a plane with powered controls?

Thanks=)
 
Pick apart the crew actions all you want. Don't forget the guy being blasted here was a dad with 2 kids at home (I think anyway). I don't know about ya'll, but that bothers me.

What part bothers you? That he was a dad?

The personal circumstances of everyone who died are truly tragic. But if there is to be any benefit from this tragedy, it is that we coldly analyze the accident, its causes and its factors - and learn from them. Maybe we recognize a little of ourselves here and hopefully we all come out little wiser and safer because of it.

If my ****-up ever causes a big smoking hole with a bunch of charred bodies, trust me, you won't be honoring me or my family by judging me lightly and then repeating my mistake.

Let's keep our heads and be safe out there.
 
What part bothers you? That he was a dad?

The personal circumstances of everyone who died are truly tragic. But if there is to be any benefit from this tragedy, it is that we coldly analyze the accident, its causes and its factors - and learn from them. Maybe we recognize a little of ourselves here and hopefully we all come out little wiser and safer because of it.

If my ****-up ever causes a big smoking hole with a bunch of charred bodies, trust me, you won't be honoring me or my family by judging me lightly and then repeating my mistake.

Let's keep our heads and be safe out there.

Analyze it, yes. Of course. Analyze it coldly, maybe. Forget that families were torn up in this mess, nope.
 
She definitely didn't wake up that morning and decide to contribute to the deaths of 49 people and the destruction of a multi-million dollar asset. This accident boils down to a study of human factors and multiple, complementary causes.

Excellent post. It's been proven/demonstrated that pilots with better skill levels and more competence can kill people just as efficiently and quickly as those that don't posses them.

Along the lines of the points you made in bold, AA in Columbia is PERFECT example. And if those DAL pilots in ATL a while back had plowed that 767 into an aircraft on that taxi way they landed on, everybody could be saying the EXACT SAME THINGS ABOUT THEM AS WELL.
 
Cali, Columbia was a human factors nightmare that demonstrated no matter how much technology enhances safety. Automation can also become a silent killer if not used (monitored) properly.
 

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