Colgan 3407 Update

[DrewBlows]

If I have the basics correct (and I may be mistaken?)... I'm left scratching my head with the big, "What were they thinking?" Stalls and approach to stalls AND THEIR RECOVERIES!... (trying to be polite here)... are two of the MOST BASIC of all aviation concepts and maneuvers to fly.

The concepts are basic but perhaps the techniques taught and practiced are not the safest options.

The altitude standards for recovering from a stall for an ATP certificate are +/- 100'. The only reason I see to not lose more than 100' if you were to stall an aircraft by mistake in an operational setting (not training) is if you were 100' from the ground, a situation that is possible, though only happens typically twice per flight very briefly. Conversely, there will never be terrain above you so why does it matter if you recover within 100' above you stalled altitude.

What if we trained to lose 500' in a stall and climb to 1000' above the initial altitude? Seems like this is a more likely scenario outside of the training environment. We could still practice the old way (flying right at Critical AoA when we know the stall is coming), but we would be taught that it is acceptable to lose altitude when lowering the AoA. This maneuver requires much less precision and, frankly, much less skill, but a safe outcome would still be assured, maybe more so.

Thoughts...

 

[q100]

I think you are onto something Drew. I think that by the time pilots are training/checking at PT 121 operators, stall recoveries are being treated as a proficiency maneuver, rather than as a potentially lifesaving semi-emergency. Nothing wrong with being proficient in recovering from an APPROACH to stall with minimal altitude loss, but it should not be at the expense of forgetting that a stall is a function of AofA and the last thing you want to be doing with stall indications is increasing AofA!

I'd say that the most dangerous stall from an altitude loss standpoint is the landing stall, with low energy and high drag needing immediate & full power application as well as minimal altitude loss. But, at 1500' AGL, losing a couple of hundred feet may cause loss of face, but probably not loss of life. So, yeah, for most situations minimizing the altitude loss should be a secondary concern.

My concern is that the way most of us train (glad to hear there are exceptions) seems likely to develop the habit of using backpressure on the controls in a stall recovery - see my earlier posts as to why I think this is.

 

[Hamburger]

rarely do pilots or airplanes invent new ways to crash. same stuff different day.

Starting to sound like this one.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA94MA027&rpt=fi

Autopilot leveled off from descent while throttles stayed untouched at idle.

 

[DrewBlows]

Starting to sound like this one.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA94MA027&rpt=fi

Autopilot leveled off from descent while throttles stayed untouched at idle.

That's easy to do if distracted, usually someone catches well before it becomes a problem though. The airplane I fly now has autothrottles; it drive me nuts when guys click them off in the descent to "save fuel" or because "they don't do what I want".

I asked one guy why he purposely gave away stall protection. He told me it wasn't stall protection...I proceeded to baby-sit.

 

[EatinRamen]

What concerns me the most is that we have had two accidents since the start of this year where the crew allowed the airplane to get too slow and stall. Turkish Air, and now it seems the Colgan crash.

We wouldn't be discussing stall recovery if the crews on these flights were monitoring their aircraft's airspeed. As airplanes have gotten more technologically advance, this is what we are supposed to be doing... being systems manager. Seems to me like we need to do a better job of monitoring the airplane.

 

[maxblast72]

The article said something about a 25lb pull force applied to the yoke. Have they released anything on the where the power was during this event?

 

[Smarta$$]

I find it humorous how some of you demonize reducing pitch at 1500 feet as some how dangerous. Swept wing, straight wing, T-prop, jet, big plane or training airplane, lower the pitch slightly gets the wing flying again. Trying to make the airplane maintain altitude like you were taught in the sim, or like you are on a type ride is not the most important thing unless you have VERY little terrain clearance.

As far as turning off the auto throttles, I have no problem with that. You are required to maintain proficiency in all levels of automation. There is only one way to do that. Whats next? Can't disengage the auto pilot because it increases the work load?

But yeah, you have to watch it more carefully. I guess my CRJ is completely unsafe because it has no auto throttles.

 

[Moustache]

When we do our stall training at the first sign of a stall we push the nose down. This Captain pulled nose up in a low speed, low power, low altitude situation. Does not look like ice is going to be the cause of this accident.

What Airplane?

 

[Amish RakeFight]

We wouldn't be discussing stall recovery if the crews on these flights were monitoring their aircraft's airspeed. As airplanes have gotten more technologically advance, this is what we are supposed to be doing... being systems manager. Seems to me like we need to do a better job of monitoring the airplane.

You mean like this:

http://dl.glitter-graphics.net/pub/1292/1292871fwls2yt8o1.jpg

 

[LJ45]

You guys keep talking about pushing or pulling... How about what ever it take to hold the desired attitude for recovery!

 

[Big Beer Belly]

The concepts are basic but perhaps the techniques taught and practiced are not the safest options.

The altitude standards for recovering from a stall for an ATP certificate are +/- 100'. The only reason I see to not lose more than 100' if you were to stall an aircraft by mistake in an operational setting (not training) is if you were 100' from the ground, a situation that is possible, though only happens typically twice per flight very briefly. Conversely, there will never be terrain above you so why does it matter if you recover within 100' above you stalled altitude.

What if we trained to lose 500' in a stall and climb to 1000' above the initial altitude? Seems like this is a more likely scenario outside of the training environment. We could still practice the old way (flying right at Critical AoA when we know the stall is coming), but we would be taught that it is acceptable to lose altitude when lowering the AoA. This maneuver requires much less precision and, frankly, much less skill, but a safe outcome would still be assured, maybe more so.

Thoughts...

I concur with your thoughts... sometimes the forest is lost through the trees.

Given that, I'm honestly blown away at the cause of this accident. I had the false assumption that by the time two pilots reach a 121 airline something as simple as basic airspeed awareness is akin to second nature. :angryfire

This aircraft was not on fire, pieces of it hadn't been shot off, there was no particular terrain threat, no terrorists in the cabin attempting to gain access... in short, there were no extenuating circumstances that would warrant sufficient distraction to allow this condition to develop. THEN, regardless of how they arrived in an approach to stall condition, I'm again left speechless that the basic increase power, relax back pressure was substituted with a horrendous +30 pitch change as the stick shaker is activating. All I can say is, "WOW!"... and NOT a good wow.

My reaction to the cause of this accident may come across as harsh, but I EXPECT MORE of the pilots flying my loved ones. Many accidents that I read about leave me with the feeling that "there but the grace of God go I"... but this accident does not. I think it best that I conclude my remarks at this point. Thanks for the info....

BBB

 

[dcfu69]

I agree 100%. What happened is sad.... for sure. But they royally screwed up. Which resulted in killing people. What a disgrace. They are 121 AIRLINE PILOTS. act like it and fly like it. period.

 

[q100]

You guys keep talking about pushing or pulling... How about what ever it take to hold the desired attitude for recovery!

That's what should happen. Problem is, the way many 121 carriers train, the "muscle memory" that gets associated with recoveries from approach to stall is to pull. And not many 121 programs seem to a) include full stalls, or b) approaches to stalls with the autopilot flying all the way to stick shaker.

 

[WSurf]

That's what should happen. Problem is, the way many 121 carriers train, the "muscle memory" that gets associated with recoveries from approach to stall is to pull. And not many 121 programs seem to a) include full stalls, or b) approaches to stalls with the autopilot flying all the way to stick shaker.

Many 121 carriers don't include full stalls because your a commerical pilot and either with or without an autopilot you shouldn't allow yourself to even get to a full stall.

 

[Caveman]

It sounds like a classic case of stall, spin, crash & burn. Normally at this point we'd be discussing a student\private pilot turning base to final or t/o with a high density altitude. The fact we are discussing two ATPs in a commercial airliner flying a relatively routine ILS is very, very disturbing. I'm with BBB on this one. I hope my perception of what happened is wrong, but wow......

And, yes, it COULD happen to any one of us given the right set of circumstances. We have sterile cokpit for a reason and I'm as guilty as anybody else, but the more experience I get the more I'm inclined to respect sterile cockpit. It's not the first disctraction that gets you nor maybe even the second one. But, at what point do the distractions rise to a level that they do make a difference? This crew may have found out the hard way.

 

[WSurf]

It sounds like a classic case of stall, spin, crash & burn. Normally at this point we'd be discussing a student\private pilot turning base to final or t/o with a high density altitude. The fact we are discussing two ATPs in a commercial airliner flying a relatively routine ILS is very, very disturbing. I'm with BBB on this one. I hope my perception of what happened is wrong, but wow......

And, yes, it COULD happen to any one of us given the right set of circumstances. We have sterile cokpit for a reason and I'm as guilty as anybody else, but the more experience I get the more I'm inclined to respect sterile cockpit. It's not the first disctraction that gets you nor maybe even the second one. But, at what point do the distractions rise to a level that they do make a difference? This crew may have found out the hard way.

While I agree with most of your thoughts, I disagree with your sterile cockpit assumption. Sterile cockpit doesn't just mean you don't talk at all unless its checklist related. It means you talk about anything that deals with the flight.

I think the distraction for them was the Ice that had built up. Remember the old saying, "As workload increases, Capacity decreases."
So is that wrong to discuss the ice on the plane? You can have a sterile cockpit and have both pilots fixated on the samething.

None of us are sure what happened, but listening to ATC Tapes and the FO's quick read backs (sometimes she didn't even read back the total clearences, only call sign) to me seems there was a bunch of work going on in the cockpit.

 

[CptMurf]

I seem to remember something on the initial release of the FDR data that the flaps were selected to 15(?), moved to 10, then reversed direction to flaps up. If this did occur, it could have been the final straw that caused the accident. The stick shaker/pusher is dependant on flap position and even though they were given a shaker and could have powered out of it, as the flaps retracted they would have been way below stall speed for their given flaps. Powering out in this senario would not be an option.

 

[FlyinFife]

Is there still any validity to the theory that while the airplane was slowing with the autopilot on, it was constantly trimming for nose up, and once the stick-shaker happened with full-power application: that is what attributed to the 30+ deg. nose up attitude?

 

[LJ45]

Many 121 carriers don't include full stalls because your a commerical pilot and either with or without an autopilot you shouldn't allow yourself to even get to a full stall.

I agree, but if that was true we wouldn't have unusual attitude training either.

Also, it is sounding like they had a stall warning and then with poor recovery techinque, actually stalled the airplane.

 

[tyuwerty]

The one thing that is suspicious in this investigation is the absence of any information related to power or thrust lever position.

This sounds like it has a lot less to do with proper stall recovery and more to do with a total loss off situational awareness (airspeed/power). The auto pilot kicked off, the nose dropped catching the PF off guard, resulting in the 25lb reflex pull on the control column. I bet that the pull on the control column came well before the application of full power.

I hope I am wrong, but I think we are going to find out there was more being discussed in the cockpit than icing.