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Colgan 3407 Update

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I didn't see this anywhere. Was the autopilot on and armed for approach? Are they looking into false capture off of the course?
 
CA and FO were fighting or arguing is what I've been told. I guess we'll see for sure once they release the CVR transcript.
 
While I agree with most of your thoughts, I disagree with your sterile cockpit assumption. Sterile cockpit doesn't just mean you don't talk at all unless its checklist related. It means you talk about anything that deals with the flight.

I think the distraction for them was the Ice that had built up. Remember the old saying, "As workload increases, Capacity decreases."
So is that wrong to discuss the ice on the plane? You can have a sterile cockpit and have both pilots fixated on the samething.

None of us are sure what happened, but listening to ATC Tapes and the FO's quick read backs (sometimes she didn't even read back the total clearences, only call sign) to me seems there was a bunch of work going on in the cockpit.

I agree. My sterile cockpit comments were an afterthought and not really a comment about this particular crew. However, if the accident was caused by a loss of SA regarding airspeed then any and all distractions were a factor, legitimate conversation or otherwise.
 
They are 121 AIRLINE PILOTS. act like it and fly like it. period.

More true words have rarely been spoken. The trust the public places in us is sacred and this accident (like all accidents) is a stark reminder of that one basic fact.

It will be very interesting to see what is on the CVR. You know, it really could happen to any of us, really. Everyone has had a moment where they got fixated on one element of the flight and missed a radio call or forgot that they had already completed a checklist. That is why there are two pilots up there after all. I have a hunch that this is an accident that will be studied in CRM courses for years to come.
 
As far as turning off the auto throttles, I have no problem with that. You are required to maintain proficiency in all levels of automation. There is only one way to do that. Whats next? Can't disengage the auto pilot because it increases the work load?

But yeah, you have to watch it more carefully. I guess my CRJ is completely unsafe because it has no auto throttles.

The CRJ isn't unsafe at all. There are no auto-throttles so the descent is made the same way every single time. When you click the AT off sometimes and leave it on other times you are asking for trouble. One distraction, and airspeed will bleed off when the aircraft levels automatically.

I agree automation should be shut off from time-to-time but not in normal descents from the flight levels with the AP engaged. There are too many distractions and no upside. I regularly turn off all the automation and hand fly for proficiency but I pick my spots. Usually nice days when few distractions are expected in the descent all the way to landing. It's not in the weather during the descent phase when checklists and ATC instructions could cause a distraction.
 
Not sure if it has been talked about in other threads but what about recommendations of shadowing the controls even with AP on at low / approach altitudes. Personally I believe that the flying pilot must have the hands on the controls from 5,000 AFE down. There are many reasons for this. It can also be a way for a distracted pilot to get clues that something is going on with the plane that is out of the norm. Controls that start bucking or moving further than usual might cue you in to "hey pay attention to me!"

Not sure at all if that played into this accident but it is something I am concerned about as I fly and ride in jumpseats. I believe a lot of pilots have too much faith in the AP at low altitude. Just my opinion.
 
For years the FAA has had a "one size fits all" stall recovery training program. Push the thrust levers up and pull back on the yoke to minimize altitude loss. About 5 years ago the FAA put together and industry working group to rewrite FAR 121 sub parts N and O. These are your current training regulations. Shortly after Pinnacle 3701 the group began looking at what that crew did when they got stick shaker. The set full thrust and tried to maintain altitude. It didn't work and they realized that maybe they should get away from the "one size fits all" stall recovery training and began working on new regulations. On January 12, 2009 the FAA introduced a notice of proposed rule making with the new regulations. Take a look at the requirements starting on page 1360 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E8-29584.pdf

The crew wasn't fighting. They were chit chatting about unions, contracts, pay rates and management like we all do. They got slow enough to get the stick pusher. The pounds of force pulled on the yoke is important because when the pusher released that's the force pulling on the yoke and hence the rapid 30 degree pitch up. They shoved the power up and pulled back on the yoke just like they were taught.

One size doesn't fit all.
 
Not sure if it has been talked about in other threads but what about recommendations of shadowing the controls even with AP on at low / approach altitudes. Personally I believe that the flying pilot must have the hands on the controls from 5,000 AFE down. There are many reasons for this. It can also be a way for a distracted pilot to get clues that something is going on with the plane that is out of the norm. Controls that start bucking or moving further than usual might cue you in to "hey pay attention to me!"

Not sure at all if that played into this accident but it is something I am concerned about as I fly and ride in jumpseats. I believe a lot of pilots have too much faith in the AP at low altitude. Just my opinion.

Lol. I've tried shadowing the controls before. The sidestick and thrust levers never move. I learned shadowing them is a waste of time.
 
....albeit lowest-bidder ones!

I'm sorry, remind me. Exactly what does pay have to do with anything? I must have missed that part during flight training.

Yeah let's smear some dead pilots who left families behind on a public forum. You're my hero.
 
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My reaction to the cause of this accident may come across as harsh, but I EXPECT MORE of the pilots flying my loved ones.
BBB

Which cause is that? Because all I've seen is speculation, and enough jumping to conclusions to get it in the Olympics. Or are you talking about the cause that will be determined at a future time?

Oh, and no matter how much this crew may or may not have screwed up when the final finding comes out, to think that you're above repeating anyone's mistake is a dangerous attitude. We protect ourselved from repeating those mistakes by studying the facts, and putting ourselved in their shoes, not by wild speculation and criticism based on early reports.
 
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I'm sorry, remind me. Exactly what does pay have to do with anything? I must have missed that part during flight training.

Yeah let's smear some dead pilots who left families behind on a public forum. You're my hero.

I'll remind you. The more qualified pilots apply to the higher paying airlines. The one's left over work at the lower paying airlines. The hiring standards at Colgan were practically non-existent at Colgan a few years ago. There are innocent people dead because of these pilots' mistake. I would not call it smearing, but just because the pilots are dead does not mean they didn't make a mistake. You guys can blame it on the training all you want, but if what the NTSB is saying is true, then this was just horrendous airmanship. These pilots should not have been flying this aircraft to begin with. There are experienced pilots out of work with 1000's of hours that would have no problem flying a Q400 if it paid a decent wage. Unfortunately it doesn't so you are left with some less experienced pilots to fill the void. You should not be building your experience as a 121 captain with an inexperienced pilot in the left seat. The system is broken. There have been a few accidents in the last couple of years at the regionals that could have and should have been avoided. We are very fortunate that there have been as few accidents as there have been with the regionals lack of hiring standards. Instead of raising pay, they lower requirements.
 
There have been a few accidents in the last couple of years at the regionals that could have and should have been avoided.

And there have been a lot of accidents at majors over the past few decades that could have and should have been avoided... Plenty of high-time, high-dollar pilots have dug smoking holes with their mistakes.
 
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I'll remind you. The more qualified pilots apply to the higher paying airlines. The one's left over work at the lower paying airlines. The hiring standards at Colgan were practically non-existent at Colgan a few years ago. There are innocent people dead because of these pilots' mistake. I would not call it smearing, but just because the pilots are dead does not mean they didn't make a mistake. You guys can blame it on the training all you want, but if what the NTSB is saying is true, then this was just horrendous airmanship. These pilots should not have been flying this aircraft to begin with. There are experienced pilots out of work with 1000's of hours that would have no problem flying a Q400 if it paid a decent wage. Unfortunately it doesn't so you are left with some less experienced pilots to fill the void. You should not be building your experience as a 121 captain with an inexperienced pilot in the left seat. The system is broken. There have been a few accidents in the last couple of years at the regionals that could have and should have been avoided. We are very fortunate that there have been as few accidents as there have been with the regionals lack of hiring standards. Instead of raising pay, they lower requirements.

Well on that dumbass thought, how about one of the highest paid regionals and LEX? That crew dropped the ball pretty bad too!
So your money theory is screwed!
 
I would not call it smearing, but just because the pilots are dead does not mean they didn't make a mistake. You guys can blame it on the training all you want, but if what the NTSB is saying is true, then this was just horrendous airmanship

The possibility exists that the crew could have mistaken the situation for tailplane icing? In this case, then the aft column movement would have been appropriate..remember while the NTSB, and all the rest of the "hindsight committees" including ourselves on this forum have many hours days weeks to speculate and pour over data, the crew had mere seconds to react to a situation..
 
The one thing that is suspicious in this investigation is the absence of any information related to power or thrust lever position.

This sounds like it has a lot less to do with proper stall recovery and more to do with a total loss off situational awareness (airspeed/power). The auto pilot kicked off, the nose dropped catching the PF off guard, resulting in the 25lb reflex pull on the control column. I bet that the pull on the control column came well before the application of full power.

I hope I am wrong, but I think we are going to find out there was more being discussed in the cockpit than icing.


Airspeed, Power Settings, Attitude, Bank Angle, Aircraft Configuration, Weather Conditions






eP.
 
Lol. I've tried shadowing the controls before. The sidestick and thrust levers never move. I learned shadowing them is a waste of time

Which is a problem with the airbus design. No tactile feedback for what the autopilot/autothrottles are doing with YOUR aircraft. Usually, not a problem. Sometimes, a big problem.

Our SOP says that the PF must have his hands/feet in a position to immediately assume control at "lower altitudes" which is defined as anytime the flaps are out.

Not sure if this has any relevance to this accident but thought I'd take a poke at Airbus, it is always a good time for that.
 
Which is a problem with the airbus design.

Not sure if this has any relevance to this accident but thought I'd take a poke at Airbus, it is always a good time for that.

Felt the same way before I started flying them..actually makes you more aware of pitch attitude thrust speed because one is forced to monitor the FMA more closely
 
had a bus captain tell me the other day, "don't ever trust 2 check airmen flying together. they blew through the final on a visual because the PF went down in the box as did the PM while they got a sidestep...

the public puts a sacred trust in us

just ask bernie madoffs' clients.. you're not alone
 

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