Colgan 3407 Update

[Big Beer Belly]

The concepts are basic but perhaps the techniques taught and practiced are not the safest options.

The altitude standards for recovering from a stall for an ATP certificate are +/- 100'. The only reason I see to not lose more than 100' if you were to stall an aircraft by mistake in an operational setting (not training) is if you were 100' from the ground, a situation that is possible, though only happens typically twice per flight very briefly. Conversely, there will never be terrain above you so why does it matter if you recover within 100' above you stalled altitude.

What if we trained to lose 500' in a stall and climb to 1000' above the initial altitude? Seems like this is a more likely scenario outside of the training environment. We could still practice the old way (flying right at Critical AoA when we know the stall is coming), but we would be taught that it is acceptable to lose altitude when lowering the AoA. This maneuver requires much less precision and, frankly, much less skill, but a safe outcome would still be assured, maybe more so.

Thoughts...

I concur with your thoughts... sometimes the forest is lost through the trees.

Given that, I'm honestly blown away at the cause of this accident. I had the false assumption that by the time two pilots reach a 121 airline something as simple as basic airspeed awareness is akin to second nature. :angryfire

This aircraft was not on fire, pieces of it hadn't been shot off, there was no particular terrain threat, no terrorists in the cabin attempting to gain access... in short, there were no extenuating circumstances that would warrant sufficient distraction to allow this condition to develop. THEN, regardless of how they arrived in an approach to stall condition, I'm again left speechless that the basic increase power, relax back pressure was substituted with a horrendous +30 pitch change as the stick shaker is activating. All I can say is, "WOW!"... and NOT a good wow.

My reaction to the cause of this accident may come across as harsh, but I EXPECT MORE of the pilots flying my loved ones. Many accidents that I read about leave me with the feeling that "there but the grace of God go I"... but this accident does not. I think it best that I conclude my remarks at this point. Thanks for the info....

BBB

 

[dcfu69]

I agree 100%. What happened is sad.... for sure. But they royally screwed up. Which resulted in killing people. What a disgrace. They are 121 AIRLINE PILOTS. act like it and fly like it. period.

 

[q100]

You guys keep talking about pushing or pulling... How about what ever it take to hold the desired attitude for recovery!

That's what should happen. Problem is, the way many 121 carriers train, the "muscle memory" that gets associated with recoveries from approach to stall is to pull. And not many 121 programs seem to a) include full stalls, or b) approaches to stalls with the autopilot flying all the way to stick shaker.

 

[WSurf]

That's what should happen. Problem is, the way many 121 carriers train, the "muscle memory" that gets associated with recoveries from approach to stall is to pull. And not many 121 programs seem to a) include full stalls, or b) approaches to stalls with the autopilot flying all the way to stick shaker.

Many 121 carriers don't include full stalls because your a commerical pilot and either with or without an autopilot you shouldn't allow yourself to even get to a full stall.

 

[Caveman]

It sounds like a classic case of stall, spin, crash & burn. Normally at this point we'd be discussing a student\private pilot turning base to final or t/o with a high density altitude. The fact we are discussing two ATPs in a commercial airliner flying a relatively routine ILS is very, very disturbing. I'm with BBB on this one. I hope my perception of what happened is wrong, but wow......

And, yes, it COULD happen to any one of us given the right set of circumstances. We have sterile cokpit for a reason and I'm as guilty as anybody else, but the more experience I get the more I'm inclined to respect sterile cockpit. It's not the first disctraction that gets you nor maybe even the second one. But, at what point do the distractions rise to a level that they do make a difference? This crew may have found out the hard way.

 

[WSurf]

It sounds like a classic case of stall, spin, crash & burn. Normally at this point we'd be discussing a student\private pilot turning base to final or t/o with a high density altitude. The fact we are discussing two ATPs in a commercial airliner flying a relatively routine ILS is very, very disturbing. I'm with BBB on this one. I hope my perception of what happened is wrong, but wow......

And, yes, it COULD happen to any one of us given the right set of circumstances. We have sterile cokpit for a reason and I'm as guilty as anybody else, but the more experience I get the more I'm inclined to respect sterile cockpit. It's not the first disctraction that gets you nor maybe even the second one. But, at what point do the distractions rise to a level that they do make a difference? This crew may have found out the hard way.

While I agree with most of your thoughts, I disagree with your sterile cockpit assumption. Sterile cockpit doesn't just mean you don't talk at all unless its checklist related. It means you talk about anything that deals with the flight.

I think the distraction for them was the Ice that had built up. Remember the old saying, "As workload increases, Capacity decreases."
So is that wrong to discuss the ice on the plane? You can have a sterile cockpit and have both pilots fixated on the samething.

None of us are sure what happened, but listening to ATC Tapes and the FO's quick read backs (sometimes she didn't even read back the total clearences, only call sign) to me seems there was a bunch of work going on in the cockpit.

 

[CptMurf]

I seem to remember something on the initial release of the FDR data that the flaps were selected to 15(?), moved to 10, then reversed direction to flaps up. If this did occur, it could have been the final straw that caused the accident. The stick shaker/pusher is dependant on flap position and even though they were given a shaker and could have powered out of it, as the flaps retracted they would have been way below stall speed for their given flaps. Powering out in this senario would not be an option.

 

[FlyinFife]

Is there still any validity to the theory that while the airplane was slowing with the autopilot on, it was constantly trimming for nose up, and once the stick-shaker happened with full-power application: that is what attributed to the 30+ deg. nose up attitude?

 

[LJ45]

Many 121 carriers don't include full stalls because your a commerical pilot and either with or without an autopilot you shouldn't allow yourself to even get to a full stall.

I agree, but if that was true we wouldn't have unusual attitude training either.

Also, it is sounding like they had a stall warning and then with poor recovery techinque, actually stalled the airplane.

 

[tyuwerty]

The one thing that is suspicious in this investigation is the absence of any information related to power or thrust lever position.

This sounds like it has a lot less to do with proper stall recovery and more to do with a total loss off situational awareness (airspeed/power). The auto pilot kicked off, the nose dropped catching the PF off guard, resulting in the 25lb reflex pull on the control column. I bet that the pull on the control column came well before the application of full power.

I hope I am wrong, but I think we are going to find out there was more being discussed in the cockpit than icing.