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Colgan 3407 Update

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I didn't see this anywhere. Was the autopilot on and armed for approach? Are they looking into false capture off of the course?
 
CA and FO were fighting or arguing is what I've been told. I guess we'll see for sure once they release the CVR transcript.
 
While I agree with most of your thoughts, I disagree with your sterile cockpit assumption. Sterile cockpit doesn't just mean you don't talk at all unless its checklist related. It means you talk about anything that deals with the flight.

I think the distraction for them was the Ice that had built up. Remember the old saying, "As workload increases, Capacity decreases."
So is that wrong to discuss the ice on the plane? You can have a sterile cockpit and have both pilots fixated on the samething.

None of us are sure what happened, but listening to ATC Tapes and the FO's quick read backs (sometimes she didn't even read back the total clearences, only call sign) to me seems there was a bunch of work going on in the cockpit.

I agree. My sterile cockpit comments were an afterthought and not really a comment about this particular crew. However, if the accident was caused by a loss of SA regarding airspeed then any and all distractions were a factor, legitimate conversation or otherwise.
 
They are 121 AIRLINE PILOTS. act like it and fly like it. period.

More true words have rarely been spoken. The trust the public places in us is sacred and this accident (like all accidents) is a stark reminder of that one basic fact.

It will be very interesting to see what is on the CVR. You know, it really could happen to any of us, really. Everyone has had a moment where they got fixated on one element of the flight and missed a radio call or forgot that they had already completed a checklist. That is why there are two pilots up there after all. I have a hunch that this is an accident that will be studied in CRM courses for years to come.
 
As far as turning off the auto throttles, I have no problem with that. You are required to maintain proficiency in all levels of automation. There is only one way to do that. Whats next? Can't disengage the auto pilot because it increases the work load?

But yeah, you have to watch it more carefully. I guess my CRJ is completely unsafe because it has no auto throttles.

The CRJ isn't unsafe at all. There are no auto-throttles so the descent is made the same way every single time. When you click the AT off sometimes and leave it on other times you are asking for trouble. One distraction, and airspeed will bleed off when the aircraft levels automatically.

I agree automation should be shut off from time-to-time but not in normal descents from the flight levels with the AP engaged. There are too many distractions and no upside. I regularly turn off all the automation and hand fly for proficiency but I pick my spots. Usually nice days when few distractions are expected in the descent all the way to landing. It's not in the weather during the descent phase when checklists and ATC instructions could cause a distraction.
 
Not sure if it has been talked about in other threads but what about recommendations of shadowing the controls even with AP on at low / approach altitudes. Personally I believe that the flying pilot must have the hands on the controls from 5,000 AFE down. There are many reasons for this. It can also be a way for a distracted pilot to get clues that something is going on with the plane that is out of the norm. Controls that start bucking or moving further than usual might cue you in to "hey pay attention to me!"

Not sure at all if that played into this accident but it is something I am concerned about as I fly and ride in jumpseats. I believe a lot of pilots have too much faith in the AP at low altitude. Just my opinion.
 
For years the FAA has had a "one size fits all" stall recovery training program. Push the thrust levers up and pull back on the yoke to minimize altitude loss. About 5 years ago the FAA put together and industry working group to rewrite FAR 121 sub parts N and O. These are your current training regulations. Shortly after Pinnacle 3701 the group began looking at what that crew did when they got stick shaker. The set full thrust and tried to maintain altitude. It didn't work and they realized that maybe they should get away from the "one size fits all" stall recovery training and began working on new regulations. On January 12, 2009 the FAA introduced a notice of proposed rule making with the new regulations. Take a look at the requirements starting on page 1360 http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E8-29584.pdf

The crew wasn't fighting. They were chit chatting about unions, contracts, pay rates and management like we all do. They got slow enough to get the stick pusher. The pounds of force pulled on the yoke is important because when the pusher released that's the force pulling on the yoke and hence the rapid 30 degree pitch up. They shoved the power up and pulled back on the yoke just like they were taught.

One size doesn't fit all.
 
Not sure if it has been talked about in other threads but what about recommendations of shadowing the controls even with AP on at low / approach altitudes. Personally I believe that the flying pilot must have the hands on the controls from 5,000 AFE down. There are many reasons for this. It can also be a way for a distracted pilot to get clues that something is going on with the plane that is out of the norm. Controls that start bucking or moving further than usual might cue you in to "hey pay attention to me!"

Not sure at all if that played into this accident but it is something I am concerned about as I fly and ride in jumpseats. I believe a lot of pilots have too much faith in the AP at low altitude. Just my opinion.

Lol. I've tried shadowing the controls before. The sidestick and thrust levers never move. I learned shadowing them is a waste of time.
 
....albeit lowest-bidder ones!

I'm sorry, remind me. Exactly what does pay have to do with anything? I must have missed that part during flight training.

Yeah let's smear some dead pilots who left families behind on a public forum. You're my hero.
 
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