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C17 Totalled in Bagram

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MAGNUM!! said:
However, you can't go fly the mission and then say you were fatigued after the fact if it goes to s***.
The trouble is, there's a "Catch 22" in there that we often fail to recognize. A fatigued pilot is not likely to make the best decision to go or not go in the first place. Then, once afforded the luxury of hindsight and rest, he can clearly see that he made a poor decision to go - - because he was fatigued. He shouldn't have gone becasue he was fatigued, and yet he went because he was fatigued.


It's just not real simple, Magnum. Maybe we could cut the guy a little bit of slack. I've made bad decisions, and I would venture to say that you've made one or two. So, mine didn't result in a hull loss. Lucky me. Unlucky him.


Just a thought...



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Deuce130 said:
As someone who has been there and done that,...


I also bet that 22-24 hour crew days are a pain in the a**. But, there are rules in place to ensure everyone gets proper crew rest and we're all responsible to make sure that those rules get followed.


If they're not being followed [and you can't make them follow them ] just plain suck it up.
Apparently you have not been there and done that, or you wouldn't have to speculate on the pain of 24 hour duty days. I don't think you really understand what it's like to be not only acutely fatigued, but chronically fatigued. 8 hrs of rest won't cure chronic fatigue, and neither will a pill.


Just plain suck it up, huh? That's the point I was trying to make. That's the message you get from the Ops officer who wants you to fly. Just suck it up. Well, these guys really sucked it up, all right, and they'll be left swinging alone at the end of the day. I guarantee there will not be a single Ops O who will step up and say, "I talked him into going even though he didn't feel comfortable with it. I share the responsibility."

GARE - OWN - TEE


Now, I don't think we know that fatigue played a part in the accident cited at the top of this thread, so don't misinterpret my passion about this subject as a comment on that accident. However, we've heard from folks who are there - - there are fatigue issues. Fatigue kills. Perhaps someone can be a real leader and address the problem.



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TonyC said:
Apparently you have not been there and done that, or you wouldn't have to speculate on the pain of 24 hour duty days.

I guarantee there will not be a single Ops O who will step up and say, "I talked him into going even though he didn't feel comfortable with it. I share the responsibility."







.

I guess Ops Os in the tanker world weren't all that hot. And be careful about doubting people who say they've been there, done that. I think you're speculating on that one.
 
MAGNUM!! said:
I guess Ops Os in the tanker world weren't all that hot.
I wouldn't know. What difference does it make?

MAGNUM!! said:
And be careful about doubting people who say they've been there, done that. I think you're speculating on that one.
I'm not speculating at all. I said it was "apparent" from his post. Perhaps I'm fooling myself by believing that we're using the English language to effectively communicate, but that's about all we have in this medium.

Had he been there, he would have said, "I know the 22-24 hour crew days are a pain in the a**." This language conveys direct knowledge that one would have from "being there and doing that." That's not the language he used. He said, "I also bet that 22-24 hour crew days are a pain in the a**." The language he chose betrays his lack of experience with that about which he commented. Again, this is not speculation. Rather, it is observation.

I can say, "I know that 24 hour sorties are dreadfully long and tiring" because I have actually flown that long. I can produce log book entries or Air Force records to attest to that experience. If I were to talk about them, I would not say, "I bet those 24 hour sorties are dreadfully long and tiring." I've been there and done it.

On the other hand, I would not say, "It's a huge thrill to drop your first bomb on target" because I've never been there, never done that. I could, though, say, "I also bet it's a huge thrill to drop your first bomb on target" even though I have never experienced that particular thrill.

You, having been there and done that (now THIS is speculation) would say, "It's a huge thrill to drop your first bomb on target." That is, of course, you still haven't done that yet, in which case you could honestly say, "I bet it's a big thrill to drop your first bomb on target." Of course, if you haven't yet dropped your first bomb on target, you might still say, "It's a huge thrill to drop your first bomb on target" but you'd be lying, and the truth would come out eventually.



Does that clear things up?


:)





OH. And I always doubt people who claim to have "been there, done that." Do you believe everything you hear/read?
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isn't fatigue many times an acceptable risk in military aviation? even more so than in civil aviation? don't mishaps happen all the time (not neccesarily fatigue related)? Don't commanders (who are supposed to have the big picture) sometimes have to push people and machines up to their limits to accomplish the mission?

i don't really see why there is a disagreement here.
 
Did the OPs O step up when the -16 pickled on the Canadians in Afghanistan?



There may be Ops Os that will take the fall for their troops, on more minor affairs, but from my experience when the S#!t really starts flying they will be ready to toe the line and drink the Kool-Aid.



One of the better missions in the tanker world is the fighter drag. The reason is simple. On a drag you get more time on the ground because the fighters get more time on the ground than the standard AMC quick turn. AMC serves the customer, just like the airlines, by keeping the plane in the air. That means long duty days and min turns.



In the tanker community, once in the AOR, it is a little better with 12 on 12 off days. However, the mission becomes monotonous and very groundhogs day like.
 
Point of order, I have no dog in the management vs. leadership fight. I've seen both terrific and lousy squadron/group commanders in AMC, but they aren't the ones driving the crew duty days. Once an AC and crew are wheels up from home station, the crew is controlled by the TACC (Tanker Airlift Control Center) until they return to home station. (TACC also plans the missions/itineraries from this humble abode outside of St. Louis where the leadership is far removed from looking into the eyes of the crewdogs) If something strange happens while on the road, you can always call home to your Ops Officer or Commander for assistance/advice, but the mission is still Commanded and Controlled by TACC. (I used to work there many moons ago so I can walk the walk and talk the talk. While there I also saw/heard many an Ops O or CC screaming on the phone on behalf of their crews) I know that TACC uses the 24 hour duty day as the norm in strat air because it maximizes crew efficiency and is easy from a scheduler/mission planners point of view. The alternative is staging more crews in more locations, which, takes more resources. Pre-Desert Storm, the AMC/MAC strategic airlift enroute system had a ton of overseas locations and hence, more stage locations/crews. For example, you flew your jet from CONUS to Europe (~8 hour flight/12 hour duty day) and then handed the jet over to another crew that flew it for another 12-16 hour duty day and so on and so on. Augmented crews were something in the regs but not often used and viewed as an "In Case of Contingency Break Glass" exception. During Desert Storm using augmented crews became the norm and AMC never looked back. My point is that we should be using a 16 hour duty day as the norm and only using the augmented day when it is absolutely necessary. (Regardless of what the facts are with this C-17 crew) The fatigue literature proves my point and I'm not going to belabor the exponential difference between a 16 hour duty day and a 24 hour duty day (not counting the circadian rhythm state the crew was in when the mission started.) We/USAF are the only ones in the world who do this and my position is that AMC needs to scale back the use of 24 hour/augmented duty days dramatically.

Also, just to clarify, in AMC (the command that doesn't give out "go-pills" because they impact your post-mission crew rest and that would delay your follow-on mission 12 hours later) the only common MWS crews that are authorized the 24 hour duty day are C-5s, C-17s, C-141s, KC-10s and KC-135s. The only crews that routinely do it are strat air crews (C-5, C-17 and C-141) C-130s are limited to 18 hours when augmented and 16 hours when a basic crew. (No doubt hard hours with the four fans of freedom vibrating them to death, but they don't cross 15 time zones in a single flight like I have either...) In ACC only the bombers, E-4s and RC-135s have a 24 hour duty day (that I know of - if not I'm sure someone will let me know :) ) But the bombers have "go pills" at their disposal. In any case, in AMC there is no "time zone ACClimation" like CobraKai was referring to. We just roll from one circadian rhythm upset to another, flying 24 hours at a time.

Sorry for the long post (again!) Just some more data for those of you scoring along at home. There is no doubt that it is the ACs call as to whether or not he and his crew are fit to fly. My point is that the "normal" environment in AMC right now with respect to duty days is wrong. Are there lots of times/missions in this post- 9/11 world when a 24 hour day is needed? - absolutely! But there are also a lot of missions being flown today that don't require the risk and they are adding to the cumulative fatigue deficit I referred to earlier (7 days of flying with only 4 rest periods...)

Light the flames...
 
Well, Tony, you list KC-135 in your profile. I assume you had DOs. Hell, maybe you were the DO.

Further, I know for a fact Deuce130 spent many, many months and hours in the AOR over the past 4 years. He has MC-130 listed in his profile...I think those guys were pretty busy over the last few years.

Still, it was a nice semantics rant. You spent 4 paragraphs saying jacks***.
 
Further, Tony, if you spent less time posting on flighinfo you might be more well rested and less chronically fatigued.
 
S#!t roles downhill, but the buck stops with the Aircraft Commander in the AFIs. No matter what the AC and crew will pay the price. They are probably already on the way home, where they will be retrained, given a Form 8 check, and sent back on the road ASAPLY. The same duty schedule is still out there and AF leadership is not changing it. If they want to turn down a mission because they feel tired, the mission will just be given to the next crew in line, that probably less rest. They will be pressured to take the sortie, by TACC/stage manager. The AC can ask for a 36 hour crew rest period after three consecutive near maximum Flight Duty Periods (FDP). The question then becomes, how likely are you to get that in the AOR with the war on and planners at higher levels planning on all crews being available, with a FMC aircraft available.
 

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