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Breaking News: FAA to require pilots know how to fly

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The one you can't recall was Pinnacle's "410 it" pilots.

But I will say that the Lexington crash happened by a CA who had around 4800TT and the FO around 6300TT. Bringing up Gulfstream academy for just the FO, which probably 6,000 hours BEFORE the accident, is a moot point. No one can conclude that this Comair crash wouldn't have happened if this FO trained elsewhere from Gulfstream.

The only 3 fatal Part 121 accidents over a substantial period of time in America alll involved pilots from a very small, disreputable airline and you are going to play it that way? You must be one of those who believes that "past performance is not indicative of future results" silly heads.

Reverse it. How many Gulfstream graduates went on to pilot the space shuttle? Imma bet none.

You don't pay to do a job that you have earned the progression to attain because others are willing to pay you for your talent/abilities.

Not knocking prostitutes, because the world needs them, but I think the vast majority of their customer base is NOT made up of johns who have so much going for them that they can pull tail at will without an overt monetary exchange. I consider PFT pilots the same type of whore mongers. They both have in common that they don't brag about it! Look at the shame/denial PFT_128 exhibits.

Other than pilots who have such an abundance of $$$ that it is inconsequential to drop $100,000 beyond a 4 year degree and all flight ratings on some Part 121 babysitting at Gulfstream, I think these pilots do this out of a lack of better options or a lack of old fashioned work ethic.

I know I learned much at each career level, and I have much more to learn. I welcome the increase in TT for Part 121 operations for many reasons. I hope .gov gets it right for a change. I am not optimistic, but that is my nature. I'm a butthead, you see.
 
I really could care less if anyone on here thinks the Colgan accident was a result of the pilots not getting enough rest or not being experienced enough or whatever.

The point is that there are some practices in this industry RIGHT NOW that are inherently unsafe. No airline should be hiring low time, inexperienced pilots to fly the public around in order to save a buck. The rest regulations as they exist now are a joke and need to be fixed. If the Colgan accident, whether it was a result of the above or not, FINALLY brings these issues to light then sobeit. It is unfortunate that it takes tombstones in order for the FAA and the federal government to actually get off it's ass and do something.
 
Would you welcome a higher academic standard Tweak?
Well said though
 
Unfortunately new regs are always written with blood from accidents. Everything Is fine and dandy and nobody cares until crap like this happens, sad truth.
 
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Both Colgan pilots had far in excess of required rest...How would rest rules have changed the outcome of the Colgan crash?

with regards to Colgan, none... That was due largely to pilots that can't fly. Witness the young girl FO who pulled the flaps during a stall recovery... Or the 5 time failed captain who initially applied the wrong recovery; but those rest rules that are long over due are much more significant with regards to long haul operations flying 10+ hour international, night operations and min rest requirements.. 8 hours on the ground now, vs 9 hours at the hotel.. etc..
 
Or putting the flaps up in a stall/spin.

BINGO! I wonder why that's always swept under the rug? female factor maybe?
 
Indeed.

I can't help but think the FO did that because she believed they were in a tail stall.

But they'd never have been in a position where that exacerbated things if 1. one or both of them had been minding the store with regards to airspeed control, or 2. the captain didn't pull a shaking yoke into his chest.

except any pilot worth his (or her) weight, knows that stick shaker DOESN'T activate for a tall stall..
 
I don't know that its fair to place any more or less blame on the FO than the Captain - they both effed up pretty bad. I wouldn't say her actions are "swept under the rug", I'd say they are less jaw-dropping than pulling a shaking yoke!

Fact remains, you don't pull a shaker. If you do, and try to power out of the low-speed, high AOA shiatstorm you put yourself into, you don't retract the flaps.

Most importantly of all, they'd have avoided the situation all together if at least one of them had been minding the store and paying attention to their FRIGGING airspeed.

They both failed Airmanship 101 when it really mattered most...and it cost them, their FAs, and their passengers their lives.
 
How did the Colgan Captain do on his basic piloting tests when the F/O decided to raise the flaps (uncommanded by the pilot flying)? I mean they do test for crewmembers to do just the wrong thing at just the wrong time don't they?


actually sometimes we do train for that. having the PM retract all flaps and leading edge devices uncommanded by the PF during a minor flap change on climbout
 
Would you welcome a higher academic standard Tweak?
Well said though

I've always said it's too easy to pass the academic portion of the FAA tests... this is why we're laughed at by a lot of EU trained pilots and why places like Cathey put us through the ringer when we interview there... they're trying to see if we actually understand the basic science of flying..

It never ceases to amaze me how often I meet people in my career that don't understand basic aerodynamics. We had a new hire on the MD11 at a prior company ask why we had to climb above 250 knots when heavy... we tried to explain it, but he lacked the basic understanding of how a jet climbs.. he was never educated on swept wing aerodynamics, high altitude aerodynamics... it was obvious that he simply memorized the ATP written, and flew props at the commuters, managed to fly RJ's there and here we are... a guy who's going to sit right seat on an MD11 and doesn't understand what keeps it flying.. it was shocking to me, but since then I've seen the same over and over.. Airbus school, 747 school... etc.. there is a basic lack of education and understanding being required by the FAA, and it's clearly evident for me.
 
actually sometimes we do train for that. having the PM retract all flaps and leading edge devices uncommanded by the PF during a minor flap change on climbout

which builds on what I just posed... we had a situation (which I'm sure you've seen before) where a co-pilot pulled flaps from 10 to 1 on a 747 (skipping 5), and the captain didn't initially catch it... it became obvious when the very heavy take off weight plane started to sink and then the shaker came on.... without even flinching, the captain immediately commanded .. FLAPS 5.. put it in FLAPS 5! that solved their problem.. this is why heavy jets like the 747 and MD11 have such complicated gates for their flap retraction... so you don't accidentally retract too much after take off before acceleration .. but understanding why that's dangerous is more critical..

Another similar demonstration of how poor the understanding of aerodynamics some pilots have is the guy you'll fly with who will ALWAYS call flaps to be extended as soon as he reaches flap limit speed... so let's say flaps 1 is at 275KIAS, then no matter whether you're at max landing weight or just above BOW+45min of fuel, he's calling flaps the second he's at 275KIAS.. *sigh*
 
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Agreed! I got way more aerodynamics than most civilians ad you know how much I've got since flight school? Zero.
A handout or two on high altitude- no testing. No instruction.

All part if the 'stay in the profile' and never go outside that and don't understand it line that's been pushed farther and farther.
 
The disappointment for me is the speed the Feds showed increasing requirements in our performance while ignoring completely the desperate need for increased rest. If they were showing the same sense of urgency on both issues I'd understand. But this smacks of blaming the victim.
 
The disappointment for me is the speed the Feds showed increasing requirements in our performance while ignoring completely the desperate need for increased rest. If they were showing the same sense of urgency on both issues I'd understand. But this smacks of blaming the victim.

Expect the new rule to hit the streets Aug as per an email I got from a very well placed FAA attorney. With the caveat that the pending Schuster amendment may take some of the teeth out of it for "cost" reasons..
 
My 2 cents


The article (from 2009--an eternity in Air Force manning policy) says we are training more RPA pilots than fighter and bomber, which is still true. A typical class right now graduates around 20 (both sides of the class--T-1 and T-38). Lately only about 3 on average T-38 studs are getting a fighter/bomber. RPAs are assignable to UPT grads, but we (at our base) haven't seen one in a while now that the RPA career track is up and running, not sure what numbers they are putting out, but they are not rated "pilots" in the sense that they'll be able to transfer to aircraft that requires a person to be in it to fly it. That being said, not sure what RPAs have to do with this discussion in any case. You can be the "Chuck Yeager" of the RPA world, but that time don't count for squat when trying to transfer to a civilian pilot position.

Stall training: It's extensive in the AF. My experience in Phase 1 was as a tweet FAIP, but I'm told the T-6 is similar. Stalls and spins are a very large portion of the pre-solo syllabus. Not sure about the Toners, but now as a 38 IP, most of the first two blocks are dedicated to landing, which means knowing why and how the jet stalls and practicing, in all configurations, stalls and slow flight, to include full aft stick stalls and stability demos. At PIT, all IP trainees get a dedicated stall ride with a specially trained stall pilot and we repeat stall academics on a regular basis back at our bases, as well as the stall ride. When I flew corporate, stall training in the BBJ and G450 was typical of what most readers here know and have accomplished, however, I don't recall a whole lot of academics on the subject, just what to do if the stick starts shaking. That being said, my pure civilian sim partner in the 450 is as good a pilot as I've ever flown with and not understanding basic aerodynamics, straight or swept wing was not an issue.

Fatigue: In my opinion, this is the big issue. I walked away from a high paying corporate gig, with two great jets, for several reasons regarding safety and integrity. A major part of the safety issue was scheduling. We were expected to fly two pilot operations no matter what the trip length, to include west coast out and backs to the Caribbean, West Coast to Europe followed by a reposition, and worst of all 24 long work days, West Coast to Asia. That is with only two pilots, no relief crew and no pre-positioned crew. I am convinced this operation will hurt someone sooner or later, after all "Fate is the Hunter". Problem is they are doing nothing wrong according to Part 91, but the evidence is pretty clear regarding accident statistics and fatigue being a contributing factor. But you've got to ask yourself, is living on one coast and working on another for crap pay really worth it? For me, living 5 minutes from work with great pay wasn't, (believe me, I understand that flying is better than not flying--usually). But I suffered for my decision with unemployment, part time and finally full time non-flying in another city.

In the end I lucked out with a recall to an active duty cockpit, but I agree with those here that say reasonable common sense rules need to be created and enforced regarding crew rest.
 
Expect the new rule to hit the streets Aug as per an email I got from a very well placed FAA attorney. With the caveat that the pending Schuster amendment may take some of the teeth out of it for "cost" reasons..
In your words what would be the perfect rest rules? Domestic, Int'l, night cargo
 
CWG, great summary and interesting info. I agree with your summary of AF stall training. In each plane I flew it was a high emphasis item. In T37s, T38s, and later T1s it seems the first maneuer you did after vertical S's was stalls, stalls, and more stalls. Configured left and right simulating stalling on the base turn, and configure/unconfigured straight ahead simulating stalls on final or at cruise. At the time it seemed like it was way overdone but the recognition/recovery routine was really drilled into your head. I can't speak to it, but I believe getting a private license involves much the same initial training.

I was also a tanker toad and I remember taking guys up to do approach to stalls as a currency item. Not sure if was once per year or even less frequent, but every line pilot had to do it. It's been a long time, but I believe we got a 2,000 foot block of space between 20k' and 30k', slowed and trimmed for level flight until we got to approach speed, then continued slowing without trimming until the rumble started, then recovered. While near buffet we'd talk about the deck angle (pretty dramatic), ADI picture, mushiness of controls, and noise level. It wasn't a full stall like pilot training, but it does show how seriously the AF took the issue. Taking a B707 to initial buffet was a continuation of the philosophy of recognize/recover.

One final note, we didn't have sims for annual checkrides and the inflight checkride included unusual attitude recover as a mandatory item. You told the pilot to close his eyes and you put the plane into a turning nose high slowing attitude or a turning nose low accelerating attitude, then say "recover." On the high one you did not want to see the roll to wings level until the nose had fallen through the horizon and you were picking up some speed. On the low one you'd want to see the roll to wings level first so the pull had maximum effect to minimize altitude loss.

Haven't seen any of this kind of training or re-familiarization in annual evals at the majors. It seems that the MBA view is to automate and proceduralize flying enough by putting the autopilot on/off at 1000' AGL and flying the plane by tapping your fingers onto a box to the point where no one ever gets into an unusual attitude or a stall. This works--most of the time. Unfortunately, while "most of the time" works for running a business (they can just declare bankruptcy and move on), it's not such a great philosophy for flying planes.
 
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