Asiana 777 crashed on landing at SFO

[IBNAV8R]

Hey wizard, STFU!!!! Jokes not funny

Get off it, man. That was funny.

I was just wondering how they got from 7 miles out to the accident site in 24 seconds.

 

[AeroDMB]

Stupid question about the 777 then. If you aren't on an autoland then do you have to turn the auto throttles off before touchdown or do they still have an auto retard before touchdown based on radar altimeter? In other words if they are doing vertical speed, level change, or a GPS would you leave the auto throttles on the entire time or do you have to disconnect them before touchdown. We don't use autoland...we only use the HUD for CAT III....and we have to disconnect auto throttles before landing (I know that's specific to our airline)

They auto-retard upon flare and landing (25' RA Idle). We don't shut them off. They disconnect automatically when either thrust reverser goes to reverse idle.

As far as the inhibit function of the A/T when using FLCH, yes I did just discover that the autothrottle wake-up is inhibited during use of FLCH when on approach and below 100' RA. The autothrottle wakeup protection basically advances the thrust levers to min maneuver speed when outside the inhibit realm. Although I'm still not sure why the speed was at 107kt unless they shut off the A/T system sometime during the manuever. It should have been keeping up with the ref +5. Using FLCH that low to the ground sounds way odd as well. It's usually VS to get back on glide...or...wait for it...hand fly!

 

[ackattacker]

Saw today where it was an IOE Captain flying with a check-airman in the right seat.

There's something I'm not getting. At the beginning of the audio, the crew calls final 7 miles south(?) and is cleared to land. The mystery go-around call is at about 16 seconds. The call for equipment is at about 24 seconds. At 137 knots, this equates to about .6 miles and .9 miles, respectively. Either I misheard or misunderstand, the crew WAY overestimated the distance to touchdown, or there is missing audio.

That audio file everybody is listening to is condensed (edited)

 

[Capn Butthead]

Thanks aero for the info! I didn't know the 777 was like that. It kind of makes at least a little more sense....whatever it was im sure we will learn a lot from it.

 

[Capn Butthead]

I listened to the live atc archive at real time. When they checked on they were level at I believe 8000 for a few minutes. On tower they checked in outside of the bridge with Skywest right behind them. The last minute of the atc tape was very intense. Great job by atc imo

 

[Wesb737fo]

Hmm. The 777 AT's low speed protection is inhibited below '100 in FLCH? I'm on the 737NG. If we don't capture an approach mode for some reason ( which has happened once or twice) the AT's will still advance in the flare as the speed slows, and can be a surprise. I guess we will have to wait for the gritty details. I thought I heard someone say they were originally on 28R and got the last minute switch to the left.

 

[Dan Roman]

I'm surprised no one has made the observation that perhaps fatigue was a major issue? A 10 hour flight is pretty grueling, 10 hours of IOE? These guys could have just flat worn themselves out. Even worse, from what I hear about Asian carriers, the training can be anal overkill with not enough focus on common sense and tremendous focus on very strict procedures that are not to be deviated from. Which in turn, makes non standard situations, like no G/S, sidestep approach, and starting the approach high and fast as is common place at SFO, more difficult when you try and replace good airmanship with an overly strict focus on procedures.

Bottom line is though, if (and I emphasize IF) the instructor quizzed and hammered on this guy all the way across the Pacific, he could have set themselves up to try and land when they were at a level of fatigue that was very dangerous.

I'm wondering if the environment in the cockpit may be a big factor. Were they working as team to land the airplane or was the check airman more concerned about judging the IOE candidate and withholding his support?
It may be politically incorrect, but I've heard too many stories of Asian Carrier instructors that are incredible tyrants and have an unhealthy focus on hierarchy in the cockpit. 10 hours of that could wear anyone down to an unsafe level.

 

[dicko]

An excellent point. The flight began in Shanghai, stopped in Seoul and ended in San Francisco. It was a four man crew, nevertheless that's a very long time to spend with a check airmen giving you the beady eye.

 

[ALGFLYR]

The finger pointing. The blame. The "I can't believe what an idiot..." It all needs to stop. One of the greatest things Jesus ever said was "Let he among you without sin cast the first stone". I can't believe how many go ahead and throw them. I'm sure I speak for many of you besides myself when I say the only reason we have not had an accident ourselves is because we knew what not to do because someone ahead of us learned the hard way.
I notice that accidents tend to come in 3's. So before anyone starts acting like Superpilot, look out or YOU may be number 2 or 3.

Is this number 2?

http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/08/us/alaska-air-taxi-crash/?hpt=hp_t2

 

[lionflyer]

I'm surprised no one has made the observation that perhaps fatigue was a major issue? A 10 hour flight is pretty grueling, 10 hours of IOE? These guys could have just flat worn themselves out. Even worse, from what I hear about Asian carriers, the training can be anal overkill with not enough focus on common sense and tremendous focus on very strict procedures that are not to be deviated from. Which in turn, makes non standard situations, like no G/S, sidestep approach, and starting the approach high and fast as is common place at SFO, more difficult when you try and replace good airmanship with an overly strict focus on procedures.

Bottom line is though, if (and I emphasize IF) the instructor quizzed and hammered on this guy all the way across the Pacific, he could have set themselves up to try and land when they were at a level of fatigue that was very dangerous.

I'm wondering if the environment in the cockpit may be a big factor. Were they working as team to land the airplane or was the check airman more concerned about judging the IOE candidate and withholding his support?
It may be politically incorrect, but I've heard too many stories of Asian Carrier instructors that are incredible tyrants and have an unhealthy focus on hierarchy in the cockpit. 10 hours of that could wear anyone down to an unsafe level.

My initial reaction to this is that these guys were very reliant on automation because it's mandated by their company and it was how they were trained. When they were thrown a curveball, they were pushing buttons all the way down instead of just hand flying it. But you make a very good point. A 10hr oral over the Pacific would wear anyone down. Add in the heirarcy culture of Asian carriers where there's usually no CRM, you start getting a chain of factors.