I understand where the family, friends and loved ones are coming from; however, I also agree with Avbug. In my mind, I have come to rationalize these types of events not as inevitable, but as consequential.
The MU-2 has been a controversial airplane from almost day one. I flew the MU-2B-60 (Marquise) single-pilot for 3 years for an air ambulance outfit. I liked the airplane, but it definitely demands a professional approach and proper initial and recurrent training. Its wing loading gives it flight characteristics more akin to a turbojet aircraft than a propeller-driven aircraft and it demands to be flown like a jet.
These “quirks” aren’t dangerous, but they need to be fully understood and considered in the day-to-day operation of the aircraft. For example, in practically every other propeller-driven aircraft you go for "blue line" in the event of an engine failure. In the MU-2 you fly a profile and clean up the aircraft sequentially as you accelerate - just as you would in a jet. If you attempt to handle an engine failure in the MU-2 they way you were taught in a King Air or light twin and you'll turn yourself into a lawn dart.
The MU-2 doesn’t handle ice particularly well, but neither do a lot of other airplanes. As I remember, it did have a minimum recommended ice speed of 160 TIAS. The minimum recommended speed in a King Air is 140 KIAS (As I remember, but it’s been a long time.) Let an MU-2 (or King Air) get slow while you’re packing ice and you will probably end up creating some memories for yourself. Keep the speed up and you'll have no problems.
As far as the safety record goes, a lot of it has to do with their low price on the used market. In years past, wealthy individuals could choose between a new single, used light twin, or an early MU-2. Let's see, a 170 knot Bonanza, a 200 knot twin or a 270+ knot MU-2 for the same price. Aircraft salesmen would tout turbine reliability and safety and make the sale. The insurance companies would ask for proper training, but there were enough guys out there that would fly without insurance and with out anything more than a rudimentary checkout. The airplane ate those kind of pilots for lunch. Nowadays, it’s the check hauling and freight outfits that have discovered the virtues of the MU-2. Fortunately, these are also the very same companies that are so well known for their thorough and extensive initial and recurrent training programs. (Sorry, I couldn’t resist.) Like I said at the beginning, the resulting safety record is something that is to be expected.
I believe that the airplane is a good one, you absolutely need to get proper training and fly it according to the AFM. The Marquise had a 10% larger cabin, was 10% faster and burned 10% less fuel than the KA200. In order to get that kind of performance, Mitsubishi had to use a lot of aeronautical tricks. After all, the total wing area isn't that much greater than say a Cessna 210. As I remember, it had the same wing loading as the T-38, the B-727, and a Learjet. You have to fly it as you would any other highly wing loaded aircraft, a King Air it ain't.
It takes a little to get used to flying a wing with spoilers instead of ailerons; but once you do it handles pretty nice - no adverse aileron yaw since there are no ailerons. The spoilers induce roll by destroying lift as opposed to creating it. Control "feel" is created by springs attached to the system and is constant throughout the aircraft speed range. The spoilers are very effective at approach speeds; but, as you would imagine, they are more effective at higher speeds. From a pilot's point of view, it just means that, at approach speeds, you need more control movement to get the same response from the airplane that you would at cruise speed. It doesn't take much to get used to, but as others have mentioned, the airplane like to be flown fast.
Finally, proper trim is very critical in the MU-2, especially when operating on a single engine. The trim ailerons are employed to keep the wings level without having a spoiler raised. This keeps the wing doing what it was designed to do - fly. You use the autopilot a lot in the MU-2. It's important to monitor the control wheel position frequently and adjust the trim as necessary during flight to make sure that it's level - indicating that the spoilers are flush. Other wise you're going to be cruising around with a spoiler up and a resultant loss of lift. (That’s why you don’t bank an MU-2 into the dead engine – you want to keep those spoilers down and the wing doing its thing.) These “quirks” don’t make it dangerous, just different. The differences, if not understood, are dangerous. An experienced MU-2 old timer told me that flying an MU-2 was like having a pet Doberman…
“You’ll really like it, and it will nuzzle you and eat out of your hand, but don’t do anything stupid around it or it will bite you.”
But that’s true in any airplane.
The MU-2 doesn't stand alone in this regard, other airplanes come to mind. I can remember, as a young kid back in the mid-1960’s, watching the smoke rise from the airport - a new United 727 had just landed short and burst into flames. Many people were killed in that accident. The captain, a highly experienced airline and military pilot, had misjudged the spool-up time of the engines. People died. That wasn't the only 727 lost under those particular circumstances. There were other examples where good, competent, experienced pilots weren't adequately trained when they transitioned into the new type. Coming from the big piston Douglas and Boeing transports they were used to having the practically instantaneous effect of power when they moved the throttles. They forgot about the response lag of turbine engines and many people died.
Was it the airplane’s fault that people died? Was it the fault of the engines? Personally, I don't buy it. It was a training issue. The crews that were flying those early jets weren't adequately trained. Sure they had all of the boxes check off on their training record, but like I said in an earlier post - "what is legal isn't always safe."
In my mind, the big issue here is one of proper and adequate training. I was fortunate enough to go to initial MU-2 training at FlightSafety. There the instructors were very upfront about the airplane and it's "quirks". We practiced the various scenarios "ad nausium" in the simulators. Later on, during my employment with that company, they decided to switch to "in-house" training because "it costs too much money to send you guys to FlightSafety". After going through both programs I understand how critical the proper training is. According to my way of thinking, there is absolutely no way that an in-house program will properly prepare a pilot, any pilot, to handle a high-performance aircraft like an MU-2. You need the no holds barred experience like you get at places like FlightSafety or Howell, not the carefully choreographed and rehearsed training typically provided by 135 operators who are scared to death to do any serious training. At that point I resigned. I didn’t fear the MU-2, I respected it and realized that, for me individually, if I couldn’t get proper recurrent training then my MU-2 days were over. Would I fly one today? Yes, and I wouldn’t hesitate to put my family in one either, but with the understanding that there would be ample amounts of proper training. But that’s the same criteria that I have for any airplane that I fly and any airplane that my family flies in.
‘Sled
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