An different article on a USAF leader

[RampFreeze]

Another joint mission in South America. JSOTF commander tells the AF C-130 commander he needs some people and parts at an airport that night. This is the major airport in a capital city of a country

I'm guessing it was Tegucigalpa, Honduras. If it was, the part that was missing from the 757 pilot's description is that in order to fly into that airfield at night/IMC in his 757 he had to be specially certified by his airline and use special procedures that were tailored for the avionics in the 757. I've flown in there and wouldn't want to do it at night without the above equipment and procedures. (Without special, tailored procedures the wx mins are 2400-3 for a circling approach or 1700-3 for an RNAV straight-in approach . For the RNAV straight-in, a 3 degree glidepath VDP would be behind the FAF.) As much as I think the USAF has gone ultra-conservative/risk averse in its decision making, this is one place where I think they've got it right. Short of being the only hope of saving the universe, I wouldn't want an unfamiliar C-130 crew to go in there at night either.

Here are some pictures that still don't do justice to that airfield:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045647/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0141994/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045648/M/

Unfortunately, your first 2 examples sound too familiar and I don't doubt them for a minute...

 

[ExAF]

Wow

Just me talking, but from looking at the pics, I'll bet that is an interesting missed approach procedure.

 

[Benhuntn]

When I was a 2lt in the early 70's the best pilot in the squadron was the CC. He had combat time in Viet Nam and could out fly all the young bucks. He was cool head with a willingness to share the things that made him a good pilot. He was trusted and people willingly followed their leadership. Somewhere in the 80's those guys became extinct and were replaced by school grads.

I saw commanders with less than 1500 hrs trying to tell young bucks how to fly when they still needed "seeing eye instructors" to keep them out of trouble. They were busy running to meetings, planning for the next CAFI (facility inspections) when we cleaned the toilets and sealed them so they would be sparkly for the inspectors, and briefing the OWC. They had the best pressed uniform and sharpest hair cut but they didn't have anything to impart to the LT's and captains or the time to do it if they did.

The good guys left (except me, lol) and joined the airlines or guard/res. I didn't see another super squadron cc after '84. The warrior attitude was lost but we gained new insignia and now if you are a career aviator you can plan on being gone by 20 to make room for the school grads and BZ types. I sit on the outside now and look at the AF and it is nothing like what I left. I doubt I could survive in today's AF.

Sure wouldn't recommend it for my kids.

 

[Scrapdog]

When I was a 2lt in the early 70's the best pilot in the squadron was the CC. He had combat time in Viet Nam and could out fly all the young bucks. He was cool head with a willingness to share the things that made him a good pilot. He was trusted and people willingly followed their leadership. Somewhere in the 80's those guys became extinct and were replaced by school grads.

I saw commanders with less than 1500 hrs trying to tell young bucks how to fly when they still needed "seeing eye instructors" to keep them out of trouble. They were busy running to meetings, planning for the next CAFI (facility inspections) when we cleaned the toilets and sealed them so they would be sparkly for the inspectors, and briefing the OWC. They had the best pressed uniform and sharpest hair cut but they didn't have anything to impart to the LT's and captains or the time to do it if they did.

The good guys left (except me, lol) and joined the airlines or guard/res. I didn't see another super squadron cc after '84. The warrior attitude was lost but we gained new insignia and now if you are a career aviator you can plan on being gone by 20 to make room for the school grads and BZ types. I sit on the outside now and look at the AF and it is nothing like what I left. I doubt I could survive in today's AF.

Sure wouldn't recommend it for my kids.

Wow, you say some pretty depressing sh*t and that's just too bad. I wasn't a LT in the 70's, but I was one in the early 2000's and I have to say there are still some outstanding leadership. I've had three SQ/CC's that are awesome individuals as well as outstanding aviators. Not only do they do a great job dealing with the queep, but they are still top notch instructors and have great SA in the airspace. While you claim today's AF is nothing like it was in the past, you're probably right. I think today's AF is still extremely sharp, is very safety conscious, and could crush any other air force out there. I'm extremely proud to be a member of TODAY'S Air Force...and I would highly recommend it to my kids when the time comes I have kids that are old enough to serve.

 

[UHBlackhawk]

I'm guessing it was Tegucigalpa, Honduras. If it was, the part that was missing from the 757 pilot's description is that in order to fly into that airfield at night/IMC in his 757 he had to be specially certified by his airline and use special procedures that were tailored for the avionics in the 757. I've flown in there and wouldn't want to do it at night without the above equipment and procedures. (Without special, tailored procedures the wx mins are 2400-3 for a circling approach or 1700-3 for an RNAV straight-in approach . For the RNAV straight-in, a 3 degree glidepath VDP would be behind the FAF.) As much as I think the USAF has gone ultra-conservative/risk averse in its decision making, this is one place where I think they've got it right. Short of being the only hope of saving the universe, I wouldn't want an unfamiliar C-130 crew to go in there at night either.

Here are some pictures that still don't do justice to that airfield:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045647/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0141994/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045648/M/

Unfortunately, your first 2 examples sound too familiar and I don't doubt them for a minute...

No, Quito. Again, a difficult place to fly in and out of. But my point was that the Marines were not flying a 757 in there, but a C-130 that was older, and probably poorly equipped when compared to the Air Force C-130. And this was a clear night. The Marine pilots were not based in that area, but did simulator training before they came down on the different airports. They were prepared to do the mission. It kind of fell into the whole Air Force mentality during this exercise. They only took easy missions, the first word out of their mouth was usually "No", and they had clearly forgotten that the purpose of the C-130 was to move stuff for the Army. There were several other missions they refused that the Marines either accepted, or accepted with modifications for safety. The Marines had a mission oriented attitude. They would try to find a way to accomplish each mission.
I think this might have been just after that C-130 went into the mountain in the NW US. The key to that accident, however, was poor training and not following the obstacle DP. Same thing when going into any mountainous terrain- follow the proceedures.
Just so I'm not only badmouthing your service, however, some good examples I recently saw:
1. Enlisted troops I saw in Iraq performed very well. I could always tell when the Air Force was running a hot-fuel site. Troops would come flying out to fuel us, and pass us ice cold water while fueling. It was 130+, no A/C in the aircraft and we were wearing chicken plates. We loved those guys.
2. SPs and other AF enlisted performing covoy escorts, taking fire, and driving on. Probably the LAST thing they thought they would be doing when they enlisted. These are the guys who deserved Bronze Stars, not some UAV pilot sitting in an air conditioned trailer in Missouri.
3. Air Force airfields over there were customer service oriented. What a novel idea to have a chow hall open 24/7, with drinks, sandwiches and ice cream after normal hours. When I suggested this at an Army post, I was told that bfast is 05:30-07:30, lunch 11:30-13:00 and dinner 17:30-19:00. All others can eat MREs. After all, if the chow hall was open 24/7, people might eat the food. Ahh, isn't that the point. Troops come back from combat missions, patrols and convoys, they would like something other than an MRE.
4. And let's not forget those A-10 pilots. I have never seen one operating in combat, but have heard enough stories and seen enough pictures of A-10 pilots putting their %$es on the line to help the grunts on the ground, then flying their shot to &%*# aircraft back home. Any A-10 pilot is okay by me.

 

[Gorilla]

I can't believe I'm going to pile on again against my beloved AF, but there are so many relevant posts here it's a bit scary. More than one guy has said, myself included, that the critical time was in the mid to late '80's. Interestingly, that corresponds to the demise of the Soviet empire, and the end of the Reagan era. It also corresponds to the arrival of the PC movement, the loss of Tactical Air Command, and the integration of female combat pilots around 1991.

Before anyone jumps me, I understand that neanderthal behavior, lewdness, rough living, etc, does not make a unit great. But what it does do, in a tribal way, is bond men together. The old fighters (SEA) passed what they knew on to the new guy over a whiskey at the squadron bar, where you can have porno on the wall and cuss like a pirate. When an O3 tells me about dropping iron on the Ho Chi Minh trail, I sit up straight, pay attention, and buy the beer. "Yeah, I remember watching Wild Bill get smoked by a 57mm unit. They both augered in. I did one last pass on that %^$$& with the gun and sprayed their ^*(^&% arms and legs all over their pit." If someone had said "Watch your langauge! We need to clean up the squadron for the General's visit!! Put out that cigar!!! There's no smoking in here!" we'd laugh and then beat them up.

This exact same O3 never made O4. He was a fountain of leadership and experience, but he didn't play the game. <sigh> I followed him in a few years.

I don't know what the answer is, but I know it is not in PP slides, PC rules, and clean living. I would have died for those guys, and they for me. Now, it's "what can I do to get promoted?", not "what can I do to blow the %&^ out of the bad guys."

 

[RampFreeze]

No, Quito. Again, a difficult place to fly in and out of...

Got it. I stand corrected. Yes, it is another spooky place at an elevation of around 10,000 feet, but not quite as bad as Tegucigalpa IMHO. My guess (only guessing again) is that it wasn't that the crew didn't want to go in there at night, it was because they weren't allowed to by reg. If there wasn't an approved instrument approach on hand (DoD approach or a Jeppesen approach that they had the lead time to get approved my a TERPs specialist) the standard USAF restriction for airports in mountainous terrain is "Day VFR Only." I guess we've crashed too many airplanes at night where guys see the runway lights ahead but don't see the unlit hill in-between them and the runway. That being said, it's tough understand why a crew can be legal to fly a low-level airdrop through the mountains at night but not fly into a large airport at night VFR... The USAF does have a much better safety record than the Marines, but the true debate is at what cost to mission accomplishment.

 

[milplt]

Going back a few posts, unfortunately it is not as easy as some good dudes learning to write OPR's and becoming USAF leadership. For the most part, the higher the level, the more they have sold their soul. The good dude, on average, won't be chosen for the ever increasing roles. Now, there are individual good leaders, but they are the minority - the evidence is overwhelming. And unfortunately, the weak-spined leadership will only choose young dudes to move up the ladder behind them who are no threat.

It was AMC leadership who went from measuring pallets downrange and successful on-time air refuelings to measuring on-time takeoff's. How many AMC crews out there took off in less than a code-1 jet just to sit at the first stop for mx or to RTB, just to make the metrics look good. Anyone who flew in AMC back in the late-90's who doesn't think that the metrics drove the fight was woefully out of touch (I say late-90's because that is when I left, but I really don' tthink things improved all that much). Real leadership would not let metrics take priority over end-user satisfaction - did the gas/bullets/fighters/bread/bombs/troops/etc. get there on time, that was not measured at all.

Not to leave the fighter community out. How many fighter schedules are driven by mx and phase timelines. I understand the limited mx capability - but the wing leaders need to fix that. How many fighter pilots are still leaving their first assignment after 2yrs and 9 mos? How many first tour dudes are becoming MC and IP - not many, and those that are aren't for long before MPC sends them to their white jet/predator/remote/etc. Why aren't wing leaders insisting that combat capability drive the fight vs. some percieved career timeline? THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY FOR OFFICER TOUR LENGTHS IS CAREER DEVELOPMENT! YHGTBSM. And, no, return to fly majors are not a one-for-one replacement for 2nd and 3rd tour-in-a-row fighter pilots.

The problem with USAF officers today is that they compare things to how bad they could be, not how they should be. First, determine what the priority is - and that is combat capability and mission (the real mission) accomplishment. Against that backdrop, determine how things are. Ask yourself why the Sq CC has to "ASK" the Mx CC for a 8 turn 6 only to get a 6 turn 4 (you know, ops tempo and all). We need a single POC for mission accomplishment - the SQ CC needs to be able to say - the mission requires a 8 turn 6 tomorrow and that is what we'll get - and the Mx officer needs to say "yes, sir". And that is only one facet of where we got away from the basics. Watch Twelve O'Clock High for a quick and educating/entertaining refresher. Speaking of that, we have lost a little sense of history.

Read Gen Kenney Reports - his account of the Pacific War of WWII - and compare your actions to those people - we aren't even close. That is the standard. Unfortunately, how much queep a Sq CC sheilds you from is not the mark of a good CC. How much he supports the mission, not you, is. It isn't about you or me, it is about the mission. I do the mission, a good SQ CC makes sure I can by giving me everything I need, and his boss the same, etc. And one last statement - a crew chief doesn't turn a wrench or a jet or anything else for ME, he does it for the mission.

 

[RampFreeze]

I couldn't agree with you more regarding the attitude that ops is just another supporting cast member on the base team. Why is it again that this base exists? Does it have something to do with those aluminum things with wings over there on the concrete? My post on page 2 tags that as the heart of the issue.

However, I don't buy your argument that the strong will not rise to the top because the leadership will only promote those behind them that are no threat. The problem is that too many of the guys that are desperately needed to take command bail out (or don't try to seek command) instead of putting their money where their mouth is. In the absence of anything else, the weak swimmers will fill the void. Now that the airline industry isn't as appealing, maybe the USAF will keep more of the guys they need to fill the important O-5 to O-7 billets. As for anyone with multiple stars, I think it is as political today as it was in the time of Billy Mitchell.

I just don't accept the doom and gloom that fills so many of the posts above. If it really is that bad we should just turn off the lights, go home and look up to the (insert a 3rd world country here) Air Force for pointers. Obviously we're not the premier Air Force that we were in the 1970s when everything was perfect.

 

[Benhuntn]

Scrapdog you are right we are the greatest AF in the world, but it is because of the superior work of junior officers up through Maj. It is inspite of the leadership not because of it. I hope you continue to have good leaders but if not hang in there and make a difference yourself.

 

[milplt]

Why does anyone think that if we are better than the USAF of the Carter administration, we are good enough - is that the standard?

The biggest problem with the current USAF is that our young personnel do not have the good examples of leaders to emulate. We couldn't scrounge up a Patton or Kenney or Mitchell if we tried. When we older dudes came in, we were trained well - and that ain't happening anymore. The young troops now have the likes of the current senior leaders to look up to - and as a result we have the young officers thinking that they deserve to have their views listened to, if not acted upon, just because they filled out an end-of-course critique. In the old days, when the older officers old us not to carry our bookbags over our shouder, we listened. Now, they ask why not and say they have a right to do what they want. In the old days, enlisted troops called officers sir, now.....

It is up to us to re-calibrate the pictures of our future leaders - because the current leaders aren't doing it. We need to stop making IP's of pilots who haven't earned the right or displayed the talent - TOS is not a sole factor. We need to stop acting as if AC or 2FL is an undeniable right. We need to stop giving the worst pilots in the Sq their AC or 2FL stamp and a trip to AETC just to get rid of them. No more FAIP's, if they are good instructors now, they'll be better after an operational tour. AFPC needs to stop stealing talent from the squadron before the squadron has had a chance to recoup a return on the investment. We need to stop berating officers for being short with the enlisted troop in MPF - maybe the enlisted troop was actually insubordinate. We need to remember the obligations of being a line officer and the requirements of customs and courtesies - there are reasons for these things. The gate guard (the military one) does need to salute me as I go through the gate and refer to me as sir, and no, I don't need to do a tour with them to see how hard their job is. They didn't shadow me through officer training, UPT, RTU, etc. - it's a voluntary force and they had the same opportunities as I did. I don't need to thank a crew chief, I need to tell them when they did a good job in supporting the mission (they don't support me) - and if they are unclear on the mission, their leadership needs to explain how they help get the bombs on target, etc. I don't think that they will have to charge a machine gun nest, but I should have no concerns that they would if required. Those that deploy and go into harm's way do deserve different treatment than those that don't. Support squadrons need to figure out how not to close every other Tuesday after 12:00 - answer the phone if it is ringing. Actually, answer the phone after 4:30 on any other day, also. (Are there any operational personnel out there who would consider not answering the ringing phone based only on what the clock says?). We don't need to go back to the white top staff car and we certainly don't need commanders badges - oops, too late.

We are a good air force, but we can be better. We haven't fought the big war, yet. The only problem with Fogelman's reading list is that it didn't stick. There is nothing wrong with looking in the past for a standard before you grade yourself as an individual warrior. Accounts in books such as Gen Kenney Reports or The Heart of a Man by Frank Elkins are eye-opening to say the least.

 

[scoreboard]

I'm guessing it was Tegucigalpa, Honduras. If it was, the part that was missing from the 757 pilot's description is that in order to fly into that airfield at night/IMC in his 757 he had to be specially certified by his airline and use special procedures that were tailored for the avionics in the 757. I've flown in there and wouldn't want to do it at night without the above equipment and procedures. (Without special, tailored procedures the wx mins are 2400-3 for a circling approach or 1700-3 for an RNAV straight-in approach . For the RNAV straight-in, a 3 degree glidepath VDP would be behind the FAF.) As much as I think the USAF has gone ultra-conservative/risk averse in its decision making, this is one place where I think they've got it right. Short of being the only hope of saving the universe, I wouldn't want an unfamiliar C-130 crew to go in there at night either.

Here are some pictures that still don't do justice to that airfield:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045647/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0141994/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045648/M/

Unfortunately, your first 2 examples sound too familiar and I don't doubt them for a minute...

DUDES!!!

Look at the picture, ITS A 727 going in there!!!! Surely USAF 130's have NVG capable crews? Come on.

Back to your regularly scheduled program.

 

[Deuce130]

DUDES!!!

Look at the picture, ITS A 727 going in there!!!! Surely USAF 130's have NVG capable crews? Come on.

Back to your regularly scheduled program.

Yes, the USAF has NVG capable C-130 crews. Did you not know that? Come on.

It's not quite as simple as you seem to make it out to be. That airfield isn't somewhere you just want to drop into on the fly for quick stop. Very doable, but with the right planning.

 

[RampFreeze]

It is up to us to re-calibrate the pictures of our future leaders - because the current leaders aren't doing it. We need to stop making IP's of pilots who haven't earned the right or displayed the talent - TOS is not a sole factor. We need to stop acting as if AC or 2FL is an undeniable right. We need to stop giving the worst pilots in the Sq their AC or 2FL stamp and a trip to AETC just to get rid of them.

Exceptionally well said. (All the more reason we need the "good guys" to stay in and make a difference.) However, poor leadership isn't isolated to the 21st Century AF. I've got a close family member who was an AC of a B-17 over Europe in WWII, flew his full tour there and then went on to fly B-29s. His career spanned from the 40s through the 70s before he retired as a Lt Col. Over the years, we have sat down over many a beer and discussed the USAF he knew vs. the one we are discussing today. His take on it is really interesting. He said that the proportion of "poor leaders" in Sr. Positions then compared to today is probably about the same. Bad leaders were more instantly visible in WWII because getting a bunch of your guys killed is a pretty easy success/failure indicator to look at. However, his view is that politics was as much of a discriminator as anything else when it came to assuming Sr. Command. He was only a Lt, but he saw plenty of guys he thought would be great Sq/CCs and Group CCs passed up. (Bear in mind that the promotion timeline during WWII was hyper-compressed) One example he talks of is a group commander he had in England that had no business being in command, was a lousy pilot and who wasn't even fully qualified on the B-17. Yet, this guy decided to lead his group into battle one day and lost a huge percentage of his crews because he was an idiot. Guess what, the guy did get "laterally assigned" eventually, but ultimately ended up getting promoted in the long run.

He does say one thing very interesting with respect to how promotion boards work today. His view is that back in his day (40s-70s), the "good old boys" network was a much more powerful influence on promotion. If your boss wanted you to get promoted, it would probably happen. If he didn't, you'd probably remain a captain forever. He said today the system appears to be much more sterile and if you tick the right boxes, the chances are much greater that one boss isn't going to have a huge impact whether or not you get promoted up through O-6 unless you really tube it bad. (Probably the result of too many guys calling their congressman and claiming that they got screwed...) If you play the game (and realize, it is the game of today, not yester-year) you'll probably end up making at least O-5 and probably O-6. Yes, there are scores of exceptions that all of us can name, but in general, this is his view. The downside is that anyone can play the game now and there is much less opportunity for leadership to remove weak swimmers from the pool just because their gut tells them it’s the right thing to do. (This adds all the more credence to milplt’s argument on not upgrading guys to AC/Flt Lead just to download the problem child to AETC.)

 

[CWGrizwald]

Make's the point

Wow, you say some pretty depressing sh*t and that's just too bad. I wasn't a LT in the 70's, but I was one in the early 2000's and I have to say there are still some outstanding leadership. I've had three SQ/CC's that are awesome individuals as well as outstanding aviators. Not only do they do a great job dealing with the queep, but they are still top notch instructors and have great SA in the airspace.

This point was made in the original article, the job is being done because of the great work in the squadrons. I saw this myself in my last flying job, as a passed over Maj, I got to spend three years in an Ops Sqdn as a line pilot flying with the Lts and Capts. We had awesome Sqdn Leadership and towards the end or my tour we deployed to the war-de-jour and had great success. I see the problem in the fact that the last opportunity someone has to have daily contact with the war fighters, be they pilots, WSOs, aircrew or ETACs is at the LtCol Sqdn CC level. After that it's all about OGs who want ot be Wing kings and Wing Kings who want to be GOs. Heck, when a Sqdn goes to war, they don't even let their OG or Wing CC go with to fly and lead. Some strange person, from a different jet is there and all he is trying to do is not be the next BG Schwallier (SP). Once you are a GO, forget about having any clue about what is going on where the work is being done.