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An different article on a USAF leader

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Slice121 said:
That's what (for the most part) meant. I'm not discounting PJ's, JTACS, etc. But when you look at AF percentages as compared to other services it's obvious and in my opinion negatively affects O + E relations. Too many shoe clerks on both sides of the fence these days.

Slice,
I'm with Ben on this one. If I remember correctly there were more Enlisted aircrew killed in the first gulf war than "O's".

But to comment on the theme of this thread, the lack of integrity in AF leadership is a large reason why I retired at 20. As a SNCO, it got real old having squadron leadership lie to my face, violate regulations at will, and screw people over in the guise of "Air Force Necessity". At the same time have the balls to chew my ass out because one of my troops was wearing a t-shirt that was not "regulation". I still remember a Wing Commander we had who used to chase guys down in the parking lot to see what kind of socks they were wearing. IMHO, it all changed sometime in the 80's when good Captains and Majors were getting passed over and rifted, while the really great "managers" were promoted.
 
B767Inst said:
IMHO, it all changed sometime in the 80's when good Captains and Majors were getting passed over and rifted, while the really great "managers" were promoted.

I think it changed when Power Point was invented.
 
OK, I’ll bite since no one else wants to. You all make excellent points except that you are forgetting one thing. The job of today’s squadron commander is not to lead his troops into battle anymore. (Which is a shame, but for better or worse, the days of flying/leading large formations over enemy territory are gone.) The CC’s job is to work the “system” to get as much money as he can for his squadron (to improve your quality of life so you are not working on 286 computers, etc.), to get his people good assignments when it is time to leave (assignments either good for the Air Force/your career or good for the individual depending upon who you ask and what their definition of “taking care of you” is) and finally to work with other agencies on base/in the USAF for the good of his people. (i.e. to pick up the phone and work with CE to get the leak in the roof fixed, family support to help out the family of a deployed guy, etc.) In order for a CC to be able to do that, you’ve got to have a guy who has knowledge of how the rest of the USAF works and how to manipulate the system to get things done. Unfortunately, the way guys learn about the rest of the base and about how things are done to “support” the mission is by going through a painful process of being a wing exec or similar.

Having the phone numbers for only base ops and the crew bus in your rolodex doesn’t do jack for solving the infinite number of problems your guys face when dealing with the rest of the base/non-flying world. Ideally, a Sq/CC could just stand up in front of his squadron, display the Patton, Doolittle, (you pick it), style of leadership and his men would be charging out of the briefing room with their fangs hanging out. While that type of leadership is still vitally important, there is more to it now days than just that. (unless all of the pilots would be unmarried, never have to interact with the rest of the base, never get paid, etc.) The support side of the USAF doesn’t answer to the flying side anymore. (this is the true heart of the issue IMHO). Ever since pilots became “just another member of the USAF team” we’ve totally lost our ability to direct the “support” side. (How many different AFSCs get leather jackets now days?)

Way too many geek pilots who can write good reports end up moving up because no one else wants to take the bull by the horns. (Let me see, give up flying full time so that I can answer a phone and fly once in a blue moon – are you kidding?) If we want some sanity to return to the flying squadrons, the respected guys with good hands have to suck it up, learn how to write and answer the phone (as an exec) and become CCs so that they can fix the problem instead of just b!tch!ng about it. If the good guys all bail out because all they want to do is fly (and not accept the responsibility of command), then I say shut up and accept the bed that you made. You’re handing the keys over to the spineless geeks.

Not all of the commanders you meet are the slime you describe above. (Although unfortunately way too many I’ve seen fit the mold) I’ve never been a CC but have a lot of respect for a good number (definitely not all) of the ones I’ve had. The guys I respect were not only good pilots, but they called a spade a spade, waived the BS flag when the “support” guys were adding additions to their empires but also pointed the finger right back at his own guys when they screwed up. The world we live in today is just plain different than the days gone by that we all dream of…

A squadron commander who sits in his tent and gives orders and does not fly, though he may have the brains of Soloman, will never get the results that a man will, who, day in and day out, leads his patrols over the line and infuses into his pilots the 'espirit de corps.'
— Brigadier General William 'Billy' Mitchell, USAS.
 
You guys didn;t get the briefing at SOS or ACSC? Its the "don't get any crap on me" managemnet style. Basically it's do what you can to keep out of trouble to include lieing and not taking resbonibility for any actions unless you might get a medal. It's right up there with the "someone craps his pants and the commander puts everyone in diapers theory." The Air Foce is led by the last man standing leadership grooming policy. Everyone that is worth a pant-load gets out for the civilian world ASAP. Even when the USAF tries to kick out a loser they still get back in. My unit's chief pilot was kicked out of the USAF as a captain for failure to promote. Basically he's lazy. After being thrown out, he spent two years in civilian life working for a railroad scheduler and tried his hand at teaching high school kids history. He failed at two jobs that barely require a degree. He got back in at my reserve unit when it stood up looking for pilots. He's still a lazy worthless opinionated bloviating loser. He's a Lt Col now with no where else to go. It's turned into a welfare program. My unit is full of these guys mixed in with hard working people that are kept down by excrement-heads like him. These are the people we promote. Do your PME and hang around long enough and you'll get your chance to screw things up as a leader.
 
RampFreeze said:
Way too many geek pilots who can write good reports end up moving up because no one else wants to take the bull by the horns. (Let me see, give up flying full time so that I can answer a phone and fly once in a blue moon – are you kidding?) If we want some sanity to return to the flying squadrons, the respected guys with good hands have to suck it up, learn how to write and answer the phone (as an exec) and become CCs so that they can fix the problem instead of just b!tch!ng about it. If the good guys all bail out because all they want to do is fly (and not accept the responsibility of command), then I say shut up and accept the bed that you made. You’re handing the keys over to the spineless geeks.

Not all of the commanders you meet are the slime you describe above. (Although unfortunately way too many I’ve seen fit the mold) I’ve never been a CC but have a lot of respect for a good number (definitely not all) of the ones I’ve had. The guys I respect were not only good pilots, but they called a spade a spade, waived the BS flag when the “support” guys were adding additions to their empires but also pointed the finger right back at his own guys when they screwed up. The world we live in today is just plain different than the days gone by that we all dream of…

Excellent post. As I read your argument, I was asking why can't someone do both - be able to handle the queep of day to day command but also be able to lead and inspire. You hit the nail on the head. The good dudes need to "play ball" and stay alive in the game in order to one day be commanders. Hopefully enough of them can stay true to themselves along the long path to leadership. I've had the honor of having great squadron commanders, but haven't seen anything great from the OG on up. On the upside, two of my former commanders are OG/CC's now and I hope they continue to do good things. I wrestled with that thought when I got out - do I quit now or stay in and change things when it's my turn to lead? It's hard for me to complain too much when I walked out on my own opportunity. Again, well though out post.
 
I like to refer to it simply as promotion by attrition. Very prevalent in the reserves since 15 years ago technicians were paid next to nothing. The only people that stayed around were those that just couldn't get a good job on the outside (for obvious reasons). They wound up in some very high positions by continuing to breathe.

Those technicians are now at the top of the heap and have their own network of "peers" in charge to ensure that it stays that way. About 8-10 years ago, technician pay got decent, so I'm hoping that we are a few years away from an improved crop of leadership.
 
B767Inst said: while the really great "managers" were promoted.


In addition to having an incredible avatar, I feel B767Inst hit the nail on the head. IMHO that one simple word, "management," is a big part of the problem. The military is NOT IBM, we're not GM, we're not a public utility. Having people in charge who call themselves, and their underlings refer to them as, "management" does all of us a great disservice. Hearing someone in uniform use that word is like fingernails on a chalkboard to me. I know it's just a word but I find it insulting and degrading and I honestly feel it's one of the symptoms of the problem we're discussing.

 
When I did a staff tour at HQ ACC/DOO back in the early 90s I was totally shocked at the routine total dishonesty practiced by many of the general officers. I was also shocked at how much they cared about superfical appearence items compared to how little they cared about actual combat related problems.

Since I worked in electronic warfare I also know for a fact that many of the generals beating the drum for the F-22 know little or nothing about how radar works or what low observable technolgy actual is, or how it can be countered.

The Air Force is really wierd in some ways. The rank and file are some of the smartest and hardest working people in the world, yet many of their leaders are very weak and timid individuals.
 
JimNtexas said:
When I did a staff tour at HQ ACC/DOO back in the early 90s I was totally shocked at the routine total dishonesty practiced by many of the general officers. I was also shocked at how much they cared about superfical appearence items compared to how little they cared about actual combat related problems.

Since I worked in electronic warfare I also know for a fact that many of the generals beating the drum for the F-22 know little or nothing about how radar works or what low observable technolgy actual is, or how it can be countered.

The Air Force is really wierd in some ways. The rank and file are some of the smartest and hardest working people in the world, yet many of their leaders are very weak and timid individuals.
As a former Army SOAR officer, a few stories to show the current problem:
1. Trying to borrow hanger space at an Air Force base for a 3 week exercise. I go to the aircraft commander. He says he can't authorize it as he does not own the hangers. I go to the maintenance commander, and he says HE can't approve it. I go to the BASE commander, and she says she can't approve it. I am absolutely frustrated at this point... every one is afraid to make a decision. As I am walking out of the base HQ, the base senior NCO who was in the last meeting comes running up to me. Asks me the hanger number, then tells me he will take care of it. He was obviously embarased. It took a senior non-com to make a decision.
2. Another joint exercise. Air Force unit supporting the exercise only completed one mission, meaning they got the SOF on target, on time. At the debrief the Air Force commander gets up and says they had a 95% mission completion rate. The JSOTF (Joint Special Operations Task Force), commander stops him, and asks how he figures they had a 95% mission completion rate. AF commander says they launched a bird 95% of the time they intended to. JSOTF commander was very pissed, and pointed out that getting an aircraft off the ground is NOT completing a mission. Getting people or bullets on target is.
3. Another joint mission in South America. JSOTF commander tells the AF C-130 commander he needs some people and parts at an airport that night. This is the major airport in a capital city of a country. Air Force commander refuses, says it is too dangerous at night. JSOTF commander turns to the Marine reserve unit supporting us and asks if they can do it. The Marine pilot responds, "Well, I fly a 757 in and out of there once a month at night, I recon' I can put a C-130 in there."
Then, of course, there was McPeak. Man, we could go on for hours about him.
 
Another joint mission in South America. JSOTF commander tells the AF C-130 commander he needs some people and parts at an airport that night. This is the major airport in a capital city of a country

I'm guessing it was Tegucigalpa, Honduras. If it was, the part that was missing from the 757 pilot's description is that in order to fly into that airfield at night/IMC in his 757 he had to be specially certified by his airline and use special procedures that were tailored for the avionics in the 757. I've flown in there and wouldn't want to do it at night without the above equipment and procedures. (Without special, tailored procedures the wx mins are 2400-3 for a circling approach or 1700-3 for an RNAV straight-in approach . For the RNAV straight-in, a 3 degree glidepath VDP would be behind the FAF.) As much as I think the USAF has gone ultra-conservative/risk averse in its decision making, this is one place where I think they've got it right. Short of being the only hope of saving the universe, I wouldn't want an unfamiliar C-130 crew to go in there at night either.

Here are some pictures that still don't do justice to that airfield:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045647/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0141994/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045648/M/

Unfortunately, your first 2 examples sound too familiar and I don't doubt them for a minute...
 
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Wow

Just me talking, but from looking at the pics, I'll bet that is an interesting missed approach procedure.
 
When I was a 2lt in the early 70's the best pilot in the squadron was the CC. He had combat time in Viet Nam and could out fly all the young bucks. He was cool head with a willingness to share the things that made him a good pilot. He was trusted and people willingly followed their leadership. Somewhere in the 80's those guys became extinct and were replaced by school grads.

I saw commanders with less than 1500 hrs trying to tell young bucks how to fly when they still needed "seeing eye instructors" to keep them out of trouble. They were busy running to meetings, planning for the next CAFI (facility inspections) when we cleaned the toilets and sealed them so they would be sparkly for the inspectors, and briefing the OWC. They had the best pressed uniform and sharpest hair cut but they didn't have anything to impart to the LT's and captains or the time to do it if they did.

The good guys left (except me, lol) and joined the airlines or guard/res. I didn't see another super squadron cc after '84. The warrior attitude was lost but we gained new insignia and now if you are a career aviator you can plan on being gone by 20 to make room for the school grads and BZ types. I sit on the outside now and look at the AF and it is nothing like what I left. I doubt I could survive in today's AF.

Sure wouldn't recommend it for my kids.
 
Benhuntn said:
When I was a 2lt in the early 70's the best pilot in the squadron was the CC. He had combat time in Viet Nam and could out fly all the young bucks. He was cool head with a willingness to share the things that made him a good pilot. He was trusted and people willingly followed their leadership. Somewhere in the 80's those guys became extinct and were replaced by school grads.

I saw commanders with less than 1500 hrs trying to tell young bucks how to fly when they still needed "seeing eye instructors" to keep them out of trouble. They were busy running to meetings, planning for the next CAFI (facility inspections) when we cleaned the toilets and sealed them so they would be sparkly for the inspectors, and briefing the OWC. They had the best pressed uniform and sharpest hair cut but they didn't have anything to impart to the LT's and captains or the time to do it if they did.

The good guys left (except me, lol) and joined the airlines or guard/res. I didn't see another super squadron cc after '84. The warrior attitude was lost but we gained new insignia and now if you are a career aviator you can plan on being gone by 20 to make room for the school grads and BZ types. I sit on the outside now and look at the AF and it is nothing like what I left. I doubt I could survive in today's AF.

Sure wouldn't recommend it for my kids.

Wow, you say some pretty depressing sh*t and that's just too bad. I wasn't a LT in the 70's, but I was one in the early 2000's and I have to say there are still some outstanding leadership. I've had three SQ/CC's that are awesome individuals as well as outstanding aviators. Not only do they do a great job dealing with the queep, but they are still top notch instructors and have great SA in the airspace. While you claim today's AF is nothing like it was in the past, you're probably right. I think today's AF is still extremely sharp, is very safety conscious, and could crush any other air force out there. I'm extremely proud to be a member of TODAY'S Air Force...and I would highly recommend it to my kids when the time comes I have kids that are old enough to serve.
 
RampFreeze said:
I'm guessing it was Tegucigalpa, Honduras. If it was, the part that was missing from the 757 pilot's description is that in order to fly into that airfield at night/IMC in his 757 he had to be specially certified by his airline and use special procedures that were tailored for the avionics in the 757. I've flown in there and wouldn't want to do it at night without the above equipment and procedures. (Without special, tailored procedures the wx mins are 2400-3 for a circling approach or 1700-3 for an RNAV straight-in approach . For the RNAV straight-in, a 3 degree glidepath VDP would be behind the FAF.) As much as I think the USAF has gone ultra-conservative/risk averse in its decision making, this is one place where I think they've got it right. Short of being the only hope of saving the universe, I wouldn't want an unfamiliar C-130 crew to go in there at night either.

Here are some pictures that still don't do justice to that airfield:

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045647/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0141994/M/
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0045648/M/

Unfortunately, your first 2 examples sound too familiar and I don't doubt them for a minute...

No, Quito. Again, a difficult place to fly in and out of. But my point was that the Marines were not flying a 757 in there, but a C-130 that was older, and probably poorly equipped when compared to the Air Force C-130. And this was a clear night. The Marine pilots were not based in that area, but did simulator training before they came down on the different airports. They were prepared to do the mission. It kind of fell into the whole Air Force mentality during this exercise. They only took easy missions, the first word out of their mouth was usually "No", and they had clearly forgotten that the purpose of the C-130 was to move stuff for the Army. There were several other missions they refused that the Marines either accepted, or accepted with modifications for safety. The Marines had a mission oriented attitude. They would try to find a way to accomplish each mission.
I think this might have been just after that C-130 went into the mountain in the NW US. The key to that accident, however, was poor training and not following the obstacle DP. Same thing when going into any mountainous terrain- follow the proceedures.
Just so I'm not only badmouthing your service, however, some good examples I recently saw:
1. Enlisted troops I saw in Iraq performed very well. I could always tell when the Air Force was running a hot-fuel site. Troops would come flying out to fuel us, and pass us ice cold water while fueling. It was 130+, no A/C in the aircraft and we were wearing chicken plates. We loved those guys.
2. SPs and other AF enlisted performing covoy escorts, taking fire, and driving on. Probably the LAST thing they thought they would be doing when they enlisted. These are the guys who deserved Bronze Stars, not some UAV pilot sitting in an air conditioned trailer in Missouri.
3. Air Force airfields over there were customer service oriented. What a novel idea to have a chow hall open 24/7, with drinks, sandwiches and ice cream after normal hours. When I suggested this at an Army post, I was told that bfast is 05:30-07:30, lunch 11:30-13:00 and dinner 17:30-19:00. All others can eat MREs. After all, if the chow hall was open 24/7, people might eat the food. Ahh, isn't that the point. Troops come back from combat missions, patrols and convoys, they would like something other than an MRE.
4. And let's not forget those A-10 pilots. I have never seen one operating in combat, but have heard enough stories and seen enough pictures of A-10 pilots putting their %$es on the line to help the grunts on the ground, then flying their shot to &%*# aircraft back home. Any A-10 pilot is okay by me.
 
I can't believe I'm going to pile on again against my beloved AF, but there are so many relevant posts here it's a bit scary. More than one guy has said, myself included, that the critical time was in the mid to late '80's. Interestingly, that corresponds to the demise of the Soviet empire, and the end of the Reagan era. It also corresponds to the arrival of the PC movement, the loss of Tactical Air Command, and the integration of female combat pilots around 1991.

Before anyone jumps me, I understand that neanderthal behavior, lewdness, rough living, etc, does not make a unit great. But what it does do, in a tribal way, is bond men together. The old fighters (SEA) passed what they knew on to the new guy over a whiskey at the squadron bar, where you can have porno on the wall and cuss like a pirate. When an O3 tells me about dropping iron on the Ho Chi Minh trail, I sit up straight, pay attention, and buy the beer. "Yeah, I remember watching Wild Bill get smoked by a 57mm unit. They both augered in. I did one last pass on that %^$$& with the gun and sprayed their ^*(^&% arms and legs all over their pit." If someone had said "Watch your langauge! We need to clean up the squadron for the General's visit!! Put out that cigar!!! There's no smoking in here!" we'd laugh and then beat them up.

This exact same O3 never made O4. He was a fountain of leadership and experience, but he didn't play the game. <sigh> I followed him in a few years.

I don't know what the answer is, but I know it is not in PP slides, PC rules, and clean living. I would have died for those guys, and they for me. Now, it's "what can I do to get promoted?", not "what can I do to blow the %&^ out of the bad guys."
 
No, Quito. Again, a difficult place to fly in and out of...
Got it. I stand corrected. Yes, it is another spooky place at an elevation of around 10,000 feet, but not quite as bad as Tegucigalpa IMHO. My guess (only guessing again) is that it wasn't that the crew didn't want to go in there at night, it was because they weren't allowed to by reg. If there wasn't an approved instrument approach on hand (DoD approach or a Jeppesen approach that they had the lead time to get approved my a TERPs specialist) the standard USAF restriction for airports in mountainous terrain is "Day VFR Only." I guess we've crashed too many airplanes at night where guys see the runway lights ahead but don't see the unlit hill in-between them and the runway. That being said, it's tough understand why a crew can be legal to fly a low-level airdrop through the mountains at night but not fly into a large airport at night VFR... The USAF does have a much better safety record than the Marines, but the true debate is at what cost to mission accomplishment.
 
Going back a few posts, unfortunately it is not as easy as some good dudes learning to write OPR's and becoming USAF leadership. For the most part, the higher the level, the more they have sold their soul. The good dude, on average, won't be chosen for the ever increasing roles. Now, there are individual good leaders, but they are the minority - the evidence is overwhelming. And unfortunately, the weak-spined leadership will only choose young dudes to move up the ladder behind them who are no threat.

It was AMC leadership who went from measuring pallets downrange and successful on-time air refuelings to measuring on-time takeoff's. How many AMC crews out there took off in less than a code-1 jet just to sit at the first stop for mx or to RTB, just to make the metrics look good. Anyone who flew in AMC back in the late-90's who doesn't think that the metrics drove the fight was woefully out of touch (I say late-90's because that is when I left, but I really don' tthink things improved all that much). Real leadership would not let metrics take priority over end-user satisfaction - did the gas/bullets/fighters/bread/bombs/troops/etc. get there on time, that was not measured at all.

Not to leave the fighter community out. How many fighter schedules are driven by mx and phase timelines. I understand the limited mx capability - but the wing leaders need to fix that. How many fighter pilots are still leaving their first assignment after 2yrs and 9 mos? How many first tour dudes are becoming MC and IP - not many, and those that are aren't for long before MPC sends them to their white jet/predator/remote/etc. Why aren't wing leaders insisting that combat capability drive the fight vs. some percieved career timeline? THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY FOR OFFICER TOUR LENGTHS IS CAREER DEVELOPMENT! YHGTBSM. And, no, return to fly majors are not a one-for-one replacement for 2nd and 3rd tour-in-a-row fighter pilots.

The problem with USAF officers today is that they compare things to how bad they could be, not how they should be. First, determine what the priority is - and that is combat capability and mission (the real mission) accomplishment. Against that backdrop, determine how things are. Ask yourself why the Sq CC has to "ASK" the Mx CC for a 8 turn 6 only to get a 6 turn 4 (you know, ops tempo and all). We need a single POC for mission accomplishment - the SQ CC needs to be able to say - the mission requires a 8 turn 6 tomorrow and that is what we'll get - and the Mx officer needs to say "yes, sir". And that is only one facet of where we got away from the basics. Watch Twelve O'Clock High for a quick and educating/entertaining refresher. Speaking of that, we have lost a little sense of history.

Read Gen Kenney Reports - his account of the Pacific War of WWII - and compare your actions to those people - we aren't even close. That is the standard. Unfortunately, how much queep a Sq CC sheilds you from is not the mark of a good CC. How much he supports the mission, not you, is. It isn't about you or me, it is about the mission. I do the mission, a good SQ CC makes sure I can by giving me everything I need, and his boss the same, etc. And one last statement - a crew chief doesn't turn a wrench or a jet or anything else for ME, he does it for the mission.
 
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I couldn't agree with you more regarding the attitude that ops is just another supporting cast member on the base team. Why is it again that this base exists? Does it have something to do with those aluminum things with wings over there on the concrete? My post on page 2 tags that as the heart of the issue.

However, I don't buy your argument that the strong will not rise to the top because the leadership will only promote those behind them that are no threat. The problem is that too many of the guys that are desperately needed to take command bail out (or don't try to seek command) instead of putting their money where their mouth is. In the absence of anything else, the weak swimmers will fill the void. Now that the airline industry isn't as appealing, maybe the USAF will keep more of the guys they need to fill the important O-5 to O-7 billets. As for anyone with multiple stars, I think it is as political today as it was in the time of Billy Mitchell.

I just don't accept the doom and gloom that fills so many of the posts above. If it really is that bad we should just turn off the lights, go home and look up to the (insert a 3rd world country here) Air Force for pointers. Obviously we're not the premier Air Force that we were in the 1970s when everything was perfect.
 
Scrapdog you are right we are the greatest AF in the world, but it is because of the superior work of junior officers up through Maj. It is inspite of the leadership not because of it. I hope you continue to have good leaders but if not hang in there and make a difference yourself.
 

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