Air france pilots getting the blame

[macdu]

Ok, I am sorry I crack you up. I was talking more about en route weather briefing! I am sure that weather was on different satellite pictures, and in their weather brief packets. So in my mind, it should have been something the Captain and all the pilots on board were aware of prior to entering that area. I find it hard to believe the pilots have little training on how to use the weather radar?

I do fly boxes......is that a "i am better than you" statement?

It is not a generalization....I have been flying for 25 years, it is reality based on experience!

You don't get to fly with ab-initio pilots do you? I do everyday I go to work. You wouldn't believe the stuff you see and hear.

 

[Guam360]

And experience

experience .....are you kidding, if one of the FO's was say, a bit older, and flew for a major airline that went bankrupt and then got hired at brand X, he may in many cases have more "experience" than the captain at that time.......

hellloooo?

 

[thor2j]

The captain of Air France only had 7000 hours Total!

 

[becket]

I'm sure there are stby. Instruments on that thing. Whatever primary airspeed fault may have occurred, it shouldn't be fatal. I hope they find a definitive mechanical reason, but it really doesn't look good for the flt crew.

 

[ultrarunner]

The standby Rosemount probes aren't immune.

 

[aa73]

Crew experience

CA age 58, 11,000 hrs with 1700hrs on type
F/O age 37, 6500 hrs with 4500hrs on type
F/O age 32, 2900 hrs with 800 hrs on type

Link: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf

Agreed... re: tilt/gain. The only auto tilt radar I've worked was on the 737NG, and was not too impressed with accuracy. Rule of thumb at night esp. over water = radar to max gain and tilt down to where you paint a little ground/water return at top of screen. Has saved my butt from flying into "innocent" towering CU several times, stuff that NEVER paints in auto and stuff that one would NEVER fly into during daytime.

 

[OrionFE]

Just because someone has a type rating and watched an Archie Trammel video doesn't mean they know their radar.

I would think that would be covered during IOE!

 

[Ty Webb]

I would think that would be covered during IOE!

I don't know about Air France, but my IOE as a FO was a whopping 25 hours, basically four days, and took place in winter. Not much convective weather!

The airlines seem to assume that the newhire has experience in radar, high altitude operations, and a number of other areas. I did, but not all do. Things are covered in the classroom, but nothing takes the place of experience.

 

[Jetjockey]

It's easy to blame dead men...............they don't talk back.

 

[densoo]

Let the media circus begin

By ANDY PASZTOR And DANIEL MICHAELS

The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital systems, including adjusting engine thrust, according to people familiar with preliminary findings from the plane's recorders.

The final moments inside the cockpit of the twin-engine Airbus A330, these people said, indicates the pilots seemingly were confused by alarms they received from various automated flight-control systems as the plane bucked through some turbulence expected on the route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris but also faced unexpectedly heavy icing at 35,000 feet. Such icing is renowned for making airspeed-indicators and other external sensors unreliable.

Ultimately, the crew failed to follow standard procedures to maintain or increase thrust and keep the aircraft's nose level, while trouble-shooting and waiting for the airspeed sensors and related functions to return to normal, according to these people.

Slated to be disclosed by investigators on Friday, the sequence of events captured on the recorders is expected to highlight that the twin-engine jet slowed dangerously shortly after the autopilot disconnected. The pilots almost immediately faced the beginning of what became a series of automation failures or disconnects related to problems with the plane's airspeed sensors, these people said. The crew apparently had difficulty sorting out the warning messages, chimes and other cues, while monitoring essential displays showing engine power and aircraft trajectory.

The pilots were never trained to handle precisely such an emergency at high altitude, according to safety experts and a previous report by France's Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses, which is heading up the investigation. All 228 people aboard died in the accident.

The senior captain, Marc Dubois, appears to have been out of the cockpit for a routine rest break when the fatal chain of events started, according to safety experts familiar with the details. But according to one person close to the probe, the cockpit-voice recorder suggests that once problems cropped up, he may have rushed back to the cockpit to join the other two pilots of Air France Flight 447.

Though Friday's announcement won't provide final conclusions or specific causes, investigators believe Air France never trained its pilots to cope with such automation problems in conjunction with a high-altitude aerodynamic stall, an emergency when the wings lose lift and the plane quickly becomes uncontrollable.

Spokesmen for Air France, a unit of Air France-KLM, and Airbus, a unit of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co., have declined to comment on any details of the investigation. Airbus last week, however, issued a bulletin reassuring airlines that the preliminary readout of the recorders hasn't prompted any "immediate recommendation" regarding the safety of the global A330 fleet. French investigators, who gave the green light for that statement, also have said their preliminary findings don't highlight any major system failures or malfunctions that could have caused the fatal dive.

According to a report issued by French investigators in November 2009, Airbus identified 32 instances involving similar model jetliners between 2003 and 2009 in which external speed probes, known as pitot tubes, suffered ice buildup at high altitude and caused "erroneous air speed indications."

Most of the incidents involved probes similar to those on the A330 that crashed. Many were on Air France planes, according to the BEA report.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100...41631579541512.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories

 

[whymeworry?]

CA age 58, 11,000 hrs with 1700hrs on type
F/O age 37, 6500 hrs with 4500hrs on type
F/O age 32, 2900 hrs with 800 hrs on type

Link: http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf

Agreed... re: tilt/gain. The only auto tilt radar I've worked was on the 737NG, and was not too impressed with accuracy. Rule of thumb at night esp. over water = radar to max gain and tilt down to where you paint a little ground/water return at top of screen. Has saved my butt from flying into "innocent" towering CU several times, stuff that NEVER paints in auto and stuff that one would NEVER fly into during daytime.

11,000 hrs for a 58 yr old would imply somewhat little flying throughout a career (assuming 30+ yrs in commercial aviation). Still, once you're past 5,000 hrs, it should be plenty.

What I was getting at is the kind of experience. At my airline we have had plenty of Sr WB FOs who had problems upgrading to 737 Captain simply because they spent 10+ years going straight and level in cruise flight as IRO. In fact, when you're hired at our company the Veeps come in and warn you to keep your skills up. They specifically tell you, "don't just roll over and become a food and movie critic, pick up a line trip where you actually fly to keep proficient." It is the pilot's responsibility.

Of course, we're only speculating here, but experience plays a role in many ways throughout aviation and I know y'all know this. I'm not exactly saying that AF447 didn't have an experienced crew, I am suggesting that w/o the right experience (i.e., pilot's database for judgement), these sorts of situations are bound to occur in aviation. Hence our industry can ill-afford to keep ignoring the importance of experience as a requisite for professional piloting. Certainly the MPL should get stopped dead in it's tracks.

I dunno' about you guys, but for me one of the things I appreciate about this job is that I learn something new every flight. Sometimes it's small and rather innocuous, other times it's an eye-opener. So I'll be the first to say that despite my 20+ yrs experience in commercial aviation, I'm far from "completely experienced", and therefore build upon my database for better judgement all the time. But as our industry evolves, the tolerance for error also narrows. Accordingly, we shouldn't be promoting the sort of ab-initio/ 220 hr new-hire/ MPL schemes that keep permeating into our industry.

As I've said before, nothing against new guys and gals, we were all there once. But having flown contracts overseas with these types, it became very apparent that anything less than a competent and strong commander paired up with a new pilot is a recipe for disaster.

I am reminded of an accident that occurred at one airline I was contracting for recently. A certain commander had a number of complaints against him by FOs. He was, or all intents and purposes, a dick. Never listened to FOs, never gave any flying legs to them, had a tail-strike once and overall lack confidence in his own flying abilities. In a word, as a Captain he was weak. Then one fine day he was paired up with a brand new guy. This kid had just completed IOE. Had all of 209 hrs when he was hired. He was on his 2nd leg of his career when the Captain boned up the landing. Sheered the nose-wheel clear off the airplane and sent the strut right up into the FOs seat. Aircraft went skidding off the runway. I flew with the FO a few months after the event, once he got back on line, and got the straight skinny from him as to what occurred.

The Captain was and always had been weak. Coupled up with a new guy landing in a severe downpour, at night, on top of a 6-leg 12+ hr duty day, it should come as no surprise as to why and how such an event occurred.

Thankfully, nobody was injured on that flight. But the aircraft sustained $2.5 million in damage, was down for 8 mos. and the poor FO gets to start off his career with an accident on his record. Meanwhile, the Captain was leaving for his dream career gig at another airline within days. That airline pulled their offer, he was lucky to keep his job and get re-trained with the original company.

We laugh and joke about the monotony of our occupation sometimes. But the reality is we're getting paid for our time and for the times when things aren't so routine (bad wx days, irregular ops, non-normals, emergencies, etc). At those latter times we as professional aviators deserve and should demand that our cockpit partner be the best of the best; not necessarily book smart or good at kissing ass, but skilled and competent aviators. And by aviator I mean someone that can fly an airplane. Not someone who is good at correcting me as to the latest revision update callout, etc.

Now that I'm back with my US Legacy carrier airline I certainly appreciate having a skilled and experienced aviator working next to me at all times. Someone who, when they question me (which is their job to do so), I know they are doing so based on knowledge and experience.

 

[scoreboardII]

radar to max gain and tilt down to where you paint a little ground/water return at top of screen. Has saved my butt from flying into "innocent" towering CU several times, stuff that NEVER paints in auto and stuff that one would NEVER fly into during daytime.

I am going to ask try this next time you fly: set auto gain and tilt down 1-2 degrees or whatever it takes to get some ground return at displayed scope range. Then, select manual gain and set gain to maximum. Or, if there is weather out there, try auto, then set scope to see returns, then select max gain. You'll find your scope displays less returns in maximum manual gain than in auto gain, there is a reason for that.

 

[ableone]

On the other hand.....

The debate about the decision to not back-drive the mode selectors (thrust levers) has a new check mark in the con column.

How many pilots would have not likely reacted to the trust levers retarding to idle?

Don't get me wrong, I love the bus and will probably finish out my career next to the sidestick but I do think the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of a fixed thrust lever. Just one pilot's opinion.

 

[jonjuan]

On the other hand.....

The debate about the decision to not back-drive the mode selectors (thrust levers) has a new check mark in the con column.

How many pilots would have not likely reacted to the trust levers retarding to idle?

Don't get me wrong, I love the bus and will probably finish out my career next to the sidestick but I do think the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of a fixed thrust lever. Just one pilot's opinion.

IMO, I believe you summed up what went wrong in this tragedy. The pilots, when faced with zero speed indication, failed to fly an AOA and thrust setting.

 

[Lear70]

On the other hand.....

The debate about the decision to not back-drive the mode selectors (thrust levers) has a new check mark in the con column.

How many pilots would have not likely reacted to the trust levers retarding to idle?

Don't get me wrong, I love the bus and will probably finish out my career next to the sidestick but I do think the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of a fixed thrust lever. Just one pilot's opinion.

Agreed.

Jonjuan may be right about their failure to fly the plane, and I don't have enough Airbus knowledge to comment on the ability to fly AOA (does it even HAVE an AOA indicator in plain view?), but I will always believe that an autothrottle similar to the Boeing would have gone a long way towards maintaining proper power setting in this scenario, and believe the final accident analysis will mirror that thought.

YMMV. Sad.