I guess its not just me Pt 1
Also I found this on SFTT.org
Abu Ghraib: Bigger than a Mere Scandal
You think those photographs of MPs abusing prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison are bad? They are, but the words are far worse.
The AR 15-6 report by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba on the activities of the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade and a subordinate unit – the 320th Military Police Battalion, whose 372nd MP Company was in charge of Iraqi detainees at the Baghdad prison – is a stern and harsh indictment of practically the entire U.S. Army and Central Command for its handling of Iraqi detainees.
Buried in the 53-page report, and obscured by the news media’s fascination with the gruesome photographs of MPs assaulting and humiliating Iraqi males, are a number of findings that portray the U.S. military in Iraq and Army support commands back in the United States as clearly derelict in their duty to ensure that soldiers abide by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Land Warfare. They include:
Ignored warnings of MP failures:
Taguba’s investigation at the request of Lt. Gen. Ricardo S. Sanchez, the senior U.S. military commander in Iraq, began on Jan. 19 as a result of an Army Criminal Investigative Division (CID) probe into allegations of abuse at Abu Ghraib. However, there had been multiple indications over the previous eight months that the 800th MP Brigade was an ill-prepared, poorly trained unit led by incompetent officers.
On June 9, 2003, an 800th MP Brigade guard at another detainment facility known as Camp Cropper sparked a riot that overwhelmed his fellow soldiers and led guards to shoot (none fatally) five prisoners. Taguba revealed:
“Several detainees allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby five detainees were wounded [italics added]. Contributing factors were poor communications, no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate and outdated.”
The on-site AR 15-6 probe into that incident also noted an earlier clash at another detainment facility under the control of the 800th MP Brigade, involving an escape attempt five days earlier where an undisclosed number of Iraqis were shot by MPs. Taguba in his report noted that subsequently “four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq.”
Between June 4, 2003 and Jan. 19, 2004, there were 17 separate riots or inmate escape attempts at facilities under the control of the 800th MP Brigade. In reviewing the incident reports and interviewing MPs involved, Taguba concluded that poor training, breakdowns in guard procedures and inadequate physical security contributed to most of the violence.
If that weren’t enough to set off alarm bells, the U.S. military had conducted two earlier reviews of the operation of detainment facilities months before Taguba was sent in to clean up the stables.
Taguba’s report notes that before launching field interviews his team reviewed the “Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq” that had been conducted by Maj. Gen. Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). This review by experts in “strategic interrogation” spent from Aug. 31 to Sept. 9, 2003 reviewing “current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable intelligence.”
In addition, Taguba and his team reviewed a report, “Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq,” that had been delivered by Maj. Gen. Donald J. Ryder, the Army’s Provost Marshal General, on Nov. 6.
Despite those incidents and on-site inspections, Sanchez and the rest of his staff at Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) headquarters remained totally clueless about the 800th MP Brigade’s shoddy performance until a soldier turned over photos of the abuse on Jan. 13. It appears unlikely that even Ryder’s review finally woke up the generals in Baghdad, although Taguba noted, “Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced during MG Ryder’s Team’s assessment are the very same issues that are the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.”
Lack of training: The entire U.S. Army military police branch is implicitly accused of dereliction in Taguba’s assessment of the performance of the 800th MP Brigade. Taguba’s conclusions are extremely blunt:
* “There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections experience.”
* “I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. MP units did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post-mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific missions. The training that was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the U.S. Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the U.S. Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.”