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Aborting a T/O

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On an FO PT once, the instructor programmed a stick pusher on take off. Obviously, I didn't know he had that planned. So on the takeoff roll, I applied some forward pressure on the yolk in line with out operations manual. Because of the pressure, the pusher didn't activate but did partially on the Captain's side. It was a situation even the senior instructor hadn't seen before. The Captain I was flying with did nothing. I assumed it was because it was a 'training event' and didn't want to call the abort. Had he tried that online, or had he not paid attention, we would have had some problems. The point - being anti CRM just because you're in the sim to me is a bad idea. I understand what is being tested, but if you have a life threatening malfunction whether or not it's in the sim should be irrelevant - regardless of who is flying.
 
After the LR60 crash in CAE, any conversation about RTOs is a good one.

Personally, and of course it depends on the specifics of the situation, but if I hear ABORT ABORT odds are pretty good I'm going to stop with maximum effort. One simply doesn't have the time to consider the cause of such a call when rapidly accelerating on the takeoff roll, especially above 80kts.

As has been said, a good takeoff brief should encompass abort criteria and have everyone on the same page.
 
At AirTran it's the Captain's call. It was the same way at Pinnacle. I did prefer Pinnacle's departure briefing, however, since it included a discussion from the Captain about aborts. AirTran's briefing includes no discussion whatsoever about what situations would warrant an abort. I think it's a horrible policy.
 
Team discussion is for the brief not at 140kts.

Damn, that would be on long brief! Bottom line is we don't know what the hell could happen. So I don't think you can brief for every situation.

That depends on how you do it.

It's a lot shorter and simpler to brief the items you will reject for (especially after the power is set/high speed regime) than to brief everything you won't reject for. Some things may change based on runway length...etc, but overall its pretty much the same for each takeoff.

For me: if the engines are turning = GO.

At CAL the Capt's make the call and perform the reject. T/O reject is included in the recommended brief.

One thing that does get a little old, is that many captains brief the full reject procedures with every different FO they fly with (but don't talk about specifics, they just say call it out and I'll make a decision). Unless the FO is new, that really gets to be overly redundant and causes many an FO to tune out and maybe miss some important info buried in the standard procedures refresher.
 
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Here at DAL is is the CA and only the CA. We can call out a problem but it is the CA's ultimate decision.

I think it's that way at most carriers. But there's always little detail-ly things. At TWA it was always Capt abort (if the F/O's leg, capt calls: "I've got it"). Even on the F/O's takeoff the capt handled the throttles until the gear up call. Then we go to AA procedures; still only CA's abort, however for some reason F/O's initially set T/O power and then CA hand is on throttles. A useless and time wasting "musical chairs" of hands and throttles.
 
at SWA it is the captain's decision.

a good takeoff brief isn't that complicated.

after 80 knots before V1, only abort for fire, engine failure, windshear, aircraft is unsafe or unable to fly

the last caveat is where the captain's decision comes in, the FO should give a clear and concise description of what they think is going on. if it isn't fire, engine failure or windshear, go flying.

that catch all is for something that might not generate a light or warning but the captain decides the plane won't fly.

that is obviously the scary one that gets people killed both ways (for aborting and for continuing).

for instance, blow a tire and try to abort, you very likely won't meet your performance numbers (poor braking with a blown tire) so on a critical runway you may be going off the end if you do a highspeed abort with a blown tire. blown tires also are a tough one if you haven't had one before in that plane, might seem like much more than it is, engine failure maybe (loud noise, swerve). there is also the question as to how much damage it did to hydraulic lines, etc. then again, if you're leaking fluid, another reason you might not stop on the paved surface.

or, flaps weren't set and you didn't get a warning (madrid, possibly) some planes won't takeoff with the flaps up and some captains might get a 'this isn't right' feeling during acceleration and abort, although flaps up is an insidious and scary one. which is why they make those warnings. at SWA we check the takeoff warning both at the gate before every flight (to get it) and just prior to takeoff (to make sure we don't get it).

anyway. I've flown both ways (in the navy anyone in the cockpit could call abort) and prefer the CA makes the decision. less debate at V1. although, any captain needs to very seriously consider the input of the FO if the FO just has time to yell abort.
 
At Mesaba on the jets it is the capatain guarding the thrust and performing the abort. On the Saab it was whoever PF was did the abort though I believe they were changing that to be the captain only like the jets. Works fine for the jet because with the CRJ9 with the fadec detents the power is set before airspeed is even alive, not sure if it's quite as smooth for the CRJ2. The Saab would be a bit more of a cluster.
 
USAF procedures has the Aircraft Commander announce the decision to abort, the Pilot Flying will then execute the procedures for the abort.

IMHO, this is a good way to run things. I'm not sure if everybody has the Abort Decision written out in their Tech Orders, but ours breaks it down into time required to make the decision, average reaction time, etc. It's just a matter of seconds as we all know. I think transferring control during an abort wastes time. Maybe on most days, you can get away with this but imagine a heavy weight take off on a contaminated runway.

If you can't trust the guy in the seat next to you to execute an abort IAW Tech Orders the moment the Aircraft Commander announces his decision, he shouldn't be sitting there.

Just my .02. I don't claim to be an expert on the matter.

Skyward80
 
If you can't trust the guy in the seat next to you to execute an abort IAW Tech Orders the moment the Aircraft Commander announces his decision, he shouldn't be sitting there.

Just my .02. I don't claim to be an expert on the matter.

Skyward80

I don't think its a matter of trust, but more of how some people handle stressful situations. You could have a guy that knows the plane inside out, knows company's policy and prodecures inside out. You might fly with him thinking he is one of the best pilots in the world.

Then all the sudden the ******************** hits the fan, and that guy you thought was Chuck Yeager goes into a shell and is wothless.

Everyone reacts to stress differently. I trust everyone I fly with, but I never know how that guy will act in a stressful situation.
 
Then we go to AA procedures; still only CA's abort, however for some reason F/O's initially set T/O power and then CA hand is on throttles. A useless and time wasting "musical chairs" of hands and throttles.

At most other airlines on the F/O's leg, F/Os usually set the power, with the CA assuming control of the throttles once power is set. In this case TWA was the one who did it differently from everyone else.
 
thought jets had thrust levers...
 

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