AA MD80 lands short in DEN? / AA MD-80 undershoots DIA rwy 35L

[AA717driver]

Between AA at ORD and this one, seems like a problem of knowing when to execute a go-around.

Good thing they're Nordstrom pilots and not K-mart types... TC

 

[crxpilot]

I am kinda confused that they actually taxied to the gate with the damage.............

 

[FracCapt]

There's a thread about this in the Majors section....even has the preliminary NTSB report.

http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=43413&page=1&pp=15

 

[wrxpilot]

There's a thread about this in the Majors section....even has the preliminary NTSB report.

http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=43413&page=1&pp=15

Great, thanks FracCapt.

 

[100LL... Again!]

Possible CRM issue with too much reluctance to take the airplane away from the FO. IF the guy is all over the sky, you gotta do it.

Or call the go-around.

 

[TonyC]

Possible CRM issue with too much reluctance to take the airplane away from the FO. IF the guy is all over the sky, you gotta do it.

Or call the go-around.

You're right, Captains are much more capable of handling vectors to "a short approach" and capturing the glideslope from "500 to 600 feet." If he had taken the airplane away from the FO, the approach would have instantly stabilized and the VASIs would have been visible from DH.

In retrospect, it appears that somebody should have decided to break off that approach and try another. (The controller suggested, the Captain declined.) In retrospect, it appears the Captain made a bad decision. In retrospect, it appears the Captain should have directed a Go-Around earlier. (He DID call Go-Around, just too late.) The trouble with this analysis, and for that matter ANY analysis we might make now, is the Captain did not have the advantage of the "in retrospect, it appears" that we seem to THINK we now have.

Back to the vultures roost, y'all.

crxpilot - - from the NTSB Preliminary report it would seem that the crew elected to taxi to the gate because they "noticed nothing wrong with the airplane."

 

[100LL... Again!]

If the CA did not see that they were going to land short, then taking it way, of course,would not have helped.

Either way, you do not need the benefit of hindsight to identify what sounds like a fairly unstable apporach.

This is subject to further details from the investigation, of course.

I am not expecting to be suprised by the final report, though. There are seldom new types of accidents.

Usually it is the same old error, made over and over by successive generations of pilots. The moral of the story will likely turn out to be "don't let a controller's less than perfect vector turn into your worst nightmare".

 

[Vik]

WHEN CONTROLLERS ATTACK!

Coming Spring 2005 on FOX!!!!

If the CA did not see that they were going to land short, then taking it way, of course,would not have helped.

Either way, you do not need the benefit of hindsight to identify what sounds like a fairly unstable apporach.

This is subject to further details from the investigation, of course.

I am not expecting to be suprised by the final report, though. There are seldom new types of accidents.

Usually it is the same old error, made over and over by successive generations of pilots. The moral of the story will likely turn out to be "don't let a controller's less than perfect vector turn into your worst nightmare".

 

[100LL... Again!]

Sometimes I suspect that they get two IMC aircraft headed straight-on and see which one is 'chicken'.

Controller1: I'm not callin' 'em up.

Controller2: Well, I'm not callin' 'em up either.

 

[dojetdriver]

You're right, Captains are much more capable of handling vectors to "a short approach" and capturing the glideslope from "500 to 600 feet." If he had taken the airplane away from the FO, the approach would have instantly stabilized and the VASIs would have been visible from DH.

In retrospect, it appears that somebody should have decided to break off that approach and try another. (The controller suggested, the Captain declined.) In retrospect, it appears the Captain made a bad decision. In retrospect, it appears the Captain should have directed a Go-Around earlier. (He DID call Go-Around, just too late.) The trouble with this analysis, and for that matter ANY analysis we might make now, is the Captain did not have the advantage of the "in retrospect, it appears" that we seem to THINK we now have.

Back to the vultures roost, y'all.

crxpilot - - from the NTSB Preliminary report it would seem that the crew elected to taxi to the gate because they "noticed nothing wrong with the airplane."

I tought all mainline pilots were such topgun/got the right stuff/super professionals that they would never make a mistake like this happen.

 

[h25b]

This seems to back up something I've notice in the industry in general. This idea that performing a GO-AROUND or MISSED-APPROACH is some sort of failure. I had a guy tell me that it scared the passengers before...

 

[Singlecoil]

This seems to back up something I've notice in the industry in general. This idea that performing a GO-AROUND or MISSED-APPROACH is some sort of failure. I had a guy tell me that it scared the passengers before...

I think that's a good point. One the one hand, you're a bad pilot if you have to go around and should be ashamed of yourself. On the other hand, you're a bad pilot and a fuel waster if you have to spool up the engines above 500' agl. That doesn't leave a lot of room in between for most mortals. I'm not saying those are my perceptions, but I do think those perceptions exist.

 

[AA717driver]

Singlecoil--At most airlines, you have to be stabilized by 500'. Engines spooled up and on the Loc and G/S.

Guys, the G/S had to be pegged at the top way before they hit. The CA blew it by not calling go-around sooner. I was always taught that if you start a go-around, finish it. Even if your wheels touch the runway, don't stop.

The FO was apparently out to lunch, too.TC

P.S.--Anyone want the rest of my furlough passes? I'll stick to riding on China Air or Aeroflot. I think they're safer...

 

[Oakum_Boy]

Singlecoil--At most airlines, you have to be stabilized by 500'. Engines spooled up and on the Loc and G/S.

Guys, the G/S had to be pegged at the top way before they hit. The CA blew it by not calling go-around sooner. I was always taught that if you start a go-around, finish it. Even if your wheels touch the runway, don't stop.

The FO was apparently out to lunch, too.TC

P.S.--Anyone want the rest of my furlough passes? I'll stick to riding on China Air or Aeroflot. I think they're safer...

I think that 1000' above TDZ is the minimum stabilization requirement for an ILS, and especially in that weather! With ceiling at 100', that means they were descending on the approach lights.

That type of approach scares me because I only get maybe one or two per year. You have to have discipline to stay on instruments until the captain calls the runway in sight. If you try a transition to visual, you have good roll reference from the terminating and wing bar lights, but terrible vertical reference. (edited: I believe that ICAO does not recommend using visual glidepath info below 200 feet, but I wouldn't exclude using PAPI as it is usually quite accurate and supposedly harmonized with the electroinc g/s. In any case, having the runway in sight will provide fair vertical reference when transitioning to visual.)

I am of the opinion that anything with a ceiling that low, unless they are flying a CAT II monitored approach, should be an autoland if the aircraft/runway has the capability. CAT II is for those of us without that feature. Disconnecting at 80' is not my kind of approach, but it can be done safely with the proper training and discipline.

Bottom line, when the weather's that low, you better be feeling the pressure to get it right. Thank god no one was hurt...

 

[TonyC]

P.S.--Anyone want the rest of my furlough passes? I'll stick to riding on China Air or Aeroflot. I think they're safer...

Can I take my wife? I'm a gambler!

 

[aa73]

From the NTSB report for AA1340, 2/9/98 at ORD: "The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the flight crew to maintain a proper pitch attitude for a successful landing or go-around. Contributing to the accident were the divergent pitch oscillations of the airplane, which occurred during the final approach and were the result of an improper autopilot desensitization rate."

....demonstrating, in fact, that only a pilot with superhuman skills would be able to recover from a sudden autopilot-induced pitch down at 300agl, which can be blamed on the autopilot desensitization rate of the 727.

As a result of that hull loss, Cat 2 autopilot approaches were discontinued on the 727.

 

[aa73]

Singlecoil--At most airlines, you have to be stabilized by 500'. Engines spooled up and on the Loc and G/S.

Guys, the G/S had to be pegged at the top way before they hit. The CA blew it by not calling go-around sooner. I was always taught that if you start a go-around, finish it. Even if your wheels touch the runway, don't stop.

The FO was apparently out to lunch, too.TC

P.S.--Anyone want the rest of my furlough passes? I'll stick to riding on China Air or Aeroflot. I think they're safer...

I'll take your furlough passes anyday. Between China Air and KAL, something like 1000 pax have been killed in the last 15 yrs. And just make sure your Aeroflot captain is not taking his kids on the trip.

All airlines have had their "streak years"... hopefully AA's is ending.

 

[TonyC]

As a result of that hull loss, Cat 2 autopilot approaches were discontinued on the 727.

That restriction must have been specific to a carrier or subsequently lifted, as our 727s can perform Cat I, II, or III Autolands.

 

[TWA Dude]

....demonstrating, in fact, that only a pilot with superhuman skills would be able to recover from a sudden autopilot-induced pitch down at 300agl, which can be blamed on the autopilot desensitization rate of the 727.

I don't understand your argument. The NTSB, not me, determined that the pilot failed to correct for the autopilot's pitchdown. They apparently didn't think such a thing required "superhuman" skills.

 

[bobbysamd]

AA incident

I agree that the Denver media has done an alright job covering this story.

Here is an excerpt from the preliminary NTSB report mentioned above:

The captain reported that the first officer was flying the airplane. Approach control vectored the airplane on to a short approach to runway 35L. The airplane overshot the localizer. The first officer was chasing the glide slope. Approach control asked American Airlines Flight 1115 if they wanted to go-around. The captain said that they (the crew) could take the approach. The first officer intercepted the glide slope at 500 to 600 feet above ground level (agl). The captain announced at 100 feet agl that he had the runway environment in sight. The first officer then looked outside and began flying a visual approach. The captain said there was sufficient runway environment in sight. The captain said the first officer did not see the PAPIs (Precision Approach Path Indicator lights). At 50 to 75 feet agl, the first officer "dipped below the glide slope." The audible warning alarm sounded. The captain called for a go-around. The first officer attempted to go-around, but did not advance the throttles in time. The airplane "landed firm" but the crew noticed nothing wrong with the airplane. The crew taxied the airplane to the gate. When they got to the gate they noticed the hydraulic quantity indicator was low, but the pressure was normal.

Of course, I hope the final outcome is okay. But, as it stands, this would be a good case study for CRM and possible interview question material. Of course, it's easy to say what one should have done in this situation while typing at the computer, but I would have taken the go-around that ATC offered. I realize they were landing aircraft two minutes apart, but this situation almost goes back to Private training, where students are taught early that a good landing is preceded by a good final which is preceded by a good base, etc. and to reject landing if the approach, etc. is unstable or anything else is wrong, which clearly was according to this information.

Anyway, that's my $0.02.