Xav8tor
Wingback Tin Kicker
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NTSB Public Docket Excerpts – DCAMA004 a/k/a AA Flight 5966
_____________________________________
NSTB Group Chairman’s Factual Report – Operational Factors (Witness Interviews): Continued
_____________________________________
(Training Dept)
“If he was the FP on the LOC approach into IRK and he was at the MDA altitude and the NFP called out the “approach lights”, he would begin a descent toward 100 feet above the TDZE. He would then use a descent rate that would be equal to a normal ILS descent rate or about 500 fpm. During this descent, his attention would remain on the instruments inside the cockpit until the NFP called the “runway in sight”.”
(Check Airman)
“He stated that he had not heard anything about IRK or the runway 36 LOC approach from other pilots. He said that on the day of the accident, other pilots in the crew room were talking about how close the trees were on an approach, but he was not sure if this was in reference to IRK or the Fort Leonard Wood airport.”
(Instructor and Check Airman)
“For the profile for the approach into IRK, he would instruct a pilot to configure the airplane 3-4 miles before Kemmy which was the FAF. At the FAF, he should start a 1,000 to1,500 FPM. descent. He should leave minimums when he could transition to safely land. When he was asked if the FP could descend if the NFP called the approach lights in sight, he stated you could go down to 100 feet above the TDZE, but he would be careful depending on how close to the runway you were. He would not want to start down to 100 feet above the TDZE too early. On a non-precision approach, it would be rare for a pilot to leave the MDA without having the runway or the VASI in sight.”
(POI)
“POI XXXXXX said you could leave the MDA only after joining the glide slope or VASI, and you could make a normal descent to the runway. When asked about Corporate Airlines’ procedure of descending to MDA, then when the crew saw the approach lights, descending to 100 feet above touch down zone elevation, he said he did not want to see Corporate Airlines pilots descending from the MDA before intercepting the VASI. He was not aware that Corporate Airlines was applying this procedure.”
(Asst. POI)
He was currently assigned to the Corporate Airlines certificate as the Assistant POI (APOI)…he had only been on the Corporate Airlines certificate management team for one year. In late January (2004) he had completed the type rating for the British Aerospace (BA) BA-3100.
When asked if the FP had to respond to any of the calls announced by the NFP, Inspector XXXXX said no. Inspector XXXXX said on the accident flight, the captain was the FP and by the procedures in the aircraft manual, his instrument scan should be inside the airplane, not outside. When asked if the FP should look outside the airplane, he said “he’s the captain; he’s responsible, if he wants to look out—that’s his prerogative, but it was not in the written procedures”. He said his opinion was that if he was the captain he would “throw a glance outside.” When asked if the aircraft manual said the captain could “not” look out during the approach. Inspector XXXXXX said he could not recall.
When asked if the crew were required to maintain the MDA once it was reached, he said Part 91 required them to maintain the MDA until additional information was obtained.
When asked what he would say if he knew the FP was the first to call the approach lights, Inspector XXXX responded that he would say they were not following their own procedures. He stated the NFP was supposed to call the approach lights in sight, because the FP was to be on the gauges flying the aircraft. When asked if they were required to follow the Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI), Inspector XXXXX said all the simulator approaches had a VASI and he had seen crews follow them. When asked if that meant they must stay at the MDA, he said “no” when you are at MDA and you see the approach lights, you could go down to 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) until you joined the VASI then continue down the VASI to land. He was asked about a procedure in the flight manual which said that the crew must remain at or above the VASI. He was asked if that did not mean the crew must stay at the MDA until it joined the VASI and he responded “no” the crew could descend to 100 feet above TDZE once the approach lights were visible. They could then join the VASI from that altitude or land before the VASI if they were in a position to do so. He said a properly trained instrument pilot would know what that meant. When asked could the crew descend if they were several miles from the airport when they saw the approach lights, Inspector XXXXXX replied that when they were at MDA and saw the approach lights they could descend to TDZE plus 100 feet. He said that at that point the aircraft could be skimming across the tops of the trees.
He was asked if he was aware of an incident at IRK on the night before the accident when a Corporate Airlines crew had to climb to avoid colliding with a tree using the same approach procedures as the accident crew. He said he was not aware of that and felt he should have been advised. He said he stood by his evaluation that Corporate Airlines was flying safely and in accordance with the FARs.
Inspector YYYY described the accident flight’s approach and asked about the crew descending to an altitude of 1,064 feet which was the airport TDZE plus 100 feet. Inspector YYYYY stated that the Jeppesen chart for the airport showed a tree rising to an altitude of 1027 feet, which resulted in a theoretical separation between tree and an airborne airplane of only 37 feet. Inspector XXXX said there was nothing wrong with that as it was allowed by FAR part 91. Inspector YYYY stated both crewmembers altimeters could legally have an error up to 75 feet, and said that could put the airplane into the ground if they were descending to 100 feet above the TDZE.
Inspector was asked did he still approve of a descent to TDZE plus 100 feet procedure knowing that information. Inspector XXXXX stated that the descent to 100 feet above the TDZE was allowed by the FARs. He was asked what altitude clearance the Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) provided for the crews as they descended below the MDA and proceeded to the TDZE plus 100 feet altitude.
Inspector XXXXX said the protection afforded was defined in FAA Order 7110. He was asked why a VASI would be necessary if it was always possible to just descend to the TDZE plus 100 foot altitude. Inspector XXXXX replied that was covered by TERPS. He was asked how the crew would be protected from obstacles on the approach course and during landing. Inspector XXXXX replied that was covered by TERPS.
(End of relevant Interviews)
_____________________________________
NSTB Group Chairman’s Factual Report – Operational Factors (Witness Interviews): Continued
_____________________________________
(Training Dept)
“If he was the FP on the LOC approach into IRK and he was at the MDA altitude and the NFP called out the “approach lights”, he would begin a descent toward 100 feet above the TDZE. He would then use a descent rate that would be equal to a normal ILS descent rate or about 500 fpm. During this descent, his attention would remain on the instruments inside the cockpit until the NFP called the “runway in sight”.”
(Check Airman)
“He stated that he had not heard anything about IRK or the runway 36 LOC approach from other pilots. He said that on the day of the accident, other pilots in the crew room were talking about how close the trees were on an approach, but he was not sure if this was in reference to IRK or the Fort Leonard Wood airport.”
(Instructor and Check Airman)
“For the profile for the approach into IRK, he would instruct a pilot to configure the airplane 3-4 miles before Kemmy which was the FAF. At the FAF, he should start a 1,000 to1,500 FPM. descent. He should leave minimums when he could transition to safely land. When he was asked if the FP could descend if the NFP called the approach lights in sight, he stated you could go down to 100 feet above the TDZE, but he would be careful depending on how close to the runway you were. He would not want to start down to 100 feet above the TDZE too early. On a non-precision approach, it would be rare for a pilot to leave the MDA without having the runway or the VASI in sight.”
(POI)
“POI XXXXXX said you could leave the MDA only after joining the glide slope or VASI, and you could make a normal descent to the runway. When asked about Corporate Airlines’ procedure of descending to MDA, then when the crew saw the approach lights, descending to 100 feet above touch down zone elevation, he said he did not want to see Corporate Airlines pilots descending from the MDA before intercepting the VASI. He was not aware that Corporate Airlines was applying this procedure.”
(Asst. POI)
He was currently assigned to the Corporate Airlines certificate as the Assistant POI (APOI)…he had only been on the Corporate Airlines certificate management team for one year. In late January (2004) he had completed the type rating for the British Aerospace (BA) BA-3100.
When asked if the FP had to respond to any of the calls announced by the NFP, Inspector XXXXX said no. Inspector XXXXX said on the accident flight, the captain was the FP and by the procedures in the aircraft manual, his instrument scan should be inside the airplane, not outside. When asked if the FP should look outside the airplane, he said “he’s the captain; he’s responsible, if he wants to look out—that’s his prerogative, but it was not in the written procedures”. He said his opinion was that if he was the captain he would “throw a glance outside.” When asked if the aircraft manual said the captain could “not” look out during the approach. Inspector XXXXXX said he could not recall.
When asked if the crew were required to maintain the MDA once it was reached, he said Part 91 required them to maintain the MDA until additional information was obtained.
When asked what he would say if he knew the FP was the first to call the approach lights, Inspector XXXX responded that he would say they were not following their own procedures. He stated the NFP was supposed to call the approach lights in sight, because the FP was to be on the gauges flying the aircraft. When asked if they were required to follow the Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI), Inspector XXXXX said all the simulator approaches had a VASI and he had seen crews follow them. When asked if that meant they must stay at the MDA, he said “no” when you are at MDA and you see the approach lights, you could go down to 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) until you joined the VASI then continue down the VASI to land. He was asked about a procedure in the flight manual which said that the crew must remain at or above the VASI. He was asked if that did not mean the crew must stay at the MDA until it joined the VASI and he responded “no” the crew could descend to 100 feet above TDZE once the approach lights were visible. They could then join the VASI from that altitude or land before the VASI if they were in a position to do so. He said a properly trained instrument pilot would know what that meant. When asked could the crew descend if they were several miles from the airport when they saw the approach lights, Inspector XXXXXX replied that when they were at MDA and saw the approach lights they could descend to TDZE plus 100 feet. He said that at that point the aircraft could be skimming across the tops of the trees.
He was asked if he was aware of an incident at IRK on the night before the accident when a Corporate Airlines crew had to climb to avoid colliding with a tree using the same approach procedures as the accident crew. He said he was not aware of that and felt he should have been advised. He said he stood by his evaluation that Corporate Airlines was flying safely and in accordance with the FARs.
Inspector YYYY described the accident flight’s approach and asked about the crew descending to an altitude of 1,064 feet which was the airport TDZE plus 100 feet. Inspector YYYYY stated that the Jeppesen chart for the airport showed a tree rising to an altitude of 1027 feet, which resulted in a theoretical separation between tree and an airborne airplane of only 37 feet. Inspector XXXX said there was nothing wrong with that as it was allowed by FAR part 91. Inspector YYYY stated both crewmembers altimeters could legally have an error up to 75 feet, and said that could put the airplane into the ground if they were descending to 100 feet above the TDZE.
Inspector was asked did he still approve of a descent to TDZE plus 100 feet procedure knowing that information. Inspector XXXXX stated that the descent to 100 feet above the TDZE was allowed by the FARs. He was asked what altitude clearance the Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) provided for the crews as they descended below the MDA and proceeded to the TDZE plus 100 feet altitude.
Inspector XXXXX said the protection afforded was defined in FAA Order 7110. He was asked why a VASI would be necessary if it was always possible to just descend to the TDZE plus 100 foot altitude. Inspector XXXXX replied that was covered by TERPS. He was asked how the crew would be protected from obstacles on the approach course and during landing. Inspector XXXXX replied that was covered by TERPS.
(End of relevant Interviews)
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