100 Above TDZE Prior to MAP on LOC/DME???

[Xav8tor]

A2'd

Yeah, that's what I get for trying to be cute. The confusion over the flight path and impact site is real typical in the first week. There are even still some minor discrepancies in the factuals. On the obstruction, I saw that one, but the report says it is on a Jepp chart, probably the airport diagram on that one too. Either way, that can't be the same as the 1059' one on the NACO which is further out, and only a couple hundred linear feet or so from the tree that first snagged them. My surprise is that, according to a chart specialist at Jepp, they don't depict obstructions less than 400' agl, even if they are controlling and/or right under your butt.

AV80R

1) My source is Attachment 1 (Witness Interviews) to Exhibit 2 (Group Chairman's Factual Report - Operational Factors), Page 32, Paragraph7, first sentence, as filed in the Public Docket on 3/7/2005 for DCA05MA004. See the exact quote in my other post above.

[EDIT 4/20/05: I guess you removed (edited) the second part of your response above but I'll leave my reply (2) below in here because it repeats what I am trying to focus on without getting too far OT. No problem, I edit mine too. Always a way to say it better or sometimes, not at all.]

2) Unfortunately, more than a few pilots apparently don't take their distance from the threshold into account as long as they are inside the FAF. At least one on this board, about half the people I've asked to see how they understood it (all ATP or II) and on this accident, some highly experienced pilots and instructors, the APOI, etc. in the above-referenced NTSB document. Some do indicate "concern," but only two I think said "not until the VASI is intercepted." Except for the latter, no one else seems to say exactly where that safe point is.

No VDP was charted. Of course you can estimate one (which should be from the TDZ not the threshold). The "tie-in" you make between a homemade VDP and the regulatory normal ROD seems to be addressing avoidance of abrupt descents, although the CFIT avoidance programs out there certainly emphasize using a VDP to avoid premature descent as well. The issue I'm trying to grasp here is not speculating on whether a VDP would have avoided this particular accident, but how 91.175 regarding sighting of the ALS is being interpreted.

3) Like I said before, I am not second guessing anyone (at the line level). In my present job, and as a former airline DOS, I question, 2nd guess, even attack "suit" level and above decisions all the time, and I speculate like crazy. That is what the field is all about. You are right that those not in the biz and especially the media, would do well to keep their opinions closely held. I used to be the local version of John Nance to keep them out of trouble on TV. I didn't give them the sensationalistic stuff they wanted and played it safe most of the time, so they quit calling. You think regional pay stinks, you should see what they pay guest television analysts even in large markets.

Today, I am trying to explore and fully understand what might be a systemic safety problem. Informed speculation is not a bad thing. Dissecting an accident and putting yourself in the other guy's shoes is not only one way of determing probable cause and contributing factors, but it is also the primary way most people teach/learn how to fix the problem and keep it from happening again. That's a good thing...right? Focus on the act, not the person, and look all the way to the top of the chain. Some really bright pilot long ago said it best:

"Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose."

 

[AV80R]

“The APOI got it assbackwards and said when you see the ALS at MDA, drop down to 100, then when you intercept the VASI, you follow it on down. Shoot, picking up the VASI at 100 feet means you are just off the end of the runway…when most guys (except lowriders) start going below the VASI to begin their “flare.” The APOI also claimed the TERPS assured obstacle clearance when you leave MDA out there if you see the lights. Say what????”

Who’s the APOI you’re talking about? Are his/her initials B.C.? As far as I know, Corporate Airlines did not have an APOI when the accident happened but there’s one being checked out right at this moment. I believe he’ll be getting his type in a month or so. So I’m really confused about who that person might be???

I have not read the NTSB preliminary report you’re referring to, would you please post a link to it?

 

[fokkers&beer]

If you guys want to see a really strange approach that meets this discussion, look at the Juneau Alaska LDA. Our companys special approach gets us down to 1000', and theres a 500 foot mountain between the missed approach point and the airport (500' on the low spot, or cut). There are also lead in lights.
Our company has a training bulletin on how to shoot it. It can be very interesting in the winter. But that is one approach where you can not follow the Vasi from far out, you will hit a mountain, and obviously can not descend to 100' above the airport.

 

[Xav8tor]

AV8OR, Yes they have an assistant POI and he was assigned to the CMT since about a year before, and at least through October 04 (i.e., the time of the accident) and did the type ride already. Even though this stuff is public info, I don't want to get into specific names on this board. I am just not comfortable with that and I'm not even sure why. All of this is in the Group Factuals, not the prelim. That is just a paragraph and full of omissions and at least one error. Forget prelims for future reference. When they are posted, the investigation has barely started. They're really just for the media and in the "public interest." Even the factuals can change at a later date if new evidence is discovered.

THe NTSB didn't post any of this docket. I have no idea why not. If you call NTSB public inquiries, they will send you a copy of the docket on CD if they have any left, otherwise you can get it from one of the private contract vendors from the list on the NTSB website for a few bucks. His interview alone was about four pages and my jaw hit the floor at least once per page, sometimes twice. I mean really unsafe procedures (IMHO) were said to be OK. The POI, on the other hand, was on the exact opposite page and said no way. Don't forget, pilots and instructors interviewed stated the same thing about leaving MDA predicated on the ALS. And like I said, some people I've asked have said that too. More though say, "you're kidding right?"

I don't have a public website, but I am working on building one after I get my new server set up. I spent a hour modifying an FDR graph to show the approach profile and I labelled various relevant points, but the board won't allow me to upload attachments. That would give everyone a better picture of the issues and the associated dangers. I'd also upload some excerpts of the CVR transcript and a few other relevant report sections if it would help, but I don't want to post the interviews. Isolated quotes are OK, but more than that just doesn't feel like it's right. Besides, I'm curious about the safety issue(s), not the people. Having read all of the reports and following this thing for 6 months, I already know what happened. The question I want to figure out an answer to is WHY? And how can it be prevented in the future?

Hope this makes sense. I gotta hit the rack, been up for a week with a wicked lower back spasm and I'm likely not making any sense at this ridiculous hour anyway.

 

[AV80R]

“Yes they have an assistant POI and he was assigned to the CMT since about a year before, and at least through October 04 (i.e., the time of the accident) and did the type ride already.”

Well, according to the Director of Training there was no assistant POI until just a month or so ago, so I’m not sure where you’re getting your information from?

“Even though this stuff is public info, I don't want to get into specific names on this board.”

As you might have noticed, neither do I which I why I used initials only and that’s all I expected to see from you as well.

“Besides, I'm curious about the safety issue(s), not the people.”

Well, I must say, when you say things such as “His interview alone was about four pages and my jaw hit the floor at least once per page, sometimes twice.” at least in my mind you seem to contradict yourself. You also mention this is just ”a paragraph and full of omissions and at least one error…”

Don’t you think it would be better to wait for the full and final NTSB report instead of trying to make our own conclusions based on partial and possibly incorrect statements?

It’s nothing personal, but what exactly are you trying to achieve here? If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?

Aren’t you presumed innocent until proven guilty? This entire thread indicates otherwise.

Again, those are only my personal thoughts. What’s your opinion?

 

[FN FAL]

So how long does a person have to go school to be an attorney?

 

[enigma]

It’s nothing personal, but what exactly are you trying to achieve here? If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?

Aren’t you presumed innocent until proven guilty? This entire thread indicates otherwise.

AV8OR, I don't think that Xav8or is presuming guilt in any way. He's done a good job, in my opinion, of explaining that he is attempting to get to the bottom of the "descend to 100ft after you get the ALS in sight " conundrum.

enigma

 

[enigma]

I read a copy of the factual reports (Operations, FDR, CVR, etc.) on the J32 accident last year in IRK. According to investigation interview statements made by pilots, managers and an FAA inspector, a lot of pilots are under the impression that, upon seeing the approach lights during a non-precision approach, it is permissible to continue descent from MDA to 100 feet above the touchdown zone – REGARDLESS of the aircraft’s distance to the threshold. In other words, after crossing the FAF and doing the old chop and drop to MDA, for example, at two miles DME from the runway/MAP you see the ALS, (but not the VASI or runway lights), they thought it was permissible (and safe) to go ahead and keep on going down to 100 feet while still that far out.
I know how I have always understood, applied, and taught that reg and related procedures, but I am curious to know what you guys (and girls) think and how you interpret and apply it, assuming you use standard 121 (i.e., airline "style") profiles and procedures.

Xav8tor, It's been twenty years since I took an instrument written and I haven't done any CFI/CFII work for almost 17. In other words, I'm not a TERPS/FAR/AIM guru. I'm just a line pilot.

My original instrument training was at Central Texas College (twenty years ago), and my continuing ed has been in 121 ground schools or at FSI/Simuflite. I was NEVER taught that the "descend to 100ft above TDZE" rule applied to any approach other than an precision approach. I'm not talking exact legal interprets here, I'm talking realistic operational procedures. Before this string came up, I'd never even considered the "100ft" rule when flying a non-precision approach.

I have never, NEVER, even heard someone give the opinion that it was permissable to desend to 100 ft above TDZE using only the approach lights as a reference on a non-precision approach. If my FO were to start down from MDA using only the ALS, I'd take the airplane. It is my understanding/practice/training to stay at the MDA until I have the runway in sight and am able to make a normal descent to land

Thanks for bringing this subject up. We used to engage on these type of informative discussions here on FI on a regular basis, but the last couple of years we seem to spend more time talking about porn, Japanese video games, and other stuff relevant to backpack lugging airline pilots.

Yes, I said backpack lugging airline pilots. WHAT'S UP WITH THAT? Since when did a backpack go along with a uniform blazer. It's flipping embarrasing, I tell ya. But I digress.

enigma

 

[Xav8tor]

AV8OR

I tried to make it clear said I am trying to look at the actions, not the person, but yes, when a representative of the agency charged with enforcing regulations that exist solely (supposedly) to enhance aviation safety says some of things I read it bothers me. I sure as Hell don’t have all the answers but I expect them to, given the time to prepare for what amounts to a deposition, at least have them ready. It isn’t like witnesses in an NTSB investigation don’t know what’s coming. I really like the FAA (weird huh) and admit to being an NTSB “groupie.” If I could afford to live on a government salary in DC, I’d love to work at either one….even had the chance once, but couldn’t make the numbers work. If I am hard on one of them, maybe its just because I’m a little jealous, yeah, that’s it.

I repeat, I am not attempting to draw any conclusions about the accident in IRK itself or about any individual. It is merely illustrative of what I see as a potential systemic safety problem (didn’t I already say that?). As for partial and incorrect statements, I was referring to the preliminary NTSB report that someone else asked about, which is a few sentences the NTSB posts about every accident within a week or so of its occurrence. The documents I am reading that brought the issue I am interested in to light (repeated again below which appears to be necessary) are contained within the FACTual reports and appendices thereto.

These reports, although subject to change, are essentially in their final form and contain the bulk of the relevant information (FACTS) that will be used by the Board to conduct their analysis, and having done that, arrive at a probable cause and contributing factors. Just about anyone familiar with the process and experienced in aviation can read the factuals, do his own analysis, and write down a PC and CF’s that will be almost the exact same thing the Board comes up with in six months or so. Once the facts are known, the rest isn’t rocket surgery (yes I meant to say it that way). On rare occasions they surprise me, but the explanation for those surprises in the final analysis is almost always political, economic, or due to successful lobbying. But one more time, I am not interested in participating in a public debate about AA 5966 per se. My questions and concerns, again, to be perfectly clear, are the following:

How does a pilot know it is safe to descend to 100 above TDZE on a non-precision approach when conditions are such that your only visual reference is the ALS? Or is it not safe at all to do that and the only option in this scenario is to remain at MDA until you see something else? A secondary concern is the apparent fact that Jepp plates do not depict obstacles less than 400 feet high. In the present example accident, the obstruction was an area of trees almost 100 feet taller than the runway elevation, about a mile out and on the localizer course (check a sat photo and you’ll see the area of subject trees is fairly large, the NACO plate showing the single tallest point in the segment, or [final] controlling obstacle).

To answer your question “If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?” My answer is a very quick NO! Regarding the NTSB, they are the finest civilian transportation accident investigative government agency in the world, but they have their limitations. Aside from understaffing, insufficient budget, time pressure, etc., the primary one is their statutory obligation to determine “probable cause.” Anyone schooled in safety will tell you that many factors must come into play to cause an airplane to crash. What the NTSB calls “contributing factors” addresses that to a degree, but it implies that those factors are somehow less important, which is almost never the case. On a personal level, I don’t like questions without a possible correct answer. On a purely professional level, I would not be seeking answers exclusively on this board or any other one. On the other hand, there are many members here with a ton of high quality and varied experience who enjoy sharing their knowledge, and a good “debate.” The nuances of IFR flying have always been a fav with most pilots I know. Since I’m not on the line anymore, I figured this would be a great place to get some qualified opinions. If I want the FAA’s take on it, about a half dozen guys/gals I used to work with went to being FSDO’s types after 9/11. Your reply did give me the idea of asking FAA DCA for an opinion letter though. That’s a good idea, but when the dust settles on this one, my bet is you are going to see something, maybe an AC come out of this. Even a rule change/clarification isn’t out of the question.

To fully understand an accident, and the reasons it happened, requires a broad AND in-depth analysis of each and every factor, the theory being that, if any single one had been different, the accident might have been avoided. They are all equally important and (potentially), equally deadly. Then there is the problem of lobbying by parties, and non-parties, to an NTSB investigation. The uninitiated may claim it has no bearing, but if you believe that, you are being very naïve. Take an ALPA safety school, or a short course at ERAU, USC, or SCSI and you’ll understand. Finally, there is this little known concept in law known as the “commerce clause,” at least I think that’s the one the “problem” springs from (I forget sometimes), that is the root of certain government actions, or inactions, that make some people very angry. It would take a week to explain it and a year to debate it to no conclusion, but the government does things the way it does for a reason, and that doesn’t always result in the same thing you or I as an individual would like to see done, or written in an official report.

FN FAL

3 years full-time for the JD degree, another 2 months to 2 years to study for a bar exam, and around 125 grand at a top private school. Oh, and 20 to 30 years to pay it all back – with accumulated interest on top. But how should I know? If you’d like I can cite my source for you

**CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED**, that dawg is almost as funny as the trunk monkey!

This system censors a word that has a homonym meaning a structure that holds back water, yet allows all the other vile ranting to be seen across the board?

Enigma

Thanks for your support! And I agree with the backpack thing. It took me two years on the line before I caved and bought a wuss wagon. However, I do like stickers on flight bags, aircraft or travel oriented, not for Sex Wax or Beavis & Butthead - I've watched it a few times though. PS - Love the glory ring. One of my corporate logo designs is a missing man formation with a ring in the missing slot.

 

[AV80R]

FN FAL - ???

ENIGMA - Well, you’re probably right and maybe because I knew the captain in this case I just have very hard time dealing with some of the “so called” statements. Some of them just don’t make any sense. Then there is the APOI which I am being told didn’t exist until a month or so ago who supposedly made all kind of weird statements. Obviously I am biased in this case so I’ll try to refrain from further posts.

Btw, it’s AV80R (with a zero) not AV8OR - just want to clarify in case someone decides to PM and shoot the wrong guy

 

[A Squared]

........ but the last couple of years we seem to spend more time talking about porn, Japanese video games, and other stuff relevant to backpack lugging airline pilots.

Yes, I said backpack lugging airline pilots. WHAT'S UP WITH THAT? Since when did a backpack go along with a uniform blazer. It's flipping embarrasing, I tell ya. But I digress. QUOTE]


whooop whoop ...... Curmudgeon alert

 

[Xav8tor]

AV80R - Man, don't stop posting completely and don't feel bad about being biased. (there are other VERY GOOD reasons for you not to post about the specific accident though). I've been in your shoes (the J32 in RDU in 94). That is what got me into the safety end of the biz. You are going to hear a lot of things you don't like, a ton of lies, rumors, and misinformation. Even though you guys aren't ALPA, and it is a little late, the CIRPS programs really help in dealing with the emotions. Back in 94, those of us on the Go Team had to meet with a counselor at least once during the first few days, and follow-ups were there if needed. I did the CVR and I gotta tell you nothing will prepare you for that feeling. I had heard dozens of CVR's before that one, but when it is your plane and you know the crew, well, I can't explain how that felt. Later, when I was a DOS, we put a CIRPS style program in place for all our employees, not just the pilots.

When you do this sort of thing on your own it can still be hard even if you didn't know the people, and you've got no one you can talk to about it. I love my work, but I still get a knot in my stomach the first time I hear a tape, do a reconstruction, review scene photo's, etc. On scene, or off, none of this is easy, but it is challenging and highly gratifying when you find a smoking gun and know you've have a role, no matter how small, in reducing the chance it will ever happen again, which is all I am trying to do here. IF one reader of this thread thinks twice about leaving MDA a little too soon because he thinks he's got the lights, all of us, from posters to moderator to the guy keeping the server cool, everyone except the flamers, collectively may have saved the life of one, and possibly one hundred or more, lives, not to mention the loss and grief of their friends and family. By being stubborn (I like to think of it as persistence) and pushing what might seem like a trival side issue to most people, you actually can "change the world." I've done this sort of thing before, and it felt really good. It didn't pay any bills, not one red cent, and I can't even talk about it to all but a few people, but I figure at least maybe it will help the balance sheet that counts, you know, the one that gets checked the day your number comes up.


Since it is public info, if I get time today, I'll post some excerpts from the report I addressed. You've got enough to deal with without trying to reconcile conflicting or just plain bad info. You won't be misinformed by me though. If it isn't factual public knowledge and verified, I do my level best not to say it, much less write it down for all to see.

Blue side up.

 

[AV80R]

Xav8tor – well, I didn’t mean to “jump” on you or your conclusions, but I do understand there are at least 5 lawsuits filed against 3C already and more are probably coming. I know some attorneys for those cases are fishing for all kinds of “statements” from current and previous employees; I’m not implying that’s what you’re doing but surely you must understand my concern here.

As far as the “chop & drop” approach, I was NEVER told that’s how you conduct a non-prec. approach while I was at 3C. However, I do remember we were taught to increase our rate of descent slightly to give ourselves more time to be able to “look outside” once at the MDA. For an ILS I believe our rate of descend was usually 6-700FPM (depending on our ground speed) and for a non-prec. approach we normally increased the rate by ~2-300FPM. I wouldn’t consider it a “chop & drop” as we were still using plenty of power (our power setting was nowhere near to flight idle).

“…You are going to hear a lot of things you don't like, a ton of lies, rumors, and misinformation…and (if) you know the crew, well, I can't explain how that felt...”


Based on your previous experience, I am sure you understand why it's so difficult to deal with it.


“You won't be misinformed by me though. If it isn't factual public knowledge and verified, I do my level best not to say it, much less write it down for all to see.”

Thank you.

“…If one reader of this thread thinks twice about leaving MDA a little too soon because he thinks he's got the lights, all of us, from posters to moderator to the guy keeping the server cool, everyone except the flamers, collectively may have saved the life of one, and possibly one hundred or more, lives, not to mention the loss and grief of their friends and family... “

I definitely see your point here

FN FAL – sorry, misunderstood your question

 

[Xav8tor]

AV80R...see my edit to the post above. I tried to explain a little more but you replied before I made the changes. Thanks. Oh, and if I was fishing, I wouldn't do it on this board. There are much better "ponds" for that kind of angling, and far more effective techniques. That is however, exactly one of the reasons I suggested you don't post anything specific about 5966, like opinions or "he said, she said" type stuff. I gave it some thought myself.

On the other hand, discussing facts on an anonymous public aviation forum, as they relate to a system safety issue(s), something that may affect all IFR pilots (and their pax) is fair game as far as I'm concerned. In the 11 years I have been doing the safety gig, I have always looked way beyond the front row. I've played on both teams, but, being a pilot at heart, even though I'm no longer flying the line, I admit a certain amount of satisfaction in digging out the root causes. 990 aside, I don't know of any recent major case where it was certain a pilot was He11bent on crashing and I never accept "pilot error" as a probable cause. I want to know why the error occurred and how many more up the ladder were made before the final one.

I will say this though, I show no mercy for repeated violations of safety regs/procedures (which amounts to intent), management disregard for safety (i.e., "the DOS is just a pain in the rear required by the regs...just smile, nod your head, and he'll go crawl back in his hole" - that's when I crawl up theirs!), or aircraft manufacturers that claim redundant systems, but fake it or BS their way through the cert. process to save money.

You get the idea. The only reason I don't still wear my ALPA and APA tie tacs is because they are framed and displayed with pride along with my wings and ribbons.

 

[Xav8tor]

Some of you have asked to see parts of the public docket documents I based my questions and concerns on so here goes. They are a little long and split into parts. PLEASE, focus on the issue and don't slam the people personally. I'm not the moderator, but I think it's perfectly OK to disagree with what someone said if we keep it civil with regard to the people involved and try to learn from their thoughts and actions described. Maybe by looking at how the reg is being understood by different people, we can get a definitive answer to this conundrum.

NTSB Public Docket Excerpts – DCA05MA004 a/k/a AA Flight 5966

(NOTICE: The following are excerpts from interviews conducted by the NTSB regarding DCA05MA004, as well as other documents and materials from the public docket for this accident. They should not be taken out of context and conclusions should only be drawn in conjunction with the entire docket and other relevant materials. They are presented here for educational purposes only and are not intended by the poster to be used for anything other than enhancing an understanding of the safety questions posed within, and elsewhere in this thread. Simply put, the focus should be on WHAT is being said, not WHO said it. The questions and issues before us revolve around the validity and correctness of the statements and assumptions made in the documents, NOT the competency of the individual(s) involved who made them. Thank you.

_____________________________________

NSTB Group Chairman’s Factual Report – Operational Factors (Witness Interviews):
_____________________________________

( A Line Captain)

“He had previously flown into the IRK airport with a 300 – 400 foot cloud ceiling. On Monday, October 18, 2004, he had a 400 foot ceiling when he flew into the IRK airport. He “broke out” at 400 feet above the ground. The radio altimeter had been set to a minimum of 360 feet. The orange light on the upper part of the attitude indicator would come on when the airplane was 100 above the MDA. There would also be a long bell chime. He saw the approach lights when he broke out, but could not see the runway lights. When he broke out of the cloud cover, he was about 1 to 1 ½ miles from the end of the runway. He did not see any other lights in the area around the airport. He only saw lights that were associated with the airport. When he saw the runway, he continued his descent to 1,064 feet which was 100 feet above the TDZE. As he started down, he saw the runway lights about 1 to 1 ½ miles ahead. The airport lights were distinct and he could tell where the airport was. He said he was “on course” when he broke out. When he broke out, he could not see the ground and it was dark. At about 100 to 200 feet above the TDZE, the F/O called “runway in sight” and he was still descending. He looked up and saw the runway lights and the runway. He did not recall what his descent rate was at that time. He did not see the VASI lights until he was “fairly close in”. When the F/O announced “runway in sight”, they both made the comment that the “trees look a lot bigger than they should”. The trees looked closer than what he thought they should have and he was surprised that they looked so close. He thought it might have been an optical illusion. They were within a mile of the runway. He immediately added power and pitched up about 50 feet and leveled off his altitude until they visually picked up the VASI, which indicated red over white, which was normal. “


(IOE Check Airman and Instructor)

“Captain XXXXXXX was asked about the descent profile if only the approach lights were seen when the airplane reached MDA. He said if the NFP should state “approach lights in sight, continue”. The FP could then descend to 100 feet above TDZE while leaving the airplane configuration the same. When asked what rate of descent should be used to 100 feet above TDZE, he stated “not very much because of the distance[to airport] - 200 to 300 fpm would be acceptable”.



(First Officer)

“He said that as the descent to 1,320 feet continued he would say “100 above minimums” at 1,420 feet, and at 1,320 feet he would say “minimums.” He stated he would be looking “in and out” of the airplane at this time for the runway environment, and when he saw the approach lights, he would state “approach lights in sight, continue.” When the runway or airport was in sight, he would call the airport position relative to the clock position. He said that when the runway or airport was in sight, you could go down to 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation (TDZE), and that the FP would then state “leaving minimums, flap 35.”

When asked again about the “approach lights in sight, continue” call, and asked if most captains would stay at MDA or go down, he said that they would start down at a slow rate of descent about 100 to 200 fpm until they got the VASI in sight. He said the VASI lights would be showing red over red “a ways out”, and that they could go down to 1,064 which was 100 feet above the touchdown zone after the approach lights were in sight. He said he would stop the descent until the VASI was “captured”, then begin a descent. He would maintain flaps 20 until he got red over white on the VASI lights, at which point the flying pilot would state “leaving minimums, flaps 35.” He was asked if he would say something to the FP if he dropped below 100 feet above the touchdown zone before getting the runway lights and he said “YES, the callout is in the manual”.


More to come….