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100 Above TDZE Prior to MAP on LOC/DME???
- Thread starter Xav8tor
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A Squared
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Uhhhh, guys, Read the NTSB's preliminary report. Unless information in the preliminary report is completely incorrect, this accident didin't have anything to do with descending to TDZE+100' with the approach lights in sight. According to the preliminary report, the airplane crashed 4 nm from the runway. Now think about it, how likely is it that you'd be at MDA, 4 nm from the runway, and have the approach lights in sight? The FAF is only 4.1 nm from the end of the runway and the FAF altitude is 2500'. MDA is 1320. It would have to be a pretty steep descent to lose more than 1200' of altitude in 0.1 nm. They'd have to be in an almost vertical descent, (63 degree dive) or more likely, they were well below the FAF altitude when they crossed the FAF. That seems to point to them either being completely lost on the approach, intentionally descending below minimums 5 miles out, or possibly having both altimeters set incorrectly. The most obvious cause of misset altimeters, not switching form QNE to QNH when descending through 18,000' can probably be ruled out as the local altimeter setting was 29.95
I'd be interested to read the factual report. It hasn't been posted on the NTSB's site at this time. Any links to it?
I'd be interested to read the factual report. It hasn't been posted on the NTSB's site at this time. Any links to it?
Xav8tor
Wingback Tin Kicker
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Illini... Don't all instrument approaches have an FAF of some type, and are there not runways with only non-precision approaches that have some type of ALS? Also, in this scenario, there was no published VDP and the profile flown was "old school" chop and drop, not the newer stabilized approach style. I personally prefer the old way myself on a LOC/VOR/NDB etc., even in a VNAV capable aircraft.
Your thinking that using the ALS as a reason to continue descent should perhaps only apply when on an ILS has some logic to it because if you are on the GS, you are protected. On a LOC/DME, if the MAP is at the threshold, as in this case, and you were making the miss or continue decision upon reaching MAP, the ALS wouldn't even be a factor because you would be on top of it if you are still, as you should be, at MDA until you see something on the "list."
That brings me to what I see as a possible conclusion to consider. Where you do not have a GS (i.e., a non-precision appr.), and you don't see a VASI/PAPI yet, shouldn't the other visual reference requirements only be considered upon reaching the MAP or VDP, and not before? What I am looking for is something, either written or a common practice that says what common sense tells you: Stay at MDA until you have a vertical reference, which the ALS isn't. Literally read, 91.175 and 121 regs using the same language seem to infer to many pilots that you can descend to 100 above the runway upon seeing the ALS, and only the ALS. They way I've always applied those regs is more a part a of the land or miss decision process at that point in time/space, and except for spotting the VASI, not before (unless there just isn't one or it is OTS).
Remember, there's another reg out there that says you must remain on or above the VASI or GS. On an NP approach you will of course at some point be below the VASI's GS at MDA, but one you intercept it, you must stay on/above it. Obviously, the problem is where you have low viz and see the ALS, maybe even the green threshold lights, but being further away you don't have the VASI and there is no VDP. At what point is it safe to leave MDA and what are you basing that upon?
Your thinking that using the ALS as a reason to continue descent should perhaps only apply when on an ILS has some logic to it because if you are on the GS, you are protected. On a LOC/DME, if the MAP is at the threshold, as in this case, and you were making the miss or continue decision upon reaching MAP, the ALS wouldn't even be a factor because you would be on top of it if you are still, as you should be, at MDA until you see something on the "list."
That brings me to what I see as a possible conclusion to consider. Where you do not have a GS (i.e., a non-precision appr.), and you don't see a VASI/PAPI yet, shouldn't the other visual reference requirements only be considered upon reaching the MAP or VDP, and not before? What I am looking for is something, either written or a common practice that says what common sense tells you: Stay at MDA until you have a vertical reference, which the ALS isn't. Literally read, 91.175 and 121 regs using the same language seem to infer to many pilots that you can descend to 100 above the runway upon seeing the ALS, and only the ALS. They way I've always applied those regs is more a part a of the land or miss decision process at that point in time/space, and except for spotting the VASI, not before (unless there just isn't one or it is OTS).
Remember, there's another reg out there that says you must remain on or above the VASI or GS. On an NP approach you will of course at some point be below the VASI's GS at MDA, but one you intercept it, you must stay on/above it. Obviously, the problem is where you have low viz and see the ALS, maybe even the green threshold lights, but being further away you don't have the VASI and there is no VDP. At what point is it safe to leave MDA and what are you basing that upon?
Xav8tor
Wingback Tin Kicker
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A2'd
You got me there - in a literal sense anyway. I mean, if you want to split hairs, there are plenty, well some anyway, I'd have to count 'em, of on field VOR/NDB's with FAF's (intersections, etc.) off field. I was just trying to make the boy think using the Socratic method without coming right out and saying "go back and read some more." Man I got my six shot off on another thread for trying to do that politely!
Good call in any case, now back to your other response, I got a long one I hope helps coming up in a minute. I had to go back and re-read some stuff to get your answers. The wife says I need to get some work done today too.
You got me there - in a literal sense anyway. I mean, if you want to split hairs, there are plenty, well some anyway, I'd have to count 'em, of on field VOR/NDB's with FAF's (intersections, etc.) off field. I was just trying to make the boy think using the Socratic method without coming right out and saying "go back and read some more." Man I got my six shot off on another thread for trying to do that politely!
Good call in any case, now back to your other response, I got a long one I hope helps coming up in a minute. I had to go back and re-read some stuff to get your answers. The wife says I need to get some work done today too.
Xav8tor
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A2’d…The NTSB prelim is something they toss together quickly before the hole even stops smoking. Yep, it leaves out a lot and they often contain errors. This one is no exception. The factuals released have all the usual group reports, charts, maps, tables, etc. I don’t have it in front of me, but the impact was almost dead on the centerline a little over one mile from the threshold (1.2 nm I think). According to the FDR and CVR, they configured before the FAF, crossed it, did around an 1100 fpm descent hitting MDA around two miles out, all SOP in the J32. The thing is they kept on going past MDA. Just a second or two after passing MDA, the CA saw the approach lights and the FO said “in sight…continue,” and they did, right into the trees. Along the way, the GPWS and radar altimeter alert systems in the ‘Stream were working properly (doesn’t seem like the new enhanced ones would have made a bit of difference in this case). The altimeters were set correctly and they were dead on the centerline.
The NTSB is (so far) doing a great job on this one because they picked up on the “continue” statement and pursued it. Although it doesn’t seem like they were going to stop right at MDA anyway (looking at the FDR), and may have intentionally gone a little lower than the 356 MDA with a 300 ceiling, they had armed the FD alt mode at MDA and probably did the CWS thing while ducking under some more, but upon seeing the ALS they cancelled the FD immediately after the FO said “continue.”
The ops group interviewed a bunch of pilots, check airmen, instructors, the POI, and his assistant (APOI). About half the group said it is SOP to leave MDA upon seeing (only) the ALS and going on down to 100 above TDZE. A few indicated concern about doing it too far out. The POI, who I think is the only one to nail it (using logic, not just spouting a reg word for word), said you can do that only if you also can see and intercept the VASI. The APOI got it assbackwards and said when you see the ALS at MDA, drop down to 100, then when you intercept the VASI, you follow it on down. Shoot, picking up the VASI at 100 feet means you are just off the end of the runway…when most guys (except lowriders) start going below the VASI to begin their “flare.” The APOI also claimed the TERPS assured obstacle clearance when you leave MDA out there if you see the lights. Say what????
The confusion doesn’t stop there. The NTSB says they showed the APOI a JEPP plate with an obstacle on final at 1027. I don’t see it on my copy, and Jepp says they don’t do that anywhere, but I do see one at 1059 on the NOS. Here’s the other mind-blowing quote: “He was asked if he was aware of an incident at IRK on the night before the accident when a Corporate Airlines crew had to climb to avoid colliding with a tree using the same approach procedures as the accident crew.”
I didn’t start this thread to speculate on this particular crash or second guess the NTSB, or the crew either, but this accident is illustrating what I think is a serious flaw in the system. The NTSB does a fine job, best in the world at it outside the military maybe, but their goal in investigating an accident, and what the airlines, manufacturers, safety people, lawyers, regulators, teachers and consultants like myself need to know about causation and how to act upon those factors is different, much broader and even deeper (another topic altogether). The NTSB “bluebook” is absolutely never the whole story and certainly not the end of it either.
What I am concerned about, professional interest aside, is for my own personal benefit, and maybe yours too. I wonder how many of my former students, whether when I was an active CFII or when I lecture, think seeing the ALS means go to 100 agl – period? I never taught it that way. When it did come up, like I said, it was in the context of deciding whether to miss or not. I’ve chased the rabbit on an ILS enough times that I don’t pucker up anymore doing it (still about the most clothed fun I can think of handflying one of those though). But on a non-precision approach, I have never given this (seeing ONLY the ALS and dropping to 100 above TDZE per 91.175) a thought…until now. Now I can’t get it off my mind, and what’s up with Jepp leaving that obstacle off of their plate?
PS – The NTSB is investigating this crash as a major, but they aren’t treating it like one in some respects, all at their option. It doesn’t look like there will be a public hearing, just the board meeting to adopt the final, and they didn’t post the docket – you have to call and ask for a copy (over 500 pages not counting pix and the FDR data) or you can get the CD. They will probably post a lot of it along with a few other goodies after the board meeting (later this year?), which will also be a webcast. They do all of them that way now.
The NTSB is (so far) doing a great job on this one because they picked up on the “continue” statement and pursued it. Although it doesn’t seem like they were going to stop right at MDA anyway (looking at the FDR), and may have intentionally gone a little lower than the 356 MDA with a 300 ceiling, they had armed the FD alt mode at MDA and probably did the CWS thing while ducking under some more, but upon seeing the ALS they cancelled the FD immediately after the FO said “continue.”
The ops group interviewed a bunch of pilots, check airmen, instructors, the POI, and his assistant (APOI). About half the group said it is SOP to leave MDA upon seeing (only) the ALS and going on down to 100 above TDZE. A few indicated concern about doing it too far out. The POI, who I think is the only one to nail it (using logic, not just spouting a reg word for word), said you can do that only if you also can see and intercept the VASI. The APOI got it assbackwards and said when you see the ALS at MDA, drop down to 100, then when you intercept the VASI, you follow it on down. Shoot, picking up the VASI at 100 feet means you are just off the end of the runway…when most guys (except lowriders) start going below the VASI to begin their “flare.” The APOI also claimed the TERPS assured obstacle clearance when you leave MDA out there if you see the lights. Say what????
The confusion doesn’t stop there. The NTSB says they showed the APOI a JEPP plate with an obstacle on final at 1027. I don’t see it on my copy, and Jepp says they don’t do that anywhere, but I do see one at 1059 on the NOS. Here’s the other mind-blowing quote: “He was asked if he was aware of an incident at IRK on the night before the accident when a Corporate Airlines crew had to climb to avoid colliding with a tree using the same approach procedures as the accident crew.”
I didn’t start this thread to speculate on this particular crash or second guess the NTSB, or the crew either, but this accident is illustrating what I think is a serious flaw in the system. The NTSB does a fine job, best in the world at it outside the military maybe, but their goal in investigating an accident, and what the airlines, manufacturers, safety people, lawyers, regulators, teachers and consultants like myself need to know about causation and how to act upon those factors is different, much broader and even deeper (another topic altogether). The NTSB “bluebook” is absolutely never the whole story and certainly not the end of it either.
What I am concerned about, professional interest aside, is for my own personal benefit, and maybe yours too. I wonder how many of my former students, whether when I was an active CFII or when I lecture, think seeing the ALS means go to 100 agl – period? I never taught it that way. When it did come up, like I said, it was in the context of deciding whether to miss or not. I’ve chased the rabbit on an ILS enough times that I don’t pucker up anymore doing it (still about the most clothed fun I can think of handflying one of those though). But on a non-precision approach, I have never given this (seeing ONLY the ALS and dropping to 100 above TDZE per 91.175) a thought…until now. Now I can’t get it off my mind, and what’s up with Jepp leaving that obstacle off of their plate?
PS – The NTSB is investigating this crash as a major, but they aren’t treating it like one in some respects, all at their option. It doesn’t look like there will be a public hearing, just the board meeting to adopt the final, and they didn’t post the docket – you have to call and ask for a copy (over 500 pages not counting pix and the FDR data) or you can get the CD. They will probably post a lot of it along with a few other goodies after the board meeting (later this year?), which will also be a webcast. They do all of them that way now.
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EatSleepFly
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MTpilot said:
If you're talking about a non-precision approach: No way, absolutely not. What about at night? What about wires or unlit temporary obstacles? That's a pretty scary statement, actually. 100' isn't much, and I don't want to be there on a non-precision approach unless I'm looking at the runway/threshold itself, personally. Now, of course, a precision approach is a different story.
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A Squared
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Oh, I didn't realize those were rhetorical questions.
Also, I'll have to withdraw my comments about it not being related to descent to TDZE+100. I know that the preliminary is just that, preliminary, but I assumed that very basic info like the distance from the runway to the crash site being 4nm would be correct. Bad assumption, apparently.
Regarding the 1027' obstruction, it is depicted in the airport diagram in the lower left corner of the NACO chart, slightly east of centerline.
Also, I'll have to withdraw my comments about it not being related to descent to TDZE+100. I know that the preliminary is just that, preliminary, but I assumed that very basic info like the distance from the runway to the crash site being 4nm would be correct. Bad assumption, apparently.
Regarding the 1027' obstruction, it is depicted in the airport diagram in the lower left corner of the NACO chart, slightly east of centerline.
Xav8tor
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A2'd
Yeah, that's what I get for trying to be cute. The confusion over the flight path and impact site is real typical in the first week. There are even still some minor discrepancies in the factuals. On the obstruction, I saw that one, but the report says it is on a Jepp chart, probably the airport diagram on that one too. Either way, that can't be the same as the 1059' one on the NACO which is further out, and only a couple hundred linear feet or so from the tree that first snagged them. My surprise is that, according to a chart specialist at Jepp, they don't depict obstructions less than 400' agl, even if they are controlling and/or right under your butt.
AV80R
1) My source is Attachment 1 (Witness Interviews) to Exhibit 2 (Group Chairman's Factual Report - Operational Factors), Page 32, Paragraph7, first sentence, as filed in the Public Docket on 3/7/2005 for DCA05MA004. See the exact quote in my other post above.
[EDIT 4/20/05: I guess you removed (edited) the second part of your response above but I'll leave my reply (2) below in here because it repeats what I am trying to focus on without getting too far OT. No problem, I edit mine too. Always a way to say it better or sometimes, not at all.]
2) Unfortunately, more than a few pilots apparently don't take their distance from the threshold into account as long as they are inside the FAF. At least one on this board, about half the people I've asked to see how they understood it (all ATP or II) and on this accident, some highly experienced pilots and instructors, the APOI, etc. in the above-referenced NTSB document. Some do indicate "concern," but only two I think said "not until the VASI is intercepted." Except for the latter, no one else seems to say exactly where that safe point is.
No VDP was charted. Of course you can estimate one (which should be from the TDZ not the threshold). The "tie-in" you make between a homemade VDP and the regulatory normal ROD seems to be addressing avoidance of abrupt descents, although the CFIT avoidance programs out there certainly emphasize using a VDP to avoid premature descent as well. The issue I'm trying to grasp here is not speculating on whether a VDP would have avoided this particular accident, but how 91.175 regarding sighting of the ALS is being interpreted.
3) Like I said before, I am not second guessing anyone (at the line level). In my present job, and as a former airline DOS, I question, 2nd guess, even attack "suit" level and above decisions all the time, and I speculate like crazy. That is what the field is all about. You are right that those not in the biz and especially the media, would do well to keep their opinions closely held. I used to be the local version of John Nance to keep them out of trouble on TV. I didn't give them the sensationalistic stuff they wanted and played it safe most of the time, so they quit calling. You think regional pay stinks, you should see what they pay guest television analysts even in large markets.
Today, I am trying to explore and fully understand what might be a systemic safety problem. Informed speculation is not a bad thing. Dissecting an accident and putting yourself in the other guy's shoes is not only one way of determing probable cause and contributing factors, but it is also the primary way most people teach/learn how to fix the problem and keep it from happening again. That's a good thing...right? Focus on the act, not the person, and look all the way to the top of the chain. Some really bright pilot long ago said it best:
"Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose."
Yeah, that's what I get for trying to be cute. The confusion over the flight path and impact site is real typical in the first week. There are even still some minor discrepancies in the factuals. On the obstruction, I saw that one, but the report says it is on a Jepp chart, probably the airport diagram on that one too. Either way, that can't be the same as the 1059' one on the NACO which is further out, and only a couple hundred linear feet or so from the tree that first snagged them. My surprise is that, according to a chart specialist at Jepp, they don't depict obstructions less than 400' agl, even if they are controlling and/or right under your butt.
AV80R
1) My source is Attachment 1 (Witness Interviews) to Exhibit 2 (Group Chairman's Factual Report - Operational Factors), Page 32, Paragraph7, first sentence, as filed in the Public Docket on 3/7/2005 for DCA05MA004. See the exact quote in my other post above.
[EDIT 4/20/05: I guess you removed (edited) the second part of your response above but I'll leave my reply (2) below in here because it repeats what I am trying to focus on without getting too far OT. No problem, I edit mine too. Always a way to say it better or sometimes, not at all.]
2) Unfortunately, more than a few pilots apparently don't take their distance from the threshold into account as long as they are inside the FAF. At least one on this board, about half the people I've asked to see how they understood it (all ATP or II) and on this accident, some highly experienced pilots and instructors, the APOI, etc. in the above-referenced NTSB document. Some do indicate "concern," but only two I think said "not until the VASI is intercepted." Except for the latter, no one else seems to say exactly where that safe point is.
No VDP was charted. Of course you can estimate one (which should be from the TDZ not the threshold). The "tie-in" you make between a homemade VDP and the regulatory normal ROD seems to be addressing avoidance of abrupt descents, although the CFIT avoidance programs out there certainly emphasize using a VDP to avoid premature descent as well. The issue I'm trying to grasp here is not speculating on whether a VDP would have avoided this particular accident, but how 91.175 regarding sighting of the ALS is being interpreted.
3) Like I said before, I am not second guessing anyone (at the line level). In my present job, and as a former airline DOS, I question, 2nd guess, even attack "suit" level and above decisions all the time, and I speculate like crazy. That is what the field is all about. You are right that those not in the biz and especially the media, would do well to keep their opinions closely held. I used to be the local version of John Nance to keep them out of trouble on TV. I didn't give them the sensationalistic stuff they wanted and played it safe most of the time, so they quit calling. You think regional pay stinks, you should see what they pay guest television analysts even in large markets.
Today, I am trying to explore and fully understand what might be a systemic safety problem. Informed speculation is not a bad thing. Dissecting an accident and putting yourself in the other guy's shoes is not only one way of determing probable cause and contributing factors, but it is also the primary way most people teach/learn how to fix the problem and keep it from happening again. That's a good thing...right? Focus on the act, not the person, and look all the way to the top of the chain. Some really bright pilot long ago said it best:
"Whenever we talk about a pilot who has been killed in a flying accident, we should all keep one thing in mind. He called upon the sum of all his knowledge and made a judgment. He believed in it so strongly that he knowingly bet his life on it. That his judgment was faulty is a tragedy, not stupidity. Every instructor, supervisor, and contemporary who ever spoke to him had an opportunity to influence his judgment, so a little bit of all of us goes with every pilot we lose."
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“The APOI got it assbackwards and said when you see the ALS at MDA, drop down to 100, then when you intercept the VASI, you follow it on down. Shoot, picking up the VASI at 100 feet means you are just off the end of the runway…when most guys (except lowriders) start going below the VASI to begin their “flare.” The APOI also claimed the TERPS assured obstacle clearance when you leave MDA out there if you see the lights. Say what????”
Who’s the APOI you’re talking about? Are his/her initials B.C.? As far as I know, Corporate Airlines did not have an APOI when the accident happened but there’s one being checked out right at this moment. I believe he’ll be getting his type in a month or so. So I’m really confused about who that person might be???
I have not read the NTSB preliminary report you’re referring to, would you please post a link to it?
Who’s the APOI you’re talking about? Are his/her initials B.C.? As far as I know, Corporate Airlines did not have an APOI when the accident happened but there’s one being checked out right at this moment. I believe he’ll be getting his type in a month or so. So I’m really confused about who that person might be???
I have not read the NTSB preliminary report you’re referring to, would you please post a link to it?
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fokkers&beer
The dude abides.
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If you guys want to see a really strange approach that meets this discussion, look at the Juneau Alaska LDA. Our companys special approach gets us down to 1000', and theres a 500 foot mountain between the missed approach point and the airport (500' on the low spot, or cut). There are also lead in lights.
Our company has a training bulletin on how to shoot it. It can be very interesting in the winter. But that is one approach where you can not follow the Vasi from far out, you will hit a mountain, and obviously can not descend to 100' above the airport.
Our company has a training bulletin on how to shoot it. It can be very interesting in the winter. But that is one approach where you can not follow the Vasi from far out, you will hit a mountain, and obviously can not descend to 100' above the airport.
Xav8tor
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AV8OR, Yes they have an assistant POI and he was assigned to the CMT since about a year before, and at least through October 04 (i.e., the time of the accident) and did the type ride already. Even though this stuff is public info, I don't want to get into specific names on this board. I am just not comfortable with that and I'm not even sure why. All of this is in the Group Factuals, not the prelim. That is just a paragraph and full of omissions and at least one error. Forget prelims for future reference. When they are posted, the investigation has barely started. They're really just for the media and in the "public interest." Even the factuals can change at a later date if new evidence is discovered.
THe NTSB didn't post any of this docket. I have no idea why not. If you call NTSB public inquiries, they will send you a copy of the docket on CD if they have any left, otherwise you can get it from one of the private contract vendors from the list on the NTSB website for a few bucks. His interview alone was about four pages and my jaw hit the floor at least once per page, sometimes twice. I mean really unsafe procedures (IMHO) were said to be OK. The POI, on the other hand, was on the exact opposite page and said no way. Don't forget, pilots and instructors interviewed stated the same thing about leaving MDA predicated on the ALS. And like I said, some people I've asked have said that too. More though say, "you're kidding right?"
I don't have a public website, but I am working on building one after I get my new server set up. I spent a hour modifying an FDR graph to show the approach profile and I labelled various relevant points, but the board won't allow me to upload attachments. That would give everyone a better picture of the issues and the associated dangers. I'd also upload some excerpts of the CVR transcript and a few other relevant report sections if it would help, but I don't want to post the interviews. Isolated quotes are OK, but more than that just doesn't feel like it's right. Besides, I'm curious about the safety issue(s), not the people. Having read all of the reports and following this thing for 6 months, I already know what happened. The question I want to figure out an answer to is WHY? And how can it be prevented in the future?
Hope this makes sense. I gotta hit the rack, been up for a week with a wicked lower back spasm and I'm likely not making any sense at this ridiculous hour anyway.
THe NTSB didn't post any of this docket. I have no idea why not. If you call NTSB public inquiries, they will send you a copy of the docket on CD if they have any left, otherwise you can get it from one of the private contract vendors from the list on the NTSB website for a few bucks. His interview alone was about four pages and my jaw hit the floor at least once per page, sometimes twice. I mean really unsafe procedures (IMHO) were said to be OK. The POI, on the other hand, was on the exact opposite page and said no way. Don't forget, pilots and instructors interviewed stated the same thing about leaving MDA predicated on the ALS. And like I said, some people I've asked have said that too. More though say, "you're kidding right?"
I don't have a public website, but I am working on building one after I get my new server set up. I spent a hour modifying an FDR graph to show the approach profile and I labelled various relevant points, but the board won't allow me to upload attachments. That would give everyone a better picture of the issues and the associated dangers. I'd also upload some excerpts of the CVR transcript and a few other relevant report sections if it would help, but I don't want to post the interviews. Isolated quotes are OK, but more than that just doesn't feel like it's right. Besides, I'm curious about the safety issue(s), not the people. Having read all of the reports and following this thing for 6 months, I already know what happened. The question I want to figure out an answer to is WHY? And how can it be prevented in the future?
Hope this makes sense. I gotta hit the rack, been up for a week with a wicked lower back spasm and I'm likely not making any sense at this ridiculous hour anyway.
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“Yes they have an assistant POI and he was assigned to the CMT since about a year before, and at least through October 04 (i.e., the time of the accident) and did the type ride already.”
Well, according to the Director of Training there was no assistant POI until just a month or so ago, so I’m not sure where you’re getting your information from?
“Even though this stuff is public info, I don't want to get into specific names on this board.”
As you might have noticed, neither do I which I why I used initials only and that’s all I expected to see from you as well.
“Besides, I'm curious about the safety issue(s), not the people.”
Well, I must say, when you say things such as “His interview alone was about four pages and my jaw hit the floor at least once per page, sometimes twice.” at least in my mind you seem to contradict yourself. You also mention this is just ”a paragraph and full of omissions and at least one error…”
Don’t you think it would be better to wait for the full and final NTSB report instead of trying to make our own conclusions based on partial and possibly incorrect statements?
It’s nothing personal, but what exactly are you trying to achieve here? If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?
Aren’t you presumed innocent until proven guilty? This entire thread indicates otherwise.
Again, those are only my personal thoughts. What’s your opinion?
Well, according to the Director of Training there was no assistant POI until just a month or so ago, so I’m not sure where you’re getting your information from?
“Even though this stuff is public info, I don't want to get into specific names on this board.”
As you might have noticed, neither do I which I why I used initials only and that’s all I expected to see from you as well.
“Besides, I'm curious about the safety issue(s), not the people.”
Well, I must say, when you say things such as “His interview alone was about four pages and my jaw hit the floor at least once per page, sometimes twice.” at least in my mind you seem to contradict yourself. You also mention this is just ”a paragraph and full of omissions and at least one error…”
Don’t you think it would be better to wait for the full and final NTSB report instead of trying to make our own conclusions based on partial and possibly incorrect statements?
It’s nothing personal, but what exactly are you trying to achieve here? If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?
Aren’t you presumed innocent until proven guilty? This entire thread indicates otherwise.
Again, those are only my personal thoughts. What’s your opinion?
enigma
good ol boy
- Joined
- Nov 26, 2001
- Posts
- 2,279
enigma
good ol boy
- Joined
- Nov 26, 2001
- Posts
- 2,279
Xav8tor said:I read a copy of the factual reports (Operations, FDR, CVR, etc.) on the J32 accident last year in IRK. According to investigation interview statements made by pilots, managers and an FAA inspector, a lot of pilots are under the impression that, upon seeing the approach lights during a non-precision approach, it is permissible to continue descent from MDA to 100 feet above the touchdown zone – REGARDLESS of the aircraft’s distance to the threshold. In other words, after crossing the FAF and doing the old chop and drop to MDA, for example, at two miles DME from the runway/MAP you see the ALS, (but not the VASI or runway lights), they thought it was permissible (and safe) to go ahead and keep on going down to 100 feet while still that far out.
I know how I have always understood, applied, and taught that reg and related procedures, but I am curious to know what you guys (and girls) think and how you interpret and apply it, assuming you use standard 121 (i.e., airline "style") profiles and procedures.
Xav8tor, It's been twenty years since I took an instrument written and I haven't done any CFI/CFII work for almost 17. In other words, I'm not a TERPS/FAR/AIM guru. I'm just a line pilot.
My original instrument training was at Central Texas College (twenty years ago), and my continuing ed has been in 121 ground schools or at FSI/Simuflite. I was NEVER taught that the "descend to 100ft above TDZE" rule applied to any approach other than an precision approach. I'm not talking exact legal interprets here, I'm talking realistic operational procedures. Before this string came up, I'd never even considered the "100ft" rule when flying a non-precision approach.
I have never, NEVER, even heard someone give the opinion that it was permissable to desend to 100 ft above TDZE using only the approach lights as a reference on a non-precision approach. If my FO were to start down from MDA using only the ALS, I'd take the airplane. It is my understanding/practice/training to stay at the MDA until I have the runway in sight and am able to make a normal descent to land
Thanks for bringing this subject up. We used to engage on these type of informative discussions here on FI on a regular basis, but the last couple of years we seem to spend more time talking about porn, Japanese video games, and other stuff relevant to backpack lugging airline pilots.
Yes, I said backpack lugging airline pilots. WHAT'S UP WITH THAT? Since when did a backpack go along with a uniform blazer. It's flipping embarrasing, I tell ya. But I digress.
enigma
Xav8tor
Wingback Tin Kicker
- Joined
- Jan 15, 2005
- Posts
- 52
AV8OR
I tried to make it clear said I am trying to look at the actions, not the person, but yes, when a representative of the agency charged with enforcing regulations that exist solely (supposedly) to enhance aviation safety says some of things I read it bothers me. I sure as Hell don’t have all the answers but I expect them to, given the time to prepare for what amounts to a deposition, at least have them ready. It isn’t like witnesses in an NTSB investigation don’t know what’s coming. I really like the FAA (weird huh) and admit to being an NTSB “groupie.” If I could afford to live on a government salary in DC, I’d love to work at either one….even had the chance once, but couldn’t make the numbers work. If I am hard on one of them, maybe its just because I’m a little jealous, yeah, that’s it.
I repeat, I am not attempting to draw any conclusions about the accident in IRK itself or about any individual. It is merely illustrative of what I see as a potential systemic safety problem (didn’t I already say that?). As for partial and incorrect statements, I was referring to the preliminary NTSB report that someone else asked about, which is a few sentences the NTSB posts about every accident within a week or so of its occurrence. The documents I am reading that brought the issue I am interested in to light (repeated again below which appears to be necessary) are contained within the FACTual reports and appendices thereto.
These reports, although subject to change, are essentially in their final form and contain the bulk of the relevant information (FACTS) that will be used by the Board to conduct their analysis, and having done that, arrive at a probable cause and contributing factors. Just about anyone familiar with the process and experienced in aviation can read the factuals, do his own analysis, and write down a PC and CF’s that will be almost the exact same thing the Board comes up with in six months or so. Once the facts are known, the rest isn’t rocket surgery (yes I meant to say it that way). On rare occasions they surprise me, but the explanation for those surprises in the final analysis is almost always political, economic, or due to successful lobbying. But one more time, I am not interested in participating in a public debate about AA 5966 per se. My questions and concerns, again, to be perfectly clear, are the following:
How does a pilot know it is safe to descend to 100 above TDZE on a non-precision approach when conditions are such that your only visual reference is the ALS? Or is it not safe at all to do that and the only option in this scenario is to remain at MDA until you see something else? A secondary concern is the apparent fact that Jepp plates do not depict obstacles less than 400 feet high. In the present example accident, the obstruction was an area of trees almost 100 feet taller than the runway elevation, about a mile out and on the localizer course (check a sat photo and you’ll see the area of subject trees is fairly large, the NACO plate showing the single tallest point in the segment, or [final] controlling obstacle).
To answer your question “If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?” My answer is a very quick NO! Regarding the NTSB, they are the finest civilian transportation accident investigative government agency in the world, but they have their limitations. Aside from understaffing, insufficient budget, time pressure, etc., the primary one is their statutory obligation to determine “probable cause.” Anyone schooled in safety will tell you that many factors must come into play to cause an airplane to crash. What the NTSB calls “contributing factors” addresses that to a degree, but it implies that those factors are somehow less important, which is almost never the case. On a personal level, I don’t like questions without a possible correct answer. On a purely professional level, I would not be seeking answers exclusively on this board or any other one. On the other hand, there are many members here with a ton of high quality and varied experience who enjoy sharing their knowledge, and a good “debate.” The nuances of IFR flying have always been a fav with most pilots I know. Since I’m not on the line anymore, I figured this would be a great place to get some qualified opinions. If I want the FAA’s take on it, about a half dozen guys/gals I used to work with went to being FSDO’s types after 9/11. Your reply did give me the idea of asking FAA DCA for an opinion letter though. That’s a good idea, but when the dust settles on this one, my bet is you are going to see something, maybe an AC come out of this. Even a rule change/clarification isn’t out of the question.
To fully understand an accident, and the reasons it happened, requires a broad AND in-depth analysis of each and every factor, the theory being that, if any single one had been different, the accident might have been avoided. They are all equally important and (potentially), equally deadly. Then there is the problem of lobbying by parties, and non-parties, to an NTSB investigation. The uninitiated may claim it has no bearing, but if you believe that, you are being very naïve. Take an ALPA safety school, or a short course at ERAU, USC, or SCSI and you’ll understand. Finally, there is this little known concept in law known as the “commerce clause,” at least I think that’s the one the “problem” springs from (I forget sometimes), that is the root of certain government actions, or inactions, that make some people very angry. It would take a week to explain it and a year to debate it to no conclusion, but the government does things the way it does for a reason, and that doesn’t always result in the same thing you or I as an individual would like to see done, or written in an official report.
FN FAL
3 years full-time for the JD degree, another 2 months to 2 years to study for a bar exam, and around 125 grand at a top private school. Oh, and 20 to 30 years to pay it all back – with accumulated interest on top. But how should I know? If you’d like I can cite my source for you
**CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED**, that dawg is almost as funny as the trunk monkey!
This system censors a word that has a homonym meaning a structure that holds back water, yet allows all the other vile ranting to be seen across the board?
Enigma
Thanks for your support! And I agree with the backpack thing. It took me two years on the line before I caved and bought a wuss wagon. However, I do like stickers on flight bags, aircraft or travel oriented, not for Sex Wax or Beavis & Butthead - I've watched it a few times though. PS - Love the glory ring. One of my corporate logo designs is a missing man formation with a ring in the missing slot.
I tried to make it clear said I am trying to look at the actions, not the person, but yes, when a representative of the agency charged with enforcing regulations that exist solely (supposedly) to enhance aviation safety says some of things I read it bothers me. I sure as Hell don’t have all the answers but I expect them to, given the time to prepare for what amounts to a deposition, at least have them ready. It isn’t like witnesses in an NTSB investigation don’t know what’s coming. I really like the FAA (weird huh) and admit to being an NTSB “groupie.” If I could afford to live on a government salary in DC, I’d love to work at either one….even had the chance once, but couldn’t make the numbers work. If I am hard on one of them, maybe its just because I’m a little jealous, yeah, that’s it.
I repeat, I am not attempting to draw any conclusions about the accident in IRK itself or about any individual. It is merely illustrative of what I see as a potential systemic safety problem (didn’t I already say that?). As for partial and incorrect statements, I was referring to the preliminary NTSB report that someone else asked about, which is a few sentences the NTSB posts about every accident within a week or so of its occurrence. The documents I am reading that brought the issue I am interested in to light (repeated again below which appears to be necessary) are contained within the FACTual reports and appendices thereto.
These reports, although subject to change, are essentially in their final form and contain the bulk of the relevant information (FACTS) that will be used by the Board to conduct their analysis, and having done that, arrive at a probable cause and contributing factors. Just about anyone familiar with the process and experienced in aviation can read the factuals, do his own analysis, and write down a PC and CF’s that will be almost the exact same thing the Board comes up with in six months or so. Once the facts are known, the rest isn’t rocket surgery (yes I meant to say it that way). On rare occasions they surprise me, but the explanation for those surprises in the final analysis is almost always political, economic, or due to successful lobbying. But one more time, I am not interested in participating in a public debate about AA 5966 per se. My questions and concerns, again, to be perfectly clear, are the following:
How does a pilot know it is safe to descend to 100 above TDZE on a non-precision approach when conditions are such that your only visual reference is the ALS? Or is it not safe at all to do that and the only option in this scenario is to remain at MDA until you see something else? A secondary concern is the apparent fact that Jepp plates do not depict obstacles less than 400 feet high. In the present example accident, the obstruction was an area of trees almost 100 feet taller than the runway elevation, about a mile out and on the localizer course (check a sat photo and you’ll see the area of subject trees is fairly large, the NACO plate showing the single tallest point in the segment, or [final] controlling obstacle).
To answer your question “If safety really is your ONLY concern, wouldn’t you say NTSB will handle this just fine?” My answer is a very quick NO! Regarding the NTSB, they are the finest civilian transportation accident investigative government agency in the world, but they have their limitations. Aside from understaffing, insufficient budget, time pressure, etc., the primary one is their statutory obligation to determine “probable cause.” Anyone schooled in safety will tell you that many factors must come into play to cause an airplane to crash. What the NTSB calls “contributing factors” addresses that to a degree, but it implies that those factors are somehow less important, which is almost never the case. On a personal level, I don’t like questions without a possible correct answer. On a purely professional level, I would not be seeking answers exclusively on this board or any other one. On the other hand, there are many members here with a ton of high quality and varied experience who enjoy sharing their knowledge, and a good “debate.” The nuances of IFR flying have always been a fav with most pilots I know. Since I’m not on the line anymore, I figured this would be a great place to get some qualified opinions. If I want the FAA’s take on it, about a half dozen guys/gals I used to work with went to being FSDO’s types after 9/11. Your reply did give me the idea of asking FAA DCA for an opinion letter though. That’s a good idea, but when the dust settles on this one, my bet is you are going to see something, maybe an AC come out of this. Even a rule change/clarification isn’t out of the question.
To fully understand an accident, and the reasons it happened, requires a broad AND in-depth analysis of each and every factor, the theory being that, if any single one had been different, the accident might have been avoided. They are all equally important and (potentially), equally deadly. Then there is the problem of lobbying by parties, and non-parties, to an NTSB investigation. The uninitiated may claim it has no bearing, but if you believe that, you are being very naïve. Take an ALPA safety school, or a short course at ERAU, USC, or SCSI and you’ll understand. Finally, there is this little known concept in law known as the “commerce clause,” at least I think that’s the one the “problem” springs from (I forget sometimes), that is the root of certain government actions, or inactions, that make some people very angry. It would take a week to explain it and a year to debate it to no conclusion, but the government does things the way it does for a reason, and that doesn’t always result in the same thing you or I as an individual would like to see done, or written in an official report.
FN FAL
3 years full-time for the JD degree, another 2 months to 2 years to study for a bar exam, and around 125 grand at a top private school. Oh, and 20 to 30 years to pay it all back – with accumulated interest on top. But how should I know? If you’d like I can cite my source for you
**CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED****CENSORED**, that dawg is almost as funny as the trunk monkey!
This system censors a word that has a homonym meaning a structure that holds back water, yet allows all the other vile ranting to be seen across the board?
Enigma
Thanks for your support! And I agree with the backpack thing. It took me two years on the line before I caved and bought a wuss wagon. However, I do like stickers on flight bags, aircraft or travel oriented, not for Sex Wax or Beavis & Butthead - I've watched it a few times though. PS - Love the glory ring. One of my corporate logo designs is a missing man formation with a ring in the missing slot.
Last edited:
FN FAL - ???
ENIGMA - Well, you’re probably right and maybe because I knew the captain in this case I just have very hard time dealing with some of the “so called” statements. Some of them just don’t make any sense. Then there is the APOI which I am being told didn’t exist until a month or so ago who supposedly made all kind of weird statements. Obviously I am biased in this case so I’ll try to refrain from further posts.
Btw, it’s AV80R (with a zero) not AV8OR - just want to clarify in case someone decides to PM and shoot the wrong guy
ENIGMA - Well, you’re probably right and maybe because I knew the captain in this case I just have very hard time dealing with some of the “so called” statements. Some of them just don’t make any sense. Then there is the APOI which I am being told didn’t exist until a month or so ago who supposedly made all kind of weird statements. Obviously I am biased in this case so I’ll try to refrain from further posts.
Btw, it’s AV80R (with a zero) not AV8OR - just want to clarify in case someone decides to PM and shoot the wrong guy
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