100 Above TDZE Prior to MAP on LOC/DME???

[TonyC]

Tony,

Did you even bother to read any other, or maybe even all of my posts?

I guess you don't know me too well. I wouldn't bother posting if I hadn't read the entire thread, including every word of every post. Before I comment on what you have to say, you can be sure I have reviewed all you have said. I even read all of this post in spite of the attempted cheap shot with which it began.

I am not trying to sound like a TIP/TERPS guru, ...

Then it would behoove you to refrain from making statements like this:

Also, everyone needs to be aware that the lack of a published VDP means there is an obstacle in your way that precludes using one. Of course, most pilots will never learn or know that because it is buried deep within the TERPS and one or two other obscure FAA documents.

Now, do you really think I was taking a cheap shot?

... not take cheap shots up my six ...

... didn't frag up my six ...

... instead of taking cheap shots ...

I criticized the authoritative way in which you presented your assertion about VDPs and obstacles, and the casual way in which you admitted it was just something you got off a website, not really from an actual study or knowledge of the depths of TERPS - - YOU SAID that EVERYONE NEEDS TO BE AWARE! A writer with more academic integrity, and an honest investigator in search of truth and knowledge might have said, "I've found a website that states ___________. Is this true?"

Cheap shot? Hardly. I'm going to assume that the pain meds are making you a bit sensitive. That's a cheap shot. I apologize if I offended you - - it wasn't my purpose.

As for your last two questions concerning the witness statements I referenced, and pasted elsewhere on this thread, what context? The pilots, check airmen, DOT, APOI, were asked if it was OK to leave MDA upon seeing the ALS?
...
Instead of crossing me, spend a few bucks and get the docket, or give me the URL of a place I can upload it. Read it and come to your own conclusions. Read the rest of the docket and attachemnts too. Then correlate the CVR with the FDR. After you do that, you can talk about putting the question in context.

Oh, I see. I have to meet certain standards before I can question your conclusions? Sorry, but I don't see it that way. Here's what I mean about questioning the context:

If you were to ask me if it's legal to descend to 100' HAT using only the approach lights as a visual reference I would say, "Yes." As far as I can tell, that may be just the way the question was asked. So, you go quoting Tony who says it's OK to descend using only the ALS, but now you use the quote in a discussion about descending to 100' HAT immediately after the FAF. Well, the context has changed, and so the answer would change. It seems to me a decent lawyer would have asked me, following the initial answer, "Are there any conditions that must be met in order to descend to 100' HAT using the ALS as the sole visual reference?" I would have answered in the affirmative.


Finally, I'll conclude this post with the same question that concluded my previous.

Your second sentence claims "a lot of pilots are under the impression that, upon seeing the approach lights during a non-precision approach, it is permissible to continue descent from MDA to 100 feet above the touchdown zone – REGARDLESS of the aircraft’s distance to the threshold." Have you found any pilots on this forum that have that impression?

 

[Xav8tor]

Tony,

How many times have I said I don't have the answers and instead asked others if they do?

OK, I initially failed to say someone else who seemed to know what he was talking about said "No VDP will exist where an obstacle exists. The absence of a VDP serves as an obstacle alert." Until I know that is not true, if there is any truth in it, yes, I think every IFR pilot should be aware that that may be a possibility. It is called erring on the side of caution. I admit after reading that I had the same knee-jerk reaction the FAA does when they put out an emergency AD or other instruction (like after 5481).

Bubba, don't even begin to question my integrity. That is about the only thing I have of my very own to be proud of. Them’s fightin’ words in my book. Besides, lighten up man, this is an informal public discussion forum, not a peer reviewed journal, and if it were, I am not even close to being at the rough draft stage - just circulating ideas and opinions asking for CONSTRUCTIVE criticism. I'm not delivering a lecture or writing a flight dept, memo. I’m not rendering a legal opinion either. However, I am tossing out ideas posting on an aviation board, something I am seriously considering quitting. Lurking was just as informative and far less frustrating. As far as my investigative skills go, I don't care what you think. My past and current superiors/clients have all been quite satisfied (except for a bean counter or two). In any case, I am not conducting an investigation here. Pay me 150 to 300 an hour (depending on the task/subject area), plus first class expenses, 5 grand non-refundable retainer up front, and I'll think about it.


How many times does my question and concern(s) have to be repeated? I don't care why 5966 per se went down. The crash is what brought the question to light. There are enough FACTS made public to ask the question: How many pilots interpret 91.175(c)(3)(i) to mean that descent to 100 above TDZE is permissible without any other visual reference, and at what point may that descent SAFELY begin, if permitted? Assume there is no charted VDP and you are using a Jepp for the LOC/DME 36 at IRK.

Continuing to respond to your questions of me:

Yes, I do believe that the vast majority of pilots don't have a clue about how instrument procedures are designed and those criteria ARE buried deep in the TERPS and a dozen other places.

Apparently I have to meet a very high standard before I so much as open my mouth or type a single word, but you can fire off the round of your choice in responding to my posts. And by the way a cheap shot followed by an apology is still a cheap shot, and last time I checked my PDR, NSAID's don't appreciably affect emotional status. But yes, uncalled for personal attacks gripe my rear end on a bad day. Usually I try to just ignore it. Notice I said “try.”

Read the entire docket before you question the context and get some experience in NTSB, legal procedure, and accident investigation, before you accuse me of jumping to an unwarranted conclusion. Don't you understand that that is why I started this thread in the first place? I wanted to know if what I read in the factuals on 5966 is indicative of a broader problem and isn't just an aberration. The approach profiles and procedures at that operator are basically cut and pasted from the GOM/FOM's at the airline I flew J32's at for four years and also similar to the ones used at two other J32 operators where I was DOS. So, I have integrated the rest of the reports with that knowledge before arriving at the question and yes, I stated in the affirmative that, based on the interviews conducted by the NTSB, a large percentage interpret the reg in question literally and a lesser number qualify their answer with concern about distance from the threshold. I would think the APOI's statements are clear enough.

Having completed 15 semester hours of doctoral level research design and statistics, I understand there may be issues with the sample size and demo’s. That is why, to repeat, I wanted to know if other pilots thought that way? If so, why? VNAV/Stab ROD aside, without a VDP, where is the safe point using only the ALS, if there is one? And don't forget the same thing nearly occurred the night before and the issue was talked about in the crew room. If I had been DOS there, even though pilots had 24 hrs. to submit an ASR, if a crew had to perform anything close to an evasive maneuver to miss a tree, I would have expected a phone call before the props stopped spinning and I would have put out an alert to the affected crews before the next flight left the gate. The one final conclusion I have reached is: there is a serious safety problem. The answer I want to know is: how widespread is it?

I did NOT say anything about going to 100 HAT immediately after crossing the FAF. In fact, a few pages ago, I pointed out that for the first mile or so, you'd better not even come close to MDA because you aren't protected at that point (that is buried way down there in the TERPS too). If you look at the FDR over a plate and topo, and roughly sync up the CVR, you'll see that they went through MDA about 1.8 or 1.9 out, kept on going, and penetrated 100 approx .5 further on. Between those two points (I have not calculated the FDR/CVR time diff yet), the CA said he had the lights, the FO then responded in sight CONTINUE, which they did. (Didn't I post that already too?).

As I have already stated, they did not use a VDP. As far as I am concerned, VDP's are not even an issue in the analysis at hand. Of course they are the primary solution to preventing this general type of CFIT/NP approach accident due to premature descent from MDA.

I think I know the IIC on 5966, if memory serves me correctly, he is the same one that was on 3379, which I was on the Go Team for. The NTSB as a whole, and one IIC in particular, is not known for going too far past "pilot error" before turning in the final. Look at the BS PC on 587. And if it hadn't been for some slick work by a few people on 427 and especially 261, they would have hung at least a chunk of it on the crew on those. Frankly I am pleasantly surprised, no, make that SHOCKED, that they are looking at this 91.175 thing as hard as they seem to be.

Now, can we please kiss and make up and try to work together to understand why a 100 foot clump of trees isn't charted and why on this, or similar approaches, the risk of a CFIT is so high? Or is it?

Thanks.

 

[TurboS7]

I had no idea aviation was so complicated. I guess you know that you are a redneck when you see the lights you stay on the VASI and land. The runway is there to land on, get your stuff or people, then go to the next place. What is so hard about that.

 

[TonyC]

Now, can we please kiss and make up and try to work together to understand why a 100 foot clump of trees isn't charted and why on this, or similar approaches, the risk of a CFIT is so high? Or is it?

I don't fly intrument approaches using topos. I use IAPs published on Jepps plates. I don't need to know where every clump of trees is, and I already told you why. If I descend no lower than the MDA until I reach a point from which I can make a descent using normal procedures and normal descent rates to the touchdown zone, I need not fear any clump of trees or stray utility pole. It's that simple. If every clump of trees, utility pole, farmer's grain elevator, office building, and hill were charted on the Jepps plate, it would become unreadable and therefore useless. It's unnecessary.


You claimed "a lot of pilots are under the impression that, upon seeing the approach lights during a non-precision approach, it is permissible to continue descent from MDA to 100 feet above the touchdown zone – REGARDLESS of the aircraft’s distance to the threshold." How many is "a lot"? Have you found any pilots on this forum that have that impression?

 

[TonyC]

Did he really call me "Bubba"?










.

 

[enigma]

Did he really call me "Bubba"?










.

Yea, he did. But you should cut him some slack. After all, he can spell. And his grammar's pretty decent too.

enigma

And another thing, this string beats reading an endless head butting session between Delta and AirTran.

 

[Xav8tor]

Well at least "Bubba" isn't as bad as impugning a person's professional honesty and integrity in writing on a public forum, nor is it libel per se, which your statements about me come dangerously close to being. But I probably don't know jack about that subject either. So much for my make-up kiss.

I didn't know we were only taking a poll. I thought we were discussing the issues too. Certainly this thread isn't a good place for an academic study (survey) conducted with "integrity" for any number of reasons. For instance, if a subject reads the thread before answering, the results will obviously be skewed. On the other hand, one could assume that members here possess a higher level of interest, and possibly, greater skill than the average IFR pilot. There are way too many variables to make any concrete conclusions based on the quantity of responses so far. A general impression is, however, possible to form already, and could, along with other sources, be the launchpad for a controlled, formal survey. Based on the responses so far, I'd say it is clearly worth pursuing. In fact, a controlled poll is a great idea.

Please refer to the excerpts from the NTSB OPS group attachment (interviews) to see the basis for my initial question and concern. If you insist, I can post the entire 35 page document, you can read it all, and do the math. My position is that if even one line Captain, Check Airman, Instructor, Manager, or Inspector thinks the dead horse procedure we have beaten is safe and legal, then that is one too many. Read (and comprehend) what I posted from the docket and draw your own conclusions. A relatively large portion of the people interviewed are operating under some very unsafe assumptions as a direct result of the misapplication of 91.175. For a 121 sked carrier code-sharing with AA, that number in effective terms (not absolute value) just got much bigger. Good Lord man, can you not understand my question that asked if this was a widespread misconception, or confined to a single operator? Given that a lot of those guys came from other places, many from AE, the finest regional in the country in the early 90's when the procedures were developed, and the fact that one of the accident crew attended and another graduated from one of the best aviation schools in the world, there are clues that the problem may not be isolated to 3C.

As for your repeated question, this time I assume is screaming, as they say in the legal biz, "asked and answered." Are you sure you read this whole thread? Did you comprehend it? There are some really strange answers in the beginning on the first couple of pages. The answer is YES!

The way you fly approaches is fairly SOP. The question before us is about pilots who think seeing the ALS on a non-precision approach means drop down to 100 above TDZE as soon as you see them, without regard to distance from the threshold and having no charted VDP.

I may very well be wrong and sorely disappointed in how the NTSB treats this issue in the bluebook. It has happened before. But the conclusion of the NTSB investigation is not the end of the story. My bet is that when this is all over, many of the questions and issues I raised here will be seen again, in a prominent way. If not, it will happen again and I will be in a better position if I am still in the business. Most of the work will have already been done. But like I said Captain C., if you keep thinking I am off base, crying wolf, saying the sky is falling etc., you might want to ask your wife if she has a good recipe for crow. I think you are going to need one in about 4 to six months.

PS- I may not like the way you post, but I sure do envy your flight experience. I still think the 707 is one of the nicest aircraft ever built. I wanted to get a flight navigator ticket in that bird just for the fun of it, but that will never happen.

 

[TonyC]

Libel ?!?

..., nor is it libel per se, which your statements about me come dangerously close to being.

You're kidding, right? I thought you went to law school.


I'd like to return again to the post that began this thread.

http://forums.flightinfo.com/images/icons/icon20.gif Do you go 100 Above TDZE Prior to MAP on LOC/DME?
I read a copy of the factual reports (Operations, FDR, CVR, etc.) on the J32 accident last year in IRK. According to investigation interview statements made by pilots, managers and an FAA inspector, a lot of pilots are under the impression that, upon seeing the approach lights during a non-precision approach, it is permissible to continue descent from MDA to 100 feet above the touchdown zone – REGARDLESS of the aircraft’s distance to the threshold. In other words, after crossing the FAF and doing the old chop and drop to MDA, for example, at two miles DME from the runway/MAP you see the ALS, (but not the VASI or runway lights), they thought it was permissible (and safe) to go ahead and keep on going down to 100 feet while still that far out.



I know how I have always understood, applied, and taught that reg and related procedures, but I am curious to know what you guys (and girls) think and how you interpret and apply it, assuming you use standard 121 (i.e., airline "style") profiles and procedures.

Two questions:

1) You state that "according to investigation interview statements ... a lot of pilots are under the impression ..." Would you please tell us the exact number of pilots whose interview statements indicated they were under that impression? In other words, would you substitute an actual number for the phrase "a lot"?

2) You state that you're curious to know what [we] "guys (and girls) think and how [we] interpret and apply it, assuming [we] use standard 121 (i.e., airline 'style') profiles and procedures." Can you produce an example of a post that indicates a participant in this thread shares the view you cited in paragraph 1?


The closest I can find is DrewBlows:

There is always a minimum visbility published for any given approach. I like to think that in a senario where you are shooting an approach to minimums, when you are at minimums, you can descend without any worry, after all you have the approach lights in sight which are about 1500' from the threshold. I really have a hard time believing that you could start a descent to 100' above TDZE at a distance so far away from the threshold that you would risk hitting an obsticle (assuming on a visual approach you fly a standard three degree approach). I may be wrong, but I have always been under the impression the the TERPS took into account this senario (not the visual senario, but the poor visability senario).

Even his answer is qualified by distances, so I don't consider his answer as meeting your criteria. Furthermore, it's not altogether clear (based on his profile which, I realize, may be completely misleading or even false) that he meets your criteria of "us[ing] standard 121 (i.e., airline 'style') profiles and procedures."

So much for my make-up kiss.

I'm not into kissin' guys, thanks.

I didn't know we were only taking a poll. I thought we were discussing the issues too.

Funny, I thought that's exactly what you were asking for when you said, "I am curious to know what you guys (and girls) think and how you interpret and apply it, ...". I believe the issue at hand is pretty straightforward. First, is it legal, safe, AND smart to descend below MDA prior to reaching a point from which a normal descent can be made using nromal procedures to arrive at the runway? And, second, if it is not legal, safe, OR smart, are there pilots operating under the mistaken impression that it IS?

On the first question, I believe the concensus of thread participants believe the answer to the first question is NO. The preponderance of posts, I believe, supports that view.

To the second question, it appears you may have a case where at least two pilots might have held that mistaken impression. I say "may" because I don't believe it has been definitively determined that such was the case. Initial review of the accident data suggests that might be the case, and that's all we really have with which to speculate at this time. Yes, I said speculate. We don't have the tools at our disposal to investigate the question further. All we really have is what the NTSB releases. Wouldn't it be nice if we could interview the people who trained these pilots so we could probe their understanding of this particular aspect of instrument flying to a satisfying depth? Alas, we cannot.

On the other hand, one could assume that members here possess a higher level of interest, and possibly, greater skill than the average IFR pilot.

That would be an extremely dangerous assumption. While there are a number of experts "here," there are as many beginners, affecianados, and friends. We're just as likely to be discussing how to taxi a 172 in a straight line as how to transition from instrument to visual procedures.

My position is that if even one line Captain, Check Airman, Instructor, Manager, or Inspector thinks the dead horse procedure we have beaten is safe and legal, then that is one too many.

I agree. Where we seem to disagree is on your assertion that "a lot" do think that. I'm not convinced that "a lot" of people think that way. I could be convinced otherwise, but I've yet to shown convincing evidence.

..., you might want to ask your wife if she has a good recipe for crow. I think you are going to need one in about 4 to six months.

You supply it, I'll cook it!

PS- I may not like the way you post, but I sure do envy your flight experience. I still think the 707 is one of the nicest aircraft ever built. I wanted to get a flight navigator ticket in that bird just for the fun of it, but that will never happen.

Don't get too green. It's listed with ratings, not airplanes I've actually flown. The type was for the RC-135, and it just shows up to the FAA as B-707 B-720. The RC-135 was close, but not quite a 707.

 

[Xav8tor]

Tony,

I don't want to kiss you either, it’s a figure of speech you know. The unproductive semantic games you are playing, and my biting the bait and responding, have added nothing but maybe entertainment for some people, but zilch to the original goals of the thread. Perhaps that is one reason the response level has dropped off.

There is no point in repeating myself. A few replies early on in this thread were not all that dissimilar to those in the witness interviews, but the split was different. I posted enough of the witness interviews to show, that considering the size of the place, a surprisingly large proportion were interpreting the subject reg and procedure in a manner that the NTSB apparently feels almost led to at least one accident, and 24 hours later, did. They typically don’t put things in the report that they don’t consider relevant. All I ever wanted to know was whether or not this misconception was widespread or isolated. Secondary to that issue is the uncharted controlling obstacle and how that might affect a do it yourself VDP.

I guess this, or any other board, isn't the best place to get that kind of information. I am quite sure that if I had spent the same amount of time doing the research myself i/o asking for opinions, and trading barbs, I would have most of my answers by now.

Yes I went to law school and yes, of course, I am kidding in that I am not a litigious person and I expect that sort of comment on a place like a message board. But, I am not kidding about how easy it is to cross the line and the kicker is damages can be presumed in some of those cases. At least that is one of the useful bits of wisdom as I barely remember it that I got for my 125K.

What I have taken from this discussion is that the reg is worded in a way that it makes it subject to being misapplied in real world flying. Chasing the rabbit as I call it down an ILS to mins (PF staying on the gauges of course) by hand is pure fun and as long as you are proficient and the plane properly equipped, it isn't particularly risky. Using the ALS as a cue to descend on a non-precision approach generally seems like a major ingredient in a recipe for disaster absent a charted VDP or VGSI in sight, etc.

If I get an answer that supports the system safety problem I "smelled" when I read the docket, supported by a few other misconceptions expressed elsewhere, I'll post it. Hopefully the NTSB will do that for us. I would have liked to spot a serious safety issue and played a part in fixing it, both for personal satisfaction, and to fatten my CV, which based on the way biz is these days, and some news I just got this morning, I may need to do sooner, rather than later.

Thanks to all for the input.

Xav8tor...missing it more than ever.

 

[TonyC]

The unproductive semantic games you are playing, ...

I don't know what games you're talking about. I've asked simple questions and failed to get straight answers. Perhaps my posts are too long. I'll keep this one short.

I asked:

2) You state that you're curious to know what [we] "guys (and girls) think and how [we] interpret and apply it, assuming [we] use standard 121 (i.e., airline 'style') profiles and procedures." Can you produce an example of a post that indicates a participant in this thread shares the view you cited in paragraph 1?

Do I take this to be your answer?

A few replies early on in this thread were not all that dissimilar to those in the witness interviews, but the split was different.

.

 

[TonyC]

I asked:

1) You state that "according to investigation interview statements ... a lot of pilots are under the impression ..." Would you please tell us the exact number of pilots whose interview statements indicated they were under that impression? In other words, would you substitute an actual number for the phrase "a lot"?

Is this your answer?

... a surprisingly large proportion were interpreting the subject reg and procedure in a manner that the NTSB apparently feels almost led to at least one accident, and 24 hours later, did.

Now, what was that remark about unproductive semantic games?



.

 

[Xav8tor]

Tony,

I hope you are having fun. I'm not. Not that you or anyone else here cares, or should care, as of today, I don't have time for this anymore, not that I ever did. I actually started this thread motivated primarily, but not exclusively, with a sincere concern for the safety of people I don't even know, and a naive desire to think that I can "change the world," a little a bit at a time, or as I concluded my personal statement in my app to law school at the ripe age of 40, "one case, one client, at a time." Well, I never took the bar and still haven't shaken my addiction to the smell of kerosene or the adrenalin rush of a handflown ILS to the bottom topped off with a greaser dead on the stripes. I got a rush out of a cap panel light and running a QRH list, and I took pride in hearing pax get on my little J32 moaning about the size of the plane and the surely inferior skills of the pilots since the good ones were all on jets, then having those same people get off the plane smiling, saying it was the most fun, best flight, smoothest ride, they'd ever had.

I miss that, and I miss being who I was after reaching the top of the heap (yes, like most men, I was so proud of what I did that, in many ways, I defined my own self-worth by my profession), which to me, wasn't the left seat of a widebody, but steering the safety aspects of an entire airline operation, albeit small. I don't get that kind of satisfaction or credit in the end of the biz I'm in now because the rules are different, the goal is different, the opportunities are few and far between, and business is slower now than in the past 15 years. To satisfy my own needs, and to feed my "white hat" syndrome, I saw an opportunity to jump on a possible system safety problem, make a few calls, write a letter or two, maybe get a study going, culminating in effecting a change that saves a life down the road.

Play your word games all you want sir. And as for my answer you quoted above, what did you expect from someone who learned that in the first week of law school? As far as I am concerned, I directly answered your questions, but I am not going to bother to cut and paste quotes, or make a spreadsheet for you. Besides, this thread went off in a different direction and the number of answers (sample size) is too small, and, there are no controls. Furthermore, even one GA IFR pilot, much less an instructor, saying they teach that it is OK sometimes, is enough to consider taking action. If not just one person at a scheduled 121 carrier code-sharing with a major in a variant of their livery, who is on the certificate, in the training dept., check airmen, etc. says that maneuver is permitted and safe, but more than one, like two or three, then toss in a line pilot or two, and an inspector….can you say “Emergency Revocation”? I would have yanked that sheet of paper off their wall in a heartbeat. I swore I wasn’t going to make this a 3C 5966 thread but you keep bringing it up. As to the number of their pilots under this questionable impression, I admit it is relevant. I used to fly with some of the people that started that outfit when they were at AE. I think at least one was still there and not one of them was ever told to shoot a LOC/DME that way back then at AE. If I remember correctly, one was a check airman way back then and word was he really knew his stuff and expected his pilots to as well. If they didn’t, it was a one-way standby ticket home in a uniform with no brass. And...If I were Nick Sabatini ( a man I deeply admire and respect, in particular for his work with regional airline safety programs), I would be sending out a letter to every pilot in the database…as a minimum action.

As I said before, if you want a stat analysis of the percentage of witnesses interviewed whose interpretation and/or application of 91.175 is unsafe, needs qualification, however you choose to define it, then get the whole report, define and categorize the statements, control for the variables of your choice, and run an ANOVA or regression analysis on it, whichever you deem appropriate depending on your design and chosen variables. Then you will have to do the same thing with a broader sample population. Third you'll choose yet another design/analytic method to see if there is a significant difference between the first two. If you truly want an academic answer with "integrity and honesty" as you put it, although I think you might have meant something more along the lines of reliable and valid, then that is how you must go about it.

Alternatively, instead of obstinately engaging in a war of words with a person having both undergrad and grad majors in speech pathology/languages/communication sciences, and playing 20 questions with a brainwashed JD grad, you could instead do what I did today: spend ten hours researching the issue in a professional manner and plan on sharing the results via useful communication, presented clearly and objectively, which I would have done tonight had I not again fallen for your flame bait. I am embarrassed about doing that and apologize to others on the board for having done so…again.

For two reasons, one personal, the other people like you on this forum who turn participation into an unpleasant experience, I will soon be leaving this board as a poster. There must be a better place where professionals, interested amateurs, or even wannabees can productively exchange ideas, express opinions, and strongly disagree without impinging upon the mod's time and the owner's bandwidth. I may now be guilty of that out of my sheer verbosity (a serious fault) and my sorely missing crew room/airport lounge chat, but with nearly a half a century of life experience and admitted into PKP as a grad student (relatively uncommon), but with courses in gen psych, abnormal, developmental, educational, perception, rehab, human factors, B-Mod, psychotherapy and counseling, plus months of clinicals, I cannot fathom your motivation for what has amounted to an aggressive hijack of what started out to be a potentially useful thread and your choice of me as a target for personal attacks.

As I stated above, I will, if I still chose to at this point, share what I learned today in a farewell post hopefully tomorrow, because I said I would and because some pilots may benefit from it. I did. I will also no longer respond directly to your posts Tony, if for no other reason, than you don't seem to comprehend mine and I am trying to lower my normal style of writing to make it easier. I vaguely remember a B-Mod prof telling me a basic principle was: "An unreinforced response tends to extinguish over time." I won't be around long enough to see the result, but I 'm going to try an initial dose anyway.

Also, I wuz gonna make yew a gift of an enternet websight with a clickerable link to a video that where these three big shot lawyers frum the biggestest lawyer cumpaneez spends almostest a hole of an hour right in frunt of these really big guvernment men and I think their boss was a women who waz all anyways jawing like krazy about my most bestest ever thing I ever did what took me almos a year of kompooter reserchinging and book reading in five or six liebaries that I finully wrote down on a whole box of typin paper that rolled what I knows about airplanes and speeking and voices and rekordingn tapes and people's brains and videos and mooviemaking and how the laws in this here kuntry are now, why they got that way, and then next how theyz awt to bee in the future after when planes krash. Now all the other lawyers that git lucky and sign up a big plane case just copy the stuff I writ in my old paper because the guys on the other side said ther ain’t much point to arguing with what I said cause all the judges think it makes more cents than what all them big shots with cloths that costed more than my house have to say about. I bennthinkin about nex time working for the other side cause theat would be fun arguing with myself and I think I could win.

Anywayz, it won’t do no gud for you to read the papers or watch the movie since you don’t like me and my stupid ideaz and butt it wuldnt do iny gud also too bekauze they don't never mention my name cause for certain raisins they couldn't and for the main is the one guy wanted everybody to thunk he rilly wrote it cuz even sevin yeers later it wuz still being called the poster child and a masterpice and stuff like that so since evin if you called them and they do say I am the one that did all that stuff thin yew won't beleeve it anyway either cuase you think I would have set it al up. But like I sed, since you prolly kicked my rear on this thred why don’t you start one about cockpit voices tapes and stuff about thim. I might hang around and post sum back just for the fun cause I will still need to have sum fun sometimes even when I am too bizzy tryin to find a job or maybe finully sitting in a bar exam instead of a bar stool.

_______________________________

Did a ton of solid research and spent a few hours on the phone and got some credible answers folks. I will post the results of what I learned today from more than one horse's mouth about the original questions and a few other relevant issues some of you raised. Thanks again, especially you Tony. If I hadn't taken the bait I might never have learned as much as I did. Even though I have all but given up on putting it into professional use in the future, some of you can. And I will finally sleep without obsessing over a nagging question thinking it was sans solution.
_______________________

PS/Hint - Crow season opens tomorrow, not in 6 months as I thought yesterday. I’ll take a few pieces on a spinach salad. I admit I am not perfect and repeatedly have so save me a little. You can have the rest for an entrée. Better make it a double breaster.

 

[TonyC]

Good GRIEF! Where did all the hate come from? Why do you insist on taking everything I say as a personal insult? Are you that thin-skinned?


You still haven't given me a straightforward, direct answer to any question I've asked. I suppose I'd be forced to ask the judge to allow me to question you as a hostile witness.


Look, you come on this board, on this thread and others, laying out your credentials and expertise, you make a statement which I challenged. Big deal!


I submit that nobody that has responded on this thread is of the opinion that one can descend below the MDA REGARDLESS OF DISTANCE TO THE RUNWAY using only the ALS as a visual reference. If you think otherwise (as you seem to) you must be misinterpreting what they've said. I feel like you have similarly misinterpreted the data you've examined with regards to the aircraft accident in question.

I'm not attacking you - - I'm disagreeing with your ideas.

Plain and simple.


Thanks for the Hillbilly talk, though. I really enjoyed that.






P.S. Are you looking at my Avatar and reading my posts at the same time? Maybe that's what's got you so upset. That ain't me, ya' know?!


.

 

[FN FAL]

Thanks for the Hillbilly talk, though. I really enjoyed that.

P.S. Are you looking at my Avatar and reading my posts at the same time? Maybe that's what's got you so upset.

That river don't go to Aintry...(dueling banjos)

 

[Xav8tor]

I swore I would not do this but here is an INFORMAL analysis of what I felt were useable, direct, non-duplicative responses to the question on this INFORMAL flightinfo thread/”poll” which is only one source, and admittedly not a good one from an academic standpoint, of getting the answer to the question posed:

OK to leave MDA for 100 above TDZE based upon seeing ALS alone: 1*
Other potentially unsafe application, misconception, etc. of 91.175: 2
OK to Leave MDA only with Add’l visual reference/approach aid: 9

Total valid responses: 12
Percentage of responses indicating clarification of 91.175 may be prudent: 25%

* “I teach my students that if you can see the approach lights you can go lower (100ft) the idea being if you can see approach lights, you can see obstructions as well.” (Post #28)

Given the well-grounded emphasis on CFIT and ALAR, the ratio of those to all other types/phases of accidents, and the direct applicability of 91.175, I would conclude that if 25% of all IFR pilots are not applying the regulation (and related procedures/rules, etc.) correctly when making one of the most, if not the most important, command decisions of an IFR flight in (low) IMC, then yes, that is a substantial number, a lot, a sheetload, too many, whatever. As a safety professional, assuming the results are valid (which I am not assuming, but think they clearly indicate the need for a FORMAL study/survey that is well-controlled/designed to confirm my preliminary assumption), then yes, I believe the risk factor presented by the issue is unacceptable in quantity and quality terms and needs immediate proactive attention. Even if you toss out the 2 indirect responses that’s still 10% and IMHO, an unacceptable number if a 10 “n” sample is sufficient, which I admit it isn’t. Nevertheless, because the single clearly erroneous response is from a CFI, the impact of the “numbers” may be far greater due to the additional IFR pilots now in the system operating on the same unsafe assumption they were taught.

I needed the break and can’t follow my own resolve to not respond, so there you go. If I have the time and inclination, I’ll do the same breakdown on the witness interviews, but that will only further delay my posting the good info/answers I got yesterday.

BTW, yes, I do sometimes get a weird feeling when I look at your avatar. First, the guy looks like a younger version of my dearly departed uncle, an ex AAC/USAF bomber and test pilot/aeronautical engineer who helped me get started in aviation and was an all-around cool person (genius, but eccentric too). The expression is the same one I’ve seen on many faces (including my own) under a cross, and is exactly that of almost every pilot witness at the NTSB hearings I’ve attended. Third, it reminds me of the “starch in their underwear” type pilots I’ve had the displeasure of flying with, or even riding in a hotel van with. In other words, pretty much the opposite of my reaction to FN’s avatar. I’d like to have a high rez version of that pic. And speaking of avatar’s, when are you going to ask what that sound is on mine?

 

[SSDD]

X...

I've been following this thread and I think its about time for both of you to give it up!!!!!

You brought up what you perceived as a potential problem...THANKS!

Now please go do your research and get back to us with your results, but please stop trying to justify you opinions with endless posts of your background and qualifications.

 

[TonyC]

OK to leave MDA for 100 above TDZE based upon seeing ALS alone: 1*

* “I teach my students that if you can see the approach lights you can go lower (100ft) the idea being if you can see approach lights, you can see obstructions as well.” (Post #28)

Finally, a straight answer. Thank you. Now we can discuss something.

Here's where context comes in to play. If we were to interview MTpilot regarding this response, we might ask a question along the lines of, "Does this apply at any distance from the runway?" Now, you might point out that you already explained that in your original post. True. However, we being human, we make mistakes from time to time. I'm sure you're aware that people form answers to questions before they've heard the entire question. Sometimes it takes restating or explaining the question several times to get to the real information. If you reword the question and get a different answer, you have to dig deeper. MTpilot might answer, "Well of course not. Distance DOES matter. I thought you meant when we were already at the descent point." On the other hand, he might answer, "Absolutely. Anyplace I can see the lights, be it 1 mile, 5 miles, or 10 miles, it's OK to descend to 100' HAT." As you can see, the followup question makes all the difference.

So, we might disagree that MTpilot incorrectly applies the descent methodology. I don't fault you for your opinion; I just don't see it that way.


Similarly, we might disagree on the published reports. What you read as an indication that someone incorrectly applies a procedure, absent the in-context inteview-type analysis might be different from what I read.

I don't really care if we disagree. It doesn't hurt my feelings one bit. I hope it doesn't hurt your feelings. That wasn't the reason I posted on this thread to begin with. I posted to raise a flag on your statement regarding published VDPs and the existance or absence of a close-in obstacle. You stated, with authority, that a certain relationship was fact. In fact, it's not. That's my issue.

BTW, yes, I do sometimes get a weird feeling when I look at your avatar. First, the guy looks like a younger version of my dearly departed uncle, an ex AAC/USAF bomber and test pilot/aeronautical engineer who helped me get started in aviation and was an all-around cool person (genius, but eccentric too). The expression is the same one I’ve see on many faces (including my own) under a cross, and is exactly that of almost every pilot witness at the NTSB hearings I’ve attended. Third, it reminds me of the “starch in their underwear” type pilots I’ve had the displeasure of flying with, or even riding in a hotel van with. In other words, pretty much the opposite of my reaction to FN’s avatar. I’d like to have a high rez version of that pic. And speaking of avatar’s, when are you going to ask what that sound is on mine?

The man in my Avatar is Frederick W. Smith, Founder, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer of FedEx Corportation. The photo was taken on 18 Jan 2005 during the "A380 Reveal" ceremony in Toulouse, France. You'd think the guy might be happy about the whole deal, him being the guy that ordered the first 10 freighter versions and all. On the contrary, he looks like he's angry that he has to share the stage with UPS. One of those "true colors" moments, if you ask me.

I don't plan to ask you what the sound on your Avatar is. Remember, I've already read all of this thread.

... the waveform and spectrogram ("voiceprint") on my current avatar is a short half second or so human sound, but it isn't speech.

That's more than I want to know.


EDIT: I can't find the picture of Fred on the Airbus website anymore. I'll PM you a link to YouSendIt.com where I just uploaded the image for you.

 

[TurboS7]

Be real. Fred is still a dreamer and a businessman, he is trying to figure out how many envelopes he can fit in that thing......LOL>

 

[Xav8tor]

SS,

I wouldn't have felt the need to do that if I my qualifications weren't called into question, perhaps because my style of writing and expressing an opinion makes it sound as if I am confident in the correctness or validity of my statements, which I am, unless I state otherwise. I know who/what I am/was, and not ever going to be, and to tell the truth, I am not all that proud of where I am right now in terms of my "station" in life and feel pretty dang worthless. Maybe that's part of the reason I wanted to jump in on this issue as I already stated my motivation, and it isn't ego, unless you confuse that with gratification from finding the smoking gun others glossed over, or enjoying a little credit for taking a difficult stand and trying to make the system a little safer.

I'd much prefer to do exactly what you suggested and remain more than humble, even totally anonymous, to a degree, my cover is already blown, and that is, I admit, my own fault. You do have a point, but I will not take even a substantial portion of the blame. In over a decade in the safety biz in varying environments and capacities, interacting with professional pilots and safety professionals from all over the country (and beyond), even in the most heated situations (i.e., immediately post crash), where accident theories were debated and the stakes, and emotions, were higher than you can possibly imagine until you "have the t-shirt", I have never experienced the sort of unprofessional behavior, disrespect, and just plain rudeness I've seen, and been subjected to, on this board, and I am not alone in feeling that way about some of the threads in the past month or two. You are right in that this may not be the best outlet for me as a stop-gap, but it was worth a try. To those of you who did participate in a productive manner, thank you.


Tony,

Thanks for the very reasonable response. Of course digging deeper is required. That is exactly what I've said more than once. On the witness interviews though, I hope they (NTSB) are digging deeper, but read in context with the other docket contents and knowing the scoop on NTSB techniques, and how this particular IIC approaches an accident, the mere fact that it is in there means they think they are onto something. I'll post the whole thing later, but it will take about three posts to get all 35 pages in there. To save space, I'll leave out the ones they didn't ask at all (i.e., other ops issues, but not this one). You will have no doubt that there is a big problem, at least there.

Regarding the accident flight itself, as Eddie postulated, and here is the best answer I can give him at the moment, it is possible for one who has not done a complete analysis of all relevant evidence to conclude on the NTSB CVR transcript alone, which is never a good idea, but not for the reasons they say in their “disclaimer,” along with a raw, rough FDR/radar profile plot, they weren't going to stop at any altitude. Having gone a little deeper, looked at a lot of other docs, I, for now at least, think that “in sight...continue" meant keep coming down. Note they cancelled the FD which had been in ALT hold mode for MDA just after that (and since they were obviously still in a descent he had to be fudging the FD with the CWS button, or just ignoring it). It is almost impossible to make those sort of conclusions without the tape itself, the FDR and/or radar data, other documents, and a ton of complex, long, tedious work. But again, aside from the witness interviews about 91.175 I want to avoid 5966 specific discussion. It is only an example (a darn good one) of what I still think is a potentially big safety problem across the whole system that is “fixable.”

As for the relationship between the presence or absence of a VDP being a very real possibility, but not necessarily probability, as a clue that an obstacle may be present, and concluding therefore that additional caution is advisable, sorry, but if and when I get to summarize the results of my findings from the past few days, especially yesterday, you will see that the statement I quoted from Whitt's flying is soundly based on fact and is a very prudent “safe side” assumption to make when thinking about how far out you should consider leaving MDA. There are a number of reasons a VDP might not be charted, but the presence of an obstacle in the final segment is a common one. I now have written quotes from various docs to back it up and some hugely credible explanations from individuals who I can’t name because they requested it, but let's just say they were very kind to take the time away from their rather high up in the chain responsibilities to help us all out. I'm sure you can verify what I hopefully get to post with a call to one of the guys in EAS at ALPA or check the member section of the website to see if there is a committee member who has looked at the issue. They'll back it up.

Re your avatar, maybe it was the French food? Re mine, you’re definitely a perceptive person. It might not be exactly what you think it is, but I have a feeling you are really close, but no cigar

 

[TurboS7]

You guys are scaring me I may never want to shoot a non-precision approach again.