100 Above TDZE Prior to MAP on LOC/DME???

[A Squared]

........ but the last couple of years we seem to spend more time talking about porn, Japanese video games, and other stuff relevant to backpack lugging airline pilots.

Yes, I said backpack lugging airline pilots. WHAT'S UP WITH THAT? Since when did a backpack go along with a uniform blazer. It's flipping embarrasing, I tell ya. But I digress. QUOTE]


whooop whoop ...... Curmudgeon alert

 

[Xav8tor]

AV80R - Man, don't stop posting completely and don't feel bad about being biased. (there are other VERY GOOD reasons for you not to post about the specific accident though). I've been in your shoes (the J32 in RDU in 94). That is what got me into the safety end of the biz. You are going to hear a lot of things you don't like, a ton of lies, rumors, and misinformation. Even though you guys aren't ALPA, and it is a little late, the CIRPS programs really help in dealing with the emotions. Back in 94, those of us on the Go Team had to meet with a counselor at least once during the first few days, and follow-ups were there if needed. I did the CVR and I gotta tell you nothing will prepare you for that feeling. I had heard dozens of CVR's before that one, but when it is your plane and you know the crew, well, I can't explain how that felt. Later, when I was a DOS, we put a CIRPS style program in place for all our employees, not just the pilots.

When you do this sort of thing on your own it can still be hard even if you didn't know the people, and you've got no one you can talk to about it. I love my work, but I still get a knot in my stomach the first time I hear a tape, do a reconstruction, review scene photo's, etc. On scene, or off, none of this is easy, but it is challenging and highly gratifying when you find a smoking gun and know you've have a role, no matter how small, in reducing the chance it will ever happen again, which is all I am trying to do here. IF one reader of this thread thinks twice about leaving MDA a little too soon because he thinks he's got the lights, all of us, from posters to moderator to the guy keeping the server cool, everyone except the flamers, collectively may have saved the life of one, and possibly one hundred or more, lives, not to mention the loss and grief of their friends and family. By being stubborn (I like to think of it as persistence) and pushing what might seem like a trival side issue to most people, you actually can "change the world." I've done this sort of thing before, and it felt really good. It didn't pay any bills, not one red cent, and I can't even talk about it to all but a few people, but I figure at least maybe it will help the balance sheet that counts, you know, the one that gets checked the day your number comes up.


Since it is public info, if I get time today, I'll post some excerpts from the report I addressed. You've got enough to deal with without trying to reconcile conflicting or just plain bad info. You won't be misinformed by me though. If it isn't factual public knowledge and verified, I do my level best not to say it, much less write it down for all to see.

Blue side up.

 

[AV80R]

Xav8tor – well, I didn’t mean to “jump” on you or your conclusions, but I do understand there are at least 5 lawsuits filed against 3C already and more are probably coming. I know some attorneys for those cases are fishing for all kinds of “statements” from current and previous employees; I’m not implying that’s what you’re doing but surely you must understand my concern here.

As far as the “chop & drop” approach, I was NEVER told that’s how you conduct a non-prec. approach while I was at 3C. However, I do remember we were taught to increase our rate of descent slightly to give ourselves more time to be able to “look outside” once at the MDA. For an ILS I believe our rate of descend was usually 6-700FPM (depending on our ground speed) and for a non-prec. approach we normally increased the rate by ~2-300FPM. I wouldn’t consider it a “chop & drop” as we were still using plenty of power (our power setting was nowhere near to flight idle).

“…You are going to hear a lot of things you don't like, a ton of lies, rumors, and misinformation…and (if) you know the crew, well, I can't explain how that felt...”


Based on your previous experience, I am sure you understand why it's so difficult to deal with it.


“You won't be misinformed by me though. If it isn't factual public knowledge and verified, I do my level best not to say it, much less write it down for all to see.”

Thank you.

“…If one reader of this thread thinks twice about leaving MDA a little too soon because he thinks he's got the lights, all of us, from posters to moderator to the guy keeping the server cool, everyone except the flamers, collectively may have saved the life of one, and possibly one hundred or more, lives, not to mention the loss and grief of their friends and family... “

I definitely see your point here

FN FAL – sorry, misunderstood your question

 

[Xav8tor]

AV80R...see my edit to the post above. I tried to explain a little more but you replied before I made the changes. Thanks. Oh, and if I was fishing, I wouldn't do it on this board. There are much better "ponds" for that kind of angling, and far more effective techniques. That is however, exactly one of the reasons I suggested you don't post anything specific about 5966, like opinions or "he said, she said" type stuff. I gave it some thought myself.

On the other hand, discussing facts on an anonymous public aviation forum, as they relate to a system safety issue(s), something that may affect all IFR pilots (and their pax) is fair game as far as I'm concerned. In the 11 years I have been doing the safety gig, I have always looked way beyond the front row. I've played on both teams, but, being a pilot at heart, even though I'm no longer flying the line, I admit a certain amount of satisfaction in digging out the root causes. 990 aside, I don't know of any recent major case where it was certain a pilot was He11bent on crashing and I never accept "pilot error" as a probable cause. I want to know why the error occurred and how many more up the ladder were made before the final one.

I will say this though, I show no mercy for repeated violations of safety regs/procedures (which amounts to intent), management disregard for safety (i.e., "the DOS is just a pain in the rear required by the regs...just smile, nod your head, and he'll go crawl back in his hole" - that's when I crawl up theirs!), or aircraft manufacturers that claim redundant systems, but fake it or BS their way through the cert. process to save money.

You get the idea. The only reason I don't still wear my ALPA and APA tie tacs is because they are framed and displayed with pride along with my wings and ribbons.

 

[Xav8tor]

Some of you have asked to see parts of the public docket documents I based my questions and concerns on so here goes. They are a little long and split into parts. PLEASE, focus on the issue and don't slam the people personally. I'm not the moderator, but I think it's perfectly OK to disagree with what someone said if we keep it civil with regard to the people involved and try to learn from their thoughts and actions described. Maybe by looking at how the reg is being understood by different people, we can get a definitive answer to this conundrum.

NTSB Public Docket Excerpts – DCA05MA004 a/k/a AA Flight 5966

(NOTICE: The following are excerpts from interviews conducted by the NTSB regarding DCA05MA004, as well as other documents and materials from the public docket for this accident. They should not be taken out of context and conclusions should only be drawn in conjunction with the entire docket and other relevant materials. They are presented here for educational purposes only and are not intended by the poster to be used for anything other than enhancing an understanding of the safety questions posed within, and elsewhere in this thread. Simply put, the focus should be on WHAT is being said, not WHO said it. The questions and issues before us revolve around the validity and correctness of the statements and assumptions made in the documents, NOT the competency of the individual(s) involved who made them. Thank you.

_____________________________________

NSTB Group Chairman’s Factual Report – Operational Factors (Witness Interviews):
_____________________________________

( A Line Captain)

“He had previously flown into the IRK airport with a 300 – 400 foot cloud ceiling. On Monday, October 18, 2004, he had a 400 foot ceiling when he flew into the IRK airport. He “broke out” at 400 feet above the ground. The radio altimeter had been set to a minimum of 360 feet. The orange light on the upper part of the attitude indicator would come on when the airplane was 100 above the MDA. There would also be a long bell chime. He saw the approach lights when he broke out, but could not see the runway lights. When he broke out of the cloud cover, he was about 1 to 1 ½ miles from the end of the runway. He did not see any other lights in the area around the airport. He only saw lights that were associated with the airport. When he saw the runway, he continued his descent to 1,064 feet which was 100 feet above the TDZE. As he started down, he saw the runway lights about 1 to 1 ½ miles ahead. The airport lights were distinct and he could tell where the airport was. He said he was “on course” when he broke out. When he broke out, he could not see the ground and it was dark. At about 100 to 200 feet above the TDZE, the F/O called “runway in sight” and he was still descending. He looked up and saw the runway lights and the runway. He did not recall what his descent rate was at that time. He did not see the VASI lights until he was “fairly close in”. When the F/O announced “runway in sight”, they both made the comment that the “trees look a lot bigger than they should”. The trees looked closer than what he thought they should have and he was surprised that they looked so close. He thought it might have been an optical illusion. They were within a mile of the runway. He immediately added power and pitched up about 50 feet and leveled off his altitude until they visually picked up the VASI, which indicated red over white, which was normal. “


(IOE Check Airman and Instructor)

“Captain XXXXXXX was asked about the descent profile if only the approach lights were seen when the airplane reached MDA. He said if the NFP should state “approach lights in sight, continue”. The FP could then descend to 100 feet above TDZE while leaving the airplane configuration the same. When asked what rate of descent should be used to 100 feet above TDZE, he stated “not very much because of the distance[to airport] - 200 to 300 fpm would be acceptable”.



(First Officer)

“He said that as the descent to 1,320 feet continued he would say “100 above minimums” at 1,420 feet, and at 1,320 feet he would say “minimums.” He stated he would be looking “in and out” of the airplane at this time for the runway environment, and when he saw the approach lights, he would state “approach lights in sight, continue.” When the runway or airport was in sight, he would call the airport position relative to the clock position. He said that when the runway or airport was in sight, you could go down to 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation (TDZE), and that the FP would then state “leaving minimums, flap 35.”

When asked again about the “approach lights in sight, continue” call, and asked if most captains would stay at MDA or go down, he said that they would start down at a slow rate of descent about 100 to 200 fpm until they got the VASI in sight. He said the VASI lights would be showing red over red “a ways out”, and that they could go down to 1,064 which was 100 feet above the touchdown zone after the approach lights were in sight. He said he would stop the descent until the VASI was “captured”, then begin a descent. He would maintain flaps 20 until he got red over white on the VASI lights, at which point the flying pilot would state “leaving minimums, flaps 35.” He was asked if he would say something to the FP if he dropped below 100 feet above the touchdown zone before getting the runway lights and he said “YES, the callout is in the manual”.


More to come….

 

[Xav8tor]

NTSB Public Docket Excerpts – DCAMA004 a/k/a AA Flight 5966

_____________________________________

NSTB Group Chairman’s Factual Report – Operational Factors (Witness Interviews): Continued
_____________________________________


(Training Dept)

“If he was the FP on the LOC approach into IRK and he was at the MDA altitude and the NFP called out the “approach lights”, he would begin a descent toward 100 feet above the TDZE. He would then use a descent rate that would be equal to a normal ILS descent rate or about 500 fpm. During this descent, his attention would remain on the instruments inside the cockpit until the NFP called the “runway in sight”.”


(Check Airman)

“He stated that he had not heard anything about IRK or the runway 36 LOC approach from other pilots. He said that on the day of the accident, other pilots in the crew room were talking about how close the trees were on an approach, but he was not sure if this was in reference to IRK or the Fort Leonard Wood airport.”

(Instructor and Check Airman)

“For the profile for the approach into IRK, he would instruct a pilot to configure the airplane 3-4 miles before Kemmy which was the FAF. At the FAF, he should start a 1,000 to1,500 FPM. descent. He should leave minimums when he could transition to safely land. When he was asked if the FP could descend if the NFP called the approach lights in sight, he stated you could go down to 100 feet above the TDZE, but he would be careful depending on how close to the runway you were. He would not want to start down to 100 feet above the TDZE too early. On a non-precision approach, it would be rare for a pilot to leave the MDA without having the runway or the VASI in sight.”


(POI)

“POI XXXXXX said you could leave the MDA only after joining the glide slope or VASI, and you could make a normal descent to the runway. When asked about Corporate Airlines’ procedure of descending to MDA, then when the crew saw the approach lights, descending to 100 feet above touch down zone elevation, he said he did not want to see Corporate Airlines pilots descending from the MDA before intercepting the VASI. He was not aware that Corporate Airlines was applying this procedure.”

(Asst. POI)

He was currently assigned to the Corporate Airlines certificate as the Assistant POI (APOI)…he had only been on the Corporate Airlines certificate management team for one year. In late January (2004) he had completed the type rating for the British Aerospace (BA) BA-3100.

When asked if the FP had to respond to any of the calls announced by the NFP, Inspector XXXXX said no. Inspector XXXXX said on the accident flight, the captain was the FP and by the procedures in the aircraft manual, his instrument scan should be inside the airplane, not outside. When asked if the FP should look outside the airplane, he said “he’s the captain; he’s responsible, if he wants to look out—that’s his prerogative, but it was not in the written procedures”. He said his opinion was that if he was the captain he would “throw a glance outside.” When asked if the aircraft manual said the captain could “not” look out during the approach. Inspector XXXXXX said he could not recall.
When asked if the crew were required to maintain the MDA once it was reached, he said Part 91 required them to maintain the MDA until additional information was obtained.

When asked what he would say if he knew the FP was the first to call the approach lights, Inspector XXXX responded that he would say they were not following their own procedures. He stated the NFP was supposed to call the approach lights in sight, because the FP was to be on the gauges flying the aircraft. When asked if they were required to follow the Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI), Inspector XXXXX said all the simulator approaches had a VASI and he had seen crews follow them. When asked if that meant they must stay at the MDA, he said “no” when you are at MDA and you see the approach lights, you could go down to 100 feet above the touchdown zone elevation (TDZE) until you joined the VASI then continue down the VASI to land. He was asked about a procedure in the flight manual which said that the crew must remain at or above the VASI. He was asked if that did not mean the crew must stay at the MDA until it joined the VASI and he responded “no” the crew could descend to 100 feet above TDZE once the approach lights were visible. They could then join the VASI from that altitude or land before the VASI if they were in a position to do so. He said a properly trained instrument pilot would know what that meant. When asked could the crew descend if they were several miles from the airport when they saw the approach lights, Inspector XXXXXX replied that when they were at MDA and saw the approach lights they could descend to TDZE plus 100 feet. He said that at that point the aircraft could be skimming across the tops of the trees.

He was asked if he was aware of an incident at IRK on the night before the accident when a Corporate Airlines crew had to climb to avoid colliding with a tree using the same approach procedures as the accident crew. He said he was not aware of that and felt he should have been advised. He said he stood by his evaluation that Corporate Airlines was flying safely and in accordance with the FARs.

Inspector YYYY described the accident flight’s approach and asked about the crew descending to an altitude of 1,064 feet which was the airport TDZE plus 100 feet. Inspector YYYYY stated that the Jeppesen chart for the airport showed a tree rising to an altitude of 1027 feet, which resulted in a theoretical separation between tree and an airborne airplane of only 37 feet. Inspector XXXX said there was nothing wrong with that as it was allowed by FAR part 91. Inspector YYYY stated both crewmembers altimeters could legally have an error up to 75 feet, and said that could put the airplane into the ground if they were descending to 100 feet above the TDZE.

Inspector was asked did he still approve of a descent to TDZE plus 100 feet procedure knowing that information. Inspector XXXXX stated that the descent to 100 feet above the TDZE was allowed by the FARs. He was asked what altitude clearance the Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) provided for the crews as they descended below the MDA and proceeded to the TDZE plus 100 feet altitude.

Inspector XXXXX said the protection afforded was defined in FAA Order 7110. He was asked why a VASI would be necessary if it was always possible to just descend to the TDZE plus 100 foot altitude. Inspector XXXXX replied that was covered by TERPS. He was asked how the crew would be protected from obstacles on the approach course and during landing. Inspector XXXXX replied that was covered by TERPS.

(End of relevant Interviews)

 

[enigma]

OK, quick poll here men. How many of you were trained to descend from the MDA on a non-precision approach using only the approach lights as a point of reference?

In my opinion, the POI is correct. Everyone else is an accident waiting to happen. Hopefully, they've changed their thinking since this tragedy.

What is legal, is not always safe!


Update, I just dug through all of my old training manuals. I found copies of the FAA instrument training handbook, etc. Nowhere in any of them do they give specific guidance about the proper method to descend from MDA on a non-precision approach. The best I can find is printed in the AirSafety Foundations' Instrument Flying Manual (late 1980's). It states, "Visual reference is the minimum visual reference that a pilot should have in view before continuing the approach below the DH or MDA. The visual segment should contain sufficient physical features(approach lights, runway lights, runway markings and featuresin the general runway environment) to ensure that the position of the airplane relative to the desired flightpath can be positively ascertained. This then enables the pilot to make an informed judgment at DH or MDA, and therefore to maintain stable flight towards the runway"

The red highlighting is mine.

Obviously, most all training manual writers, and the FAA consider this to be so basic, so obvious, that they don't even bother telling begining instrument pilots that they need real good visual reference of the entire runway environment before they descend from MDA. It seems pretty obvious to me, the last place I want to be is floundering around below MDA with only one point of reference(ALS) for spatial orientation. One point of reference is insufficient for maintaining orientation in a three dimensional environment.


enigma

 

[FN FAL]

I hear you Enigma, this is insane.

 

[TurboS7]

You can decend if you see the lights, but you also must decend on the VASI or a 3 degree glideslope. You can do this with a GPS by putting the end of the runway "Up" and just using a 3 to 1 off the end. Diving for the lights and using the lights as a ref to get the the airport is a great way to get killed in low weather.

 

[Xav8tor]

Turbo,

I wish the board admin would allow attachments because I could upload a profile of the subject flight path and approach. I even spent an hour trying to do one in ascii but it looked like crap and I gave up. On this flight, they didn't really "dive" for the lights, but thought they saw them about 1.8 to 1.9 miles from the threshold, which is the point when they continued on down through MDA. Close examination of the FDR roughly time correlated with the CVR reveals that it looks like they went through 1320 (MDA) even a little before they said they saw the ALS. They kept the same rate of descent all the way down and even went lower than 100 above TDZE (1064) a couple of tenths of a mile or so before topping the first tree. In other words, from MDA to a split second before the first impact, it was a constant rate of descent.

It is on the CVR and in the witness interviews I posted above that you get the impression the descent below MDA to 100 feet was intentional. Looking at the flight path/FDR data alone, you would probably conclude they never were going to stop the descent at all until the second they saw the trees. That is why I still fear the NTSB may gloss over this issue even though it appears they are giving it a hard look. If ALPA was a party to this investigation, I guarantee you they would make sure it gets in the final report as at least a contributing factor for two reasons: 1) it is a system safety issue and affects all pilots, and 2) it takes some of the heat off of the crew, as it should if that is what they were taught to do (OT editorial comment: ditto for the AA A300 FO).

I agree about GPS being a Godsend and using it to make your own GS, VDP, even "ILS" (as a backup), as long as you do it correctly. We never had that luxury in the J32: no GPS and no AP either. I've flown two-seaters with more bells and whistles than the old 800/900 serial no. Jetstreams. However, they do have two baro altimeters, two radar altimeters, two DH/MDA alerters (lights), and a GPWS that yells at you more than once before you eat dirt. Sadly, none of that will do anyone a bit of good if everyone from your CFII to the people that wrote the rules tell you it is safe to trim the tops of trees two miles out if you can see a string of little white light bulbs.

 

[TurboS7]

Especially when the little white lite bulbs turn out to be a road---too late. EU uses the constant rate decent which is being taught in most 121 ops now combined with the VNAV/LNAV stuff makes big airplane flying a lot safer. For little guys just maintain the MDA until you see the runway, usually the slow speed still allows for a decent that will put you in the touchdown zone. It is fun but you have to be careful.

 

[Xav8tor]

Whoa there, I hate to disagree, especially with someone with your level of experience, but let's not let the big plane/little plane debate change this thread's topic. The whole concept of using VNAV equipment or any other method of estimating a VDP was conceived in response to government and industry efforts to reduce CFIT accidents (many of which involved very heavy 121 aircraft flown by pilots who had so much time they quit logging it except for currency or company requirements). Also, everyone needs to be aware that the lack of a published VDP means there is an obstacle in your way that precludes using one. Of course, most pilots will never learn or know that because it is buried deep within the TERPS and one or two other obscure FAA documents.

Do it yourself approaches, or approach aids, carry their own risks (another topic). I've flown Bonanzas and Barons with more glass than any Boeing older than an NG and many of the guys sitting next to me were, for example, ex EAL L10 Captains, furloughs from any number of heavy jet ops, and one was an ex AF1 driver (you had to drag that tidbit out of him). Turb, I know you meant no offense, but that is the kind of comment (i.e., "little guys...big planes are safer, etc.") that turns these useful forums into out of control battlegrounds. I know some of the folks who have done/do the hiring at a couple of BIG 121 outfits and they absolutely adore J32 drivers with a couple of years handflying in hard IMC shooting approaches into places like IRK. At one airline, if they are hiring, it is almost an automatic interview. According to most guys I've asked who have flown just about everything, they all say, almost without exception (like a shorty Lear, or some F-x,y or z), below FL250 and 250KIAS, if you can fly the J32 well on the panel, you can fly anything. Keeping that thing straight and level without any needles moving is not that easy. OK, now I am biased and getting OT myself, but the bottom line is: It isn't the size (or sophistication) of your equipment, it is what you do with it that counts. I'm quite sure that I am right about that because I married a very smart (and beautiful) woman who tells me that at least once a week!

Flown properly, I personally don't believe a non-precision approach, especially a straight-in LOC/DME is inherently more dangerous than a CAT III ILS. It just means I need a little more viz to have a shot at seeing the runway in time to make a smooth touchdown. In addition, I say again, flown as designed and by the book, the "chop and drop" is IMHO, just as safe as the constant ROD method and even has certain advantages (another topic/debate). And I can think of one recent semi-major crash where the cause might have been a DIY GPS approach instead of just flying the LOC/DME as published.

I can't speak for the RJ's because I turned down the opportunity to fly the first 170's at one carrier and left the other long before the RJ's came on property, but I am slightly familiar with the non-precision profiles for the J32 (the way they were 11 years ago at one J32 airline-the biggest one, and 3 years ago at another one–not that many 32’s but still 121): Gear and 20 with speeds (props) high before the FAF, slow to and maintain 130 KIAS all the way down until going visual. At the FAF, Tq back to a little above flight idle (any less and it will NTS on you), that brings her down at 1000 to 1200 fpm and at 50 or so above MDA sock the power to it to maintain level flight at MDA at 130 KIAS (50% Tq up to whatever it takes), at the PF's option, re-engage the FD if desired, and STAY AT MDA until you have to make the decision that is the conundrum (I liked the use of that word for this issue), according to the rules/procedures in question. We set all sorts of altitude reminders and before GPWS was installed, had a gizmo we called "BitchinBetty" to look over our shoulder. BTW, since when is 130K slow for an approach speed? We never went below 125 and adding 10 wasn't uncommon. Our 32's used to get "can you slow her up a bit?" all the time in trail of a 7xx, DC-x, A-3xx, on a routine basis. Of course that wasn't on an non-precision approach either, except for maybe one or two places in the islands. ILS or not, our approach speeds were basically the same. One profile allowed for 170 at the FAF and around a 120 ref over the fence. Maybe not the fastest, but it seemed pretty quick to me.

Since day one of IFR training, I interpreted (in application, not literally) the reg(s) in question to mean: “at the MAP or at DH/DA, but not before, if you don’t see one of these things on the list, execute a missed approach, except that, if you see only the approach lights, you can come on down to 100 above the runway, then if you still don’t see one of the other items on the list, execute the miss. On top of that, if there is a GS or VASI, you must remain at or above it until...over the "fence," crossing the threshold, required for landing, dadgum sure there is nothing but concrete under you, whatever it says in that part of the regs, I'm too tired to remember or look up the exact wording.

Now, back to the original question: Why is there such a huge freaking hole in the system that encourages otherwise apparently highly qualified and experienced pilots to assume they can use the sighting of the ALS (without more) to drop down to the treetops outside the MM or its equivalent distance from the threshold?

 

[TurboS7]

Just to qualify myself I had 10,000 hours in small aircraft before I started flying heavy aircraft. Since ,another 3000 hours in Lear 20 Series aircraft. I am actually in agreement with you but since I fly an NG and VNAV/LNAV seems to be our next rav I am quoting what I am learning. Cheers.

 

[Xav8tor]

No need to "qualify yourself." It is obvious. That stuff must be nice. I'd take almost anything that flies if I could make a decent living at it and still have at least 12 off a month over what I'm doing now. I miss the line like a lost lover, but on the other hand, they've taken all the fun out of it in the air with too much automation and the BS on the ground is worse than ever.

What I really envy is that SES of yours.

 

[TurboS7]

I just got the SES and a little time putsing around with it on my own, never did seaplane stuff commerically. At least I am doing charter which makes it interesting. I just did a trip with 3 days layover at Maui, I was able to take my wife along which was nice. At least I keep from being bored. On the ground it is a mess and getting worse.

 

[Xav8tor]

A 3 day in Maui. Man, I thought I had hit the bigtime with a 14 hour once in the Bahamas! NG, and SES to play with, and a wife on a long layover on a tropical beach. No way you deserve that! I paid my dues too and they kept closing bases, grounding fleets, shutting down, and filing BK everywhere I went. Lucky #$%^&*@. Seriously, hard-earned, lucky, or somewhere between, be thankful every single day you wake up, for you are one of the chosen few.

Now back On T. Please people, help me figure this thing out. Let's have more opinions, experiences, cites to regs, accident or NASA reports, anything but flames and smarta** comments. Don't make me do all the work. My business stinks right now (which is a good thing for everyone in aviation and the travelling public), but I do have some work to do besides haunting flightinfo.

Help a brother out and maybe together we can save a tree...sorry, just a little gallows humor to try and lighten up what I see to be a deadly serious situation that not nearly enough people seem to be concerned about. I will tell you that I did get a PM from someone who IS actually taking the bull by the horns in a very brave and proper fashion. I'd share it but I assume if he wanted me to do that he would have posted it.

We need LOTS more participation. Maybe someone could let the guys on the other boards here and at other av sites in on this with a link or something. I would have put this on the FAR, Regionals, etc. sections here but I thought that would be a cross-post violation. Don't forget, it isn't just 91.175 that's a problem. I think the diff's between how obstacles are depicted (or not) on NACO v. Jepps is a biggie too. It sure could have been a factor on 5966.

 

[FN FAL]

The harrowing part about this accident discussion comes to haunt me a little bit now that I am recently certified to do GPS non-precision approaches.

After I did my checkride, I decided to prosecute a couple of these approaches in VMC conditions, while on my IFR arrivals to airports along my route. Just to familiarize me with the procedures better and to see what the "lay of the land" was like before I would have to shoot one of these to mins at night.

Where this correlates in the discussion is the use of radar altimeter, MDA and the use of 'derived' VDP's for positional awareness.

First, my chief pilot did my checkride on the GPS approaches and he went through quite the song and dance about getting down to MDA in time to see the airport...but do it safely. So he went through the math with me on how to calculate where a VDP should be on a few of the approaches, just so a pilot would have a margin of safety in positional awareness...not to be used as "inventing your own procedures". I enjoyed the presentation and he did a great job of correlating it to glide path and distance from the airport.

What he was trying to do was emphasize knowing where you need to be so that you can make a "normal landing". I think his point was, if you go to the missed approach point at MDA and all the sudden you make out the runway, you might be too high and too fast to make a normal approach. He wasn't trying teach an "improvised approach".

Second, I use radar altimeter for all approaches and I use the autopilot quite a bit, especially on non-precision approaches to mins. It's my PF, since we are single pilot 135.

While flying my first VFR GPS approach after getting certified, I had a pretty eye opening experience. I crossed the FAF and started my descent to MDA with the radar altimeter set to MDA...which was about 380-390 feet. The plane was configured for the approach before the FAF, with the approach plate briefed and the checklists complete as well. All I had to do was chop power, start about a 1,000 FPM descent, let the autopilot keep lateral guidence and taper off the descent rate, capturing MDA with the alt hold button and replacing approach power for level off.

I was totally not prepared for the view out the front of the windscreen!!! There is rising terrain between the FAF and MAP and the descent looked scary in daylight VFR conditions. Just under 100 feet above MDA, the radar altimeter beeps and I get a light...WTF? Damm we look close to those trees!

I checked both altimeters and the plate again, I was where I was supposed to be...AT MDA and ON COURSE! I reached the VASI, disconected and landed. These GPS approaches are sweet!

All the radar altimeter did, was it's job...remind me that terrain away from the airport can be higher than TDZE.

 

[Xav8tor]

Can anyone help me out on how I can post a graphic of this approach and flightpath? It would help our discussions considerably. I don't have the inclination or time to open an image hosting account to link to. Any ideas????

 

[enigma]

Can anyone help me out on how I can post a graphic of this approach and flightpath? It would help our discussions considerably. I don't have the inclination or time to open an image hosting account to link to. Any ideas????

I can't help here at FI, but I can help with another site.

www.spirit-pilots.com

The page will load as Airline Employee Forums, for now, soon the site address will change to the Airline name instead of Spirit. It used to be named Spirit, but management apparently didn't like that

You'll have to register, but I believe that anyone can. Only Spirit pilots can see the restricted forum, but there are open forums on which anyone can post. You can attatch pics, forms, etc.

enigma

edit: once you post it there, please put a link on here to the page.

 

[firstthird]

FN FAL,
not sure I'm reading your post correctly. You're using Radalt for setting mins for non-precisions? I just know how we do it in the reserves and at my airline, and we set MDAs in the Baro for most stuff. At my airline, the only time we set the MDA in the radalt is CAT II ILS and below.
It seems that setting a non-prec min in the radalt is not ideal, since it is a height above airport, versus a precision height above TDZE. Especially since you'll get weird indications like the trees and ridges and whatnot. Seems that setting MDA in Baro, and scanning the Radalt for SA would be a better choice.
thoughts?