Clutch,
Thanks for all that hard work. To answer your last questions first, it is a long story. I've worked on a number of crashes in varying capacities on every side of the fence there is, but I've NEVER bought "pilot error" as the "probable cause." In fact, in my opinion, there is no such thing. It's called "Reason's Model." It takes a whole string of holes in the system to bring an airplane down. The problem is usually far up the chain. What I have always done, no matter who I was working for (airline, law firm, pilot, individuals), or even out of my own personal interest when just reading about an accident, is attempt to understand why they occur and how to prevent them from happening again. I had the same philosophy when I was a Director of Safety. When airplanes crash, the root causes (plural) are in the system, NOT the people.
What I, as a plain old individual, for my own benefit, am "fishing" for on a public discussion board, where other pilots may benefit, are answers to why an apparently large number of people interpret 91.175 as they do, and why those who write the regs and design approaches have left such a gaping hole in the system that continues to exist even though there have been similar accidents before this one. I know that the law, which is what the FAR’s are after all, is not black and white, but there must be a clear and definitive answer to these issues.
In the future, in my areas of expertise (and I admit TERPS ain’t one of 'em), I'd like to teach, write a book, and do research. I am not a practicing attorney and haven't even sat for a bar...yet-maybe some day (but I have sat "at" a few though!). The main reason I learned the law and got the JD (law degree) was because when I went to DC and participated in an NTSB crash investigation as the CVR expert for the union (trying my best to keep the crew from getting "hung"), I saw and heard things that made my skin crawl and realized that if I was ever going have a snowball's chance in He11 of "making a difference," I needed to learn the rules of the game in order to play it. Would I do it again? Nope...it cost me far more than my house and if I had stayed put where I was I'd be a (big regional) super-seniority Captain at the top of the pay scale with 15 days off a month and zero debt spending my days off on SoBe. I got back in the airline game as a DOS and got to fly a little more time on the line to boot…the most fun I’ve ever had and gotten paid for it. Then 9/11 came along and well, you know the rest of the story. Me and 30 or 40 thousand other airline employees hit the street. All but a few airline safety departments were slashed in half, or worse. My airline folded completely, and the one they wanted me to transfer to is disappearing at this very moment. Since then, every offer I've had has either been up North or from a startup. No thanks. Even the carrot of a 74 type from one and a 320 from another one wasn't enough to take a chance on an underfunded startup in this economy.
From a purely personal standpoint, yes, as I said before, it would be very gratifying if I could continue to play a role in enhancing flight safety. Professionally, yes, if I did help push through a needed change in the regs that solved a systemwide safety issue, it would be nice to put that on a resume, or at least bring it up in an interview - to offset the gray hair (why do they all want "experience" but only want to hire "young" people?). Finally, as a “Samaritan,” I've had some success doing this sort of thing before and it is really a good feeling. Try it, you’ll like it, but don’t expect much in the way of $$$ or even credit for doing it. Other than teaching, my dream job now I guess would be either at NTSB (but that’s out due to the GS salary not covering my student loans) or lobbyist for an aviation safety organization (ALPA, FSF, etc., yes! ATA or RAA, not a chance!) Sounds like your current position might be attractive as well! Any openings? I can't hit a tennis ball worth a c rap, but I drive a mean RX-8 in the turns and am pretty darn good with my hands (according to my wife and her forerunners).
Regarding 5966 itself, as far as my questions on this board are concerned, I don't have a single one. The facts are all in the public docket. If I could find a better accident to illustrate the problem(s), I’d use it. (AA 1572 is fairly close though). The reports released by the NTSB about the IRK accident, along with the IRK LOC/DME 36 plate, are merely perfect illustrations of the question/issues that I originally posed and wanted the input of knowledgeable members, such as yourself, about. As I posted before, until they opened the docket on this crash I personally had never thought this sort of 91.175 decision could lead to an accident. However, I did know how I understood the reg and the safe way to shoot a LOC without incorporating a VDP: the ALS sighting permitting 100 above TDZE only makes sense on an ILS (but that isn't how the reg is written or how it is being applied by some people and one is too many).
The chart issue was an afterthought, but again, something I had never been aware of as it applies to this scenario. Because almost every airline uses Jepps, as do most pro pilots, why don't they chart obstacles less than 400' high, especially when the obstacle in question is the final segment controlling obstacle and almost dead on the extended centerline? I am almost positive it is that group of trees that precluded a charted VDP. In addition to charting, there is a possibility that there is something wrong with the approach design itself. I didn't work on the nav/chart aspect of the AA Cali crash, but I do recall that issues with the nav info that existed were ultimately used to take a sizeable chunk of the heat off of the crew. I can think of at least two other accidents where the same thing was done.
My approach to every "pilot error" accident is: OK, the pilot may have made a mistake and/or misunderstood something, but what led him there? An ambiguous reg, inaccurate chart, omission in the AOM, negative training, management pressure/corporate safety culture, etc.? More often than not, everyone involved in an aircraft accident investigation sees the final error as the only error. The rest, if mentioned at all, get buried somewhere else deep in the report or reduced to being labelled "contributing factor." In the more enlightened airline safety departments, and at some other developed country agencies, EVERY factor is a probable cause.
Like you, I am now deep into the TERPS, other AFS-420 pubs, and a huge stack of books and docs trying to piece it all together. (More on that later. I need time to "process" all of that info and get some honeydo’s done). Meanwhile, I disagree about 91.175 being clear enough, but do agree about it not being properly applied. Seems to me like most pilots interpret (c)1 as meaning "don't be too HIGH" when reaching DA/MAP. Viz under (2) is assumed here and the ALS meeting (3)(i) as the reg is written, but not, as you pointed out, properly applied, is exactly the question before us.
PS- Is anyone else at all concerned about the differences in Jepps and NACO obstacle charting or do you just assume that if you fly as published there isn't anything to worry about? I've read ebough of the TERPS to know some things I'm glad I didn't know back when I was a II doing a lot of training in actual, but there is something about "controlling" obstacles not being charted that doesn't feel right.
PPS - 130KIAS is the final segment approach speed used by most J32 operators, Vref "over the fence" with flaps 35 varies by weight of course and is somewhat slower than that (I don't have the manual handy) Edit-110 to 112 seems like it was about avg. ref.
I read a copy of the factual reports (Operations, FDR, CVR, etc.) on the J32 accident last year in IRK. According to investigation interview statements made by pilots, managers and an FAA inspector, a lot of pilots are under the impression that, upon seeing the approach lights during a non-precision approach, it is permissible to continue descent from MDA to 100 feet above the touchdown zone – REGARDLESS of the aircraft’s distance to the threshold. In other words, after crossing the FAF and doing the old chop and drop to MDA, for example, at two miles DME from the runway/MAP you see the ALS, (but not the VASI or runway lights), they thought it was permissible (and safe) to go ahead and keep on going down to 100 feet while still that far out.
