Air France 447, automation and the pilot

[Baronman]

I thought one design feature that probably significantly added to the confusion was that of their being no stall warning as airspeed was too slow to be reliable.

In the AF case their was no stall warning as they were stalled and falling, the stall warning only began as they lowered their AOA and airspeed indications became "reliable" again. Essentially as they began to rectify the situation they were given negative feedback via aural stall warnings.

Another thing I can't understand is why the CA left right when things were getting interesting. The flying FO being very inexperienced (<3000 hrs) and the returning FO being a management pilot who rarely flew. Palmer's book really highlights the junior FO's anxiety approaching the weather. He was getting very flustered that they were at FL350 rather than 370 or asking twice if they could get 360...All in an effort to get over the weather. I think the other two were dismissive of him knowing they wouldn't top out any real severe WX out there.

 

[freightdogfred]

They definitely weren't asleep or with the radar off. A while ago I read or saw some scenarios from that evening where there was probably some attenuation going on...They were deviating around fairly large areas that were hiding an even larger area that they ended up penetrating.

Not true. They passed all waypoints on track (INTOL,SALPU,ORARO)
After passing ORARO enroute to TASIL is when the chit hit the fan, and the deviation west of track began, actually turning into prob the highest, most active part of the cell. There is just no way any flight crew could penetrate such an area of weather with a fully functional radar.


[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]On July 11, 2009, EuroCockpit released an important information about other commercial flights that were close to Air France Flight 447 in terms of both distance and time. These flights tracked the same route to TASIL between FL 350 and FL 370. Iberia Airlines Flight 6024, Rio De Janeiro to Madrid, flying a Boeing 747 was only 12 minutes behind Air France Fight 447. IB-6024 found a safe flight path through severe storms that were not revealed in advance on their radar as managing director of Air France Pierre-Henri Gourgeon explained in Le Figaro July 8, 2009. Lufthansa 507, St. Paulo to Frankfurt was 20 minutes behind AF 447, and Air France Flight 459, Sao Paul to Paris was 37 minutes behind. Each flight encountered storm cells and diverted from their planned flight paths with distances that ranged from 11 to 80 nautical miles. Turbulence was reported as moderate and problems were experienced communicating with Dakar (Senegal) but these situations did not require satellite phone conversations from the crew.[/FONT]

 

[Microclimates]

on the ground the 'double cross' function allows to monitor side stick deflection during flight control checks. wouldn't it be nice to have the feature in flight? you would have immediate info on the PF's control and understanding of the situation... just a couple of lines of code, nes pas?

 

[Baronman]

Not true. They passed all waypoints on track (INTOL,SALPU,ORARO)
After passing ORARO enroute to TASIL is when the chit hit the fan, and the deviation west of track began, actually turning into prob the highest, most active part of the cell. There is just no way any flight crew could penetrate such an area of weather with a fully functional radar.

So you believe they either didn't have the radar on or that it wasn't fully functional?

Hadn't they been in light/mod turb for a few minutes with St. Elmo's? Sometimes those conditions paint things we aren't accustomed to (ice doesn't paint well right?). The CVR reported the sound of ice prior to the pitot tubes failing. My guess is still embedded storms that weren't painting as well as they were accustomed to.

 

[freightdogfred]

So you believe they either didn't have the radar on or that it wasn't fully functional?

Hadn't they been in light/mod turb for a few minutes with St. Elmo's? Sometimes those conditions paint things we aren't accustomed to (ice doesn't paint well right?). The CVR reported the sound of ice prior to the pitot tubes failing. My guess is still embedded storms that weren't painting as well as they were accustomed to.

If the radar was operational, it was either mistuned on tilt or gain (not in auto) or as Dan Roman suggests the intensity of the display was dialed down. (I'm no expert on an A330's radar having never flown it.) It's either that, or it was not operational. To me there is no other explanation on their attempt to penetrate this area of weather. The other mitigating factors such as the pitot icing and poor pilot technique are just so many more links in the classic accident chain, along with Airbus inherent design flaws. Sad state of affairs which i hope we can learn from.

 

[Dan Roman]

That's a plausible explanation. But with all the flashing goin on outside?

Good point.....although they wouldn't be the first to be sitting there with cockpit lights up to full bright. That said the point was made they had in fact done some deviating...so that kills my theory!

 

[Flyer1015]

The weather was just a contributing factor, according to the transcripts and the data, the ride wasn't all that bad. The real problems come in with basic airmanship then the fact that the AB philosophy does not allow feedback to the other pilots to let them overcome the bad airmanship. The left seat guy obviously did not hear the warning that the right seat guy took back control, so when he moved his nintendo stick nothing happened further adding to the confusion.
When you are task loaded as you all should know the fine motor skills start degrading and you miss otherwise very obvious stuff.

All planes have their quirks, in this case the AB design helped doom this plane. You will never hear this mentioned from AB or anyone admitting that the super high tech, we hardly even need a pilot modern design, has any kind of design deficiency.
Why, because then they would have to fix it $$$$$$$$. That would open up liability for the thousands of airframes currently flying.
Doesn't anyone find it interesting that there has NEVER been an accident caused by an Airbus Design flaw? It is always pilot error, and only pilot error. name another aircraft manufacturer that has ever been that good.
This case is a perfect example, as there is plenty of contributing items. Bad weather decisions, Ab initio pilots, and pitot system failure. The report even talks about the confusion caused by the flight control design, but as always it stops short by just blaming the pilots for the confusion via bad communications.
Yea I know all aircraft ever manufactured have had problems surface except Airbus, they are perfect.

You can't just blame this on the sidestick not moving together as a cause. Keep in mind the guy in the left seat at the time was a FO who was management and hardly ever flew. He'd fly about once every 3 months, the bare minimum. You said the feedback could overcome the bad airmanship. Airmanship starts at knowing your instruments and pitch/power performance. The attitude indicators were clear the entire time. You can't really blame this crash on Airbus philosophy. A BirgenAir B757 crashed into the Ocean as well and only the CA side pitot probe was blocked. They rode the stick shaker all the way to the Ocean.

 

[Dornier 335]

If the radar was operational, it was either mistuned on tilt or gain (not in auto) or as Dan Roman suggests the intensity of the display was dialed down. (I'm no expert on an A330's radar having never flown it.) It's either that, or it was not operational. To me there is no other explanation on their attempt to penetrate this area of weather. The other mitigating factors such as the pitot icing and poor pilot technique are just so many more links in the classic accident chain, along with Airbus inherent design flaws. Sad state of affairs which i hope we can learn from.

I recommend buying the book I'd previously mentioned. We are at the point now where it is just too easy to put the entire blame on the pilot or Airbus. This is a VERY complex human factor/automation issue. The problem about this crash is that there is a lot of misinformation on the web (even on "mighty" pprune).

Regarding your statement about mistuning the radar, the f/o changed the gain to MAX at 02:08 (the crash was at 02:14).

Once again.....the focus shifts to the conditions encountered. Super-cooled water, graupel, under-sized pitot heat etc

WHAT WERE THEY DOING INSIDE THAT CELL TO BEGIN WITH

The crew was aware of the storm, but probably not of its severity. The crew did discuss deviations and changed their heading.

One interesting point the author makes is the difference between the Rockwell-Collins WXR 700 (ARF 447) and the newer WXR 2100. Basically, the 700 model required more manual adjustment.

 

[freightdogfred]

Good point.....although they wouldn't be the first to be sitting there with cockpit lights up to full bright. That said the point was made they had in fact done some deviating...so that kills my theory!

I don't think they did. The track I saw showed them directly overhead ORARO, enroute to TASIL. The time for deviation was long before ORARO, by then it was too late.

 

[Flyer1015]

You can't blame the weather deviation or lack thereof. The bottom line is it all started with a 2,900 hr wonder FO raised on the Airbus autopilot who had no clue about manual flight. That much was obvious from the second he took control when the AP kicked off. The other FO was a management guy who flew one trip every 3 months to barely stay current. He too was an ab-initio type.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

The attitude indicators were clear the entire time. You can't really blame this crash on Airbus philosophy. A BirgenAir B757 crashed into the Ocean as well and only the CA side pitot probe was blocked. They rode the stick shaker all the way to the Ocean.

Yeah, the fact that both pilots were each doing their own thing whilst remaining clueless about the other's input certainly didn't help though. Oddly enough, had they just sat there like a couple of stumps, they probably would have barreled right through, probes would cleared shortly thereafter and they could have been back on autopilot worrying about dinner.

 

[Dornier 335]

You can't blame the weather deviation or lack thereof. The bottom line is it all started with a 2,900 hr wonder FO raised on the Airbus autopilot who had no clue about manual flight. That much was obvious from the second he took control when the AP kicked off. The other FO was a management guy who flew one trip every 3 months to barely stay current. He too was an ab-initio type.

Not true. I assume you are referring to Pierre-Cedric Bonin. He had a glider rating. The pilots I have flown with who have a glider rating are a pretty good stick. That makes this whole accident more puzzling. Not accusing or defending anybody. Those are the facts.

 

[Dornier 335]

Yeah, the fact that both pilots were each doing their own thing whilst remaining clueless about the other's input certainly didn't help though. Oddly enough, had they just sat there like a couple of stumps, they probably would have barreled right through, probes would cleared shortly thereafter and they could have been back on autopilot worrying about dinner.

I guess you need to read up a little. They DID discuss wx and deviation.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

Oh, I'm aware they discussed deviating, did I say they didn't?

I'm referring to after their encounter with the ice crystals, their indications locking out and reverting to alternate mode. I was specifically referring to the side stick positions and control inputs no one clearly in control as each pilot cancelled each out. You'll see that I was responding to Flyer's quote about the "Airbus philosophy" - I didn't intend to imply they should have penetrated - just avoided the post encounter flail-ex. The plane's flight control system didn't help matters, IMO.

I see where I was ambiguous. When I was referring to "input" - I meant physical side stick command/movement.

 

[freightdogfred]

I guess you need to read up a little. They DID discuss wx and deviation.

They may have discussed it. They didn't do it. That's my point. Why? That's the part I find so puzzling