Air France 447, automation and the pilot

[Dan Roman]

That's a plausible explanation. But with all the flashing goin on outside?

Good point.....although they wouldn't be the first to be sitting there with cockpit lights up to full bright. That said the point was made they had in fact done some deviating...so that kills my theory!

 

[Flyer1015]

The weather was just a contributing factor, according to the transcripts and the data, the ride wasn't all that bad. The real problems come in with basic airmanship then the fact that the AB philosophy does not allow feedback to the other pilots to let them overcome the bad airmanship. The left seat guy obviously did not hear the warning that the right seat guy took back control, so when he moved his nintendo stick nothing happened further adding to the confusion.
When you are task loaded as you all should know the fine motor skills start degrading and you miss otherwise very obvious stuff.

All planes have their quirks, in this case the AB design helped doom this plane. You will never hear this mentioned from AB or anyone admitting that the super high tech, we hardly even need a pilot modern design, has any kind of design deficiency.
Why, because then they would have to fix it $$$$$$$$. That would open up liability for the thousands of airframes currently flying.
Doesn't anyone find it interesting that there has NEVER been an accident caused by an Airbus Design flaw? It is always pilot error, and only pilot error. name another aircraft manufacturer that has ever been that good.
This case is a perfect example, as there is plenty of contributing items. Bad weather decisions, Ab initio pilots, and pitot system failure. The report even talks about the confusion caused by the flight control design, but as always it stops short by just blaming the pilots for the confusion via bad communications.
Yea I know all aircraft ever manufactured have had problems surface except Airbus, they are perfect.

You can't just blame this on the sidestick not moving together as a cause. Keep in mind the guy in the left seat at the time was a FO who was management and hardly ever flew. He'd fly about once every 3 months, the bare minimum. You said the feedback could overcome the bad airmanship. Airmanship starts at knowing your instruments and pitch/power performance. The attitude indicators were clear the entire time. You can't really blame this crash on Airbus philosophy. A BirgenAir B757 crashed into the Ocean as well and only the CA side pitot probe was blocked. They rode the stick shaker all the way to the Ocean.

 

[Dornier 335]

If the radar was operational, it was either mistuned on tilt or gain (not in auto) or as Dan Roman suggests the intensity of the display was dialed down. (I'm no expert on an A330's radar having never flown it.) It's either that, or it was not operational. To me there is no other explanation on their attempt to penetrate this area of weather. The other mitigating factors such as the pitot icing and poor pilot technique are just so many more links in the classic accident chain, along with Airbus inherent design flaws. Sad state of affairs which i hope we can learn from.

I recommend buying the book I'd previously mentioned. We are at the point now where it is just too easy to put the entire blame on the pilot or Airbus. This is a VERY complex human factor/automation issue. The problem about this crash is that there is a lot of misinformation on the web (even on "mighty" pprune).

Regarding your statement about mistuning the radar, the f/o changed the gain to MAX at 02:08 (the crash was at 02:14).

Once again.....the focus shifts to the conditions encountered. Super-cooled water, graupel, under-sized pitot heat etc

WHAT WERE THEY DOING INSIDE THAT CELL TO BEGIN WITH

The crew was aware of the storm, but probably not of its severity. The crew did discuss deviations and changed their heading.

One interesting point the author makes is the difference between the Rockwell-Collins WXR 700 (ARF 447) and the newer WXR 2100. Basically, the 700 model required more manual adjustment.

 

[freightdogfred]

Good point.....although they wouldn't be the first to be sitting there with cockpit lights up to full bright. That said the point was made they had in fact done some deviating...so that kills my theory!

I don't think they did. The track I saw showed them directly overhead ORARO, enroute to TASIL. The time for deviation was long before ORARO, by then it was too late.

 

[Flyer1015]

You can't blame the weather deviation or lack thereof. The bottom line is it all started with a 2,900 hr wonder FO raised on the Airbus autopilot who had no clue about manual flight. That much was obvious from the second he took control when the AP kicked off. The other FO was a management guy who flew one trip every 3 months to barely stay current. He too was an ab-initio type.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

The attitude indicators were clear the entire time. You can't really blame this crash on Airbus philosophy. A BirgenAir B757 crashed into the Ocean as well and only the CA side pitot probe was blocked. They rode the stick shaker all the way to the Ocean.

Yeah, the fact that both pilots were each doing their own thing whilst remaining clueless about the other's input certainly didn't help though. Oddly enough, had they just sat there like a couple of stumps, they probably would have barreled right through, probes would cleared shortly thereafter and they could have been back on autopilot worrying about dinner.

 

[Dornier 335]

You can't blame the weather deviation or lack thereof. The bottom line is it all started with a 2,900 hr wonder FO raised on the Airbus autopilot who had no clue about manual flight. That much was obvious from the second he took control when the AP kicked off. The other FO was a management guy who flew one trip every 3 months to barely stay current. He too was an ab-initio type.

Not true. I assume you are referring to Pierre-Cedric Bonin. He had a glider rating. The pilots I have flown with who have a glider rating are a pretty good stick. That makes this whole accident more puzzling. Not accusing or defending anybody. Those are the facts.

 

[Dornier 335]

Yeah, the fact that both pilots were each doing their own thing whilst remaining clueless about the other's input certainly didn't help though. Oddly enough, had they just sat there like a couple of stumps, they probably would have barreled right through, probes would cleared shortly thereafter and they could have been back on autopilot worrying about dinner.

I guess you need to read up a little. They DID discuss wx and deviation.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

Oh, I'm aware they discussed deviating, did I say they didn't?

I'm referring to after their encounter with the ice crystals, their indications locking out and reverting to alternate mode. I was specifically referring to the side stick positions and control inputs no one clearly in control as each pilot cancelled each out. You'll see that I was responding to Flyer's quote about the "Airbus philosophy" - I didn't intend to imply they should have penetrated - just avoided the post encounter flail-ex. The plane's flight control system didn't help matters, IMO.

I see where I was ambiguous. When I was referring to "input" - I meant physical side stick command/movement.

 

[freightdogfred]

I guess you need to read up a little. They DID discuss wx and deviation.

They may have discussed it. They didn't do it. That's my point. Why? That's the part I find so puzzling

 

[enigma]

Not true. I assume you are referring to Pierre-Cedric Bonin. He had a glider rating. The pilots I have flown with who have a glider rating are a pretty good stick. That makes this whole accident more puzzling. Not accusing or defending anybody. Those are the facts.

This is true and it's about the only item I've seen in this entire thread that is factual.

I highly suggest that everyone download the official reports from the French BEA website and read all of those reports.

http://www.bea.aero/en/enquetes/flight.af.447/flight.af.447.php would be your starting point.


This accident was not as simple as most seem to think! We had some cheese with lots of holes, and on that night they all lined up.

The only thing I personally consider "pilot error" is the Captains actions. Other than that, it's way too complicated to blame on the pilots. The Captain came back into the cockpit and was told, "We lost all control of the airplane we don 't understand anything we've tried everything". This happened at 2h 11min 46.7 s of flight. (What I wrote is an exact quote from the official BEA accident report) I can't for the life of me understand why the Captain did not at that time, having been given that assessment of the flight, WHY HE DIDN'T TAKE HIS SEAT? ? ? He never attempted to fly the airplane. He either stood over their shoulders or sat in the jumpseat all the way to sea level.

 

[enigma]

They may have discussed it. They didn't do it. That's my point. Why? That's the part I find so puzzling

I don't know how to post a picture from the BEA report, but the interim report dated 27 May 2011 shows their flight path. They began a left deviation of about 10 degrees 80 or Kilometres before the upset.

 

[freightdogfred]

I don't know how to post a picture from the BEA report, but the interim report dated 27 May 2011 shows their flight path. They began a left deviation of about 10 degrees 80 or Kilometres before the upset.

I understand that. If you look at the links I posted previously, they were already in the thick of it by then

 

[enigma]

I understand that. If you look at the links I posted previously, they were already in the thick of it by then

You said that they didn't deviate. They did deviate. Maybe not to the extent required to avoid all the weather, but it isn't fair to them to state that they did not deviate.

As far as the weather pics on the site you linked to, they seem to be using the same images that the BEA used, and the BEA stated that those images were not sufficient to determine the conditions at the time of the accident. Additionally, the turbulence recorded by the doomed FDR's showed nothing more than light turbulence indicating that the w/x at time of upset was not particularly dangerous from a turbulent viewpoint.

 

[gmsguy]

[/U]

The only thing I personally consider "pilot error" is the Captains actions. Other than that, it's way too complicated to blame on the pilots.

Seriously?

"Above all, this was a stall accident. Initial prevention of the stall was possible. This is proven by a number of other flights with the same malfunction that maintained control, often with little effort. All indications show that the pitch up that resulted in the loss of airspeed and excessive angles of attack were pilot induced." - Bill Palmer, Understanding Air France 447.

Pilot sidestick inputs resulting in pitch attitudes exceeding 15 degrees nose up (at FL 350 in a transport category aircraft) and the loss of over 50 knots of airspeed within 30 seconds of the autopilot disconnecting is not something you consider pilot error?

Incidentally, didn't the BEA's final report say that by the time the Captain returned to the flight deck that it was "too late" to recover control of it? Perhaps the Captain's actions prior to returning to the flight deck contributed more to the crash than his inaction afterwards.

 

[nwaf16dude]

[/U]

Seriously?

"Above all, this was a stall accident. Initial prevention of the stall was possible. This is proven by a number of other flights with the same malfunction that maintained control, often with little effort. All indications show that the pitch up that resulted in the loss of airspeed and excessive angles of attack were pilot induced." - Bill Palmer, Understanding Air France 447.

Pilot sidestick inputs resulting in pitch attitudes exceeding 15 degrees nose up (at FL 350 in a transport category aircraft) and the loss of over 50 knots of airspeed within 30 seconds of the autopilot disconnecting is not something you consider pilot error?

Incidentally, didn't the BEA's final report say that by the time the Captain returned to the flight deck that it was "too late" to recover control of it? Perhaps the Captain's actions prior to returning to the flight deck contributed more to the crash than his inaction afterwards.

If the captain had returned to the cockpit, gotten into a control seat, immediately recognized the problem, and did the exact right thing, he theoretically could have recovered the airplane. Considering that he most likely just woke up from REM sleep, all of the above was probably impossible.

 

[gmsguy]

If the captain had returned to the cockpit, gotten into a control seat, immediately recognized the problem, and did the exact right thing, he theoretically could have recovered the airplane. Considering that he most likely just woke up from REM sleep, all of the above was probably impossible.

Perhaps...but not according to the BEA final report. Also, isn't there debate concerning the whereabouts of the Captain once he left the flight deck?.

If I recall correctly from the book, the Captain didn't acknowledge the repeated calls from the crew with the normal "knock" on the wall. Furthermore, I believe the author (Palmer) remarks about the way the Captain enters the flight deck as if he was not answering a call. Instead, he believes the Captain was returning to the flight deck because of his own curiosity and not from the rest area.

So his actions leaving the flight deck and before returning are questionable, and for me, where he is most culpable - not his actions once he was back in the flight deck.

Again, it was a stall accident above everything else. For two professional pilots unable to maintain straight and level flight for 1 minute while hand flying is baffling to me...and where the blame should be placed.

 

[Wesb737fo]

Again, it was a stall accident above everything else. For two professional pilots unable to maintain straight and level flight for 1 minute while hand flying is baffling to me...and where the blame should be placed.

Yeah, seems basically just that. A high altitude stall. Maybe not so baffling that the less experienced FO stalled the plane after the auto-pilot suddenly handed him the plane in a less than smooth ride at 350, but more so why Robert David called out the fact that he was climbing and then directed his attention somewhere else until the plane stabilized. I suppose there was a lot of puckering going on in that flight deck. Didn't help that the boss apparently had partied a little too hard the night before.

 

[freightdogfred]

You said that they didn't deviate. They did deviate. Maybe not to the extent required to avoid all the weather, but it isn't fair to them to state that they did not deviate.

As far as the weather pics on the site you linked to, they seem to be using the same images that the BEA used, and the BEA stated that those images were not sufficient to determine the conditions at the time of the accident. Additionally, the turbulence recorded by the doomed FDR's showed nothing more than light turbulence indicating that the w/x at time of upset was not particularly dangerous from a turbulent viewpoint.

I find that very hard to believe. Entering a cell with tops upwards of 56,000 ft will contain more than light turbulence, don't ask me how I know.

 

[SpauldingSmails]

Mmm, yeah. Tops don't get to 56,000' on the shear will of moisture alone.