Air France 447, automation and the pilot

[Erlanger]

Here's a good article about the human factor, automation in flying and the Air France 447 crash. Long article but good read.

http://www.vanityfair.com/business/2014/10/air-france-flight-447-crash

 

[SpauldingSmails]

Good read. Thanks.

 

[freightdogfred]

The thing that has always disturbed me about this accident is why that crew flew that airplane into a cell with tops above 56,000 ft.. The icing/stalling the wing is one thing, but what were they doing there in the first place?

http://ahrtp.com/RSS-JSfeeds/AF_447_weather_bkgrd.files.html

 

[SpauldingSmails]

With that crew, I think the tail was wagging the dog all along. They even had the FYI from dx.

 

[freightdogfred]

The focus of the investigation was on the inadequacies of the pitot heaters, and the lack of basic flying skills by the costar. A TAP (Air Portugal) 767 was 15 mins behind them on the same route and deviated over 200 miles off track. There never was any questioning on why they were where they were in the first place. My conclusion is
A) The radar was not on or it was not tuned or malfunctioning
B) They were asleep (72 hr Rio layover could be taxing)
C) They did not know what they were looking at

In defense of the crew I'm convinced they had a malfunctioning radar, it's the only plausible explanation to me.

 

[INIT REF]

I've come back to the cockpit after my break to find all the lights on, both relief pilots reading, and the radar off.

In the middle of the night.

In the middle of the North Atlantic.




It only takes once.

 

[Dan Roman]

Here's a theory on the radar. The radar return intensity is a knob within a knob. I.E. The knob that controls the nav display also has an inner knob that controls the radar return. On shutdown, crews dim all the screens (including the radar knob with the Nav display).
On preflight it's easy to turn the Nav display knob up but not the radar return knob. You would then be flying around with the radar on and not painting anything on your Nav display.

 

[tomgoodman]

Another radar tip: Certain failure modes will show a normal indication in the "test" switch position. To fully verify radar operation (when in a safe position to do so), turn it on and lower the tilt until it paints terrain.

 

[freightdogfred]

I've come back to the cockpit after my break to find all the lights on, both relief pilots reading, and the radar off.

In the middle of the night.

In the middle of the North Atlantic.




It only takes once.

The radar being off in the middle of the North Atlantic, in the middle of the night, would not bother me too much. The radar being off in the ITCZ in the middle of the night would bother me greatly. The flashes in the window, the St Elmo's fire lighting up the windows would have me twisting and tuning to get some kind of return. Infrared imaging showed temps of -75 to -80C which puts those cloud tops above 56,000 ft. And they flew right thru the middle of them. It's unexplainable.

 

[freightdogfred]

Here's a theory on the radar. The radar return intensity is a knob within a knob. I.E. The knob that controls the nav display also has an inner knob that controls the radar return. On shutdown, crews dim all the screens (including the radar knob with the Nav display).
On preflight it's easy to turn the Nav display knob up but not the radar return knob. You would then be flying around with the radar on and not painting anything on your Nav display.

That's a plausible explanation. But with all the flashing goin on outside?

 

[Dornier 335]

If you want a deeper analysis of AFR447, I recommend "Understanding Air France 447" by Bill Palmer. Very well researched.

 

[Dornier 335]

The focus of the investigation was on the inadequacies of the pitot heaters, and the lack of basic flying skills by the costar. A TAP (Air Portugal) 767 was 15 mins behind them on the same route and deviated over 200 miles off track. There never was any questioning on why they were where they were in the first place. My conclusion is
A) The radar was not on or it was not tuned or malfunctioning
B) They were asleep (72 hr Rio layover could be taxing)
C) They did not know what they were looking at

In defense of the crew I'm convinced they had a malfunctioning radar, it's the only plausible explanation to me.

One weather possibility being discussed in the book are high ice crystal concentrations aka graupel.

 

[freightdogfred]

Once again.....the focus shifts to the conditions encountered. Super-cooled water, graupel, under-sized pitot heat etc

WHAT WERE THEY DOING INSIDE THAT CELL TO BEGIN WITH

 

[Baronman]

They definitely weren't asleep or with the radar off. A while ago I read or saw some scenarios from that evening where there was probably some attenuation going on...They were deviating around fairly large areas that were hiding an even larger area that they ended up penetrating.

 

[FR8mastr]

The weather was just a contributing factor, according to the transcripts and the data, the ride wasn't all that bad. The real problems come in with basic airmanship then the fact that the AB philosophy does not allow feedback to the other pilots to let them overcome the bad airmanship. The left seat guy obviously did not hear the warning that the right seat guy took back control, so when he moved his nintendo stick nothing happened further adding to the confusion.
When you are task loaded as you all should know the fine motor skills start degrading and you miss otherwise very obvious stuff.

All planes have their quirks, in this case the AB design helped doom this plane. You will never hear this mentioned from AB or anyone admitting that the super high tech, we hardly even need a pilot modern design, has any kind of design deficiency.
Why, because then they would have to fix it $$$$$$$$. That would open up liability for the thousands of airframes currently flying.
Doesn't anyone find it interesting that there has NEVER been an accident caused by an Airbus Design flaw? It is always pilot error, and only pilot error. name another aircraft manufacturer that has ever been that good.
This case is a perfect example, as there is plenty of contributing items. Bad weather decisions, Ab initio pilots, and pitot system failure. The report even talks about the confusion caused by the flight control design, but as always it stops short by just blaming the pilots for the confusion via bad communications.
Yea I know all aircraft ever manufactured have had problems surface except Airbus, they are perfect.

 

[Baronman]

I thought one design feature that probably significantly added to the confusion was that of their being no stall warning as airspeed was too slow to be reliable.

In the AF case their was no stall warning as they were stalled and falling, the stall warning only began as they lowered their AOA and airspeed indications became "reliable" again. Essentially as they began to rectify the situation they were given negative feedback via aural stall warnings.

Another thing I can't understand is why the CA left right when things were getting interesting. The flying FO being very inexperienced (<3000 hrs) and the returning FO being a management pilot who rarely flew. Palmer's book really highlights the junior FO's anxiety approaching the weather. He was getting very flustered that they were at FL350 rather than 370 or asking twice if they could get 360...All in an effort to get over the weather. I think the other two were dismissive of him knowing they wouldn't top out any real severe WX out there.

 

[freightdogfred]

They definitely weren't asleep or with the radar off. A while ago I read or saw some scenarios from that evening where there was probably some attenuation going on...They were deviating around fairly large areas that were hiding an even larger area that they ended up penetrating.

Not true. They passed all waypoints on track (INTOL,SALPU,ORARO)
After passing ORARO enroute to TASIL is when the chit hit the fan, and the deviation west of track began, actually turning into prob the highest, most active part of the cell. There is just no way any flight crew could penetrate such an area of weather with a fully functional radar.


[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]On July 11, 2009, EuroCockpit released an important information about other commercial flights that were close to Air France Flight 447 in terms of both distance and time. These flights tracked the same route to TASIL between FL 350 and FL 370. Iberia Airlines Flight 6024, Rio De Janeiro to Madrid, flying a Boeing 747 was only 12 minutes behind Air France Fight 447. IB-6024 found a safe flight path through severe storms that were not revealed in advance on their radar as managing director of Air France Pierre-Henri Gourgeon explained in Le Figaro July 8, 2009. Lufthansa 507, St. Paulo to Frankfurt was 20 minutes behind AF 447, and Air France Flight 459, Sao Paul to Paris was 37 minutes behind. Each flight encountered storm cells and diverted from their planned flight paths with distances that ranged from 11 to 80 nautical miles. Turbulence was reported as moderate and problems were experienced communicating with Dakar (Senegal) but these situations did not require satellite phone conversations from the crew.[/FONT]

 

[Microclimates]

on the ground the 'double cross' function allows to monitor side stick deflection during flight control checks. wouldn't it be nice to have the feature in flight? you would have immediate info on the PF's control and understanding of the situation... just a couple of lines of code, nes pas?

 

[Baronman]

Not true. They passed all waypoints on track (INTOL,SALPU,ORARO)
After passing ORARO enroute to TASIL is when the chit hit the fan, and the deviation west of track began, actually turning into prob the highest, most active part of the cell. There is just no way any flight crew could penetrate such an area of weather with a fully functional radar.

So you believe they either didn't have the radar on or that it wasn't fully functional?

Hadn't they been in light/mod turb for a few minutes with St. Elmo's? Sometimes those conditions paint things we aren't accustomed to (ice doesn't paint well right?). The CVR reported the sound of ice prior to the pitot tubes failing. My guess is still embedded storms that weren't painting as well as they were accustomed to.

 

[freightdogfred]

So you believe they either didn't have the radar on or that it wasn't fully functional?

Hadn't they been in light/mod turb for a few minutes with St. Elmo's? Sometimes those conditions paint things we aren't accustomed to (ice doesn't paint well right?). The CVR reported the sound of ice prior to the pitot tubes failing. My guess is still embedded storms that weren't painting as well as they were accustomed to.

If the radar was operational, it was either mistuned on tilt or gain (not in auto) or as Dan Roman suggests the intensity of the display was dialed down. (I'm no expert on an A330's radar having never flown it.) It's either that, or it was not operational. To me there is no other explanation on their attempt to penetrate this area of weather. The other mitigating factors such as the pitot icing and poor pilot technique are just so many more links in the classic accident chain, along with Airbus inherent design flaws. Sad state of affairs which i hope we can learn from.