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June 24, 2011 JAOC Podcast: 1-855-JB4-ALPA or: http://jaoc.podbean.com/#
Transcript:
Lost and found. 7 min
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for listening in on this week's JAOC podcast for June 24th 2011.
Please stop by JFK this Saturday or Sunday to ask questions of ALPA representatives and your JAOC. We will also be visiting Boston on June 29th and returning to JFK on June 30th and July 1st.
Over the past few weeks we’ve received communications from PVC co-chairs and management implying that the ELT was on the verge of fixing the five documents when cards were filed for an NMB election. We can’t read minds and we won’t speculate as to what would have happened. But we can rely on history, past actions and facts to reach a logical conclusion.
Recently we visited the JetBlue Lost and Found Department. Lo and behold, we found many earlier misplaced promises. So let’s take a short trip down memory lane to refresh our recollections.
In September 2004, a PEA amendment came with a promise to review compensation after operating the E190 for one year. The review was to be known as the pilot compensation group (PCG). Over two years later, on December 19th, 2006, after months of delay, JetBlue delivered the results of the PCG. It contained a small pay raise for the E190. Most pilots were left out. Retirement issues, medical costs and work rule concerns were ignored. We were sorely disappointed and voiced our concerns loudly. Management scrambled to control the damage and promised to review pilot compensation by March, 31st 2007. This review would be known as PCG-2.
In road shows leading up to PCG-2, management made many promises to address pilot expectations. In fact, at one of the Long Beach PCG road shows, system chief pilot Craig Hoskins made the bold statement that PCG-2 will include significant improvements to PCG-1 and will NOT “rob Peter to pay Paul.”
The PCG2 study increased matching retirement contributions, wordsmith-ed PEA language and promised an annual compensation review. Management claimed that we were now at par with our peers. “Industry standard” became the new catch phrase for flight ops leadership. During this period however, work rules were unilaterally changed, pilots suffered financial hardship under our disability programs, and medical benefits declined at the same time as our share of costs soared. Promises of industry standard benefits were short-lived.
Management next formed the Pilot Compensation Review Board – also known as the PCRB - to benchmark JetBlue pilot pay, benefits and work rules in relation to terms for other pilots. For three months a group of dedicated Jetblue pilots compiled data that compared us to our peers. But management decided who that peer group was.
During road shows promoting the PCRB process, Vice President of Flight Operations John Ross, promised that any deficiencies noted by the PCRB report would be fixed retroactively to January 1st of that year.
But when the PCRB report was released, the Company’s actions fell way short of fixing disparities with our peers and we weren’t raised to their levels. Instead, there were minor improvements. Even more troubling, management denied that it had promised to make changes retroactive to January 1st. It wasn’t until a PCRB road show in JFK that a pilot played an audio recording of their earlier promise. Management then defended the change of heart by claiming that oil price increases caused them to revisit their earlier promise and commitment.
Our next stop down memory lane takes us to the JetBlue Pilots Association (JBPA) National Mediation Board card filing.
In 2007, a small group of pilots approached JetBlue management notifying them of their desire to form an in-house union called the JBPA. Their intention was to fashion an organization that mirrored the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association. As always, these pilot representatives voiced their strong support for the Company, its values and continued financial success.
In November 2008, the JBPA notified Dave Barger and the JetBlue Board of Directors of their intent to file interest cards with the NMB. Dave Barger emailed all JetBlue employees and workgroups to tell them that he felt “kicked in the teeth” by the actions of the pilots and that we were a threat to JetBlue’s culture and survival.
Management made numerous commitments and promises over the following weeks. Most frequently stated were: “we hear you loud and clear;” “we get it now;” and, “just give us one more chance.” Even more illuminating were their statements that “they were just about to provide improvements and ‘fixes’ to pilot issues” when the JBPA filed but due to laboratory conditions during an election, those fixes and improvements must be put on hold.”
During the JBPA campaign management made bold statements during aggressively scheduled face-to-face road shows that they “had work arounds” for the issues raised. JetBlue later admitted that the “work arounds” were not fully vetted or developed. After beating back the election challenge, senior managers retreated to their offices and the “improvements” and “fixes” never materialized.
Sweeping changes to the FSM and its implementation process reminded us again that our issues and priorities – along with Company commitments -- are rarely remembered. We haven’t forgotten Mike Barger’s letter promising no FSM changes without PVC approval. But a short time later, in the early days of the work rules committee, the FSM approval protocol was changed, Flight Operations “steering committees” were created and weighted unequally with managers who could now “shape” pilot recommendations, and a modified FSM was implemented in 2010 – without pilot approval! Of course, sections that reduced costs were implemented quickly. Sections that benefit pilots are largely still pending. Once again, pay raises were offset by pilot cost and benefit reductions. Peter was robbed again.
Finally, a year after management determined that a 2009 pay adjustment was “de minimus,” it offered a 1.09% pay adjustment based on its industry peer comparison. Of course, other pilots received their comparative rates for all of 2010 and we didn’t. We have yet to receive this year’s pay adjustment. When Sandy Sandoval was questioned at a Long Beach road show, he claimed the delay was “a good thing” for the pilots. He also stated that the pay rate adjustment was delayed so our PEAs could include new long term disability language that would address issues in that area. But when the PEA amendment was released, no changes to long term disability were included.
As pilots, we’re acutely aware of issues that affect our careers and our families. We make decisions based on facts and our experience. Reviewing facts and thinking analytically leads to one clear conclusion. That is, management is quick to promise that it “hears us” and promise “that there will be changes.” Our past experience shows those promises end up in the Lost and Found.
Regrettably, our visit to the Lost and Found Department reminds us that’s where most of management’s promises end up. Based on our history we can only conclude that meaningful improvements to the five documents were not imminent. Even if they were, our careful analysis showed how flawed those documents and the PVC approach are.
We’ve concluded that it’s time to stop relying on promises and start taking care of business by negotiating a contract for ourselves. We can’t afford to continue to gamble on our careers, security and our family’s benefits.
Thank you for calling in and please continue to fly safe and adhere to proper sterile cockpit discipline.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vote Yes for ALPA!
Transcript:
Lost and found. 7 min
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for listening in on this week's JAOC podcast for June 24th 2011.
Please stop by JFK this Saturday or Sunday to ask questions of ALPA representatives and your JAOC. We will also be visiting Boston on June 29th and returning to JFK on June 30th and July 1st.
Over the past few weeks we’ve received communications from PVC co-chairs and management implying that the ELT was on the verge of fixing the five documents when cards were filed for an NMB election. We can’t read minds and we won’t speculate as to what would have happened. But we can rely on history, past actions and facts to reach a logical conclusion.
Recently we visited the JetBlue Lost and Found Department. Lo and behold, we found many earlier misplaced promises. So let’s take a short trip down memory lane to refresh our recollections.
In September 2004, a PEA amendment came with a promise to review compensation after operating the E190 for one year. The review was to be known as the pilot compensation group (PCG). Over two years later, on December 19th, 2006, after months of delay, JetBlue delivered the results of the PCG. It contained a small pay raise for the E190. Most pilots were left out. Retirement issues, medical costs and work rule concerns were ignored. We were sorely disappointed and voiced our concerns loudly. Management scrambled to control the damage and promised to review pilot compensation by March, 31st 2007. This review would be known as PCG-2.
In road shows leading up to PCG-2, management made many promises to address pilot expectations. In fact, at one of the Long Beach PCG road shows, system chief pilot Craig Hoskins made the bold statement that PCG-2 will include significant improvements to PCG-1 and will NOT “rob Peter to pay Paul.”
The PCG2 study increased matching retirement contributions, wordsmith-ed PEA language and promised an annual compensation review. Management claimed that we were now at par with our peers. “Industry standard” became the new catch phrase for flight ops leadership. During this period however, work rules were unilaterally changed, pilots suffered financial hardship under our disability programs, and medical benefits declined at the same time as our share of costs soared. Promises of industry standard benefits were short-lived.
Management next formed the Pilot Compensation Review Board – also known as the PCRB - to benchmark JetBlue pilot pay, benefits and work rules in relation to terms for other pilots. For three months a group of dedicated Jetblue pilots compiled data that compared us to our peers. But management decided who that peer group was.
During road shows promoting the PCRB process, Vice President of Flight Operations John Ross, promised that any deficiencies noted by the PCRB report would be fixed retroactively to January 1st of that year.
But when the PCRB report was released, the Company’s actions fell way short of fixing disparities with our peers and we weren’t raised to their levels. Instead, there were minor improvements. Even more troubling, management denied that it had promised to make changes retroactive to January 1st. It wasn’t until a PCRB road show in JFK that a pilot played an audio recording of their earlier promise. Management then defended the change of heart by claiming that oil price increases caused them to revisit their earlier promise and commitment.
Our next stop down memory lane takes us to the JetBlue Pilots Association (JBPA) National Mediation Board card filing.
In 2007, a small group of pilots approached JetBlue management notifying them of their desire to form an in-house union called the JBPA. Their intention was to fashion an organization that mirrored the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association. As always, these pilot representatives voiced their strong support for the Company, its values and continued financial success.
In November 2008, the JBPA notified Dave Barger and the JetBlue Board of Directors of their intent to file interest cards with the NMB. Dave Barger emailed all JetBlue employees and workgroups to tell them that he felt “kicked in the teeth” by the actions of the pilots and that we were a threat to JetBlue’s culture and survival.
Management made numerous commitments and promises over the following weeks. Most frequently stated were: “we hear you loud and clear;” “we get it now;” and, “just give us one more chance.” Even more illuminating were their statements that “they were just about to provide improvements and ‘fixes’ to pilot issues” when the JBPA filed but due to laboratory conditions during an election, those fixes and improvements must be put on hold.”
During the JBPA campaign management made bold statements during aggressively scheduled face-to-face road shows that they “had work arounds” for the issues raised. JetBlue later admitted that the “work arounds” were not fully vetted or developed. After beating back the election challenge, senior managers retreated to their offices and the “improvements” and “fixes” never materialized.
Sweeping changes to the FSM and its implementation process reminded us again that our issues and priorities – along with Company commitments -- are rarely remembered. We haven’t forgotten Mike Barger’s letter promising no FSM changes without PVC approval. But a short time later, in the early days of the work rules committee, the FSM approval protocol was changed, Flight Operations “steering committees” were created and weighted unequally with managers who could now “shape” pilot recommendations, and a modified FSM was implemented in 2010 – without pilot approval! Of course, sections that reduced costs were implemented quickly. Sections that benefit pilots are largely still pending. Once again, pay raises were offset by pilot cost and benefit reductions. Peter was robbed again.
Finally, a year after management determined that a 2009 pay adjustment was “de minimus,” it offered a 1.09% pay adjustment based on its industry peer comparison. Of course, other pilots received their comparative rates for all of 2010 and we didn’t. We have yet to receive this year’s pay adjustment. When Sandy Sandoval was questioned at a Long Beach road show, he claimed the delay was “a good thing” for the pilots. He also stated that the pay rate adjustment was delayed so our PEAs could include new long term disability language that would address issues in that area. But when the PEA amendment was released, no changes to long term disability were included.
As pilots, we’re acutely aware of issues that affect our careers and our families. We make decisions based on facts and our experience. Reviewing facts and thinking analytically leads to one clear conclusion. That is, management is quick to promise that it “hears us” and promise “that there will be changes.” Our past experience shows those promises end up in the Lost and Found.
Regrettably, our visit to the Lost and Found Department reminds us that’s where most of management’s promises end up. Based on our history we can only conclude that meaningful improvements to the five documents were not imminent. Even if they were, our careful analysis showed how flawed those documents and the PVC approach are.
We’ve concluded that it’s time to stop relying on promises and start taking care of business by negotiating a contract for ourselves. We can’t afford to continue to gamble on our careers, security and our family’s benefits.
Thank you for calling in and please continue to fly safe and adhere to proper sterile cockpit discipline.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vote Yes for ALPA!
