Interesting Colgan transcript tidbits

[FO 4 Life]

To me the most disturbing is this:

22:16:37.1
HOT-2
I put the flaps up.

Anybody know if that's normal shaker recovery for the Q? CVR didn't record Marvin asking for that, just wondering.

 

[HalinTexas]

To me the most disturbing is this:

22:16:37.1
HOT-2
I put the flaps up.

Anybody know if that's normal shaker recovery for the Q? CVR didn't record Marvin asking for that, just wondering.

I noticed that too. Pretty screwed up.

 

[solpilot]

The problem with paying pilots so little is...you get what you pay for. It's a calculated risk the regional airlines are obviously willing to take.

 

[StopNTSing]

Bottom Line: Both pilots were WAY out of their league flying this aircraft. The only question is: Why were they there in the first place? Lot's of changes to come at Colgan Air. This can't happen again. A total lack of experience, maturity, and professionalism in that aircraft that day. Sad to see all the family members affected by this needless crash.

It's not the first, nor will it be the last. Anyone remember the Eagle J32 about fifteen years ago that crashed on approach because the captain thought (erroneously) he lost an engine and became too distracted? The one that spawned the Pilot Records Improvement Act? In hindsight that captain was an accident waiting to happen. This is life at the regionals. The training, schedules, work rules, and management all suck and will never improve even when the spotlight is shown upon them. Congress, with all their righteous indignation, will pass more symbolic legislation that will have absolutely no effect on the problems. The media will trumpet it and then run to chase the next ambulance. And the beat goes on....


P.S. Former regional dude, here.

 

[HA25]

The problem with paying pilots so little is...you get what you pay for. It's a calculated risk the regional airlines are obviously willing to take.

Someone finally said what's probably on the tip of most peoples tongue.

Fact is, while they were hiring 1000 hour girls at Colgan, there were 1000s' of out of work 5000+ hour pilots with all kinds of experience... but would they work for $18/hr? not likely.

 

[V-1]

Someone finally said what's probably on the tip of most peoples tongue.

Fact is, while they were hiring 1000 hour girls at Colgan, there were 1000s' of out of work 5000+ hour pilots with all kinds of experience... but would they work for $18/hr? not likely.

Well said.

 

[CA1900]

No one has mentioned that the SIC was complaining about her ears. Why? Can't you take a sick day at Colgan?

I can't speak for Colgan, but at my last operator (another all-turboprop regional with low pay), it was definitely discouraged. While I was there, they enacted a policy that three sick calls within a specific timeframe was grounds for termination. The director of safety actually compared taking a sick day to stealing from the company! If Colgan's culture is at all similar to that (and I'd bet good money that it is), I understand her reluctance to call in sick.


I still think fatigue played a huge part in this crash--more so than will probably be in the final report. Had the FO been more alert (tough, after commuting in on a red-eye that morning), she might well have caught the slow airspeed before it was too late. Had the captain not built up a sleep debt from repeated stand-up overnights, maybe he'd have caught it, too.


Yeah, they screwed up the end game; that much is obvious. But there were many links in this accident chain we can all learn from. Simply calling it "pilot error" and moving on is a cop-out.

 

[BushwickBill]

I can't speak for Colgan, but at my last operator (another all-turboprop regional with low pay), it was definitely discouraged. While I was there, they enacted a policy that three sick calls within a specific timeframe was grounds for termination. The director of safety actually compared taking a sick day to stealing from the company! If Colgan's culture is at all similar to that (and I'd bet good money that it is), I understand her reluctance to call in sick.


I still think fatigue played a huge part in this crash--more so than will probably be in the final report. Had the FO been more alert (tough, after commuting in on a red-eye that morning), she might well have caught the slow airspeed before it was too late. Had the captain not built up a sleep debt from repeated stand-up overnights, maybe he'd have caught it, too.


Yeah, they screwed up the end game; that much is obvious. But there were many links in this accident chain we can all learn from. Simply calling it "pilot error" and moving on is a cop-out.

Thanks for that and the last few replies as well. I'm not sure what can be done about the problem but a good start is not just blaming overworked and underpaid pilots.

 

[HawkerF/O]

The only thing I can say in defense of what she said

Why am I not surprised that you would have the nerve to sit up here and defend any of this as being OK. 50 passengers died, and you want to sit up here and defend it is being ok. That tells us all we need to know about your character. You go get 'em, 1900 Boy.

 

[dispatchguy]

I still think fatigue played a huge part in this crash--more so than will probably be in the final report. Had the FO been more alert (tough, after commuting in on a red-eye that morning), she might well have caught the slow airspeed before it was too late. Had the captain not built up a sleep debt from repeated stand-up overnights, maybe he'd have caught it, too.

I was at a carrier that even though we did nap trips (I think they need to be illegal), we still required the crew at least (and I am running on memory here from many years back) 5.5 in the hotel on a nap trip.

Does CJC have such a rule - my guess is no.

 

[Thurman Merman]

I can't speak for Colgan, but at my last operator (another all-turboprop regional with low pay), it was definitely discouraged. While I was there, they enacted a policy that three sick calls within a specific timeframe was grounds for termination. The director of safety actually compared taking a sick day to stealing from the company! If Colgan's culture is at all similar to that (and I'd bet good money that it is), I understand her reluctance to call in sick.


I still think fatigue played a huge part in this crash--more so than will probably be in the final report. Had the FO been more alert (tough, after commuting in on a red-eye that morning), she might well have caught the slow airspeed before it was too late. Had the captain not built up a sleep debt from repeated stand-up overnights, maybe he'd have caught it, too.


Yeah, they screwed up the end game; that much is obvious. But there were many links in this accident chain we can all learn from. Simply calling it "pilot error" and moving on is a cop-out.

As a former Colgan Captain, I can say you hit the nail on the head. Sick days were worse than swine flu. Crew Sched sometimes would want a doctors note. If they couldn't cover the trip you were calling in for they would give you a missed trip. While at CJC I can honestly count on one hand how many days I called out sick (5 years of service). It is company culture that will not, in all likelyhood, be addressed by the NTSB.

 

[semperfido]

The crew in this case was simply very weak and should not have been in that cockpit. In way over their heads. A very poor example of professionalism. The facts speak for themselves.

Seems like the bar just keeps getting lower and lower. What next?

 

[SEVEN]

What next?

Big, Big changes at Colgan Air. You can bet on it.

 

[B-J-J Fighter]

Colgan for sure questioned any and all sick calls, I know this firsthand. I was given a hard time there every time I called in sick.

 

[Smacktard]

Why am I not surprised that you would have the nerve to sit up here and defend any of this as being OK. 50 passengers died, and you want to sit up here and defend it is being ok. That tells us all we need to know about your character. You go get 'em, 1900 Boy.

You know nothing about me, you appear to know even less about basic FARs either. What were you saying about character again?

So how many hours of instruction do you have in icing conditions? Snow? How many hours in icing conditions did you have prior to your first paying job? What type of aircraft would you recommend instructors use to take students into known icing conditions? Any FARs you'd like to cover for us that might relate to this issue?

You realize that probably 99.9% of instructors have zero or less than 1 hour of instruction in icing conditions, right? I fall into the 99.9% category, of my 1000 hours instructing, I had exactly zero hours of instruction while in icing conditions.

So again, looking at what she said, where is it so wrong? That's what I'm defending numbnuts. "1900 boy"? What does that have to do with this? Are we comparing planes now? Are you out of high-school? Oh wait, let me qualify myself so that you can feel better, my plane has 2 bathrooms and my seat is up and to the left, is that better?

Oh, and one other edit, my original quote was defending what she was saying about seeing ice for the first time, how you could take that out of context and assume that I was defending the crew's actions is, again, illustrative, of your posting without thinking. Use your brain Hawker boy.