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PCL off the Runway in TVC--no injuries

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6480 looks wrong, ..............................................wow that could have been me.

Hope I never fly on your aircraft then.

Could it happen to this captain again? Most likely not. Going off the end of a runway steepens the learning curve considerably. So it seems to me experience is the factor here. All the warning signs were present to make any prudent pilot consider going to the alternate.
 
Hope I never fly on your aircraft then.

Could it happen to this captain again? Most likely not. Going off the end of a runway steepens the learning curve considerably. So it seems to me experience is the factor here. All the warning signs were present to make any prudent pilot consider going to the alternate.

In fact, an NFPRM has just come out from the FAA saying that a pilot must have at least one over-run before you have the appropriate experience to a be Part 121 pilot. Also, he must have an actual engine fan disintegration (fed sits in the jumpseat with a switch linked to some C-4) , a real cockpit breach, and 3 deadstick night landings in the previous 90 days.
 
In fact, an NFPRM has just come out from the FAA saying that a pilot must have at least one over-run before you have the appropriate experience to a be Part 121 pilot. Also, he must have an actual engine fan disintegration (fed sits in the jumpseat with a switch linked to some C-4) , a real cockpit breach, and 3 deadstick night landings in the previous 90 days.

Factors: Long day, last leg, bad weather, IOE flight, inconsistant braking action reports, short runway, tailwind componant.......

None of these factors jumped out from behind a bush.

This is not a Pinnacle issue it's a risk management issue. Recognize the signs and take the safest course of action. When a bucket gets too full it sinks.
 
Factors: Long day, last leg, bad weather, IOE flight, inconsistant braking action reports, short runway, tailwind componant.......

None of these factors jumped out from behind a bush.

This is not a Pinnacle issue it's a risk management issue. Recognize the signs and take the safest course of action. When a bucket gets too full it sinks.

With that post, I agree. To say the captain was not experienced enough, I don't agree (if that's what you meant in your previous post).
 
BFB..

Excellent post. Hit the nail right on the head.

Always
Motch
 
Update On Ntsb Investigation Into Runway Overrun In Traverse City, Michigan

Washington, DC – The National Transportation Safety Board runway overrun of a Bombardier CRJ-200 regional jet on April 12, 2007, about 12:43 am EDT, in Traverse City, Michigan. Flight 4712, operated by Pinnacle Airlines, overran the runway while landing at Cherry Capital Airport, Traverse City. There were no injuries among the 49 passengers (including 3 lap-held infants) and 3 crewmembers, and the aircraft received substantial damage.
The flight was cleared for an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 28 by Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center. The Traverse City control tower was closed at 10:00 pm per normal operations. Weather was reported as snowing. Automatic weather observation data indicated at 12:30 am, the visibility was one-half mile in snow, with indefinite ceiling and vertical visibility of 200 feet. Snow removal operations were in progress at the airport, and the flight crew communicated directly with airport operations regarding the runway conditions.
After landing, the airplane overran the departure end of runway 28, which is 6,501 feet long, with an additional 200 feet of pavement. Initial examination indicates that the airplane exited the paved surface onto a grassy snow- covered field, the nose gear separated from the fuselage, and the airplane came to rest about 100 feet beyond the pavement. The passengers and crew exited the airplane via the main cabin door.
A go-team was launched from NTSB Headquarters under the direction of Investigator-in-Charge Bill English and specialists in Operations, Human Performance, and Airworthiness.
Recorders Group
Flight data and cockpit voice recorders were recovered from the airplane and read out at the NTSB laboratory in Washington DC. Initial audition of the recorders indicates both were in good condition and include the accident flight. A cockpit voice recorder group was formed and will produce a transcript of the recording.
Operations and Human Performance Group
The Operations and Human Performance Group interviewed the flight crew on April 13. The captain, a company check airman who was piloting the aircraft, had a total time of about 5,600 hours, with 4,390 flight hours in the CRJ-200.
The first officer, who had been hired by Pinnacle in January of 2007, had 2,500 total flight hours, with 15 flight hours in the CRJ-200. Additional interviews of airline personnel involved with the flight and the crew were done on scene or scheduled for the near future. Airport personnel working at the time of the accident, and airport management personnel were also interviewed, and an Airport Operations Group has been formed.
Further work remains in evaluating the recorder data, weather information, airport field conditions and communication, and performance of the airplane. An Aircraft Performance Group will be formed, and specialists in Meteorology and Air Traffic Control are also supporting the investigation. Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration, Pinnacle Airlines, Airline Pilots Association, General Electric Aircraft Engines, and the Northwest Regional Airport Commission. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada has provided an Accredited Representative and technical advisors from Bombardier Aerospace.
-30-
Media Contact: Keith Holloway, (202) 314-6100
[email protected]
 
I noticed you added bold print to certain areas of this news release.


Here's the main part you forgot to highlight:

After landing, the airplane overran the departure end of runway 28, which is 6,501 feet long, with an additional 200 feet of pavement. Initial examination indicates that the airplane exited the paved surface onto a grassy snow- covered field, the nose gear separated from the fuselage, and the airplane came to rest about 100 feet beyond the pavement.
 
You guys that are nailing this guys balls to the wall have some nerve, not even waiting for more info from the NTSB.

I spoke to a United Captain about this in the van last week. Told me a story about a landing in MI he did in a B52. No mechanical problems, braking action reported OK just before he landed (by truck). Went clear off the end of a 11000+ foot runway (if I recall correctly). Investigation found that the deicing agent was applied just before he landed, causing the ice to become WET ice, hence no braking action.

Bad things CAN happen to anyone, no mater how good you are (or think you are)...

Turbo
 
Braking action reports are known to be determined by Bubba.


Bubba gets into a Datsun pick up truck and places his mag lite on the seat... if the mag lite flies forward then braking action good....

Got it?


Good.
 
I noticed you added bold print to certain areas of this news release.


Here's the main part you forgot to highlight:

After landing, the airplane overran the departure end of runway 28, which is 6,501 feet long, with an additional 200 feet of pavement. Initial examination indicates that the airplane exited the paved surface onto a grassy snow- covered field, the nose gear separated from the fuselage, and the airplane came to rest about 100 feet beyond the pavement.

You're an ass. That's all I've got to say about this subject.
 
You're an ass. That's all I've got to say about this subject.
Agreed.

How's the view from the cheap seats, Beagle? Must be nice to sit all cozy in your house throwing stones when you do NOT have all the information.

Tell me, genius: what was the weather report the F/O (PNF) obtained before they began the approach. Ever heard of weather changing from a crosswind to a slight quartering tailwind?

Do you know what the AWOS said at the EXACT time the aircraft touched down?

If you don't have ALL that data, then you're talking out your a*s... which we all knew you were doing anyway.

Putz.
 
Having flown with the captain in question when he was still an F/O and having seen this individual work, I don't have to wait for the NTSB report to understand that bad things can happen to good pilots
 
Having flown with the captain in question when he was still an F/O and having seen this individual work, I don't have to wait for the NTSB report to understand that bad things can happen to good pilots

I hear you DP (Konichiwa)

I still can't believe it. We interviewed together, lived together in MEM, upgraded and became check airman around the same time. We haven't heard 'the rest of the story' so I'll hold off until the NTSB releases its findings.
 
Ditto. All 3 of us (myself, Rook, and the CA involved) were all in initial class together at PCL.

He was intelligent, professional, and VERY open for learning whatever he could. Flying with him later as his CA he was the very same way.

The F/O's I flew with after he became a Check were always a pleasure. He was one of the few checks that wouldn't sign someone off just because they had reached the hourly minimum which, at PCL, was always a pressure.

I got a c-note that says the NTSB exonerates him of any wrong-doing that is being ASSumed on here. If and when he decides to come here to AirTran, I guarantee he'll have at least a dozen internal letter of recs... mine included.
 
Actually, now that you bring it up, I am almost as concerned about XJ than I am about 9E. Xj has lost most of its experienced people and still counting. There are a few still there and I wish them luck, they will have their hands full in the next few years.

Clean house, please!


How can you say XJ has lost MOST of it's experienced people? That's just not true. Have we lost senior people? Yes, we have. Have we lost experienced people? Yup. Have you taken a look at the seniority list that is here? Nope. Dude, the captains that are here have been captains for a damn long time. The FO's that will be upgrading have been sitting FO's for a S*&^pot long time. We have and will continue to have some of the most experienced captains out there to teach the new hire FO's. Are we going to hire low time junior FO's? Yes, unfortunately that's the nature of the beast everywhere right now. But thank goodness we do have the experience here to handle them. The FO's that will be upgrading here have a ton of experience and the new hires won't be upgrading anytime soon.
 
Just like the old saying "it takes a village to raise an idiot" it also takes an industry to have an accident. You guys need to expand your view and look at everyone who played a part in this accident. No pilot says "lets run off the end of the runway". They have to be set up so that when they're handicapped they can't break the chain of errors and stand up as the last line of defense.
 
You're an ass. That's all I've got to say about this subject.


Lear 70, my opinion of this capt is not totally realated to this incident, lets just say it's personal. If you want more info call me. In the end I'm betting the blame will be spread across many fronts. It's unfortunate that the buck always stops with the crew but since that's the case why risk your career for a second rate regional? By the way I'm taking you up on the bet. I know you're good for it.
 
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