SKYWEST AIRLINES INC (D.B.A. Skywest Airlines)
The captain stated that almost immediately upon entering the top of the fog layer they received an ICE caution message. He stated they turned on the wing and engine inlet anti-ice, but the ice accumulation on the windshield wipers was rapid and ice was accumulating on the winglet. The captain stated the approach lights came into sight when they were just above minimums and that he had the runway in sight at approximately 140 feet above the ground. The first officer then disconnected the autopilot and the nose came up slightly. He stated he informed the first officer to keep the nose down and add thrust.
He stated the airspeed was just inside the "bottom of the bucket" and the trend vector was indicating a decrease in airspeed. The captain stated he "again said something about more thrust and keeping the nose down." He stated the airplane continued to move to the right of the centerline and he took control of the airplane. He stated the airplane responded "poorly" feeling "heavy and sluggish." The captain stated the airplane was close to the right side of the runway and he added thrust at which time the ailerons became more responsive. He stated the left wing dropped, scraping the runway, at about the same time the left main gear touched down. The captain stated the airplane bounced into the air then landed hard on the runway.
The first officer, who was flying the approach, had about 15 hours of total flight time in the CL-600. The captain, who was also a check airman, had a total of 1,196 hours of flight time in the CL-600. At the time of the accident the local weather was reported as being visibility 1/4 mile in freezing fog, vertical visibility 100 feet.
Inspection of the airport and airplane on the afternoon following the incident revealed ice was still visible on the antennas, windshield wipers, radome, winglets, and horizontal and vertical stabilizers. The main body of ice on these structures measured between one-half to five-eights of an inch thick and that the main body of ice plus the "ice spines" totaled three-quarters of an inch thick. A Kinematic parameter extraction showed loss of lift consistent with airframe icing but there was no early stall due to icing prior to touchdown and no indication that airframe icing had caused any loss of control. Marks on the ground and on the runway revealed the airplane initially touched down 1,976 feet from the approach end of the runway with the right main landing gear in the grass off the side of the runway. The left wing tip then left a 63-foot long scrape mark on the runway, which was followed about 1,100 feet later by another set of tire marks. Data from the flight data recorder showed the airplane rolled slightly to the left followed by a roll to the right when the autopilot was disengaged. It then showed the airplane touched down with a vertical acceleration of at least 1.8g's. The airplane then became airborne in a 16-degree left bank, with a 5-degree nose up pitch at which time the ground and flight spoilers deployed contributing to the firmness of the 3.25 g touchdown one second later.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident as follows:
The copilot's failure to maintain control of the airplane during the landing and the captain's delay in initiating remedial action. Factors contributing to the accident were the low ceiling and low visibility due to fog, and the aircraft's deviation from expected performance due to airframe icing.
Anyone heard of going missed? It is this procedure where you set go around thrust, ensure spoilers are in, set flaps 8 and climb like your life depended on it. It works real well if either pilot is close to the ground and has to exceed normal bank angles to get the landing gear over a paved surface.
This isn't an icing incident. This is an
inexperience incident. There are many people who are now coming into this job who have never seen any ice, let alone severe icing and who really have no idea how to deal with it. First, an extra 5 or 10 knots (providing you are landing at a long runway) is a good idea. Hand flying the approach so you have a better feel for what the aircraft is doing is a good idea. Having the more experienced (on this case, less inexperienced pilot) fly an approach to minimums in icing conditions is a good idea. Considering another destination is also a good idea.
In almost 6,000 hours I've only seen icing on the severe side of moderate twice. Going slow always makes it worse, particularly in the RJ. My experience is that severe icing is hard to find in the real world and easy to get away from. Like thunderstorms, you learn to recognize the characteristics and take action to avoid the hazardous condition. Waiting 15 minutes can make all the difference.
Now days that longevity and experience are considered a bad thing at SkyWest (at least the ASA division of SkyWest) there are few who have seen any hazardous icing conditions and few Instructor Pilots who know enough about the stuff to teach their students how to deal with it. Only a few of the experienced IP's at my airline
fully understand how important it is to stay on profile, most have never considered how ice is kept off the fan.
The sad fact is that airlines will continue hiring with 200 / 50 and upgrading IP's with only 1,000 hours in the aircraft, while trying to chase away the IP's with almost 20,000 hours total time & and a little uncommon sense. In my opinion this report really highlights the dangers of inexperienced crews out flying together.
In Comair 5191 the experienced guys get on the airplane focused on finding another job. In other incidents we read about inexperience like this nearly leading to a crash. Wouldn't it be nice if this was a profession where pilots flying airline passengers were paid reasonably and their experience appreciated by management?
I'm not criticizing these pilots, they apparently did not know any better. I am asking if this would have happened with a more experienced crew and I think we all know the answer.
